Khai Huynh v. Christine T. Hang Nguyen ( 2018 )

Opinion issued August 30, 2018
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-17-00935-CV
———————————
KHAI HUYNH, Appellant
V.
CHRISTINE T. HANG NGUYEN, Appellee
On Appeal from the 80th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2017-47236
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this interlocutory appeal,1 appellant, Khai Huynh, challenges the trial
court’s order denying his special appearance in the suit of appellee, Christine T.
Hang Nguyen, against him for breach of fiduciary duty and misappropriation of
1
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(7) (Vernon Supp. 2017).
image and likeness. In his sole issue, Huynh contends that the trial court erred in
denying his special appearance.
We affirm in part and reverse and render in part.
Background
In her amended petition,2 Nguyen alleges that although she is a United States
citizen, she and her husband reside in Vietnam, where they lead a ministry “serving
the poor of Ho Chi Minh City.” Her ministry receives support from direct gifts as
well as from the “Go.Be.Hope charity headquartered in McKinney, Texas.”
Huynh is a high-level “agent” with Seacret Direct, a company that “sells Dead Sea
Minerals and Cosmetics through its multi-level marketing . . . channels.” And he
recruited a group of “agents” of Vietnamese heritage, many of whom live and
work in Texas, to sell underneath him (or “down-line”). Huynh named the group
2
We conclude that Huynh’s argument that Nguyen’s amended petition should not
be considered because it was filed untimely, without leave of court and only two
days before the special appearance hearing, is without merit. See TEX. R. CIV. P.
63. Even presuming, without deciding, that rule 63 applies in this case, Huynh
made no showing of surprise or prejudice in his motion to strike the amended
pleading. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 63; see also Goswami v. Metro. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n, 751 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tex. 1988) (explaining Rule 63 interpreted liberally
and “in the absence of a sufficient showing of surprise by the opposing party, the
failure to obtain leave of court when filing a late pleading may be cured by the
trial court’s action in considering the amended pleading”). The lack of surprise or
prejudice is supported by the fact that the additions to Nguyen’s pleading, such as
discussions of payments distributed in Texas to Texas residents, is directly
addressed in her response to his special appearance. Further, it does not appear
that Huynh obtained a ruling from the trial court on his objection or objected to the
trial court’s failure to rule. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).
2
“TeamSeacret,” which had its own Facebook page and held events for its
members.
Nguyen further alleges that in 2014, Huynh visited her in Ho Chi Minh City
and “assisted [her] charity in distributing meals to the poor.” In September 2014,
Huynh, unbeknownst to Nguyen, sent out an electronic invitation to TeamSeacret
for a “Talent Night,” the purpose of which was “to celebrate the success of
Vietnamese workers at SEACRET and concurrently raise funds
for [Nguyen] . . . to help fund an education and feeding charity program for
children living in slums during Christmas and New Years.”3 In a Facebook post on
the TeamSeacret page, Huynh explained that the price of admission to the event
would first cover the costs and any “extra will go to [c]harity.” He further stated
that he would “match 100%” of the amount “left[]over from the event.”
In October 2014, Huynh met with Nguyen again in Vietnam and told her
that “he intended to raise money for her charity,” asking her to send “pictures and
videos” that he could “use to promote” her charity at the TeamSeacret event.
Nguyen sent Huynh a video of some of the children her charity served in the slums
of Vietnam, and she thanked TeamSeacret “for being the beneficiary of the
[c]harity [e]vent.”
3
Nguyen also alleges that this electronic invitation was later edited to remove
reference to her charity.
3
On November 9, 2014, TeamSeacret held the charity event in Arizona,
raising $24,130 “over and above expenses.” After the event, Huynh published the
results of the funds raised on his Facebook page and represented that, after
donating $400 of his own money, $24,530 would be placed in “the TeamS[eacret]
Charity.” Nguyen alleges, however, that there is no such charity and Huynh kept
the money raised either at his home in cash or in his bank account. Nguyen further
alleges that, due to Huynh’s promise to match the donations at 100%, the total
amount of funds due to her charity is $48,260.00.
In December 2014, Huynh represented to Nguyen that the total amount of
money raised at the event was only $3,000, he asked her permission to give $1,000
of the funds to another Vietnamese charity, and she agreed. And, on December 27,
2014, Huynh’s assistant delivered $2,000 to her. Nguyen then asked Huynh for
permission to thank the group for their donation in a Facebook post. In his
response, Huynh agreed, but instructed her that there was “no need to say the
amount of money that . . . had [been raised] for [her] charity in her thank you
Facebook posting.” At the time, she did not realize that the charity event had
raised more money. And she received no further payments from Huynh.
