Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1940 )


Menu:
  • Mr. H. D. Dodgen      Opinion No. O-2864
    Chief Clerk           Re : Liability of Game, Fish & Oyster
    Game, Fish & Oyster   Commlssion to Water Improvement District
    Commission           for "flat rate water service charge,"
    Austin, Texas         for customary charge for water used, and
    for sinking fund taxes.
    Dear Sir:
    This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of Octo-
    ber 26 1940, wherein you request the opinion of this department
    as to 8ertain matters therein set out. We quote your letter as
    follows:
    "The State of Texas owns 40.57 acres of land lying
    within the boundaries of the Bexar-Medina-Atascosa Counties
    Water Improvement District No. 1. There has been built on
    this land a fish hatchery which is now in operation. The
    hatchery is being supplied with water from an irrigation
    canal operated by the above water improvement district.
    "We respectfully request your opinion on the following
    questions:
    "1. Should the Game, Fish and Oyster Commission be
    required to pay the flat rate water service charge custom-
    arily assessed against owners of land lying within this
    district?
    "2. Is the Game, Fish and Oyster Commission required
    to pay the customary charges for water used, such charge
    being in addition to the flat rate charge?
    "3 . Is the Game, Fish and Oyster Commission required
    to pay sinking fund taxes assessed by the Water Improvement
    District?
    "4. Does the Bexar-Medina-Atascosa Counties Water
    Improvement District No. 1 have authority to furnish water
    without charge to the State Fish Hatchery located within
    that district?
    29
    Mr. H. D. Dodges, Pago 2
    ‘3.  fs the CIaw, Fish and Oyster Commis-
    sion roqulrod to pay sinking fund taxes assessed
    by the Water Inprovewnt Di8triOtT
    '4. Does the Bexar-&dine-Ataesosa Countlos
    Water ImprovemaatDlstriOt Ilo.1 hare authority
    to furnish water without sharge to the Stats
    Fish Iiatohery looated withln that dfmtrlot?
    Tour attention is oaUed to t.b lxlstenoe
    of sn agreewnt the orlglnal copy OS whloh is
    belieredto be In tb file of the'AttorneyGen-
    eral's Offloe, relative to the supply of water
    to be furnished the State Fish Batolmry located
    within the boundaries of the Bexar-Medina-Atasoosa
    Countiss Water Iaprorewnt Dirtriot lo. l.*
    We shall dlsouss the agrsement referred   to In   mother
    portion of this opinion.
    Under our 86atutes when a water oontrul and improve-
    ment dietriot is organlead,  it is rspuired  to set up two funds.
    Ona of those, prorlded  for in Article 9115, R. C. 3.. 1925, 18
    the wlntcrest alld sinking fund,” and the other ,
    denozninated~
    authorized b;l Article 7714, 8. C. S., 1925, is the %aintenanoe
    and operating rund."
    Artiolm 9712, B. c. S., 1925, empowere the direotors
    to levy a tax upon all propsrty within tha distriot suffiolent
    to pay the lntsrest on its bonds and to provide a slnklng fund
    to pay off the bonds at maturity. The dlreotors of tlm Dls-
    trlct under   Artlols 1113 are required to plaoe in tha first
    fund above menttoqed money reallsod iron taxes.'
    Moneys ior ths wlntenanoe  and operating fund are
    derived rrom two typss or oharges ror water servioe. The
    direotors OS the Distrlst wider the provisions of Artiole
    7152, R..U. ,S.,1925, are require4 to estimate the operating
    and Oaintenanoeexpense at tb    beginning of eaoh year, A’
    portion ot the neoessarg fund is then to be raised by assess-
    aents against all lrrlgablr lsnds within the dirrtriot; pro
    rata per aore, and the remainder is to k paid by porsonc
    taking water.
    We assume that what loa refer ta as tlm “flat rate
    water oharge* is the pro rata assesswnt levied against -Oh
    Mr. H. D. Dodgen, page 3   (O-2864)
    the State government in the absence of provisions of theconsti-
    tution or statutes specifically granti ng them relief thereform.
    The exemption from taxation may not be construed to relieve them
    of such other burdens. See 40 Tex.Jur. 109 and authorities
    cited.
    We doubt that It could   be seriously contended that the
    customary charge for water used,   even remotely approaches any
    of the accepted definitions of a   **tax." This charge is nothing
    more than a fee for a service to   be paid only by those making
    use of such service.
    There might have been some doubt as to whether the as-
    sessments or "flat rate water charge" Is a lltax,"had not our
    Appellate Courts already foreclosed the question. This assess-
    ment is levied against all irrigable lands within the District
    without regard to whether the owners of such lands avail them-
    selves of the water service or not.
    However, the statute authorizing this charge scrupu-
    lously refrains from designating this charge as a 14taxwand, as
    stated, our Courts, in the few instances when the,question was
    before them, have pointed out that this assessment is not a tax."
    In Brady vs. Hidalgo County Water Control and Improve-
    ment District (Civ.App., San Antonio, 1932) 36 S.W.(2d) 298;
