Reade v. Secretary of the Commonwealth , 472 Mass. 573 ( 2015 )


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    SJC-11776
    WILLIAM F. READE, JR.    vs. SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH &
    others.1
    Barnstable.       May 4, 2015. - September 3, 2015.
    Present:   Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, &
    Hines, JJ.
    Practice, Civil, Costs.    Indigent.   Veteran.   Statute,
    Construction.
    Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
    June 10, 2013.
    A hearing on a request for indigency status and a waiver of
    fees and costs was had before Robert C. Rufo, J.
    Leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal was allowed in
    the Appeals Court by James R. Milkey, J. The Supreme Judicial
    Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the
    Appeals Court.
    Emily B. Kanstroom (Meredith M. Leary & Robert M. Buchholz
    with her) for the plaintiff.
    Daniel P. Sullivan, Special Assistant Attorney General
    (Gwen A. Werner, Special Assistant Attorney General, with him)
    for the intervener.
    1
    The Attorney General; Office of Court Management of the
    Trial Court, intervener.
    2
    Georgia Katsoulomitis & Phillip Kassel, for Massachusetts
    Law Reform Institute, Inc., & another, amici curiae, submitted a
    brief.
    CORDY, J.   Since 1974, the Legislature has demonstrated a
    commitment to ensuring that the doors of the Commonwealth's
    courts will not be closed to the poor.   This commitment is
    embodied in the so-called Indigent Court Costs Law, G. L.
    c. 261, §§ 27A-27G (§§ 27A-27G), which creates a mechanism for
    indigent persons to obtain waivers or reductions of court fees
    and other costs incurred during litigation.    The statutory
    scheme defines "[i]ndigent persons" to include those with income
    below the poverty line; those who demonstrate that the payment
    of fees and costs would create a hardship; and those who receive
    "public assistance" under certain programs, including "veterans'
    benefits programs."   G. L. c. 261, § 27A.    The question
    presented in this appeal is whether a litigant such as the
    plaintiff, who receives Federal veterans' benefits and a
    Massachusetts property tax abatement that are not dependent on
    his economic circumstances, is considered indigent under § 27A
    and therefore entitled to a waiver despite having ample
    financial resources to pay court fees and costs.2
    2
    By order of this court, all information submitted in an
    affidavit of indigency is confidential unless otherwise stated
    in a specific court order. Accordingly, the affidavits of
    indigency and accompanying papers submitted in connection with
    this case were impounded. See S.J.C. Rule 1:15 (2) (b), as
    3
    We conclude that the statute was not intended to provide
    for a waiver under these circumstances.     The history of the
    statute reveals an unbroken chain of legislative intent to limit
    the definition of indigent to persons whose limited financial
    resources prevent them from obtaining meaningful access to the
    Commonwealth's courts.    In light of the statute's history and
    purpose, we interpret the phrase "public assistance under . . .
    veterans' benefits programs" as referring only to the
    Massachusetts need-based programs for veterans presently
    administered pursuant to G. L. c. 115, § 5.     Because the
    plaintiff does not participate in such a program, his request
    for a waiver of fees and costs was properly denied.3
    1.   Background.    The plaintiff, William Reade, is a retired
    lieutenant colonel of the Unites States Army Reserve and a
    resident of Massachusetts.    In 1978, the Federal Veterans'
    Administration determined that Reade suffered a ten per cent
    appearing in 
    401 Mass. 1301
    (1988) ("Unless otherwise ordered by
    the appellate court . . . material impounded in the trial court
    shall remain impounded in the appellate court"). Yet, because
    some of the information contained in those materials is critical
    to the resolution of this appeal, we now lift the order of
    impoundment to the extent necessary to explain our decision
    today. See Adams v. Adams, 
    459 Mass. 361
    , 362 n.1 (2011), S.C.,
    
    466 Mass. 1015
    (2013).
    3
    We acknowledge the amicus curiae brief submitted by the
    Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, Inc., and Mental Health
    Legal Advisors Committee.
