WALTER TORMASI v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS) ( 2022 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1024-20
    WALTER TORMASI,
    Appellant,
    v.
    NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
    OF CORRECTIONS,
    Respondent.
    __________________________
    Submitted December 8, 2021 – Decided January 26, 2022
    Before Judges Hoffman, Whipple and Susswein.
    On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
    Corrections.
    Walter Tormasi, appellant pro se.
    Andrew J. Bruck, Acting Attorney General, attorney for
    respondent (Jane C. Schuster, Assistant Attorney
    General, of counsel; Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy
    Attorney General, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Plaintiff, Walter Tormasi, a State Prison inmate, appeals from an agency
    decision by the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC) that purports to
    deny his request to file a patent infringement lawsuit against a computer
    company that he alleges has infringed upon his patent. Pursuant to N.J.A.C.
    10A:4-4.1(a)(3)(xviii)—referred to as the "no business rule"—State Prison
    inmates must receive permission from the prison administrator to file a lawsuit
    for damages. After carefully reviewing the record in light of the governing legal
    principles, we are constrained to remand for the DOC to clarify whether it
    approved or denied Tormasi's request, and if denied, to provide a statement of
    reasons to permit meaningful appellate review.
    We briefly recount the facts and procedural history pertinent to the issues
    raised on appeal. Tormasi has been confined in State Prison since 1996, when
    he was sixteen years old. While in prison, he completed numerous paralegal
    courses and read over 1000 books on technology, mathematics, and other
    subjects. He also invented an improvement "to the actuator mechanism upon
    which hard disk drives depend." In January 2008, he was issued a patent by the
    United States Patent and Trademark Office.        During that time period, he
    persistently violated the "no business" rule by engaging in corporate and
    business activities without permission.
    A-1024-20
    2
    In February 2019, plaintiff sued Western Digital Corp. (WDC) for patent
    infringement. In April 2019, WDC filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's suit for
    lack of standing and capacity to sue. On November 21, 2019, the United States
    District Court for the Northern District of California granted WDC's motion to
    dismiss. Tormasi v. W. Digit. Corp., No. 19-cv-00772-HSG, 
    2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202536
     (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2019).             The District Court found that
    plaintiff lacked capacity to sue but did not reach the issue of standing. 
    Id.
     at
    *5–8. The District Court reasoned that "because New Jersey law prevents
    inmates from 'commencing or operating a business or group for profit or
    commencing or operating a nonprofit enterprise without the approval of the
    Administrator,' [p]laintiff lacks capacity to bring this patent infringement suit."
    Id. at *5.
    On August 20, 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
    Circuit affirmed the District Court order dismissing Tormasi's complaint.
    Tormasi v. W. Digit. Corp., 
    825 F. App'x 783
    , 785 (Fed. Cir. 2020). The Court
    of Appeals reasoned that "Tormasi's attempt to file this lawsuit as a personal
    action merely repackages his previous business objectives as personal activities
    so he may sidestep the 'no business' regulation. Because these actions are a mere
    continuation of his prior business activities, we find that here, as in . . . Tormasi's
    A-1024-20
    3
    previous lawsuit, [his] characterization of his suit as personal, as opposed to
    related to business, to be without merit." Id. at 787.
    On September 30, 2020, Tormasi submitted a request to the New Jersey
    State Prison Administrator seeking approval to sue for patent infringement. On
    October 9, 2020, the Administrator responded with the following decision:
    This office is in receipt of your correspondence
    requesting Administrative approval to file and litigate
    your lawsuits regarding your alleged patent-
    infringement.
    To the extent that your activity does not run afoul of
    [N.J.A.C.] 10A:4-4.1 (.705) and the decisions in
    Tormasi v. Hayman, 
    443 Fed. Appx. 742
    , as well as
    other applicable laws and authorities in this area, you
    have all applicable legal access rights afforded New
    Jersey State Inmates.
    You are encouraged to make use [] of the Law Library
    and/ or the ILA for any legal issues or questions.
    Tormasi interpreted the decision as a denial of his request. On October
    14, 2020, he appealed the Administrator's decision via the electronic grievance
    system.   The administration responded: "Your concerns are noted, but the
    department disagrees with your characterization."        On October 21, 2020,
    Tormasi again challenged the decision via the electronic grievance system. The
    administration responded: "The response is appropriate.       This is the final
    determination of the Administration."