    affirmed by the Commission of Appeals in 91 S.W. (2d) 1058, the
    court used the following language:
    "The district cannot levy taxes except to provide
    interest upon its bonds and sinking fund for the retire-
    ment of its bonds. Its operating expenses, after construc-
    tion expenses, must come from water rentals and service
    charpes."
    In Western Metal Manufacturing Company of Texas vs.
    Cameron County Water Improvement District (Civ.App. Fort Worth,
    1927) 105 S.W.(2d) 700, error dismissed, the'court makes the
    following observation:
    "The prayer in plaintiff's petition asking for a man-
    damus to require the assessment and collection of fees,
    against land in the district for the purpose of raising
    funds to pay the current maintenance and operating expense
    of the district was fully justified, if recovery should be
    had by it. We have shown that by the provisions of arti-
    cle 7752, it is the duty of the directors to estimate the
    current expense for the year and to collect it from the
    land owners in the district in the manner and proportions
    therein set out. .*** It will be noted, however, that the
    .      -
    ,--               Mr. H. D. Dodgen, page 4   (O-2664)
    prayer in the petition asks for the writ of mandamus to
    require the collection of .‘taxes’as well as assessments
    against the property in the district to raise revenues
    for the purpose of paying plaintiff’s debt. If the writ
    is granted it should not require the collection of ‘taxes’
    .for the purpose mentioned, since taxes can only be cr
    lected to cay interest and to create a sinking fund to re-
    tire the bonds when due.”
    The following language from.Texas Jurisprudence also
    adheres to this distinction:
    “While taxation is the source of the funds used for
    the payment of interest on the district’s bonded indebted-
    ness and the accumulation of a sinking fund, expenses of
    maintaining and operating the water system cannot be met in
    this way. Such expenses mustbe paid, in the case of water
    improvement districts at least, from a fund known as the
    ‘maintenance and operating fund, I which is created by levy-
    ing pro rata assessments against all irrigable lands within
    the districtand by making charges for all waters delivered
    ,‘-             to water users.” 44 Tex.Jur. 295.
    .(,
    /j,
    Another opinion by the Commission of Appeals declared:
    “The only provision in the chapter expressly authoriz-
    ing a tax for any purpose is to be found in Article 5107-
    69 (now Art. 7712)” Creager et al v. Hidalgo County Water
    Improvement Dist. No. 4. 
    283 S.W. 157
    .
    It becomes apparent, therefore, that the answers to
    your first and second questions are that the Commission is re-
    quired to pay both the “flat rate water service charge” assessed
    against all irrigable land in the district and the customary
    charge for water used-unless the District has by the contract
    mentioned above relieved the Commission of the burden of these
    charges.
    The agreement to which you have directed our attention
    recites that the Commission agreed to locate a fish hatchery
    within the boundaries of the Bexar-Medina-Atascosa Counties
    Water Improvement District No. 1 and that the directors of the
    District agreed to furnish the land and water necessary for so
    long as the property was used for a hatchery. By a resolution
    of the Board of Directors of the District,,which was incorpor-
    ated into the agreement, the District agreed to furnish water
    to the Commission “without charge.”
    :-~
    Two possible constructions of the language “without
    charge” occur to us--that neither the “flat rate” nor the
    . -_
    hr. H. D. Dodgen, page 5   (o-2864)
    "customary service charge" would be paid or that the Commission
    would be relieved only of payment of the "customary service
    charge." The District has apparently adopted the latter con-
    struction, while the Commission has adopted the former.
    We have no way of knowing which construction those who
    made the agreement intended or whether the meaning of this
    phrase was even discussed. However, at all events, it appears
    to be undisputed that the parties intended to relieve the Com-
    mission at least of the burden of paying the customary service
    charges based upon the amount cf,water used. In the absence of
    more ,evidencewe feel constrained'to.ado~pt.thatconstruction.
    Under such a construction, the answer to your first
    question is Iryes",while the answer to your second question is
    and you are so advised. The obvious answer to your third
    rlnolV,
    question, under the pertinent authorities cited above is "no."
    Your fourth question concerns the authority of the
    directors of the D1stric.tto donate water service to theCommis-
    sion. We find nothing in the statutes which msy be construed
    as authorizing the directors to dispose of water service other-
    wise than by.sale. Sound public policy would mi.litateagainst
    a presumption of such authority. See Jones v. Wi.lliams,121
    Tex. 94, 45 S.W. (2d) 130 
    79 A.L.R. 983
    ; Llano County v.
    Knowles, et al, (Civ.App.$ 