By February 2015, TeamSeacret members began inquiring about what had
happened with the remaining donations. In response, Huynh suggested additional
charities to which TeamSeacret should give the remaining funds, and he also
4
returned some of the money to donors. However, Huynh, after March 2015, did
not make any further public postings about the funds or otherwise publicly account
for his management of the donations.
In August 2015, one TeamSeacret member, Dam K. Dinh (“Quarter”), made
a public post on Facebook, accusing Huynh of stealing the donations raised at the
Arizona charity event. In response, Huynh hired the Houston-based Tammy Tran
Law Firm to represent him in a possible libel suit. Huynh also told Nguyen that he
had “returned much of [the money] to the donors and that he intended to give the
remaining money to the Joel Osteen ministry in Houston.” Several of the donors
who had their money returned reside in Texas. And instead of donating to the Joel
Osteen ministry, Huynh gave $5,630 to Sharon Gartman, who runs a charity
benefiting children, in Houston, Texas. Huynh ultimately filed a defamation
lawsuit against Quarter, a Michigan resident, and two others in Texas.
In regard to her claim for breach of fiduciary duty, Nguyen alleges that
Huynh represented to her and the attendees of the charity event that its purpose
was to raise money for Nguyen’s charity. Thus, Huynh had a fiduciary duty to
deliver the funds raised to Nguyen’s charity after the event, and he breached this
duty by returning some of the funds to donors and donating the rest to Gartman’s
charity. In regard to her claim for misappropriation of image and likeness, Nguyen
alleges that Huynh “appropriated [her] image and likeness to induce the people at
5
the [c]harity [e]vent to attend . . . and donate money.” She further alleges that
Huynh used her image and likeness to “bring honor and credit upon himself and to
raise money” that he ultimately did not provide to Nguyen after the event as
promised. Nguyen seeks to recover actual damages in the amount of $45,260,
exemplary damages, and her attorneys’ fees.
Huynh filed a special appearance, asserting that Texas does not have general
or specific jurisdiction over him and the exercise of jurisdiction over him would
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. He attached to his
special appearance the “Declaration of Khai Huynh,” in which he testified that he
is not a resident of Texas, is not domiciled in Texas, is not required to maintain a
registered agent for service of process in Texas, does not maintain a residence or
place of business in Texas, and has no employees, mailing address, telephone
listing, or bank account in Texas.
Nguyen filed a response, asserting that Huynh regularly conducts business in
Texas and “committed numerous torts in Texas,” including the breach of his
fiduciary duty to Nguyen by “making unauthorized distributions” of the charity
funds to Texas residents, among others. She argues that Texas courts have general
jurisdiction over Huynh because he has “systematic and continuous business
contacts with the State of Texas,” including several downline agents who live and
work in the State. And she argues that Texas courts have specific jurisdiction over
6
Huynh because he committed three separate breaches of fiduciary duty in Texas by
donating the charity funds to Gartman and returning them to two donors from
Texas instead of giving them to Nguyen.
Nguyen attached to her response deposition and trial testimony excerpts
from Huynh’s defamation suit against Quarter. These include excerpts from
Huynh’s deposition, in which he testified that he learned of Gartman and her
charity through his contacts in Texas, and, although he does not live in Houston, he
comes here “all the time.” They also include excerpts from Gartman’s deposition,
in which she testified that she received a donation from Huynh when she met with
him at Tammy Tran’s office in Houston, Texas. Additionally, Tiffany La and
Tuan Huynh testified that Huynh returned their donations to them during meetings
with him in Texas.
Nguyen also filed a supplemental response to Huynh’s special appearance,
attaching three additional exhibits.4 The first exhibit is a two-year Lease
Agreement, in which Huynh is listed as the “tenant,” commencing on March 1,
2014, for commercial space in Houston, Texas. The second and third exhibits are
certificates of formation for Texas limited liability companies that list Huynh, with
his California address, as a managing member.
4
Because we do not rely on these documents in reaching our holding, we do not
address Huynh’s contention that they were inadmissible in the trial court. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
7
Huynh then filed a supplemental special appearance, attaching additional
exhibits in support of his assertion that Texas courts do not have jurisdiction over
him. These exhibits include his revised declaration in which he testified that he
either donated to charity or returned to donors all of the money raised by
TeamSeacret at the Arizona charity event. He further testified that he does not, nor
has he ever, derived any income or benefit from the two limited liability companies
registered in Texas that list him as a member, he did not execute the lease that lists
him as a tenant for commercial space in Houston, and he does not operate the
premises subject to that lease. The remaining exhibits include declarations from
donors to whom Huynh returned money and excerpts from Quarter and Nguyen’s
depositions in the defamation case.