    4
    disability as a result of an injury to his left shoulder and
    elbow incurred in connection with his military service.     As a
    result of his injury, Reade receives a monthly disability
    payment pursuant to 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1114 (2012), as well as a
    partial property tax abatement pursuant to a Massachusetts
    program for resident disabled veterans, see G. L. c. 59, § 5,
    Twenty-second.   His eligibility for the disability payments and
    property tax abatement is not dependent on his income or
    resource levels.4
    In 2013, Reade commenced an action in the Superior Court,
    alleging various constitutional violations with respect to the
    presidential ballot.   Along with his civil complaint, Reade
    filed an affidavit of indigency pursuant to § 27B,5 in which he
    4
    General Laws c. 59, § 5, Twenty-second, provides for a
    partial property tax abatement for certain resident veterans
    "who, as a result of disabilities contracted while in the line
    of duty, have a disability rating of ten per cent or more as
    determined by the Veterans Administration or by any branch of
    the armed forces." The abatement applies to the veteran's
    domicile in "the amount of [$2,000] of [its] assessed taxable
    valuation or the sum of $400, whichever would result in an
    abatement of the greater amount of actual taxes due." 
    Id. In contrast,
    G. L. c. 59, § 5, Eighteenth, exempts from taxation
    "[a]ny portion of the estates of persons who by reason of age,
    infirmity and poverty, or financial hardship resulting from a
    change to active military status, not including initial
    enlistment are in the judgment of the assessors unable to
    contribute fully toward the public charges." Reade does not
    purport to receive the more generous need-based exemption
    afforded by clause Eighteenth.
    5
    General Laws c. 261, § 27B, provides, in relevant part,
    that "[u]pon or after commencing or answering to any civil,
    5
    requested a waiver of normal court fees and litigation costs,6 as
    well as extra fees and costs.7   As grounds, Reade indicated in
    criminal or juvenile proceeding or appeal in any court, . . .
    any party may file with the clerk an affidavit of indigency and
    request for waiver, substitution or payment by the commonwealth
    of fees and costs upon a form prescribed by the chief justice of
    the supreme judicial court and in accordance with the standards
    set forth in [§§ 27C-27F], inclusive, and sworn to under oath by
    the affiant." A person qualifies as "[i]ndigent" under the
    statutory scheme if he or she:
    "(a) receives public assistance under aid to families with
    dependent children, program of emergency aid for elderly
    and disabled residents or veterans' benefits programs or
    who receives assistance under Title XVI of the Social
    Security Act or the medicaid program, 42 U.S.C.A. 1396, et
    seq.;
    "(b) [has an] income, after taxes, . . . 125 per cent or
    less of the current poverty threshold established annually
    by the Community Services Administration pursuant to
    section 625 of the Economic Opportunity Act, as amended; or
    "(c) . . . is unable to pay the fees and costs of the
    proceeding in which he is involved or is unable to do so
    without depriving himself or his dependents of the
    necessities of life, including food, shelter and clothing
    . . . ."
    G. L. c. 261, § 27A.
    6
    "Normal fees and costs" are those that "a party normally
    is required to pay in order to prosecute or defend the
    particular type of proceeding in which he is involved,"
    including, for example, "filing or entry fees"; "fees and
    related costs for service of process"; "fees and costs for the
    issuance or service of a subpoena and witness fees for trial or
    deposition; jury trial fees; removal fees; costs assessed in a
    bill of costs"; and "fees for the issuance of an injunction,
    restraining order, writ or other process." G. L. c. 261, § 27A.
    7
    "Extra fees and costs" are those that "result when a party
    employs or responds to a procedure not necessarily required in
    the particular type of proceeding in which he is involved,"
    6
    his affidavit that his income was at or below the poverty
    threshold for indigency.8   See G. L. c. 261, § 27A ("Indigent"
    definition [b]).   Reade also filed a letter in which he detailed
    his various sources of income.9   A clerk referred the affidavit
    to a judge because Reade's stated income suggested that he was
    not indigent and because Reade requested a waiver of extra fees
    and costs, which may be approved only by a judge.   See G. L.
    including, for example, "the cost of transcribing a deposition,
    expert assistance and appeal bonds and appeal bond premiums."
    G. L. c. 261, § 27A.
    8
    In his affidavit, Reade indicated a household income of
    approximately $3,400 per month.
    9
    In his letter, Reade indicated that he received "SSI."
