Mitchell v. Goings ( 2022 )

Case: 20-30672 Document: 00516350620 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/09/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
June 9, 2022
No. 20-30672
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Gator Mitchell,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Sergeant Robert Goings; Sergeant John Craine;
Sergeant Gary King; Captain Brink Hillman;
Warden Robert Tanner; Louisiana State, through
Louisiana Department of Public Safety and
Corrections,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:20-CV-1333
Before Jones, Stewart, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Edith H. Jones, Circuit Judge:
Gator Mitchell appeals the dismissal of his claims as barred by
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), colloquially known as the “three strikes” provision of
the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”). That provision is
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No. 20-30672
inapplicable because Mitchell’s claims were removed to, as opposed to
brought in, federal court. We therefore Reverse and Remand.
I. BACKGROUND
Mitchell is confined in the B.B. “Sixty” Rayburn Correctional Center
(“RCC”) in Angie, Louisiana. Mitchell alleges that, beginning in January
2019, guards Robert Goings, John Craine, Gary King, and Brink Hillman
abused and intimidated him. Mitchell alleges he reported this treatment to
Robert Tanner, the warden, who took no action. Mitchell then filed a
grievance against Goings in mid-March 2019. The result of the internal
investigation is, however, uncertain.
In March 2020, Mitchell elected to bring § 1983 and negligence claims
in Louisiana state court against the State of Louisiana (through the
Department of Public Safety and Corrections) and the above-named
individual Defendants. Importantly, he obtained leave to proceed in forma
pauperis (IFP). Goings then timely removed the action to federal court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and paid the filing fee. The other
Defendants consented. Mitchell filed an amended complaint several weeks
later that raised the same claims.
Defendants moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and
for summary judgment, maintaining in part that Mitchell had not exhausted
his administrative remedies. Mitchell opposed the motions and sought
limited discovery on the issue of exhaustion. Hillman replied, again
contending that Mitchell failed to exhaust by seeking relief through the prison
grievance system.
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. The
magistrate judge determined that Mitchell had at least three prior “strikes”
arising from his previous frivolous prison litigation. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), (g). The magistrate judge also ruled that § 1915(g)
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applied to actions, like this one, that are removed from state court. That
meant Mitchell could not proceed IFP unless he was in imminent danger of
serious physical injury. Mitchell made no such showing. The magistrate
judge accordingly dismissed the action without prejudice and specified that
Mitchell may refile after paying the requisite fee.
Mitchell timely, but unsuccessfully, sought reconsideration or a new
trial pursuant to Rules 59 and 60. Mitchell contended that he had no
opportunity to address the three strikes issue, and § 1915(g) was inapplicable
because he had not sought to proceed IFP in federal court after Goings
removed the action. In denying Mitchell’s motion, the court reasoned that
Mitchell’s failure to move to proceed IFP in federal court was irrelevant
because he was granted IFP status in state court and that permission
“remain[ed] in full force and effect.” The magistrate judge then
reemphasized that § 1915(g) applies to cases that were filed IFP in state court
and removed to federal court. Mitchell appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
This court reviews the district court’s interpretation of the PLRA de
novo, and we review de novo the court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration
based on a question of law. See Jackson v. Johnson, 475 F.3d 261, 265 (5th
Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quotation omitted); see also Dearmore v. City of
Garland, 519 F.3d 517, 520 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
Mitchell maintains that the magistrate judge erred by dismissing his
action pursuant to § 1915(g) of the PLRA. Defendants respond that this
court lacks jurisdiction to review Mitchell’s claims; the magistrate judge
correctly applied the three strikes rule; and the court may alternatively affirm
the judgment based on Mitchell’s failure to exhaust his prison administrative
remedies. We disagree with each of Defendants’ contentions.
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A.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court is only empowered to review
“final decisions.” Goings, Tanner, and the state acknowledge that the
magistrate judge’s ruling “dispose[d] of the entire case” and there was
“nothing left for [the magistrate judge] to do.” But they maintain that the
action is not “final” because the magistrate judge dismissed the action
without prejudice and authorized Mitchell to refile if he paid the filing fee.
This is incorrect.
We exercise jurisdiction over this appeal because “[t]he dismissal of
an action—whether with or without prejudice—is final and appealable.”
