Darryl Wakefield v. Richard Indermill , 588 F. App'x 675 ( 2014 )


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  •                                                                              FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              DEC 18 2014
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DARRYL KENT WAKEFIELD,                           No. 12-15062
    Plaintiff - Appellant,            D.C. No. 1:09-cv-00274-LJO-
    BAM
    v.
    RICHARD INDERMILL; CSPC/CDCR,                    MEMORANDUM*
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted December 9, 2014**
    Before:        WALLACE, LEAVY, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    Darryl Kent Wakefield, a former California state prisoner, appeals pro se
    from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
    violations of his right to free exercise under the First Amendment and the
    Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). We have
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Shakur v. Schriro, 
    514 F.3d 878
    , 883 (9th Cir. 2008), and may affirm on any ground supported by the
    record, Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 
    534 F.3d 1116
    , 1121 (9th Cir.
    2008). We affirm.
    The district court properly granted summary judgment on Wakefield’s First
    Amendment claim because Wakefield failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
    fact as to whether the denial of weekly religious services was not rationally related
    to a legitimate penological interest in maintaining prison security. See O’Lone v.
    Estate of Shabazz, 
    482 U.S. 342
    , 350-53 (1987) (restraint on inmate’s ability to
    exercise his religion does not violate the First Amendment if it is reasonably
    related to a legitimate penological interest).
    Summary judgment on Wakefield’s RLUIPA claim was proper because
    Wakefield failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether denying
    him weekly communion and foot washing services in the Security Housing Unit
    was not the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest,
    in light of defendant’s evidence that less restrictive measures were actually
    considered and rejected. See Greene v. Solano Cnty. Jail, 
    513 F.3d 982
    , 986-90
    (9th Cir. 2008) (setting forth RLUIPA standard); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 
    544 U.S. 709
    , 725 n.13 (2005) (“[P]rison security is a compelling state interest, and . . .
    2                                    12-15062
    deference is due to institutional officials’ expertise in this area.”).
    AFFIRMED.
    3                            12-15062