Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1973 )


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  •                           March13. 1973
    Honorable Charles F.,Herring, Chairman
    Senator JurisprudenceCommittee
    Senate of the State of Texas
    Austin, Texas
    Opinion B-18
    Re: Constitutionalityof House
    Dear Senator   Herring:             Bill 2
    Your letter of February 22, 1973 requested our opinion as
    to the constitutionalityof H.B.2, called the Lobby Control
    Act, particularlywith respect to the rights of petition and
    free speech.
    Basically, X.D.2 provides in Sections 3 through 5 for reg-
    istration of those engaged in efforts to influence legislation
    or administrativeaction; for activities reports  by those re-
    quired to register, and for a State Ethics Commission to inves-
    tigate violations of the act, render advisory opisions, and to
    advise other State officess of violation.
    Although the Legislature undoubtedly has the right to so
    provide for the registrationof those engaged in efforts to di-
    rectly influence legislativeor executive action, and to require
    such registrants to furnish relevant information,the classifica-
    tions of persons covered and of the information sought must be
    reasonable, so as not to improperly infringe upon Fzrst Amend-
    ment rights. and must not be so vague as to violate the concept
    of due process. The path to be taken, and much of the ground
    to be avoided, was shown by the Supreme Court of the United
    States in United States v.-Harriss;     
    347 U.S. 812
    , 
    98 L. Ed. 989
    ,
    
    74 S. Ct. 800
                           ttiePedexd i@ulation   of Lobby-
    The legislationlpprwed in Harris8 was oonstrued by the
    Court  to cover those who solioit,nt,          or receive money or
    other  things of value to directly influence legislation,or who
    engage agents to do so. In our opinion, the regulatory      scheme
    of H.B.2, requiring  registration    also of those who a end money
    or other things of value to directly influence legis     at ve or
    -;pr
    administrativeaction, is equally pennissable. In selecting mon-
    etary parameters for such regulations, the Legislature is in-
    vested with brosd discretion so long as the selection is rea-
    sonable.
    p. 85
    Honorable Charles F. Herring, Page 2 (H-18)
    We further are of the view that the Legislaturemay
    reasonably classify the persons to be covered in terms of
    amounts of money or other things of value solicited, ool-
    lected, received or spent by themselves or by their paid
    or reimbursed agents to directly influence legislativeor
    executive action. We do not believe, however, that it is
    constitutionallypermissible to attempt regulation of grass
    roots lobbying activities or campaigns of public persuasion
    which do not in themselves amount to direct governmental
    contacts. Awakening public concern about an issue is gener-
    ically different from personally attempting to directly af-
    fect governmental action.
    Applying the above discussed general principles to the
    legislationat hand, we conclude that Ii.B.2is oonstitutional
    in many of its aspects, but not all.
    Persons Covered
    In the context of this Bill and its purpose, the forced
    registration  of those who make expenditures "to solicit other
    persons  by an advertisingaampaign to ooamanicate directly
    with members of the legislativeor executive branch to in-
    fluence legislationor administrativeaction" goes too far,
    we think, and amounts to an improper burden on free speech.
    We do not believe the Courts would find a compelling state
    interest in the regulation of such activities. Cf. U.S. v.
    Bsrrims, supra; U.S. v. Rumely, 
    345 U.S. 41
    , 97 L.Ed.73
    ti43       (19'53)rEastern Railroad Conference v. Noerr Motor
    Prei ht, 
    365 U.S. 121
    5 L Ed Zd 464 81 S Cf 523 (1961)
    flimk. Button, 371 6.S. il5; 9 L.Ed: 2d 4;5,'83 S.Ct. 32;
    NAACP v. Patty 
    159 F. Supp. 503
    (E.D. Va., 19581,
    vaaatd on ocher groun&s, sub nom, Harrison V. NMCT, 
    360 U.S. 167
    , 
    3 L. Ed. 2d 1152
    , 79 S.Ct.2025 (1959).