Umbrella Inv. Grp., L.L.C. v. Wolters Kluwer Fin. Servs., Inc., 972 F.3d 710,
712 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Ciralsky v. C.I.A., 355 F.3d 661, 666 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (alteration in original)). The magistrate judge “dismissed [this action]
as barred by the three strikes provision of §1915(g)[.]” “That the dismissal
was without prejudice to filing another suit does not make the cause
unappealable, for denial of relief and dismissal of the case ended this suit so
far as the [magistrate judge] was concerned.” United States v. Wallace &
Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793, 794 n. 1, 69 S. Ct. 824, 825 (1949); see also
15A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and
Procedure § 3914.6 (2nd ed. April 2022 update) (“Many cases reflect the
rule that a dismissal without prejudice is appealable as a final judgment.”).
B.
“What this country needs, Congress [has] decided, is fewer and better
prisoner suits.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203, 127 S. Ct. 910, 914 (2007)
(citation omitted). To that end, the PLRA instituted “a variety of reforms
designed to filter out the bad claims and facilitate consideration of the good.”
Id. at 549 U.S. at 204, 127 S. Ct. at 914. The three strikes rule is one such
filtering device. It provides that:
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In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a
judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if
the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while
incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or
appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the
grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under
imminent danger of serious physical injury.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Without this rule, litigious prisoners “lack[] an[y]
economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive
lawsuits.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1831
(1989). With the rule, prisoners must think hard before involving federal
courts in their grievances.
Actions removed from state courts, however, do not count as
“strikes” under § 1915(g) because they are not brought in federal court. “To
‘bring’ an action has long meant to initiate or commence it, not to prosecute
or to continue it.” Maldonado v. Baker Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 23 F.4th 1299,
1304 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 192 (6th ed.
1990)); see also Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 377 n.9 (3d Cir. 2020).
Moreover, “[t]o bring an action under § 1915, the prisoner must seek and be
granted the ability to proceed [IFP] in a ‘court of the United States’ by
submitting ‘an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such [person]
possesses’ to prove indigency.” Maldonado, 23 F.4th at 1305 (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)). A court of the United States “includes the Supreme
Court of the United States, courts of appeals, district courts . . .[,] and any
court created by Act of Congress the judges of which are entitled to hold
office during good behavior.” 28 U.S.C. § 451. State courts are not included.
Thus, “[w]hen a defendant removes a case from state to federal court, it
cannot be said that a prisoner-plaintiff was the one who brought the case in
federal court.” Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 2017). We
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agree with the Third, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits that
§ 1915(g) is inapplicable when an action is removed from state court. See
Maldonado, 23 F.4th at 1306-07; Hill v. Madison County, 983 F.3d 904, 907-
08 (7th Cir. 2020); Dooley, 957 F.3d at 377 n.9; Woodson v. McCollum,
875 F.3d 1304, 1307 (10th Cir. 2017); Harris, 863 F.3d at 1140-41.
Nonetheless, we point out that Rule 11 also provides courts with a
“means to penalize the pursuit of frivolous suits that are removed to federal
court.” Hill, 983 F.3d at 907. And “[i]f a prisoner fails to pay a penalty
imposed under Rule 11, the court may take other steps, such as revoking the
privilege of litigating [IFP] or barring new suits altogether.” Id. (citation
omitted). Courts may consider these measures where appropriate even
where § 1915(g) is inapplicable.
Because Mitchell did not bring this action in any court of the United
States, the magistrate judge erred by determining that his claims were barred
by § 1915(g).1
C.
The magistrate judge did not address whether Mitchell exhausted his
administrative remedies. Several Defendants nevertheless urge affirmance
based on Mitchell’s alleged failure to exhaust prison administrative remedies.
But “we are a court of review, not first view.” Montano v. Texas,
867 F.3d 540, 546 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Houston, 792 F.3d
663, 669 (6th Cir. 2015)). That is why “[t]he issue of . . . exhaustion of []
1
It is also worth emphasizing that “the federal filing fee was paid in full here by
[Goings], so the federal courts are not burdened by an action without payment.”
Maldonado, 23 F.4th at 1306. Absent removal, any burden in adjudicating Mitchell’s claims
would have fallen on the Louisiana judiciary; Defendants, not Mitchell, shifted the burden
to this court. Finally, Mitchell is now represented by counsel on appeal and the appellate
filing fee has been duly paid.
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administrative remedies is . . . appropriate for the district court to decide in
the first instance.” Cano-Miranda v. Ashcroft, 262 F.3d 477, 479 (5th Cir.
2001); see also Jones, 549 U.S. at 219 , 127 S. Ct. at 923 (“We leave it to the
court below in the first instance to determine the sufficiency of the
exhaustion in these cases.”). The record here is devoid of any findings
regarding exhaustion. Indeed, the issue of exhaustion was in discovery by the
parties when this appeal occurred. As Mitchell suggests, remand is required
to determine this question.
The judgment is REVERSED and REMANDED for further
proceedings consistent herewith.
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