    Assuming that this was a reference to Supplemental Security
    Income, the program set forth in Title XVI of the Social
    Security Act, Reade may have qualified as indigent under G. L.
    c. 261, § 27A ("Indigent" definition [a]). Whether he actually
    received such assistance is a matter of considerable doubt,
    however, given his stated income and resource levels. See Roe
    v. Rosencratz, 
    71 Mass. App. Ct. 901
    , 901 (2007) ("neither the
    statute nor the [Instructions to Courts on the Administration of
    the Indigency Court Costs Law (Indigency Instructions)] requires
    the clerk or the judge to ignore other court filings by the
    plaintiff that raise 'significant question[s]' regarding the
    indigency of the plaintiff"). See also 20 C.F.R. § 416.1205
    (2014) (Supplemental Security Income resource limit for
    individual with spouse is $3,000). In any event, Reade does not
    make this argument on appeal, and we consider it waived. See
    Merriam v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 
    464 Mass. 721
    , 722 n.7
    (2013); Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (4), as amended, 
    367 Mass. 921
    (1975). If Reade does, in fact, receive Supplemental Security
    Income, he is free to file a new affidavit so reflecting. See
    G. L. c. 261, § 27B ("indigent party may subsequently file one
    or more supplementary affidavits requesting the waiver,
    substitution or payment by the commonwealth of fees and costs
    not previously granted at any time while the case is still
    pending . . .").
    7
    c. 261, § 27C (3).    After holding a hearing, the judge denied
    the waiver on the ground that Reade's income exceeded the
    poverty threshold for indigency.   A single justice of the
    Appeals Court affirmed.
    Reade then filed a second affidavit of indigency, again
    requesting a waiver of both normal and extra fees and costs.
    This time, however, Reade claimed indigency on the ground that
    he was unable to pay the fees and costs without depriving
    himself or his dependents of the necessities of life.    See G. L.
    c. 261, § 27A ("Indigent" definition [c]).   He also submitted
    the required supplement to the affidavit in which he detailed
    his assets, income, and expenses.10   A clerk referred the
    affidavit to the same judge, again because of Reade's stated
    income and the request for extra fees and costs.   The judge held
    a new hearing and, on the basis of Reade's available assets,
    determined that he was not indigent and again denied the waiver.
    A single justice of the Appeals Court affirmed.
    Undeterred, Reade filed a third affidavit of indigency
    seeking a waiver of normal and extra fees, claiming indigency on
    the ground that he received public assistance in the form of
    veterans' benefits.   See G. L. c. 261, § 27A ("Indigent"
    10
    In the supplement to the affidavit, Reade declared after
    tax income in excess of $40,000 per year, substantial balances
    in his checking and savings accounts, and more than $200,000 of
    equity in his house.
    8
    definition [a]).    Reade included documents demonstrating his
    receipt of the property tax abatement for Massachusetts veterans
    and the monthly disability payments from the Veterans'
    Administration.    A clerk again referred the affidavit to the
    same judge, this time for the additional reason that the
    affidavit was not "regular and complete on its face."    The judge
    held another hearing and, after reviewing all three affidavits,
    concluded that Reade was not indigent because he had the ability
    to pay the normal and extra fees and costs.    A single justice of
    the Appeals Court granted Reade leave to file an interlocutory
    appeal, observing that whether a judge has authority to deny
    indigency status to a person receiving "veteran's benefits" was
    a question with "broad policy ramifications for the
    administration of justice."   Reade filed the appeal, the Appeals
    Court allowed the Office of Court Management of the Trial Court
    to intervene, and we transferred the case to this court on our
    own motion.
    2.   Discussion.    The Indigent Court Costs Law entitles an
    indigent person to a waiver or reduction of certain fees and
    costs incurred during litigation.    G. L. c. 261, § 27C.   Under
    § 27A, first definition, a person is "indigent" if, inter alia,
    he or she receives "receives public assistance under . . .
    veterans' benefits programs."    Reade argues that because he
    receives Federal disability payments and the Massachusetts
    9
    property tax abatement for veterans, the plain language of the
    statute compels the conclusion that he is indigent and therefore
    entitled to a waiver.    We disagree.