    We cannot say that excmpptingfrom registrationrequire-
    ments those who expend less than $150.00 per quarter, or any
    other reasonable figure, to influence legislation is unconsti-
    tutionally discriminatory,because the purpose of the Bill is
    to identify substantial interests which directly seek to influ-
    ence legislativeor administrativeaction. In the political
    world, there is a readily ascertainedcorrelation  between
    the value of interests to be protected snd the amounts of
    swney ordinarily 8pubt ia attempting to protact them. Such
    legislativedimtinotioas follow a pattern 8et by the Federal
    Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. SS431, 432, et seq., and the
    Texas Campaign Enpenditur8 Law, Article 14.04, Texa8 Election
    Cod..
    p. 86
    ?   .
    Ronorable Charles P. Herring, Page 3 (H-18)
    There are other coverage problems. We believe the exemp-
    tion of legielative and executive officers 8nd employees from
    the class of salaried persons required to register, without
    exempting those attached to the judicial branch, places a bur-
    den upon the judiciarywhich amounts to an encroachmentupon
    the constitutionalprerogativesof that branch, and cannot be
    sustained. Article 2, 91, Texas Constitution:State Board of
    Insurance v. Bett8, 
    308 S.W.2d 846
    (Tex. 1958).
    Cartain other exemption8 allowed by Section 4 make dis-
    oriminationsbased upon the identity of the actor rather than
    upon the character of the act. Certain news people, .lawyers
    and cleric8 are not required to register, though others en-
    gaged in 888entially identical actioitie8 must. Such cla8-
    sifioationsappear unreasonable in the context of.the Bill's
    purpo8e, and for that reason, 8eem to violate the Equal Pro-
    tection Clau8e of the Fourteenth Amendm8nt to the Federal
    Constitution,Reed v. Reed, 
    404 U.S. 71
    , 30 L.Rd.?d 225, 
    92 S. Ct. 251
    (1971)s Cf. AttOln8y Generai Opinion R-15 (1973).
    Vagueness
    Vagueness in a statute is oftsm a fatal vice, and while
    the courts have &xaet&nea..toleratedlea8 praoise language in
    lobby regulatory legi8lation than they might otherwise do (Cf.
    U.S. v. 
    Harri88, supra
    ), there are still limits which must be
    observed. Texas Liquor Control Board v. Attic Club, 
    457 S.W. 2d
    41 (Tex.-I910).
    InClUded in the definition Of nP 8r 8On*
    88tout in Section
    2 of the Bill, in addition to individual8, Corporations, aeso-
    oiations, firms, partnership8, committaes, clubs, or other
    organizations,is the further designation, "Or group of persons”.
    The designation is not limited to those persons voluntarily
    acting in concert, or otherwise intentionallylending their
    presence to an identifiable combination, and it is difficult
    to determine whom the Bill intend8 to subject to it13provision8
    by that designation.
    Scme of the disclosures required by the %ctivity Report"
    that  registrantsmust periodically file appear overly broad and
    perhaps impomible of performance.       The identifioationof
    "other regi8trant8 ” reoeiving benefits    from the registrant, for
    in8t8ne8, 18 not tid in any way to expenditures or effort6
    intended  to directly influmce legislative or administrative
    action. Th8 requimmnt that measuree.privatelysupported
    b8 revealed, as we&l 88 those supported through direct govern-
    mental oontaat,  is too broad. Nor can.8n unrelatd regis-
    p. 87
    Honorable Charler,P. fluxing, Page 4 (Ii-18)
    trant be made criminally re8ponsible for reporting  the activ-
    itiee_-of_otherrr! And, certainly the regietrant cannot rea-
    8onaBly be t8gulred to report expenditure8by others (even it8
    employees) unlese they wue made on its behalf and with its
    express or implied  oonsent, or which it ratif:ad.
