Lisa Atkins-January v. State Office of Risk Management ( 2017 )


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  •                                     In The
    Court of Appeals
    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
    ____________________
    NO. 09-16-00439-CV
    ____________________
    LISA ATKINS-JANUARY, Appellant
    V.
    STATE OFFICE OF RISK MANAGEMENT, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 60th District Court
    Jefferson County, Texas
    Trial Cause No. B-197,001
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Lisa Atkins-January (January or Appellant) filed this appeal complaining of
    an order granting summary judgment in favor of the Texas State Office of Risk
    Management (SORM or Appellee) and dismissing all of Appellant’s workers’
    compensation claims with prejudice. We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    January is a former employee of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
    (TDCJ). SORM serves as the workers’ compensation insurance carrier for TDCJ.
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    On November 17, 2012, while employed by TDCJ, January sustained a work-related
    injury when she tripped and fell. After pursuing a workers’ compensation claim, a
    hearing officer of the Texas Department of Insurance–Division of Workers’
    Compensation (“the Division”) concluded as follows:
    The credible evidence established that the compensable injury
    includes a right elbow contusion, a left elbow contusion, a left hip
    injury, and a right ankle sprain/strain. The credible evidence did not
    establish that the compensable injury includes left knee internal
    derangement and an HNP at L4-L5.
    On December 16, 2014, the hearing officer signed a decision and order that
    contained findings of fact and conclusions of law. The decision explained that
    [t]he claimant did not present a doctor’s testimony or written
    statement which explains how the on-the-job accident/mechanism of
    injury caused or aggravated these two conditions. As a result, she failed
    to prove that the compensable injury includes left knee internal
    derangement or an HNP at L4-L5.
    The Appeals Panel of the Division subsequently affirmed the hearing officer’s
    decision and order, making the hearing officer’s decision the “final decision”
    effective March 9, 2015.
    January then filed the instant lawsuit in April of 2015, seeking judicial review
    of the Division’s final decision with respect to the extent of her injuries caused by
    the on-the-job accident in 2012. SORM filed an answer and propounded written
    2
    discovery seeking, in relevant part, information related to the causation of January’s
    claimed conditions.
    SORM filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment in August of 2016,
    after the applicable discovery period had expired. Therein, SORM argued that
    . . . no evidence has been produced or disclosed and none exists[]
    which could support the conclusion, within a reasonable degree of
    medical probability, that the conditions claimed by the Plaintiff of left
    knee internal derangement and HNP at L4-L5 would not have resulted
    or have been aggravated but for her work-related injury of November
    17, 201[2]. As such, given the absolute lack of evidence in support of
    causation of the claimed medical conditions in this case, an essential
    element to the Plaintiff’s claim, Defendant is entitled to summary
    judgment pursuant to Rule 166a(i) of the Texas Rules of Civil
    Procedure.
    January filed no response to the motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the
    trial court entered a “Final Summary Judgment” granting summary judgment in
    favor of SORM, affirming the final decision of the Division and “dispos[ing] of all
    claims and all parties[.]” Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.
    ANALYSIS
    Initially, we note that we must construe Appellant’s brief liberally as
    Appellant appears pro se in this appeal. See Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 
    767 S.W.2d 686
    , 690 (Tex. 1989). Nevertheless, pro se litigants must still comply with the
    briefing rules, applicable laws, and rules of procedure. See Washington v. Bank of
    3
    N.Y., 
    362 S.W.3d 853
    , 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no. pet.) (citing Mansfield
    State Bank v. Cohn, 
    573 S.W.2d 181
    , 184-85 (Tex. 1978)).
    Under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appellant’s brief is required
    to contain “a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate
    citations to authorities and to the record.” Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). “Rule 38 requires
    [a party] to provide us with such discussion of the facts and the authorities relied
    upon as may be requisite to maintain the point at issue.” Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v.
    Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 
    106 S.W.3d 118
    , 128 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
    2002, pet. denied). When the appellate issue is unsupported by argument or lacks
    citation to the record or legal authority, nothing is presented for review. See Valadez
    v. Avitia, 
    238 S.W.3d 843
    , 845 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.); Nguyen v.
    Kosnoski, 
    93 S.W.3d 186
    , 188 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.). Our
    sister court has explained as follows:
    It is the Appellant’s burden to discuss her assertions of error. An
    appellate court has no duty—or even right—to perform an independent
    review of the record and applicable law to determine whether there was
    error. Were we to do so, even on behalf of a pro se appellant, we would
    be abandoning our role as neutral adjudicators and become an advocate
    for that party.
    
    Valadez, 238 S.W.3d at 845
    (citations omitted). Accordingly, an appellant may
    forfeit error through her failure to brief adequately. See Fredonia State Bank v. Gen.
    Am. Life Ins. Co., 
    881 S.W.2d 279
    , 284-85 (Tex. 1994) (“error may be waived by
    4
    inadequate briefing[]”); McKellar v. Cervantes, 
    367 S.W.3d 478
    , 484 n.5 (Tex.
    App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.) (“Bare assertions of error, without argument or
    authority, waive error.”); 
    Washington, 362 S.W.3d at 854-55
    ; In re Lester, 
    254 S.W.3d 663
    , 668 n.3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, orig. proceeding). If a party fails
    to advance a viable argument on appeal with citations to appropriate authority, an
    appellate court is not required to conduct an independent review of the record and
    applicable law to determine whether any error occurred. See Happy Harbor
    Methodist Home, Inc. v. Cowins, 
    903 S.W.2d 884
    , 886 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
    Dist.] 1995, no writ) (“We will not do the job of the advocate.”).
    In this matter, Appellant’s brief consists of one page that does not identify a
    legal issue and does not assert a point of error supported by “clear and concise”
    argument.1 Moreover, Appellant has provided no record references nor any citations
    to relevant legal authority. We conclude that, due to the inadequacy of her brief,
    Appellant has waived her issues on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); Fredonia
    State 
    Bank, 881 S.W.2d at 284
    . Finding that nothing has been preserved for our
    1
    Appellant attaches numerous exhibits to her brief. A reviewing court may
    not consider evidence that was not before the trial court at the time it made its
    decision. See Univ. of Tex. v. Morris, 
    344 S.W.2d 426
    , 429 (Tex. 1961). With limited
    exceptions not relevant to this appeal, an appellate court may not consider materials
    outside the appellate record. See In re K.M., 
    401 S.W.3d 864
    , 866 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.).
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    review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. See Martinez v. El Paso Cty., 
    218 S.W.3d 841
    , 845 (Tex. App.—El Paso, 2007, pet. struck); see also 
    Washington, 362 S.W.3d at 854-55
    .
    AFFIRMED.
    _________________________
    LEANNE JOHNSON
    Justice
    Submitted on June 20, 2017
    Opinion Delivered August 3, 2017
    Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.
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