In support of his special appearance, Huynh also filed a brief in which he
accounts for the money raised at the Arizona charity event as being returned to the
donors or otherwise donated to charities. He further argues that Texas courts
cannot exercise general jurisdiction over him because he is not “essentially at
home in the forum,” even though he does travel here regularly for business. He
further alleges that he is a resident of California, does not maintain a place of
business in Texas, and the “mere fact that some of [his] downline [agents] reside in
Texas is insufficient” to confer general jurisdiction. In regard to specific
jurisdiction, Huynh alleges that all of his in-person contacts with Nguyen were at
8
meetings in Vietnam, and any alleged breach of fiduciary duty would have
occurred in Arizona, where Huynh collected the donations, or in Vietnam, where
he gave Nguyen less than all of the money raised.
Following a hearing, the trial court denied Huynh’s special appearance.
Standard of Review
The existence of personal jurisdiction is a question of law, which must
sometimes be preceded by the resolution of underlying factual disputes. BMC
Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002); Paul Gillrie
Inst., Inc. v. Universal Comput. Consulting, Ltd., 183 S.W.3d 755, 759 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.); Preussag Aktiengesellschaft v. Coleman,
16 S.W.3d 110, 113 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. dism’d w.o.j.).
When the underlying facts are undisputed or otherwise established, we review a
trial court’s denial of a special appearance de novo. Paul Gillrie Inst., 183 S.W.3d
at 759. Where, as here, a trial court does not issue findings of fact or conclusions
of law with its special appearance ruling, all fact findings necessary to support the
judgment and supported by the evidence are implied. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d at
795; Paul Gillrie Inst., 183 S.W.3d at 759.
A trial court determines a “special appearance on the basis of the pleadings,
any stipulations made by and between the parties, such affidavits and attachments
as may be filed by the parties, the results of discovery processes, and any oral
9
testimony.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a(3). The plaintiff bears the initial burden of
pleading allegations sufficient to bring a nonresident defendant within the
provisions of the Texas long-arm statute. Am. Type Culture Collection v.
Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 807 (Tex. 2002); Paul Gillrie Inst., 183 S.W.3d at 759.
The burden of proof then shifts to the nonresident to negate all the bases of
jurisdiction alleged by the plaintiff. Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. Middleton, 699
S.W.2d 199, 203 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam); see also Kelly v. Gen. Interior Constr.,
Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2010) (“Because the plaintiff defines the scope
and nature of the lawsuit, the defendant’s corresponding burden to negate
jurisdiction is tied to the allegations in the plaintiff’s pleading.”).
Personal Jurisdiction
In his sole issue, Huynh argues that the trial court erred in denying his
special appearance because he is not subject to general or specific jurisdiction in
Texas.
A court may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if
the requirements of both the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause and the
Texas long-arm statute are satisfied. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (Vernon 2015); Guardian Royal Exch.
Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 226–27 (Tex.
1991). The Texas long-arm statute allows a court to exercise personal jurisdiction
10
over a nonresident defendant who does business in Texas. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 17.042. A nonresident “does business” in Texas if he “contracts by
mail or otherwise with a Texas resident and either party is to perform the contract
in whole or in part” in Texas, he “commits a tort in whole or in part” in Texas, or
he “recruits Texas residents, directly or through an intermediary located in this
state, for employment inside or outside this state.” Id. The Texas Supreme Court
has repeatedly interpreted this statutory language “to reach as far as the federal
constitutional requirements of due process will allow.” Guardian Royal, 815
S.W.2d at 226. Therefore, the requirements of the Texas long-arm statute are
satisfied if the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with federal due process
limitations. Id.
The United States Constitution permits a state to assert personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant only if he has some minimum, purposeful contacts
with the state and if the exercise of jurisdiction will not offend traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice. Dawson-Austin v. Austin, 968 S.W.2d 319, 326
(Tex. 1998). A nonresident who has purposefully availed himself of the privileges
and benefits of conducting business in the state has sufficient contacts with the
state to confer personal jurisdiction. See Guardian Royal, 815 S.W.2d at 226.
The “purposeful availment” requirement has been characterized by the
Texas Supreme Court as the “touchstone of jurisdictional due process.” Michiana
11
Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 784 (Tex. 2005). In
Michiana, the court articulated three important aspects of the purposeful availment
inquiry. Id. at 785. First, only the defendant’s contacts with the forum count. Id.