    "[I]t is a well-established canon of statutory construction
    that a strictly literal reading of a statute should not be
    adopted if the result will be to thwart or hamper the
    accomplishment of the statute's obvious purpose, and if another
    construction which would avoid this undesirable result is
    possible."    Watros v. Greater Lynn Mental Health & Retardation
    Ass'n, 
    421 Mass. 106
    , 113 (1995).       "The legislative intent in
    enacting a statute is to be gathered from a consideration of the
    words in which it is couched, giving to them their ordinary
    meaning unless there is something in the statute indicating that
    they should have a different significance; the subject matter of
    the statute; the preexisting state of the common and statutory
    law; the evil or mischief toward which the statute was
    apparently directed; and the main object sought to be
    accomplished by the enactment."     Meunier's Case, 
    319 Mass. 421
    ,
    423 (1946).   See Commonwealth v. De'Amicis, 
    450 Mass. 271
    , 273-
    274 (2007) (interpreting indigent court costs statute in light
    of purpose and history).    See also Edwards, petitioner, 
    464 Mass. 454
    , 461 (2013) (same); Underwood v. Appeals Court, 
    427 Mass. 1012
    , 1013 (1998) (same).     With these principles in mind,
    10
    we turn to the legislative history of the statute with an aim
    toward gleaning the Legislature's intent in enacting it.
    The seeds for the Indigent Court Costs Law were planted in
    1970 by the Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, Inc. (MLRI), a
    nonprofit legal advocacy group dedicated to promoting systemic
    legal changes that benefit the poor.   Rodgers, Rap-ups of a
    Retired Reformer:   Stories About How Legal Services Advocates
    Transformed the Laws for Poor People in Massachusetts 81 (2013).
    MLRI's efforts were focused on increasing access to the courts
    for poor people who could not afford to pay filing fees and
    other litigation costs.   
    Id. These efforts
    eventually blossomed
    into 1974 Senate Doc. No. 1099, An Act to relieve indigent
    litigants of burdensome court costs in civil and criminal
    proceedings.   See Rodgers, supra at 81.    The proposed bill
    defined a litigant as "[i]ndigent" where:
    "(1) he receives any federal, state or local public
    assistance, including medical assistance or any rental
    subsidy, or (2) his net income does not exceed the limits
    set out in [§ 27E], or (3) he is otherwise indigent because
    wholly unable to pay the expected total of the fees and
    costs of the proceeding in which he is involved, or is
    unable to do so without depriving himself or his dependents
    of the necessities of life, including shelter, food and
    clothing."
    1974 Senate Doc. No. 1099, § 2.   The legislative purpose
    statement included in the bill made clear that the legislation
    was focused on providing aid to the poor:
    11
    "The General Court hereby finds and declares that many
    litigants in both civil and criminal cases are unable to
    secure due process of law and equal protection of the laws
    in the courts of Massachusetts by reason of being too poor
    to afford the fees and costs (not including attorneys fees)
    incident to such litigation.
    "Therefore, the purpose of this act is to provide for
    the absorption, payment or obviation of such fees and
    costs, initially by the counties and ultimately by the
    Commonwealth.
    "This Act shall be given a liberal construction to the
    end that its broad and humane purposes may be served."
    1974 Senate Doc. No. 1099, § 1.
    The Senate bill was ultimately superseded by 1974 House
    Doc. No. 5859, which trimmed the definition of indigent to a
    person who "is unable to pay the fees and costs of the
    proceedings in which he is involved, or is unable to do so
    without depriving himself or his dependents of the necessities
    of life, including food, shelter and clothing," making it even
    clearer that the statute was only intended to provide waivers to
    litigants who could truly not afford to pay litigation costs.
    Under this version of the statute, which was enacted into law by
    St. 1974, c. 694, § 3, Reade would not have qualified as
    indigent.
    12
    The Senate's version was resurrected in the 1980 amendments
    to § 27A,11 which changed the definition of "[i]ndigent" to a
    person who:
    "(a) . . . receives public assistance under the
    Massachusetts Aid to Families with Dependent Children,
    General Relief or Veteran's Benefits programs or receives
    assistance under Title XVI of the Social Security Act or
    the Medicaid program, 42 U.S.C. 1396, et seq.;
    "(b) [has] income, after taxes, . . . [125] per cent or
    less of the current poverty threshold annually established
    by the Community Services Administration pursuant to
    [§ 625] of the Economic Opportunity Act, as amended; or
    "(c) . . . is unable to pay the fees and costs of the
    proceeding in which he is involved, or is unable to do so
    without depriving himself or his dependents of the
    necessities of life, including food, shelter and clothing."
