Aundre James Simien Sr. v. Tanika Michelle Simien-Rideau ( 2017 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
_________________
NO. 09-15-00445-CV
_________________
AUNDRE JAMES SIMIEN SR., Appellant
V.
TANIKA MICHELLE SIMIEN-RIDEAU, Appellee
________________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 317th District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. C-215,371
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
This divorce originated in the 317th District Court. Appellant, Aundre James
Simien, Sr. appeals a final judgment entered in the case by the presiding judge of the
136th District Court.1 In three issues, Aundre argues that the trial court that entered
1
We note at the outset that both the 136th and the 317th Judicial Districts are
located in Jefferson County. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 24.238(a), 24.625 (West
2004). Although the final judgment and post-trial pleadings identify the 136th
District Court in their respective captions, the record from the Jefferson County
District Clerk’s office indicates that the case remained docketed in the 317th District
Court through the time of appeal.
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the divorce decree lacked jurisdiction to do so and complains about provisions in the
decree that provide for the division of the community estate. For the reasons set forth
below, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Jurisdiction
This case was originally filed in the 317th District Court and was called to
trial before an associate judge sitting in that court. Aundre objected to the associate
judge hearing the case, and the case was then “assigned to Judge Milton Gunn
Shuffield to preside.”2 The final hearing was continued to allow the parties to prepare
a joint inventory. Following the continuance, Judge Shuffield called the case to trial
and heard evidence over the course of several days, and thereafter, signed and
entered a Final Decree of Divorce. The record contains no indication that Aundre
objected to the assignment of Judge Shuffield to hear the case or enter orders at the
time of assignment, before or during the trial on the merits, at the hearing on Tanika’s
request to enter a final order, or in his Motion for New Trial.
In his first issue on appeal, Aundre argues that the 136th District Court did
not have jurisdiction to enter any divorce decree or custody order because there was
no motion or order to transfer the case into that court from the 317th District Court.
2
The Honorable Milton Shuffield was the presiding judge of the 136th
District Court at the time of the assignment.
2
The Texas Constitution expressly permits District Judges to “exchange
districts, or hold courts for each other when they may deem it expedient[.]” Tex.
Const. art. V, § 11. The Texas Government Code also provides district judges wide
discretion to temporarily exchange benches with the judge of another district court
in the county, hear and determine matters pending in other district courts within the
county, and transfer civil or criminal cases to the docket of another district court
within the same county. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 24.003 (West Supp. 2016).
Aundre argues that “[t]he exclusive transfer provisions provided in . . . section
155.202 [of the Texas Family Code] negate the ability to transfer cases freely
between District Courts and [sic] the same county.” Aundre’s reliance on section
155.202 under the facts of this case is misplaced, however, as that subchapter applies
specifically to proceedings in which one trial court has acquired continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction over a matter as a result of the rendition of a final order
pertaining to a child, and a party seeks to initiate or transfer subsequent proceedings
relating to that child in or to a different court. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 155.001(a),
(c) (West Supp. 2016). The cases Aundre cites in support of his argument are also
inapplicable, as both cases involve transfers of suits from courts that had acquired
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the respective matters. See Alexander v.
Russell, 699 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Tex. 1985) (holding that jurisdiction could not be
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transferred from the court that originally established conservatorship of a child to
another district court without a proper motion and transfer order); Kirby v. Chapman,
917 S.W.2d 902, 907–08 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, no writ) (finding that a
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the custody order of
another district court that had acquired continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the
matter).
In this case, there was no transfer of the proceedings from the 317th District
Court to the 136th District Court; rather, there was an assignment for Judge Shuffield
to preside, as explicitly permitted by section 24.003 of the Texas Government Code
irrespective of Chapter 155 of the Texas Family Code. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §
24.003(b)(2). Moreover, even if the proceedings were deemed “transferred,” no
court had acquired continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the matter prior to entry
of a final order. See Tex. Fam. Code § 155.001(a). Therefore, the assignment of
Judge Shuffield to preside over the matter was not subject to the procedures for
transfer of suits affecting the parent-child relationship set forth in Chapter 155. See
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 155.204 (West 2014).
Aundre also cites section 74.053(a) of the Texas Government Code in support
of his assertion that a written notice or order was required to properly convey
jurisdiction. This reliance is likewise misplaced, because “[w]hen judges exchange
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districts or hold court for each other, [s]ection 74.053 of the Government Code does
not apply.” Gonzalez v. Ables, 945 S.W.2d 253, 254 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997,
orig. proceeding). Further, nothing in section 24.003 of the Government Code or
article V, section 11 of the Texas Constitution requires a written order or explanation
for an exchange of benches by district judges. See Mata v. State, 669 S.W.2d 119,
121 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Accordingly, we overrule Aundre’s first issue.
Property Division
In his second issue, Aundre argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
awarding Tanika a disproportionate division of the community estate. Specifically,
Aundre contends that the trial court awarded Tanika sixty percent of the community
property and that “[n]o conceivable explanation justifies this disproportionate
division.”
The Texas Family Code provides that in divorce cases, the trial court “shall
order a division of the estate of the parties in a manner that the court deems just and
right, having due regard for the rights of each party and any children of the
marriage.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 7.001 (West 2006). We review a trial court’s
division of marital property under an abuse of discretion standard, and “indulge
every reasonable presumption in favor of the proper exercise of discretion.” Massey
v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391, 398 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
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“The party attacking the property division bears the heavy burden of showing that
the trial court’s property division was not just and right.” Pletcher v. Goetz, 9 S.W.3d
442, 446 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied). Thus, it is Aundre’s burden to
show not only that “an inequality in the division of the community property was
manifestly unjust . . . but also that such inequality is of such substantial proportions
that it constitutes an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.” King v. King, 661 S.W.2d
252, 255 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ).
The record before us indicates that the parties prepared and submitted a joint
inventory that the trial court used in its division of the marital estate; however, the
inventory was not admitted as an exhibit at trial and does not otherwise appear in the
appellate record. The record from the trial on the merits does contain some testimony
from Aundre and Tanika about their respective valuations of some items of
community property, such as the marital home and retirement accounts; however,
neither the record nor Aundre’s brief provide the overall value of the marital estate
or the relative value of the community property awarded to each party. Based on the
record before us, we are unable to conclude that the property division was
disproportionate, much less so disproportionate as to constitute an abuse of the trial
court’s discretion. We hold that Aundre has not met his burden on this issue. See
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Levesque v. Levesque, No. 04-05-00146-CV, 2006 WL 47044, at *2 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio Jan. 11, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Motion for New Trial
In his final issue on appeal, Aundre complains that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying his motion for new trial based on the sufficiency of the
evidence to support what Aundre characterizes as a disproportionate property
division. Like legal and factual sufficiency of evidence, we review a trial court’s
denial of a motion for new trial for abuse of discretion. See Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc.
v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922, 926 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam). “A trial court abuses its
discretion if it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner without reference to any
guiding rules or principles.” Bowie Mem’l Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex.
2002).
As discussed above, we find that Aundre has failed to meet his burden to show
that the trial court’s division of the marital estate was manifestly unjust. See King,
661 S.W.2d at 255. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by denying Aundre’s motion for new trial on that basis. See Hinkle v. Hinkle, 223
S.W.3d 773, 783 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.).
Having overruled all of Aundre’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
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AFFIRMED.
______________________________
CHARLES KREGER
Justice
Submitted on November 15, 2016
Opinion Delivered August 3, 2017
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.
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