Damian Dudley v. Philip MacLaren ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 27 2022 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DAMIAN L. DUDLEY, No. 20-17495 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:19-cv-01237-DGC v. MEMORANDUM* PHILIP MACLAREN, named as Chaplain Maclaren, Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona David G. Campbell, District Judge, Presiding Submitted January 19, 2022** Before: SILVERMAN, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges. Arizona state prisoner Damian L. Dudley appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) arising from his inability to observe Ramadan. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). novo. Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 883 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment because Dudley failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant MacLaren substantially burdened the exercise of Dudley’s religious beliefs. See Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031-32 (9th Cir. 2015) (setting forth elements of a § 1983 free exercise claim); Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125, 1134 (9th Cir. 2015) (setting forth elements of a RLUIPA claim); San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (under RLUIPA, to constitute a substantial burden on religious exercise, a regulation “must impose a significantly great restriction or onus upon such exercise”). The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Dudley’s discovery motion and request for discovery-related sanctions because Dudley failed to demonstrate that MacLaren’s belated filing of supplemental discovery resulted in actual and substantial prejudice to him. See Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a district court’s “decision to deny discovery will not be disturbed except upon the clearest showing that the denial of discovery result[ed] in actual and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on 2 20-17495 appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). AFFIRMED. 3 20-17495