Brewer v. State ( 1998 )


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  •              IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE               FILED
    AUGUST 1998 SESSION
    September 22, 1998
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    Appellate C ourt Clerk
    JAMIE EDWARD BREWER,        )
    )
    Appellant,     )      No. 03C01-9709-CC-00397
    )
    )       Blount County
    v.                          )
    )       Honorable D. Kelly Thomas, Jr., Judge
    )
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,         )       (Post-Conviction)
    )
    Appellee.      )
    For the Appellant:                 For the Appellee:
    Thomas G. McCroskey                John Knox Walkup
    627 Smithview Drive                Attorney General of Tennessee
    Maryville, TN 37801                       and
    Todd R. Kelley
    Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee
    425 Fifth Avenue North
    Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    Michael L. Flynn
    District Attorney General
    and
    Philip Morton
    Assistant District Attorney General
    363 Court Street
    Blount County Courthouse
    Maryville, TN 37804
    OPINION FILED:____________________
    AFFIRMED
    Joseph M. Tipton
    Judge
    OPINION
    The petitioner, Jamie Edward Brewer, appeals as of right from the Blount
    County Circuit Court’s order denying him post-conviction relief from his three 1996
    robbery convictions resulting in a total sentence of fifteen years in the Department of
    Correction. He contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly, understandingly, and
    voluntarily entered because his appointed counsel was ineffective by providing him
    misadvice regarding release eligibility. We affirm the trial court.
    The petitioner was charged in July 1995 with a robbery occurring on July
    10, 1995. In November 1995, he was charged with an aggravated robbery occurring on
    November 11, 1995, and an aggravated robbery occurring on November 26, 1995. The
    petitioner had been on probation for a previous felony burglary conviction and a
    misdemeanor theft conviction. The probation had been revoked, and the case was on
    appeal, with the petitioner released on bond, when the two November robberies
    occurred. The petitioner was indicted on three counts of robbery, and pursuant to an
    agreement, he entered guilty pleas and was sentenced to terms of four, five and six
    years, to be served consecutively.
    The gist of the petitioner’s claim is that because one of his attorneys told
    him that he would have to serve eighty-five percent of an aggravated robbery sentence,
    he saw no option but to plead guilty to the three counts of robbery and to accept a total
    sentence of fifteen years. He asserts that if he had known that he was exposed to a
    much earlier release eligibility for aggravated robbery, he would have gone to trial.
    At the evidentiary hearing, the petitioner and his two attorneys from the
    public defender’s office testified. The petitioner testified that he committed the
    robberies but that he did so without a weapon, only pretending to have one. He
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    acknowledged giving the police statements about the robberies. He acknowledged that
    the victim of one of the robberies testified at the preliminary hearing that he displayed a
    gun, but he indicated that the testimony was weak. He also admitted that he told
    counsel he would accept twelve years.
    The petitioner and the attorneys differed about who primarily represented
    him. The petitioner said Assistant Public Defender Natalee Hurley dealt with him most
    of the time, including discussing plea bargaining, and Public Defender Mack Garner
    only met with him a couple of times. Ms. Hurley said Mr. Garner was the primary
    attorney, and she only handled a preliminary hearing and appeared at the petitioner’s
    guilty plea hearing because Mr. Garner had another engagement. Mr. Garner said he
    handled the cases primarily.
    Regardless, the petitioner testified that Ms. Hurley told him that a
    conviction for aggravated robbery would mean he would have to serve eighty-five
    percent of the sentence as opposed to thirty percent required for robbery. He said that
    he considered her comments and decided to accept the fifteen-year offer because he
    did not want to serve eighty-five percent. He also testified that the example given by
    Ms. Hurley was that he could serve four and one-half years of the fifteen-year sentence
    or ten years of the twenty-four or twenty-five-year sentence.
    The petitioner acknowledged that the trial court advised him at the guilty
    plea hearing that aggravated robbery carried a thirty percent release eligibility date and
    the actual release date could vary depending upon the Parole Board’s decision.
    However, he stated he did not say anything because he was nervous. He claimed that
    without the eighty-five percent advice, he would have taken his chances at trial, stating
    he did not believe he could be convicted of aggravated robbery.
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    Mack Garner testified that the petitioner told him that the petitioner was
    guilty and asked him to get the petitioner the best deal he could. Mr. Garner said he
    talked to Detective Manul, who told him the petitioner admitted to the robberies. Under
    these circumstances, Mr. Garner was interested in resolving the cases. At that time,
    the district attorney had a policy of not reducing charges after indictment, but
    agreements could be reached to lesser charges before the grand jury acted. Mr.
    Garner was certain he worked out an agreement for the petitioner before the petitioner
    was indicted because the petitioner was only indicted for robbery, not aggravated
    robbery. He recalled that the petitioner took time before he decided to accept the
    fifteen-year offer.
    Natalee Hurley testified that she appeared with the petitioner at the guilty
    plea hearing at Mr. Garner’s request. She said Mr. Garner had negotiated the
    agreement. She said she discussed the terms of the agreement with the petitioner and
    advised him that the district attorney would have him indicted for aggravated robbery if
    the agreement fell apart. Ms. Hurley testified that she was sure that she discussed with
    the petitioner her concern that the Department of Correction could possibly require
    eighty-five percent service of a sentence for aggravated robbery for a violent offender
    and that she could not guarantee a thirty percent release eligibility. She said she was
    not sure about how simple robbery was considered, but she thought she would have
    given her opinion that it would not be considered as a violent offense for parole
    purposes. She denied promising the petitioner that an aggravated robbery conviction
    would carry an eighty-five percent release eligibility date.
    The guilty plea hearing transcript reflects that the trial court advised the
    petitioner of the punishment ranges for both robbery and aggravated robbery and of the
    fact that both carried thirty percent release eligibility dates, with even that being
    uncertain. The petitioner testified at the guilty plea hearing that he had not been forced
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    or coerced into pleading. He stated that he was accepting the plea offer because he
    did not want to risk securing a sentence up to twenty-four years if convicted of
    aggravated robbery. The petitioner told the trial court that he had no questions,
    complaints, or concerns. He also stated his awareness of and waiver of his rights to a
    jury trial, to remain silent, to cross-examine witnesses, and to have witnesses testify on
    his behalf.
    The trial court found that the petitioner’s attorneys adequately prepared
    the case under the circumstances. It found that Ms. Hurley told the petitioner he could
    serve up to eight-five percent of an aggravated robbery sentence but would probably
    serve no more than thirty percent for simple robbery, depending upon the Parole
    Board’s actions. The trial court stated that the advice was couched in terms of
    possibilities and depended upon the Parole Board. It found that any misunderstanding
    about parole was corrected at the guilty plea hearing, with the petitioner being told the
    applicable release percentages and given the opportunity to ask questions. Also, the
    trial court stated that at a trial, the petitioner would have been convicted of a Class B
    felony, probably two, resulting in a sentence of more than fifteen years. It concluded
    that the petitioner had proven no prejudice flowing from the alleged ineffective
    assistance of counsel.
    In a post-conviction case, the petitioner must prove his grounds for relief
    by clear and convincing evidence. T.C.A. § 40-30-210(f). To establish counsel
    ineffectiveness, the petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and
    that the deficiency resulted in prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687,
    