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    4
    Tormasi raises the following issues for our consideration:
    POINT I
    THE DEPARTMENT OVERSTEPPED ITS BOUNDS
    IN REFUSING TO APPROVE TORMASI'S
    LAWSUITS FOR FILING/LITIGATION.
    A.  LEGAL STANDARDS GOVERNING DOC
    RULING
    B. ALLOWANCE OF INTELLECTUAL-PROPERTY
    THEFT
    C. INJURY TO U.S. PATENT SYSTEM AND ITS
    BENEFICIARIES
    D. INCONSISTENCY WITH PRIOR DOC RULING
    E. VIOLATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES
    AND REGULATIONS
    We begin our analysis by acknowledging certain basic principles
    governing this appeal. Although final agency actions are subject to appellate
    review, R. 2:2-3(a)(2), the scope of that review is limited. A final agency action
    will be reversed only if it is "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or it is not
    supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole." Henry v.
    Rahway State Prison, 
    81 N.J. 571
    , 580 (1980) (citing Campbell v. Dep't of Civil
    Serv., 
    39 N.J. 556
    , 562 (1963)). In applying this highly deferential standard,
    courts inquire into "whether the decision conforms with relevant law, whether
    A-1024-20
    5
    there is substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole to support the
    agency's decision, and whether in applying the relevant law to the facts, the
    agency clearly erred in reaching its conclusion." In re State & Sch. Emps.'
    Health Benefits Comm'ns' Implementation of Yucht, 
    233 N.J. 267
    , 280 (2018).
    In order to give the challenged final agency action this deference,
    however, the record must be sufficiently developed to permit meaningful
    review. 
    Ibid.
     If the record is not sufficiently developed to permit meaningful
    review, the court may remand for supplementation of the record. R. 2:5-5(b).
    Importantly, the agency is required to make findings of fact and give a
    statement of reasons.
    [D]eference does not require that we forego a careful
    review of administrative decisions simply because an
    agency has exercised its expertise. We cannot accept
    without question an agency's conclusory statements,
    even when they represent an exercise in agency
    expertise. The agency is "obliged . . . 'to tell us why.'"'
    [Balagun v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 
    361 N.J. Super. 199
    ,
    202–03 (App. Div. 2003) (quoting In re Valley Hosp.,
    
    240 N.J. Super. 301
    , 306 (App. Div. 1990))].
    In this instance, the Administrator's initial response was so cryptic that we
    cannot even be sure whether it constitutes an acceptance or denial of Tormasi's
    request. The replies to Tormasi's two administrative appeals via the electronic
    A-1024-20
    6
    grievance system shed no light on the situation and reveal little more than the
    administration's irritation with Tormasi's persistence.
    If the agency decision was to deny Tormasi's request, that conclusion is
    not supported by any findings of fact. Indeed, no reasons are given either with
    respect to the initial response or the two electronic replies to Tormasi's grievance
    system appeals. In short, if the agency decision is meant to be a denial, the
    agency did not "tell us why." Balagun, 361 N.J. Super. at 202–03 (quoting In re
    Valley Hosp., 
    240 N.J. Super. at 306
    ). Accordingly, we remand the matter to
    DOC for a clearer decision and statement of reasons. See In re Vey, 
    124 N.J. 534
    , 544 (1991) ("When the absence of particular findings hinders or detracts
    from effective appellate review, the court may remand the matter to the agency
    for a clearer statement of findings and later reconsideration."); see also Mainland
    Manor Nursing & Rehab. Center v. N.J. Dep't of Health & Sr. Servs., 
    403 N.J. Super. 562
    , 571 (App. Div. 2008) ("[A]n administrative agency must conduct an
    independent evaluation of all relevant evidence and legal arguments presented
    in support of and in opposition to proposed administrative agency action . . . .
    [F]ailure to do so may make the agency's decision arbitrary and capricious and
    require a remand for reconsideration.") (citation omitted).
    A-1024-20
    7
    We direct DOC to issue a clarified final decision within forty-five days of
    this decision. We offer no opinion on whether permission to file a patent
    infringement action in federal court should be granted. If the final agency
    decision is to deny Tormasi's request for permission to file a patent infringement
    suit, that decision shall include a statement of findings of fact and law that are
    sufficiently detailed to permit meaningful appellate review.       We therefore
    remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    Remanded. We retain jurisdiction.
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    8