Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1975 )


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  •                                       October   1, 1975
    The Honorable M. L. Brockette                              Opinion   No.   H- 702
    Commissioner    of Education
    Texas Education Agency                                     Re: Authority   of school districts
    201 E. 11th Street                                         to charge fees for certain courses,
    Austin, Texas   78701                                      school supplies and extra-curricular
    activities.
    .
    Dear Commissioner        Brockette:
    You have asked whether       a.school     district   may’impose      any or all of the
    following fees:
    1.   Tuition   for driver education training.
    2. Charges      for school supplies and instruction and
    lab fees in conjunction witlrnorinal       academic,
    vocational or physical education classroom          in-
    struction or training.
    3.   Fees for extra curricular      activities,   such as
    band uniforms,     athletic lockers and towels,
    and club membership.
    The Legislature   is directed by article 7, section 1 of the Texas Constitution
    to establish  “an efficient system of public free schools.    “The Supreme Court has
    held that the Legislature     alone is authorized to interpret and implement this con-
    stitutional provision:
    Since the Legislature      has the mandatory duty
    to make suitable provision         for the support Andy
    maintenance     of an efficient system of public free
    schools,   and has the power to pass any law re-
    lative thereto,    it necessarily    follows that it has
    ~a choice in the selection of methods by which the
    object of the organic law may be effectuated.            The
    Legislature   alone is.to judge what means are
    necessary    and appropriate      for a purpose which the
    Constitution makes legitimate.           The legislative
    determination     of the methods,      restrictions,   and
    regi.dations is final, except when so arbitrary as
    to be violative of the constitutional        rights of the
    citizen.   Mumme V. Mans,            40 S. W.id 31, 36
    (Tex. Sup. 1931).
    p. 3037
    The Honorable    M.   L.   Brockette   - Page 2 (H-702)
    The Legislature   has not seen fit to authorize any of the charges about
    which you inquire in the Education Code or any other statute.          By contrast,
    certain other charges are specifically     mentioned in the Education Code.         We
    note, for example that section 16. 864 of the Education Code authorizes          a district
    to impose tuition for the fourth quarter,      section 21.063 permits a district to
    assess a tuition fee for transfer    students,   section 26. 66 provides for tuition and
    fees for rehabilitation   students and section 21.03 authorizes      the imposition of
    tuition and fees for vocational training.      The Legislature   not having authorized
    charges in the area of your inquiries,     and having specifically    permitted charges
    in other areas,    would argue for the conclusion that, the Legislature     did not intend
    to authorize charges for those activities about which you inquire.         State V. Richards,
    301 S. W. 2d 597,60O(Tex.     Sup. 1957); Federal Crude Oil Co. v. Yount-Lee         Oil C 0.8
    
    52 S.W.2d 56
    , 60 (Tex. Sup. 1932).
    In a decision rendered by then Commissioner         of Education J. W. Edgar on
    April 4, 1966, it was held that the assessment      by a school district of supply,
    towel and locker fees~~artd the ,i?nforcem’eht thereof.bythe    ‘withhold$ng:of a’:studeht’s
    report card constitute “compulsory      fee assessments     unauthorized by law. ”
    Commissioner     Edgar stated in his decision that
    [ i] n the absence of specific authority
    expressly    granted, constitutional      or
    otherwise,     empowering, a school district
    to assess    or impose and collect the defined
    ‘supply fee, ’ made intentionally       compulsory
    ~.by the simple expedient of withholding report
    cards and/or transcript        until paid, it would
    be and is my, best judgment and opinion that
    the imposition and collection        of same is
    without legal support and contravenes          the
    spirit and intendment of the school laws con-
    sidered in para materia . . . . Article VII,
    Section I, Constitution of Texas,         has vested
    itithe Legislature      the responsibility    to make
    suitable provision     ,for the support and main-
    tenance of an efficient system of public free
    schools.     As I see it, this Constitutional      man-
    date militates    against the school district assess-
    ing such unauthorized fee, thereby to protect a
    child or his family,      indigent or otherwise,      from
    the experience     of harassment      or humiliation that
    can evolve from such impositions           and forced
    collection thereof.
    p. 3038
    The Honorable     M.    L.   Brockette   - Page     3 (H-702)
    The courts have held that the construction   placed upon,a~statute by the agency
    charged with its administration,   while not binding, is entitled to substantial
    weight.  Calvert v. Kadane, 
    427 S.W.2d 605
    , 608 (Te~x. Sup: 1968); Armco
    Steel Corp.’ v. Texas Employment      Comm’n. J 386 S. W~i 2d’894,  896Civ.
    App; --Austin’1965   writ ref’d, n. r. e. ).
    On the basis of the 1966 decision rendered by the Commissioner       of
    Education and the Supreme Court’s language in Mumme U. ,Marrs,          s,      and
    in the absehce of any specific legislative sanction, it :is our, opinion that a school
    distkict does not have the authority to impose any of the charges about which you
    inquire.
    For purposes of this opinion, it is not necessary           to determine what kind of
    fees,   if any, the Legislature     might authorize under article 7, section 1 of the
    .-Texas Constitution:      We n.ote;~h owever,    that there is a significant difference    of
    .‘: opinion’aniotig the appellate courts of ‘othe’r’%tates as. to,what is requiied’by          a
    constitutional   provision   establishing a system of “free public“schools.         ” See
    Vandevender     v.’ CaBsell,’ 
    208 S.E.2d 436
    (W. Va. 1974); Board’of Education.
    Sinclair,    
    222 N.W.2d 143
    (Wis. 1974); Granger V. Cascade County School
    District    No. 1, 499~P. 2d 780 (Mont..,l972);      Hamer v. board of Education of
    School District No. ,-109;‘~ 
    265 N.E. 2
    ’d-616 ‘(Ill,.‘.l971);‘Bond   v. Board of Public
    Schools of Ann Arbor School District, ‘178 N. W. 2d’484.(Mich.             1970); Paulson v.
    ySchdolDistrictNo.31,
    Minidoka Count                                    
    463 P. 2d
    ~935 (Idaho 1970); Chandler v.
    South Bend Community School G p               312 N: E. 2d 915(Ind.App.        1974); Hamer v.
    Board of Educatibn of School Di%z;         No. 109, 
    292 N.E.2d 569
    (Ill. Appm
    SUMMARY
    In the absence of specific legislative     sanction,
    a ,.school district does not have the.‘authority to
    impose tuition for driver education training; charges
    .for school supplies and instruction’and        lab fees in
    conjunction with normal academic,          vocational or
    physical education classroom       instruction or training;
    or fees for extra-curricular      activities I such as band
    uniforms,     athletic locker’s and towels,    and club mem-
    bership.
    /Yerv      truly vouis,~
    Attorney     General     of Texas
    p. 3039
    The Honorable   M.   L.   Brockette   - Page 4 (H-702)
    *ROVED:
    Opinion Committee
    jad:
    p. 3040