Anthony Hernandez Navarro v. Kim Holland , 698 F. App'x 541 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
OCT 10 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANTHONY PAUL HERNANDEZ No. 15-55152
NAVARRO,
D.C. No. 5:14-cv-00210-DOC-SH
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM *
KIM HOLLAND, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 2, 2017 **
Pasadena, California
Before: M. SMITH and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and SETTLE, District Judge.***
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Benjamin H. Settle, United States District Judge for
the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
1
Petitioner-Appellant Anthony Paul Hernandez Navarro (“Navarro”) appeals
the district court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking relief
from a jury conviction in state court. Specifically, he argues that the state
appellate court erred in upholding (1) the state trial court’s credibility
determination and (2) the state trial court’s denial of his motion for a new trial.
We review de novo a district court’s decision on a petition for writ of habeas
corpus. Hall v. Haws, 861 F.3d 977, 988 (9th Cir. 2017). We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.1
1. Navarro argues that the state appellate court’s decision upholding the trial
court’s adverse credibility determination was objectively unreasonable. This court
may grant relief if the state court’s adjudication on the merits “resulted in a
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
“[A] federal court may not second-guess a state court’s fact-finding process unless,
after review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court was not
merely wrong, but actually unreasonable.” Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999
(9th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984,
1
The request for judicial notice, filed by Navarro on December 13,
2016, is granted.
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999–1000 (9th Cir. 2014). Federal habeas courts have “no license to redetermine
credibility of witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by the state trial court,
but not by them.” Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983); accord
Mann v. Ryan, 828 F.3d 1143, 1153 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 137 S.
Ct. 1091 (2017). The state appellate court concluded that there was sufficient
evidence to support the trial court’s adverse credibility determination, including
because the witness had a criminal history and had an incentive not to be labeled a
“snitch.” Navarro has failed to show that this decision was more than wrong and
actually unreasonable. Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999. Moreover, federal habeas courts
afford great deference to the credibility determinations of the state trial court.
Marshall, 459 U.S. at 434. Therefore, the district court properly denied Navarro’s
petition on this issue.
2. Navarro argues that the state court’s denial of his motion for new trial
violated his due process right to a fair trial. “The mere existence of newly-
discovered evidence does not constitute grounds for federal habeas corpus relief
unless the evidence bears upon the constitutionality of the petitioner’s detention.”
Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 922 (1980)
(citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963)). “It must be shown that the
newly discovered evidence would probably have resulted in the defendant’s
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acquittal.” Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Quigg,
616 F.2d at 1112). In this case, the state court fulfilled its constitutional duties by
accepting the proffered testimony and determining that it would not probably result
in Navarro’s acquittal. Therefore, Navarro has failed to show that the state
appellate court’s decision affirming the trial court’s denial of a new trial resulted in
a decision that was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
3. Finally, Navarro moves the panel to expand the certificate of
appealability pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 22-1(e). We have reviewed the issue
and conclude that reasonable jurists would not disagree with the district court’s
resolution of his sufficiency of the evidence claim. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 484 (2000). Thus, we decline to expand the certificate of appealability.
AFFIRMED.
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