in Re Prentis B. Tomlinson, Jr., Trustee of the Slattery Trust ( 2019 )


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  • Opinion issued June 27, 2019
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    For The
    First District of Texas
    ————————————
    NO. 01-19-00324-CV
    ———————————
    IN RE PRENTIS B. TOMLINSON, JR., TRUSTEE OF THE SLATTERY
    TRUST, Relator
    Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Relator, Prentis B. Tomlinson, Jr., Trustee of the Slattery Trust, filed a petition
    for writ of mandamus seeking to compel the respondent trial judge to vacate his
    February 12 and 14, 2019 post-judgment turnover orders in the underlying
    proceeding.1 With his petition, relator included a notice of related appeal stating that
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    The underlying case is John Khoury v. Prentis B. Tomlinson, Jr., Cause No. 2012-
    61491, pending in the 281st District Court of Harris County, Texas, the Honorable
    Christine Weems presiding.
    he, in his individual capacity, had filed a related notice of appeal on March 14, 2019,
    from the same trial court cause number 2012-61491, challenging the same two
    turnover orders challenged in his petition, and that appeal was assigned to appellate
    cause number 01-19-00183-CV. Relator’s petition contends, among other things,
    that he has no adequate remedy by appeal because he, as trustee, is not a party to the
    turnover proceeding where he, in his individual capacity, is the defendant and, thus,
    he cannot appeal the turnover orders as trustee. In any event, relator claims that he
    does not need to show lack of an adequate appellate remedy because the turnover
    orders are void.
    Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, available only when the relator can
    show both that: (1) the trial court clearly abused its discretion or violated a duty
    imposed by law; and (2) there is no adequate remedy by way of appeal. In re Ford
    Motor Co., 
    165 S.W.3d 315
    , 317 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer,
    
    827 S.W.2d 833
    , 839–40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
    This Court requested and received a response to the petition. Real party in
    interest John Khoury contends that the petition should be denied because relator, in
    his individual capacity, is currently exercising his appellate remedy by appealing the
    same two February 12 and 14, 2019 turnover orders that he challenges in this
    petition. This Court also requested and received a response from the real party in
    interest to relator’s emergency motion to stay enforcement of the two post-judgment
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    turnover orders. Relator also filed a reply in support of his petition and a supplement
    to his emergency motion stating that Khoury has recently set a contempt motion, a
    request for injunction, and a motion to consolidate for a June 21, 2019 hearing in the
    trial court.
    A judgment creditor is entitled to assistance from a court of appropriate
    jurisdiction to reach property to obtain satisfaction of a judgment and a turnover
    order is one means of providing such assistance. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
    ANN. § 31.002(a), (b) (West 2008); see also In re Bradberry, No. 12-12-00162-CV,
    
    2012 WL 3201928
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler Aug. 8, 2012, orig. proceeding) (mem.
    op.). Generally, turnover orders are final, appealable orders and, thus, must be
    attacked on direct appeal. See Burns v. Miller, Hiersche, Martens & Hayward, P.C.,
    
    909 S.W.2d 505
    , 506 (Tex. 1995) (turnover order was final, appealable judgment);
    see also In re Bradberry, No. 12-12-00162-CV, 
    2012 WL 3201928
    , at *1 (citing
    Davis v. West, 
    317 S.W.3d 301
    , 309 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.)).
    Relator has an adequate remedy by appeal for which he, in his individual
    capacity, is currently exercising by appealing the same two February 12 and 14, 2019
    turnover orders that he challenges, as trustee, in this petition. Thus, because that
    appeal remains pending under 01-19-00183-CV, for which he has not shown is an
    inadequate remedy for challenging the validity of those orders, relator is exercising
    his adequate appellate remedy. See 
    Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839
    –40 (mandamus relief
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    is not available when adequate appellate remedy exists); see also In re Bradberry,
    No. 12-12-00162-CV, 
    2012 WL 3201928
    , at *2 (denying mandamus petition
    because relator had not shown that appeal was inadequate remedy for challenging
    turnover order).
    Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus because relator, in
    his individual capacity, is exercising his adequate appellate remedy. We dismiss all
    pending motions as moot.
    PER CURIAM
    Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Higley and Hightower.
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