    29 S.W. 549
    ; and Dreeben vs. White-
    hurst (Comm.App., 1934.)68 S.W. (2d) 1025.
    We have?reached tbc:conclusion however tha,tyour ob-
    ject in asking the fourth o,?l?st~ion
    was to determine whether
    the District may furnish weter t,othe Commission witbout charge
    under the agreement to which you directed our attention ,inyour
    letter, and we will answer i ::under that assumption. Tht1t
    agreement, as pointed out above, recites as a consideration the
    promise on the part of the Commission to locate a fish hatchery
    within the boundaries of the District. 'WCknow of no reason
    why this would not be valid consideration upon which the Dis-
    trict would be authorized to furnish the water service.
    The bi~ndingeffect 01 i~r,i:<
    coni,rac
    t might be upheld
    on still another basis. It war.bold in a recent case that even
    though a contract enter4 into ky7 dir~c.tcr::of a Water Improve-
    ment District is prohibited by the Cons,titutlonand laws of the
    ,State, yet if it was deliberately entered into by the proper
    District officials, thereunto lawfully auti,cl;~iz?d
    and the other
    party was induced thereby to perform service:;exacted of it in
    rel~ianceupon the contraci:and the District accepted such serv-
    ices and benefits derivable therefrom, the District was bound
    by the terms of the contract. Nagle, Witt, Rollins Engineering
    Co. vs. La Salle Water Improvement District NC. 1 (Civ,App.,
    ur.   Ii. D. Dodgen, Page 8
    latter aonstruotion,   while   the Commission has adopted the
    f ora4r.
    tie have no way of knowing which eonstruotlon
    those who trade the agreemnt intended or whether the msn-
    ing of this phrase was even discussed.      However, at all
    4vent 8 ) it appears to be undieputed that the parties intend-
    ed to relieve the Comiission at least of the burden of pipp
    lng the customary service charges based upon the amount of
    water used.     In the absence of more evidenoe we tee1 eon-
    strained to adopt that oonstruotlon.
    Under such a construction,  the answer to your
    rirat question is eyes?, while the answer to your seoond Ques-
    tion is “non, and you are so advised.   The obvious answer to
    your third question, under the pertinent authorities oited
    above is “no. n
    Your fourth question eonoerns the authority of the
    direotoro  of the Distriot  to donate water service   to the Corn-
    mission.   be find nothing in the statutes which may be oon-
    strued as authorizing   the dlreotors  to dispose of water serv-
    ice otherwise thsn by sale.     Sound publlo polioy would mill-
    tats against a presumption of suoh authority.      See Jones t.
    Williams, 131 Ter. 94, 45 S. W. (9d) 130, 
    79 A. L
    . R. 983;
    Llano County v. Rnowles, et al, (Civ. App.) S9 9. W. 349;
    gi&Dreeben vs. Whitehurst (Comm. App., 1934) 68 5. W. (Rd)
    .
    We have reaahed the oonoluslon however that your
    object In asking the fourth question was to determine wheth-
    er the Distriot   may furnish water to the Commission without
    aharge under the agreement to which you dlreoted    our atten-
    tion in your letter,    ahd we will anewer it under that araruql)-
    tlon.   That agreement, aa pointed out above, recites as a
    consideration   the promlse on tho part of the Conm.lsalon to
    locate a fish hatohery within the boumlaries of tlm Distrlot.
    We know of no reason why this would not be valid oonaldera-
    tion upon whioh the Dlstriot    would be authorized to furnish
    the water eervioe.
    The bindlhg effeot of this oontraot might be Up-
    held on still  another basis.    It was held in a reoent aaoo
    that even though a contract entered Into by dimotors       of a
    Water Improvement District    is prohibited by the Constitution
    and laws of the State, yet if it was deliberately     entered
    .
    Mr. H. D. Dodgon, Pa&8 7
    into by the proper Distriot oiiloials, themunto lawfully
    authorized end the othar psrty was lnducpd thereby to par-
    fo r msenlo ss lxaotsd of it In relianoe upon tb oontraot
    and the Dirtriot aooeptod such ssnioss and benstlts ds-
    Arable thereiron,the District was bound by the terms ot
    the oontraot. Waglo, Witt, Bolllns EngInesrIng Co. vs.
    La Salle Water Impror~msnt Dlstriot No. 1 (Clr. App., San
    Antonio, 1931) 44 8. W. (Ed) 1033, error dismissed.   Sss
    also Oltl 0i Tyasr f. Jester, 97 l's% 344, 78 8. W. 103S;
    Sludsr w. Gitr of San Antonio (Corn.App.)  3 8. W. (Zd)
    S4lj cab Eudspsth County Consenatlon & Reolanmtlon Dist.
    T. Spars (Clr. Am., El Paso, 1931) 39 8. W. (2d) 94.
    You are advissd, therefore, that under th8 agree-
    ment referred to, the Dlstriot is authorizedto furnish
    water to tbr State Fish Eatohsry looated within that Dis-
    trlot wwithout oharga.*
    Trusting that we hate sufrloientlyanswered           your
    LnptirJ, ws are
    Yours wry      trn&y
    -   -
    Peter Manisoaloo
    Assistant
    APiRCfVEDNOV27, 1940
    i
    s
    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
    

Document Info

Docket Number: O-2864

Judges: Gerald Mann

Filed Date: 7/2/1940

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017