Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1973 )

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GENERAL
ACRTIS. TEXAS 76711
September 12, 1973
The Honorable Russell Cummings Opinion No. H- 98
Executive Director
Texas Mass Transportation Commission Re: Interpretation of $ 3(e)
1013 San Jacinto of~senate Bill 642, 63rd
Austin, Texas 78701 Legislature, as to whether
governing body of a piin-
cipal city or the Rapid
Transit Authority is to
Dear Mr. Cummings: submit plan for review
Your letter requesting our opinion is directed to a ‘question concern-
ing the procedure for the creation of a Rapid Transit Authority pursuant
to Senate Bill 642 of the 63rd Legislature (Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., ch. 141,
p. 302). This statute will be codified as Article 1118x, Vernon’s Texas
Civil Statutes. Generally it authorizes the creation and organization in
metropolitan areas of rapid transit authorities. Their creation is governed
by § 3 which requires the governing body of a metropolitan area, either on
its own motion or upon being presented with a petition signed by not less
than 5,000 qualified voters, to institute proceedings to create such an
authority. The first step required is the adoption of an ordinance or reso-
lution fixing a time and place for a public hearing on the proposal. [F 3(a)]
Subsection (b) of § 3 requires that notice of such hearing be published.
Subsection (c) relates to the conduct of the hearing. Subsection (d) provides
that if, after such hearing, the governing body of the principal city finds that
the creation of the system would be of benefit&c., it shall adopt an ordinance
creating the authority and prescribing its boundaries.
Finally, Subsection (e) provides:
“After such hearing by the governing body of
such authority, the said authority shall submit the
proposed plan to the governor’s interagency trans-
portation council for their review and comment. ”
(emphasis added)
p. 447
The Honorable Russell Cummings, page 2 (H-98)
Your question to us is:
ISince the ‘governing body of such authority’
has not held any ‘such hearing, ’ is it the intent of
this subsection to direct the governing body of the
principal city rather than the governing body of
authority to submit the plan to the Governor’s
Interagency Council for review and comment? ”
In construing the statutes it is always our purpose to so construe them
as to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. State v. Jackson, 376 S.W.2d
341 (Tex. 1964); Calvert v. British-American Oil Producing Co., 397 S.W.2d
839 (Tex. 1966).
Normally, unambiguous language will be interpreted literally. However,
as it is stated in 53 Tex. Jur. 2d. Statutes, $140, p. 203, with ample support
in the authorities:
“It is not the function of the judiciary to correct
legislative errors, mistakes, or omissions. If the
language of a statute is plain, a court will not eliminate
or supply a word or clause on the supposition that it was
included or omitted by inadvertence. But obvious errors
or mistakes of a clerical, grammatical, or typographical
nature may be disregarded. . . .” (emphasis added)
To that extent, where necessary, courts may add or delete language.
Sweeny Hospital District v. Carr, 378 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1964); State v.
Shoppers World Inc., 380 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1964).
As we read Subsection (e) of S 3 it is clear that the Legislature intended
that it read:
“After such hearing by the governing body of
such principal city, the principal city shall submit
the proposed plan to the governor’s interagency
transportation council for their review and comment. ”
p. 448
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The Honorable Russell Cummings, page 3 (H-98)
Any other construction would be meaningless in view of the fact
that at the time to which reference is made, i.e., “After such hearing, ”
the “proposed plan” is the plan of the principal city to create an autho-
rity. The authority, if it is even in existence at that time, will have
no plan. The purpose of the notice is to secure the assistance of the
council in organizing the authority and formulating its plan. We should
not adopt a construction of a statute which would result in an absurdity.
State Highway Department v. Gorham, 162 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. 1942);
Dovalina v. Albert, 409 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Civ. App., Amarillo, 1966,
err. ref., n. r. e.)
Further, as we substitute “principal city” for “authority” in one
place in the subsection, it is our opinion that “said authority” elsewhere
in the subsection should likewise refer to the same governmental body,
i. e., the city.
We therefore answer your question that the notice to be given to
the Governor’s Interagency Council should come from the governing body
of the principal city.
SUMMARY
Section 3(e) of Senate Bill 642, 63rd Legislature,
.should be read to require that notice of a proposed plan
for a Rapid Transit Authority shall be furnished to the
Governor’s Interagency Transportation Council by the
governing body of the principal city rather than by the
governing body of the authority.
Very truly yours,
Attorney General of Texas
p. 449
The Honorable Russell Cummings, page 4 (H-98)
APPROPED:
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DhfiD M. KENDALL, Choirman
Opinion Committee
p. 450