This ensures that a defendant is not haled into a jurisdiction solely by the unilateral
activities of a third party. Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 475, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2183 (1985)). Second, the acts relied on must be
purposeful; a defendant may not be haled into a jurisdiction solely based on
contacts that are “random, isolated, or fortuitous.” Id. (citing Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774, 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (1984)). Third, a
defendant “must seek some benefit, advantage, or profit by ‘availing’ itself of the
jurisdiction” because “[j]urisdiction is premised on notions of implied consent”
and by “invoking the benefits and protections of a forum’s laws, a nonresident
consents to suit there.” Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 297, 100 S. Ct. 559, 567 (1980)).
A defendant’s contacts with a forum can give rise to either general or
specific jurisdiction. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d at 795. General jurisdiction is present
when a nonresident’s “affiliations with the [s]tate are so continuous and systematic
as to render [him] essentially at home in the forum [s]tate,” even if the cause of
action did not arise from or relate to activities conducted within the forum state.
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014) (quoting
12
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919, 131 S. Ct.
2846, 2851 (2011)); see also Marchand, 83 S.W.3d at 796. General jurisdiction
requires a showing that a defendant conducted substantial activities within the
forum, a “more demanding minimum contacts analysis” than for specific
jurisdiction. PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, 168
(Tex. 2007). Specific jurisdiction, however, is established if the defendant’s
alleged liability arises from or relates to an activity conducted within the forum.
Marchand, 83 S.W.3d at 796. When specific jurisdiction is asserted, the minimum
contacts analysis focuses on the relationship between the defendant, the forum, and
the litigation. Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 575–76
(Tex. 2007).
Foreseeability is an important consideration in deciding whether a
nonresident has purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum state.
Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 474, 105 S. Ct. at 2183; Guardian Royal, 815
S.W.2d at 227. The concept of foreseeability is implicit in the requirement that
there be a substantial connection between the nonresident defendant and Texas,
arising from actions or conduct of the nonresident defendant purposefully directed
toward Texas. Guardian Royal, 815 S.W.2d at 227.
13
General Jurisdiction
In a portion of his sole issue, Huynh argues that Texas courts cannot
exercise general jurisdiction over him because he lacks the kind of contacts which
would render him essentially at home in the forum.
“For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general
jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924, 131 S. Ct. at
2853. Under Texas law, a “domicile” is (1) an actual residence that is (2) intended
to be a permanent home. Willig v. Diaz, No. 01-15-00073-CV, 2016 WL 2955395,
at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 19, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing
Snyder v. Pitts, 241 S.W.2d 136, 139 (Tex. 1951)); see also Domicile, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “domicile” as “[t]he place at which a
person has been physically present and that the person regards as home; a person’s
true, fixed, principal, and permanent home, to which that person intends to return
and remain even though currently residing elsewhere”).
Here, there is no dispute that Huynh is domiciled in California.
Nevertheless, Nguyen argues that a Texas court can exercise general jurisdiction
over him because he has admitted that he comes to Texas “all the time,” some of
his downline partners on TeamSeacret live and work in Texas, he has leased office
space in Texas, he was listed as a managing member on two certificates of
formation for Texas limited liability companies, and he filed a defamation lawsuit
14
as a plaintiff in Texas. But Huynh also submitted to the trial court a declaration
stating that he is not a resident of or domiciled in Texas, he is not required to
maintain a registered agent for service of process in Texas, he does not maintain a
residence or place of business in Texas,5 and he has no “employees, mailing
address, telephone listings or bank accounts in Texas.” And there is nothing in the
record that contradicts these statements. From this record, Huynh appears to travel
to Texas primarily for business. Thus, there is no basis to support an assertion that
Texas is essentially his second domicile. See Searcy v. Parex Res., Inc., 496
S.W.3d 58, 72 (Tex. 2016) (“Continuous and systematic contacts that fail to rise
to” level of rendering defendant essentially at home in forum state “are insufficient
to confer general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant”).
Accordingly, we hold that Huynh is not subject to general jurisdiction in
Texas.
We sustain this portion of Huynh’s sole issue.
Specific Jurisdiction
In another portion of his sole issue, Huynh argues that Texas courts cannot
exercise specific jurisdiction over him because he has not purposefully availed
5
As noted above, Huynh also attached to his supplemental special appearance a
declaration, in which he states that he does not operate the premises subject to the
lease.
15
himself in Texas and his Texas contacts do not bear a substantial connection to the
operative facts of the litigation.
We analyze specific jurisdiction on a claim-by-claim basis. Moncrief Oil
Int’l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 150 (Tex. 2013). In order for a
nonresident defendant’s forum contacts “to support an exercise of specific
jurisdiction, there must be a substantial connection between those contacts and the
operative facts of the litigation.” Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 585 (citing Guardian
Royal, 815 S.W.2d at 229–33).
