Jeremiah M. Matthews v. State , 530 S.W.3d 744 ( 2017 )


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  • Affirmed and Opinion filed August 1, 2017.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-16-00913-CR
    JEREMIAH M. MATTHEWS, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 182nd District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 1466348
    OPINION
    Appellant Jeremiah M. Matthews appeals his conviction for attempted capital
    murder. In a single issue appellant argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction because
    the grand jury that indicted him sat in a different Harris County District Court than
    the one in which his case was heard. We conclude that the indictment vested
    jurisdiction in the trial court, and appellant did not preserve for review any
    procedural defect. We affirm.
    I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    The State filed a complaint alleging that appellant committed attempted
    capital murder. The complaint was assigned to the 182nd District Court in Harris
    County.
    An indictment was later filed in the 182nd District Court, and signed by the
    grand jury foreman of the 179th District Court. The trial court proceedings were
    conducted in the 182nd District Court. After appellant pleaded “guilty” to attempted
    capital murder, the trial court ordered a presentence investigation report and
    reconvened for the punishment phase. Following the punishment hearing, the trial
    court assessed punishment at confinement for 45 years in the Institutional Division
    of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
    II. ISSUE AND ANALYSIS
    Appellant argues that the trial court—the 182nd District Court of Harris
    County—lacked jurisdiction because the grand jury of a different court—the 179th
    District Court of Harris County—presented the indictment. Appellant relies on the
    grand jury foreman’s stamp on the indictment to support his argument that the grand
    jury of the 179th District Court presented the indictment. Appellant contends that a
    grand jury serves a particular court, not a particular county, and therefore, when the
    179th District Court’s grand jury presented the indictment, it did not vest jurisdiction
    over the case in the 182nd District Court. According to appellant this means of
    presentment created a jurisdictional defect that can be raised for the first time on
    appeal. Our Houston sister court recently considered and rejected this argument in
    Davis v. State, 
    519 S.W.3d 251
    (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. filed).
    “Any procedural challenge to the transfer of a case within a county is . . . determined
    and resolved by proper application of local rule promulgated pursuant to
    constitutional and statutory authority; it is not a jurisdictional defect.” 
    Id. at 256
                                               2
    (citing Tex. Gov’t Code § 74.094 (West 2015)); Bourque v. State, 
    156 S.W.3d 675
    ,
    678 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. ref’d). We agree with our sister court and hold
    that appellant waived this issue for appellate review.
    Criminal district courts have original jurisdiction in felony criminal cases.
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 4.05 (West 2015). To vest a court with jurisdiction
    of a criminal action, a grand jury must present an indictment or information charging
    a person with committing an offense. Tex. Const. art V, § 12(b); see Tex. Code Crim.
    Proc. art. 20.21 (West 2015). Appellant asserts that because a trial court acquires
    jurisdiction upon presentment of the indictment, the trial court did not acquire
    jurisdiction because the indictment was not properly presented.
    A district court forms and impanels a grand jury and empowers it to inquire
    into indictable offenses, including attempted capital murder. See Tex. Code Crim.
    Proc. Ann. art. 20.09 (West 2015) (“The grand jury shall inquire into all offenses
    liable to indictment of which any member may have knowledge, or of which they
    shall be informed by the attorney representing the State, or any other credible
    person.”); Ex parte Edone, 
    740 S.W.2d 446
    , 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). After
    hearing testimony, a grand jury votes concerning the presentment of an indictment.
    See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 20.19 (West 2015); Ex parte 
    Edone, 740 S.W.2d at 448
    . After presentment, the State files the indictment in a court with jurisdiction
    to hear the case. Cook v. State, 
    902 S.W.2d 471
    , 476 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995);
    
    Bourque, 156 S.W.3d at 677
    . All state district courts within the same county have
    jurisdiction over the same cases. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 74.094; 
    Davis, 519 S.W.3d at 254
    .
    Although a specific district court may impanel a grand jury, all cases returned
    by that grand jury are not necessarily assigned to that court. 
    Bourque, 156 S.W.3d at 678
    . A case assigned to a district court other than the district court to which the
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    grand jury presented the indictment amounts only to a procedural irregularity, not a
    jurisdictional defect. See 
    Davis, 519 S.W.3d at 254
    ; see also Tamez v. State, 
    27 S.W.3d 668
    , 671 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, pet. ref’d) (no jurisdictional defect where
    grand jury empaneled by 232nd Judicial District Court of Harris County returned
    indictment, which was later filed in 180th Judicial District Court of Harris County);
    see also Mosley v. State, 
    172 Tex. Crim. 117
    , 120, 
    354 S.W.2d 391
    , 393–94 (1962)
    (rejecting “jurisdictional” challenge where defendant was tried and convicted in
    district court other than one that empaneled grand jury even though record contained
    no transfer order). An objection to a procedural irregularity must be raised in the trial
    court. 
    Tamez, 27 S.W.3d at 671
    . Appellant did not raise his complaint in the trial
    court.
    The accused waives a defect in a charging instrument unless the accused raises
    it before trial. See Studer v. State, 
    799 S.W.2d 263
    , 268–69 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990);
    see also Ex parte Matthews, 
    873 S.W.2d 40
    , 41 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Fisher v.
    State, 
    887 S.W.2d 49
    , 60–61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (addressing whether an
    indictment is facially incomplete and analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence in
    relation to that indictment); State v. Yount, 
    853 S.W.2d 6
    , 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)
    (considering whether an indictment is sufficient if it indicates an offense date that is
    barred by the statute of limitations, and holding that “jurisdiction was conferred upon
    the trial court by the presentment of the charging instrument, even if the charging
    instrument was flawed”). If the defendant fails to direct the trial court’s attention to
    the defects in the charging instrument before trial, the defendant may not raise those
    defects on appeal. See Martin v. State, 
    346 S.W.3d 229
    , 232 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.). The indictment in this case is a written instrument
    presented to a court by a grand jury charging a person with the commission of an
    offense, and appellant does not argue otherwise. See Tex. Const. art. V, § 12(b);
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    Martin, 346 S.W.3d at 231
    –33. Thus, the presentment of the indictment vested the
    trial court with jurisdiction, regardless of any irregularity as to which grand jury
    presented the indictment. See Tex. Const. art. V, § 12(b); 
    Martin, 346 S.W.3d at 231
    –33. Appellant’s indictment reflects that it was filed with the Harris County
    District Clerk and signed by the grand jury foreman of the 179th District Court. The
    indictment charges appellant with attempted capital murder, a felony offense.
    Therefore, the indictment was properly presented to vest the 182nd District Court
    with jurisdiction of appellant’s case. So, to avoid waiver, appellant had to raise any
    objection to proceeding in the 182nd—a procedural irregularity—in the trial court.
    See 
    Davis, 519 S.W.3d at 256
    . Appellant did not complain to the trial court about
    this alleged defect or about proceeding in the 182nd District Court. Appellant filed
    no motion to quash or other pretrial motion complaining of the alleged defect.
    Appellant failed to preserve error on his complaint. We overrule appellant’s sole
    issue on appeal and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    /s/       Kem Thompson Frost
    Chief Justice
    Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Jamison and Busby.
    Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
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