    St. 1980, c. 539, § 5.12    Reade's position is that the 1980
    amendments reflected an intention by the Legislature to broaden
    the definition of indigent to include a person who receives any
    type of veterans' benefit, regardless of the origin of or reason
    for that benefit.    This position is not sustainable.
    11
    The amendments were proposed in 1980 Senate Doc. No.
    2260.
    12
    As can be seen, the 1980 definition of indigent is
    reminiscent of the original proposed definition found in 1974
    Senate Doc. No. 1099, which, in light of the legislative purpose
    statement, cannot be interpreted reasonably as applying to
    anything other than needs-based benefits. An important
    difference between those two versions, however, was in the
    language of the first definition of indigent, which in the 1974
    version applied broadly to a person receiving "any federal,
    state or local public assistance." See id.at § 2. In contrast,
    the 1980 version listed five specific public assistance
    programs. See St. 1980, c. 539, § 5.
    13
    The 1980 definitional changes may be best understood in the
    context of the amendments as a whole, particularly in tandem
    with the changes made to § 27C.   Prior to 1980, relief from
    court fees and costs had to be approved by a judge.    The 1980
    amendments to § 27C altered this practice by directing the clerk
    to grant relief "forthwith" where a litigant files an affidavit
    that "appears regular and complete on its face and indicates
    that the affiant is indigent, as defined in [§ 27A], and
    requests a waiver, substitution or payment by the commonwealth,
    of normal fees and costs."   St. 1980, c. 539, § 7.   Empowering
    the clerk to grant relief clearly was intended to expedite the
    waiver process in cases involving routine costs and expenses.
    Without the definitional changes to § 27A, the clerk still would
    have been required to engage in the cumbersome process of
    determining whether the payment of fees and costs would deprive
    a litigant of the "necessities of life."   The definitional
    changes circumvented unnecessary delays by capitalizing on
    preexisting systemic determinations of financial need in the
    form of income-poverty guidelines and means-tested public
    assistance programs.
    The first definition of indigent set out in the 1980
    statute created two distinct categories of benefits:    "public
    assistance" under three listed programs, and "assistance" under
    two other listed programs.   St. 1980, c. 539, § 5.   This
    14
    structure is significant, as "[w]ords grouped together in a
    statute must be read in harmony, and we are not free to
    interpret [one provision] in a way that makes it exceptionally
    broader than its neighbors."     Franklin Office Park Realty Corp.
    v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 
    466 Mass. 454
    , 462 (2013).     The first category began with the word
    "Massachusetts," followed by three programs corresponding to
    statutes located in the Public Welfare section of the General
    Laws:     G. L. c. 115 (veterans' benefits); G. L. c. 117, repealed
    by St. 1991, c. 255, § 3 (general relief); and G. L. c. 118 (aid
    to families with dependent children).     Importantly, each of the
    three statutes -- consistent with the original intent of § 27A -
    - premised the receipt of public assistance on financial need.13
    That the Legislature was referring to those specific statutes in
    § 27A is reinforced by other instances in which the Legislature
    has referenced them in concert.     See, e.g., An Act providing
    13
    See St. 1936, c. 413 ("before so aiding any parent the
    board of public welfare . . . shall make an immediate and
    careful inquiry, including the resources of the family and the
    ability of its other members, if any, to work or otherwise
    contribute to its support"); St. 1961, c. 317 ("such [veterans']
    benefits shall not be paid to any person who is able to support
    himself or who is in receipt of income from any source
    sufficient for his support"); St. 1971, c. 908 ("[general
    relief] aid furnished shall be determined by the department on
    the basis of the circumstances surrounding each application
    [and] shall be sufficient to maintain an adequate standard of
    living for the poor and indigent applicant and his immediate
    family who are eligible").