Misappropriation of image and likeness
Regarding her claim for misappropriation of image and likeness, Nguyen
conceded at the special appearance hearing before the trial court that this “took
place in Arizona” and did not arise from or relate to any of Huynh’s contacts with
Texas. Further, the record reveals that the videotape that forms the basis of this
claim was made in Vietnam, sent to Huynh by electronic mail, and used at the
charity dinner in Arizona.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in denying Huynh’s special
appearance in regard to Nguyen’s claim for misappropriation of image and
likeness. See Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 585.
We sustain this portion of Huynh’s sole issue.
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Breach of fiduciary duty
Regarding her claim for breach of fiduciary duty, Nguyen asserts that Huynh
collected and controlled funds donated for her charity’s benefit and he breached his
fiduciary duty to her by distributing those funds to other persons and charities. She
further asserts that Huynh purposefully availed himself of the privileges and
benefits of Texas by filing a related defamation case in this state, improperly
returning donations to two Texas residents, and donating a portion of the money to
a Texas charity. Huynh does not dispute these purposeful contacts with Texas, but
asserts that they are insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over him.
Voluntarily filing a lawsuit in a jurisdiction constitutes a purposeful
availment of the jurisdiction’s facilities and can subject a party to personal
jurisdiction in another lawsuit when the two lawsuits arise from the same general
transaction.6 Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Ruiz, 355 S.W.3d 387, 422 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) (citing Zamarron v. Shinko Wire Co.,
125 S.W.3d 132, 143 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied)). And,
6
We reject Huynh’s assertion that Nguyen waived this argument by not raising it in
the trial court. She specifically addressed the issue of Huynh’s Texas-based
defamation suit as a jurisdictional contact in her response to his special appearance
as well as at the hearing before the trial court. As explained by the Texas Supreme
Court, “[w]e do not consider issues that were not raised in the courts below, but
parties are free to construct new arguments in support of issues properly before the
[c]ourt.” Greene v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 446 S.W.3d 761, 764 n.4 (Tex. 2014).
Nguyen’s point that Huynh’s defamation suit constitutes purposeful availment in
Texas is merely a new argument in support of the issues she raised in the trial
court and reurges on appeal.
17
from the record before us, we conclude that the defamation action and this action
are sufficiently factually related such that they arise from the same general
transaction.7
Huynh argues that the two actions are not connected because his defamation
action “arose from a campaign to damage [his] reputation by non-parties to this
lawsuit who published comments on Facebook . . . that [Huynh] stole over $25,000
of charity money” whereas “[Nguyen]’s lawsuit arose . . . from an alleged meeting
with [Huynh] in Vietnam” where he told her that he would raise money for her
charity and “allegedly failed to honor that commitment when he only gave her
$2,000.” However, the entire basis of the alleged defamatory statement at issue in
Huynh’s action concerned his handling of the money raised at the TeamSeacret
charity event in Arizona that Nguyen alleges, in this action, Huynh had represented
was being held for her charity’s benefit. Thus, the money that was raised at the
event discussed in the Facebook post is the same money that Nguyen alleges
Huynh improperly withheld from her charity or distributed to others. It is readily
foreseeable that there will be significant factual overlap between the two cases,
7
Significantly, Huynh does not, nor cannot, argue that the exercise of specific
jurisdiction over him in this suit in regard to Nguyen’s breach-of-fiduciary-duty
claim would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. In his
deposition in the defamation action, Huynh testified that he does not live here, but
he comes to Texas “all the time.” Further, he chose Texas as the forum for his
defamation action and hired a Texas-based attorney, so it is presumably not
inconvenient or a burden for him to litigate in the state.
18
even if the causes of action and parties are not identical. Additionally, both Huynh
and Nguyen were deposed in the defamation action, along with several other
witnesses whose testimony and affidavits both parties relied upon in their special
appearance briefing in the trial court.
Accordingly, we hold that Huynh is subject to specific jurisdiction in Texas
in regard to Nguyen’s breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim.8
We overrule this portion of Huynh’s sole issue.
8
Having held that the defamation action filed by Huynh is sufficient to support
specific jurisdiction over Nguyen’s breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim, we need not
address her assertion that Huynh’s distribution of funds to Texas residents also
supports personal jurisdiction over him. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
19
Conclusion
We reverse the portion of the trial court’s order denying Huynh’s special
appearance in regard to Nguyen’s claim for misappropriation of image and
likeness. And we render judgment dismissing this claim against him for lack of
personal jurisdiction. We affirm the remaining portions of the trial court’s order.
Terry Jennings
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Jennings and Lloyd.
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