    104 S. Ct. 2052
    , 2064 (1984); State v. Melson, 
    772 S.W.2d 417
    , 419 n.2 (Tenn. 1989).
    Relative to a claim that a guilty plea resulted from the ineffective assistance of counsel,
    the petitioner must show that but for counsel’s errors he would not have pled guilty and
    would have insisted upon going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 
    474 U.S. 52
    , 59, 
    106 S. Ct. 5
    366, 370 (1985); Bankston v. State, 
    815 S.W.2d 213
    , 215 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).
    Relative to our review on appeal, the factual findings of the trial court are deemed
    conclusive unless the evidence of record preponderates against them. Cooper v. State,
    
    849 S.W.2d 744
    , 746 (Tenn. 1993).
    Unquestionably, the guilty plea hearing transcript reflects that the
    petitioner expressed his understanding that both robbery and aggravated robbery have
    thirty percent release eligibility dates. It also shows that he expressed concern about
    receiving aggravated robbery convictions and that he was choosing to plead guilty to
    robbery to avoid the risk of a higher sentence. We are mindful that a petitioner’s
    testimony at a guilty plea hearing “constitutes a formidable barrier” in any subsequent
    collateral proceeding because “solemn declarations in open court carry a strong
    presumption of verity.” Blackledge v. Allison, 
    431 U.S. 63
    , 73, 
    97 S. Ct. 1621
    , 1629
    (1977). Neither the evidence presented in this case nor the law dispels the reliability of
    the petitioner’s testimony at his guilty plea hearing.
    The fact that the petitioner committed felonies while on bond for a felony
    charge exposed him to mandatory consecutive sentences if convicted of all of the
    robberies, which he admitted committing. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(C). He was
    reasonably exposed to consecutive sentences by virtue of committing felonies while on
    probation. T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b)(6). He was exposed to aggravated robbery
    convictions and to enhanced punishments because of his history of criminal activity and
    the commission of felonies while on probation. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114(1) and (13)(C).
    The petitioner’s exposure to greater sentences was ended by the agreement he
    reached. We do not believe that the record preponderates against the trial court’s
    findings and conclusions relative to the petitioner entering knowing, understood, and
    voluntary guilty pleas regardless of the parole possibilities his counsel had told him.
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    In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, we affirm the
    judgment of the trial court.
    ______________________________
    Joseph M. Tipton, Judge
    CONCUR:
    ____________________________
    Joe G. Riley, Judge
    ____________________________
    Thomas T. Woodall, Judge
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