Ex Parte Jeffery Pool ( 2018 )


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  •                          COURT OF APPEALS
    SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    FORT WORTH
    NO. 02-18-00124-CR
    EX PARTE JEFFERY POOL
    ----------
    FROM THE 30TH DISTRICT COURT OF WICHITA COUNTY
    TRIAL COURT NO. 187,799-A
    ----------
    MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
    ----------
    Appellant Jeffery Pool appeals the trial court’s denial of his application for
    a writ of habeas corpus. Because the court of criminal appeals has determined
    that pretrial habeas proceedings are not an appropriate avenue for raising a
    claim related to the Interstate Agreement on Detainer’s Act (IAD), we dismiss the
    appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Ex parte Doster, 
    303 S.W.3d 720
    , 727 (Tex.
    Crim. App.), cert. denied, 
    560 U.S. 957
    (2010).
    1
    See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
    Background
    This case centers upon the extradition of Pool from Washington to Texas.
    The State of Texas indicted Pool for two counts of aggravated robbery in July
    2015. At the time, he was incarcerated in Washington state. Texas began the
    extradition process by filing a petition under Article IV of the IAD. See Tex. Code
    Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.14 (West 2018). Pool contested the extradition in the
    Washington trial court. The trial court appointed an attorney to represent Pool,
    held a hearing, and approved the extradition to Texas. The Washington trial court
    entered the following findings:
    1. That the defendant, Jeff[er]y Lamont Pool, is the same person
    whose temporary custody has been requested by the District
    Attorney’s Office, Wichita, Texas;
    2. That there is an outstanding warrant pending against defendant
    Jeff[er]y Lamont Pool, in the 30th Judicial District Court, State of
    Texas; and
    3. That the request for temporary custody of the defendant is in
    proper form and complies with the Interstate Agreement of
    Detainers.
    Once in Texas, Pool filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in which
    he alleged that Washington state had violated the requirements of the IAD during
    the extradition process. He specifically alleged that Washington did not hold him
    for 30 days as required by article 51.14, Article IV(a); that the appropriate party
    did not approve, record, or transmit the request as required by article 51.14,
    Article IV(a); that information required to be transmitted under article 51.14,
    Article IV(b) was not transmitted; and that he was not provided a meaningful
    2
    opportunity to challenge the legality of the extradition as required by article 51.14,
    Article IV(d) and due process. See 
    id. Article IV(a)–(b),
    (d).
    The trial court held a hearing, during which Pool’s attorney advanced the
    same arguments.      The trial court denied Pool’s application and this appeal
    followed.
    Discussion
    It is well-established that appellate courts must be careful “to ensure that a
    pretrial writ is not misused to secure pretrial appellate review of matters that in
    actual fact should not be put before appellate courts at the pretrial stage.”
    Ex parte Smith, 
    178 S.W.3d 797
    , 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (internal quotation
    marks omitted). This is because pretrial habeas relief “should be reserved for
    situations in which the protection of the applicant’s substantive rights or the
    conservation of judicial resources would be better served by interlocutory
    review.” Ex parte Weise, 
    55 S.W.3d 617
    , 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
    The court of criminal appeals has already determined that judicial economy
    is not served through the interlocutory appeal of the denial of an IAD-based
    pretrial writ application and has therefore concluded that “pretrial habeas
    proceedings are not an appropriate avenue for raising an IAD claim.” 
    Doster, 303 S.W.3d at 726
    –27.        Pool has not addressed the Doster opinion in his
    arguments, and we are bound by the decisions of the court of criminal appeals,
    see Wiley v. State, 
    112 S.W.3d 173
    , 175 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet.
    3
    ref’d). We therefore dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App.
    P. 43.2(f).
    Conclusion
    Having held that we lack jurisdiction, we dismiss this appeal. See 
    Doster, 303 S.W.3d at 727
    ; Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f).
    /s/ Bonnie Sudderth
    BONNIE SUDDERTH
    CHIEF JUSTICE
    PANEL: SUDDERTH, C.J.; WALKER and BIRDWELL, JJ.
    DO NOT PUBLISH
    Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
    DELIVERED: August 16, 2018
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-18-00124-CR

Filed Date: 8/16/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/18/2018