    PeIlalti88
    The p8nalty prwisio~ of the Bill require attention.
    Insofar ss lper8oM* ar8 legal entitie8, w8 be&me        the Leg-
    islature say comand that they be convicted of crimes com-
    mitted in that capacity, as8uming the proper procedural
    machinery i8 made available. Cf. Ralph WilIiams Gulfgate
    Chrmler Plymouth Inc. v. State, 466 8 W 26 639 (Tex. Civ. App.,
    IIouston-14th 19/l, writ ref.,   n.r.e.1$*&orate    Criminal Lia-
    24 S.W. L.J. 93 (1970JtCorporate Criminal L.abllity
    , 47 T.L.R. 60 (1968)7 Attorney General Gpinfom
    k-969)          and V-491 (1948). In Attorney General.Opinion
    M-348 (1969) it was concluded that though aorporationemight
    be convicted of crimes, partierships and associationscould
    not be 80 convicted. That opinion overlooJcedthe "entity.
    character of partner8hips in Texas today [See Texa8 Uniform
    PartnershiuAct, Art. 6132b. V.T.C.S..     and 8uah ca8es as
    U.S. V. A i $ Tkoking Co.,-358 U;S. i21, 3 L.Bd.2d 165,
    758S.Ct. 203 (1958)) Our reexamination lead8 to 8 diff8rent
    wnclu8ion.      We be&v8   partnership8 can be mad8 liable for
    oriminal conduct.
    But the Bill does not presently provide the necessary pro-
    CedtUal d8ViCe8. Cf. Article 698c, Section8 8-13, and Article
    6986, 88CtiOn8 7-12, V.T.P.C. Moreover, limiting the nwn-
    etary penalty for filing false informationto $l,OOO.OO for
    individualviolator8, and authorizing  a fine of $lO,OOO.OO
    against,corporateoffenders, but providing no penalty for
    guilty non-corporateentities is, we believe, violative of
    the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
    the Conlrtitutionof the United States.
    Ethics Comnission
    Lastly, the Bill'8 provi8ions setting up a State Ethic8
    Ccemission are for all practical purposes identical with those
    di8ous8ed in AttOXiI8y Gen8ral Opinion B-15 WnCerning H.B. 1,
    tha athi   Bill, and we refer you there for our commentary on
    tho8e pasiages.
    Xonor8bl8 Charles P. Herring, Page 5 (H-U))
    SUMMARY
    The Legislaturemay require registra-
    tion by those who 8pend money or other things
    of value to directly influence legislativeor
    adminirtrativeaotion (and by the agent8
    thereof) and may reaclonsblyadopt regiatra-
    tion Wquirements ba8cd on amount8 80 spsnt.
    The forced regirrtrationof tbo8e who
    merely make exp8nditure8 to SOliCit others
    adVerti8ing o8mpaign8, etc., to aommioate
    3 reotly with member8 of the 8xecutive    or leg-
    i8lative brenohes impsnhiesiblyburden8 the
    right of fre8'8p8Wh im the centut      sd the
    propoeed legislation.
    The omission of judicial personnel from
    those governmentaloffioers  and employee8
    ex~pt8d tram registration r8quir8ment8 when
    lotiw officially is impermirsibl8.
    Arbitrsry discriminationsamong persons
    8itilUly  8itU8tad and engaged in 888entially
    identical.activitie8are constitutionally
    prohibitcrd.
    Vagu8 definition8 and reporting require-
    ments should b8 Wrr8cted to avoid overbreadth.
    Criminal penalties must not be imposed on
    an arbitrarily 8eleotive basis and a special
    procedural baa18 must be establi8hed ta effect
    the conviction of legal entities other than
    natural pamona.
    Very tray
    .
    Y-8,
    C&nor81 of Texas
    p. 89
    Honorable Charles F. Herring,   Page 6 (H-18)
    APPROVED:
    rl
    p. 90