    15
    cost-of-living adjustments for recipients of aid to families
    with dependent children, general relief and veterans' benefits,
    St. 1974, c. 623 (amending G. L. cc. 115, 117, and 118).14
    Further, with respect to the second category, the
    Legislature included only Federal programs and referred to those
    programs specifically by statute.   Had the Legislature intended
    to premise qualification for indigency under § 27A on the
    receipt of Federal veterans' benefits, we infer that it would
    have done so in a manner consistent with its treatment of other
    Federal programs in the same section of the statute.     See
    Commonwealth v. Williamson, 
    462 Mass. 676
    , 681 (2012), quoting
    Commonwealth v. Fall River Motor Sales, Inc., 
    409 Mass. 302
    , 316
    (1991) ("Statutes should be read 'as a whole to produce an
    internal consistency'").   It is also telling that both of the
    Federal statutes referred to in the amended version of § 27A --
    like the aforementioned Massachusetts statutes -- made the
    receipt of benefits contingent on financial need,15 suggesting a
    14
    See also St. 1978, c. 367, § 54B ("An advisory committee
    on the implementation of a wage reporting system is hereby
    created consisting of . . . three persons to be appointed by the
    chairman of the state welfare advisory board one of whom shall
    be a recipient of aid to families with dependent children; one
    of whom shall be a recipient of general relief; and one of whom
    shall be a recipient of veterans' benefits").
    15
    See 42 U.S.C. § 1381a (2012) ("Every aged, blind, or
    disabled individual who is determined under part A of this
    subchapter to be eligible on the basis of his income and
    resources shall . . . be paid benefits" [emphasis added]); 42
    16
    continuation of legislative intent to restrict the meaning of
    16
    "indigent" to persons with limited financial resources.        St.
    1980, c. 539, § 5.    In view of the foregoing, we conclude that
    the 1980 amendment tying indigency to the receipt of "Veteran's
    Benefits" was intended to encompass only the receipt of
    Massachusetts need-based veterans' benefits under G. L. c. 115,
    § 5.    St. 1980, c. 539, § 5.   Because Reade did not receive such
    benefits, he would not have qualified as indigent under the 1980
    version of the statute.
    The next relevant modification to the statute occurred in
    2000 in connection with a bill introduced pursuant to G. L.
    c. 3, § 53 (§ 53).    Section 53 allows counsel to the Senate and
    House of Representatives, see G. L. c. 3, § 51, to make
    recommendations for the "repeal of such statutory provisions as
    have become obsolete or the reasons for the enactment of which
    have ceased to exist," "rejection of superfluous words, [and]
    condensation of all circuitous, tautological and ambiguous
    phraseology into as concise and comprehensive a form as is
    U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2012) ("For the purpose of enabling each State
    . . . to furnish [1] medical assistance on behalf of families
    with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled
    individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient to meet
    the costs of necessary medical services" [emphasis added]).
    16
    Similarly, S.J.C. Rule 3:10, as amended, 
    416 Mass. 1306
    (1993) (assignment of counsel to indigent criminal defendants),
    defines the term "[i]ndigent" to include, inter alia, a person
    receiving "poverty related veterans' benefits."
    17
    consistent with the full and clear expression of the will of the
    general court."    In other words, linguistic changes made
    pursuant to § 53 are generally of a technical, rather than
    substantive, character.     The changes made to § 27A in 2000 are
    no exception.     See St. 2000, c. 313, § 46.
    The 2000 bill, entitled, "An Act making certain corrective
    changes in certain general and special laws," suggested several
    linguistic changes to § 27A, including the removal of the word
    "Massachusetts."    See 2000 Senate Doc. No. 2212.    The word
    "Massachusetts" was likely omitted because it was superfluous.
    As observed above, where the Legislature referred to a non-
    Massachusetts program in § 27A, it did so explicitly by
    including a statutory citation.    The omission of such a citation
    when referring to the other programs sufficed to indicate their
    Massachusetts origins.     See G. L. c. 3, § 53.   See generally
    Hartford Ins. Co. v. Hertz Corp., 
    410 Mass. 279
    , 283 (1991) ("As
    a general rule, when the Legislature has employed specific
    language in one part of a statute, but not in another part which
    deals with the same topic, the earlier language should not be
    implied where it is not present").17
    17
    The Legislature has a long history of revising statutes
    to remove superfluous language. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
    Dana, 
    2 Met. 329
    , 339 (1841) ("One of the objects of the
    revision of our laws was to condense them by change of
    phraseology, and the rejection of all superfluous words, which
    has been frequently done, where there is evidently no change of
    18
    Other modifications to § 27A were prompted by inaccuracies
    in the existing program descriptions.18   The final language
    choices in § 27A reflect an intention to conform the text to the
    language of the specific statutes referenced therein, which is
    consistent with the technical nature of the modifications
    contemplated by § 53.   See Arthur A. Johnson Corp. v.
