Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1960 )

THEA ORNEY GENERAL
OF-XAS
AUSTIN ~.TEXAS
December 20, 1360
Honorable Jack Varner Opinion i;o.W-971,
Co,untyAttorney
Nacogdoches County Re: Must a dismissed employee of
Nacogdoches, Texas an independent school district
with less than 500 scholastics
appeal directly to the State
Commissioner of Education or
must such employee appeal first
to the County School Superinten-
dent, then the County Board of
Dear Mr. Varner: School Trustees?
You recently req,uestedthe opinion of this department on
the subject question. In your letter you quoted Section 1,
Article 2654-7, Vernon's Civil Statutes, which reads as follows:
"Parties having any matter of dispute among them
arising under provisions of the school laws of Texas,
or any person or parties aggrieved by the actions or
decisions of any Board of Trustees or Board of Educa-
tion, may appeal in wr?tSng to the Commissioner of Ed-
ucation who, after dunenotice to the parties interested,
shall examine in a hearing and render a judgment with-,
o,utcost to the parties involved. However, nothing
contained in ;his Section shall deprive any party of a
legal remedy.
Yo,ualso quoted Article 2656, Vernon's Civil Statutes, which
reads in part as follows:
"The State Superintendent shall be charged with
the administration of the school laws and a general
superintendency of the business relating to the pub-
lic schools of the State, and he shall have printed
for general distribution such number of copies of
school laws as the State Board of Education may deter-
mine. He shall hear and determine all appeals from
the rulings and decisions of subordinate school officers,
and all such officers and teachers shall conform to his
decisions. Appeal shall always be from his rulings to
the State Board. . . .'
Additionally, you quoted Arti.cle2686, Vernon's Civ?~lSta-
tutes, which reads in part as follows:
Honorable Jack Varner, Page 2 (W-975)
"All appeals from the Co,untySuperintendent
of Public Instruction shall lie to the County
Board of Trustees, and should either party de-
cide to further appeal such matters, they are
here given the right to elect to appeal to any
court having proper jurisdiction of the s,ubject
matter; or to the State Superintendent of Public
Instruction as now provided by law, . . .'
Article 2690, Vernon's Civil Statutes, reads in part
as follows:
,t. . . In such independent school districts
as have less than five hundred scholastic popu-
lation, the reports of the principals and trea-
surers to the State Department of Education shall
be approved by the co,untysuperintendent before
they are forwarded to the State Superintendent.
All appeals in s,uchindependent school districts
shall lie to the county superintendent, and from
the decisions of the county superintendent to the
State Superintendent, and thence to the State
Board of Education."
We notice that Articles 2654-7, Section 1, 2656 and
2686, Vernon's Civil Statutes, do not deal specifically
with the subject question. However, Article 2690 does, in
ject question. A reading of
specific terms, answer the s,ub
Article 2690 clearly reflects that all appeals in an lnde-
pendent school district having less than five hundred
scholastics shall go to the county superintendent, then to
the State Superintendent (now the State Commissioner of Edu-
cation) and then to the State Board of Education.
A familiar and established rule of statutory construc-
tion is that a general provision is limited by a specific
provision when such provisions are in conflict and when they
are in pari materia. In State ex rel Peden v. Valentine,
198 S.W. 1006 (Civ. App., October 1917, writ ref.) where
the co,urtwas concerned with two provisions of theaTexas Con-
stltution which were in confli,ct,the Court stated 2s follows:
. It is a well-settled rule
I,
. . in the con-
struction of constitutional law that a general
provision sufficiently comprehensive to include
a given subject-matter will be controlled by an-
other provision specif+,callyrelating to the same
subject-matter. . . .
. -.
Honorable Jack Varner, Page 3 (ww-975)
In Perez v. Perez, 59 Tex. 322, the rule is stated thusly:
II
. . . The general rule is that when the law
makes a 'generalprovision, apparently for all cases,
and a special provision for a particular class, the
general must yield to the special clause, so far as
the particular class is concerned. . . .'
Article 2690, Vernon's Civil Statutes, is the only statute
we have found that specifically deals with appeals from indepen-
dent school districts with a scholastic population of less than
five hundred. Articles 2654-7, Section 1, 2656 and 2686, all
deal, in general terms, with appeals of rulings or decisions of
certain school officials and are therefore in oari materia with
Article 2690. In view of the rule of statutory construction as
set out in Peden v. Valentine and Perez v. Perez, both supra,
it is our opinion that Article 2690 controls the subject question.
SUMMARY
If a dismissed employee of an independent
school district with a scholastic popula-
tion of less than five hundred desires to
appeal from such dismissal, he should ap-
peal to the county superintendent and then
to the State Commissioner of Education, and
then to the State Board of Education.
Yours very tr,uly,
WILL WILSON
Attornev General of Texas
Joe B. McMaster
JBM:mm/hmc Assistant
APPROVED:
OPINION COMMITTEE
W. V. Geppert, Chairman
Robert L. Armstrong
W. Ray Scruggs
Elmer McVey
REVIEWED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: Leonard Passmore