    Commonwealth, 
    306 Mass. 347
    , 353 (1940), quoting Main v.
    Plymouth County, 
    223 Mass. 66
    , 69 (1916) ("It is a familiar
    principle of statutory construction that mere verbal changes in
    the revision of a statute do not alter its meaning and are
    construed as a continuation of the previous law").
    At oral argument, Reade pointed out the Commonwealth has a
    long tradition of providing preferential treatment to veterans.
    meaning by the change of language or the omission of the
    superfluous parts of the former statutes").
    18
    For example, the term "Veterans' Benefits," as it is
    spelled in G. L. c. 115, previously had been spelled incorrectly
    as "Veteran's Benefits." The initial draft of the bill
    contained an oversight, however, insofar as it retained the
    reference to the obsolete general relief statute, G. L. c. 117,
    which had been superseded by G. L. c. 117A. See. St. 1991,
    c. 255, § 4. Correspondence from the Department of Transitional
    Assistance (department) while the "draft technical correction
    bill" was still in committee pointed out that "the statutory
    definition presently, and as amended, incorrectly cites two
    department programs." The DTA then suggested that the term
    "General Relief" be replaced with "Emergency Aid to the Elderly,
    Disabled and Children." This suggestion was partially adopted
    by way of a handwritten modification to the bill, replacing the
    term "General Relief" with "program of emergency aid for elderly
    and disabled residents," which is the language used in G. L.
    c. 117A, § 1.
    19
    That is undoubtedly true, and where the Legislature has
    indicated such an intention, we have not hesitated to recognize
    the legitimacy of the public interest at stake.   See, e.g.,
    G. L. c. 31, § 26 (affording gradations of civil service
    priority based on veteran and disabled veteran status); Smith v.
    Director of Civil Serv., 
    324 Mass. 455
    , 461 (1949) ("it is open
    to the Legislature to say that, whereas all veterans may be
    preferred because of their service in uniform, the public
    interest is served by additionally preferring those who have
    incurred disability in the course of their service").     However,
    the Indigent Court Costs Law did not originate as a veterans'
    preference law and, as the foregoing legislative history
    demonstrates, the "principle embodied in the statute," as it
    stands today, remains "equal justice under the law:     an indigent
    party should have the financial resources necessary to mount as
    effective a case as a party who is not indigent."   Edwards,
    
    petitioner, 464 Mass. at 461
    .   Reade's argument, that the
    receipt of any veterans' benefits renders a litigant indigent,
    is incompatible with this principle because it would allow
    waivers for individuals who already have ample financial
    resources to afford court fees and other litigation costs.     See
    
    Underwood, 427 Mass. at 1013
    .   We decline to construe § 27A in
    a manner that is plainly inconsistent with its central purpose,
    20
    notwithstanding the susceptibility of the statute's plain
    language to such a construction.    See 
    Watros, 421 Mass. at 113
    .
    Rather, we continue to read § 27A, "Indigent" definition
    (a), as referring to the five specific, need-based public
    assistance programs -- three of which derive from Massachusetts
    law and two which derive from Federal law -- that are listed on
    the form affidavit of indigency prescribed by the Chief Justice
    of this court pursuant to § 27B.    This includes the
    "Massachusetts Veterans Benefits" program, which is presently
    codified at G. L. c. 115, § 5.   Accordingly, Reade's receipt of
    Federal disability payments and the Massachusetts property tax
    abatement for veterans, neither of which is contingent on
    financial need, did not render him a "person who receives public
    assistance under . . . veterans' benefits programs" within the
    meaning of § 27A ("Indigent" definition [a]).    Therefore, Reade
    is not indigent and his request for a waiver of fees and costs
    was properly denied by the judge.
    The question remains, however, whether Reade's third
    request for a waiver of normal fees and costs even should have
    been referred to a judge.   Reade contends that the clerk was
    required to grant the request forthwith, without further
    inspection of the circumstances, because his affidavit was (i)
    regular and complete on its face; (ii) indicated that he was
    indigent by virtue of his selection of "Massachusetts Veterans
    21
    Benefits" on the form affidavit; and (iii) requested a waiver of
    normal fees and costs.   We conclude that the clerk was correct
    to refer the affidavit to a judge.
    The "Instructions to Courts on the Administration of the
    Indigent Court Costs Law" of this court direct the clerk to
    refer the affidavit to a judge where there is a "significant
    question about whether the applicant is indigent."   Here, Reade
    did not simply select "Massachusetts Veterans Benefits" on the
    form affidavit.   Rather, he attached a series of documents
    indicating that the Massachusetts benefit he was contemplating
    was a property tax abatement for disabled veterans, which, as
    discussed above, is not the benefit contemplated by the form.
    Thus, considered as a whole -- i.e., the form affidavit along
    with the attachments -- Reade's affidavit created ambiguity as
    to whether he received veterans benefits within the meaning of
    the first definition of "Indigent" in § 27A.19   Moreover, the
    19
    Nonetheless, we reject the argument of the Office of
    Court Management of the Trial Court that Reade's affidavit was
    "irregular" on its face because it contained an excessive
    estimate of his costs. The form affidavit instructs the
    applicant to "indicate your best guess as to the cost, if
    known." The Indigency Instructions recognize that "[m]ost
    applicants will not know the actual costs of many of these
    services. Therefore, courts should approve otherwise
    appropriate applications for waiver or [S]tate payment and
    insert in the approval the actual or estimated amount of the fee
    or service, as it is known to the court." In other words, where
    the only defect in a qualifying affidavit is an incorrect
    estimation of normal fees and costs, the clerk should approve
    the request at the correct amount.
    22
    clerk was entitled to consider Reade's past affidavits pursuant
    to Roe v. Rosencratz, 
    71 Mass. App. Ct. 901
    , 903 (2007)
    ("previous court filings by the plaintiff for payment of entry
    fees and costs, in which she had represented that she had
    significant assets . . . justified further consideration by the
    clerk and referral to a judge").    Those affidavits reflected
    considerable income and assets, casting additional doubt on
    Reade's claim that he received the need-based benefits afforded
    by the Massachusetts Veterans' Benefits program, G. L. c. 115,
    § 5.    In view of these significant questions about Reade's
    receipt of veterans' benefits, we cannot say that the clerk
    erred in referring the matter to the judge.20
    20
    Section 27C (3) also directs the clerk to refer the
    affidavit to a judge where the applicant requests not only
    normal fees and costs, but also extra fees and costs. This was,
    therefore, another ground on which Reade's affidavit was
    properly referred to the judge. The intervener goes one step
    further, however, by arguing that even if Reade had received
    veterans' benefits within the meaning of § 27A ("Indigent"
    definition [a]), once the affidavit was before the judge on the
    request for extra fees and costs, the judge had discretion under
    § 27C (3) to deny indigency status based on Reade's economic
    circumstances. Although the judge in this case appears to have
    agreed, we do not. If Reade had, in fact, received
    Massachusetts veterans' benefits within the meaning of the first
    definition of "[i]ndigent" under § 27A, he would be indigent and
    entitled to relief. See G. L. c. 261, § 27C (4) ("If the court
    makes a finding of indigency, it shall not deny any request with
    respect to normal fees and costs . . ."). Under those
    circumstances, the judge's discretion would be limited to
    assessing Reade a reasonable partial payment as a substitute for
    the waiver. See 
    id. at §
    27C (6). See also Underwood v.
    Appeals Court, 
    427 Mass. 1013
    , 1013 (1998) ("Requiring litigants
    23
    3.   Conclusion.   For the reasons set forth herein, we
    conclude that the "veterans' benefits" program described in the
    first definition of "[i]ndigent" under G. L. c. 261, § 27A,
    refers to the need-based Massachusetts veterans' benefits
    program presently administered pursuant to G. L. c. 115, § 5.
    Reade does not receive such benefits and therefore he is not
    indigent on that ground.   Consequently, we affirm the judge's
    decision denying Reade's request for a waiver of normal and
    extra court fees and litigation costs.
    So ordered.
    to pay a reasonably reduced filing fee, set within their limited
    financial means, serves the important dual purpose of providing
    equal access to the courts while simultaneously screening out
    frivolous claims").
    

Document Info

Docket Number: SJC 11776

Citation Numbers: 472 Mass. 573

Filed Date: 9/3/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023