L.S. v. James Shawn III ( 2018 )

NUMBER 13-17-00224-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
L.S., Appellant,
v.
JAMES SHAWN III, Appellee.
On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4
of Travis County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Benavides
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rodriguez
Appellant L.S. appeals the dissolution of the protective order against her father,
appellee James Shawn III. We reverse and render.1
1 This cause is before the Court on transfer from the Third Court of Appeals in Austin pursuant to
an order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West, Westlaw
through 2017 1st C.S.). Because this is a transfer case, we apply the precedent of the Third Court of
Appeals to the extent it differs from our own. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
I. BACKGROUND
L.S. filed an application for a protective order against Shawn on January 27, 2014.
At the hearing on her application, L.S. testified that Shawn sexually abused her from the
age of five until she was seventeen years old. L.S. testified that Shawn threatened “to
hunt me down and kill me when I least expected it” if she told anyone about the abuse.
According to L.S., Shawn made a display of killing small animals in front of her to
demonstrate the violence he would inflict on her. L.S. disclosed the abuse when she
was a senior in high school. Shawn pleaded guilty to indecency with a child and was
sentenced to eight years’ deferred adjudication community supervision. See TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 21.11 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). As part of his community
supervision, Shawn was prohibited from owning a firearm and from contacting L.S.
L.S. testified that she sought a protective order when Shawn’s community
supervision expired. According to L.S., she continued to fear Shawn because of his
repeated threats throughout her childhood. She testified that other than at the hearing
for the protective order, she had not seen her father since she first disclosed the abuse,
and she had no desire to see him ever again. L.S. asked the court for a lifetime
protective order.
The trial court heard testimony from Shawn’s current wife, his therapist, and his
probation officer, who testified that Shawn had been a model probationer and husband
since the abuse was revealed and that he had strictly complied with all legal requirements
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placed upon him. These witnesses testified that Shawn had never expressed any
hostility against L.S. and that he had not contacted her in ten years.
The trial court proposed a long-term protective order, but with a “review date”
midway to determine whether the order was still necessary. Counsel for L.S. assented
to the trial court’s proposal for a review hearing but requested a lifetime protective order
prohibiting Shawn from owning firearms. Counsel argued that such an order was
justified in light of Shawn’s crimes and threats towards L.S.
Counsel for Shawn asked that the protective order be limited to two years so that
Shawn could resume his lifelong passion for bird hunting. Counsel argued that a two-
year term was warranted because Shawn had not demonstrated any aggression toward
L.S. and because he had rigorously complied with the terms of his community supervision
and sex-offender registration.
After hearing argument, the trial court issued a criminal protective order pursuant
to the code of criminal procedure (“the Order”). See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
7A.01 et seq. (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). The Order prohibited Shawn from
possessing firearms or ammunition, from approaching L.S.’s residence or work address,
and from communicating with her, among other directives. The Order stated that it was
effective for ten years, with a review hearing to be held in three years.
Three years later, the trial court held the review hearing. Shawn moved to
terminate the protective order. L.S. again testified concerning her father’s sexual abuse
and threats, as well as his display of ripping the head off a dove to demonstrate the
violence he would inflict on her if she disclosed the abuse. She expressed skepticism
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that Shawn had changed, as well as fear and profound discomfort at the prospect of
Shawn being allowed to own firearms.
The trial court dissolved the Order. In its place, the trial court issued a trespass
warning directing Shawn not to appear at L.S.’s property. The trial court also warned
Shawn that any unwanted communication with L.S. could be considered harassment or
possibly a terroristic threat. The court placed no limitation on Shawn’s ability to possess
firearms.
By three issues, L.S. appeals the dissolution of the Order.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
The code of criminal procedure allows victims of sexual assault and other offenses2
to obtain a protective order lasting the lifetimes of the victim and the offender, or for any
shorter period determined by the trial court. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts.
7A.01(a)(1)–(2), 7A.07(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). If the court finds that
“there are reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant is the victim of sexual assault
or abuse, stalking, or trafficking,” the court “shall issue a protective order . . . .” See id.
art. 7A.03 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). “No additional showings beyond
status as a crime victim are required to obtain the order.” R.M. v. Swearingen, 510
S.W.3d 630, 633 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.). The trial court has discretion over
the content of the order, which may include a prohibition on carrying a firearm. See TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 7A.05(a).
2 Criminal protective orders are also available to victims of continuous sexual abuse of a young
child, indecency with a child, aggravated sexual assault, stalking, trafficking of persons, continuous
trafficking of persons, or compelling prostitution. R.M. v. Swearingen, 510 S.W.3d 630, 633 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 2016, no pet.); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 7A.01(a)(1)–(2) (West, Westlaw through 2017
1st C.S.).
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III. APPLICATION
A. Authority to Review Order
By her first issue, L.S. argues that the trial court had no authority to review the
Order. L.S. contends that when the Order was issued on February 10, 2014, it was final
and appealable. L.S. asserts that the trial court’s plenary power and jurisdiction to
modify or dissolve the Order therefore expired thirty days after its issuance.
We agree that the Order was final and appealable. Protective orders are
appealable when issued unless they are (1) rendered against a party in an ongoing suit
for dissolution of a marriage, or (2) rendered against a party in an ongoing suit affecting
the parent-child relationship. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 81.009 (West, Westlaw
through 2017 1st C.S.); In re Keck, 329 S.W.3d 658, 661 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2010, no pet.) (combined appeal & orig. proceeding); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 7A.04. Here, because the Order was not rendered as part of an ongoing family
law proceeding, it was final and appealable when issued.
Nonetheless, the trial court retained jurisdiction to modify the Order throughout its
pendency. The family code provides a trial court with authority to modify an existing
protective order. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 87.001 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st
C.S.). That modification provision is made applicable to criminal protective orders. See
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 7A.04. Therefore, during the effective period of a
protective order, the trial court retains the power and jurisdiction to modify the order by
either deleting or adding items to the order. In re S.S., 217 S.W.3d 685, 687 (Tex. App.—
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Eastland 2007, no pet.); Cooke v. Cooke, 65 S.W.3d 785, 788 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001,
no pet.).3
Thus, though the Order was final and appealable when it was rendered on
February 10, 2014, the trial court nonetheless retained jurisdiction over the Order in 2017.
See In re S.S., 217 S.W.3d at 687.
Also within her first issue, L.S. challenges the trial court’s ability to hold a “review
hearing” without any party requesting such a hearing, and doing so after a final protective
order had been rendered.4 However, in 2014, counsel for L.S. assented to the review
hearing, saying, “If we want to put a review date in five years and come back and see
what’s going [sic], that’s fine.” Thus, L.S. waived this argument.
We overrule L.S.’s first issue.
B. Rescission of Order
By her second issue, L.S. argues that Shawn had no statutory right to ask the trial
court to rescind the Order and that the trial court erred in dissolving the Order at Shawn’s
behest. She cites article 7A.07, which provides that the “following persons may file at
3 Protective orders have often been compared to permanent injunctions, and this statutory authority
to modify protective orders is consistent with a court’s common law power to modify injunctions. See B.C.
v. Rhodes, 116 S.W.3d 878, 881–82 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.); Kelt v. Kelt, 67 S.W.3d 364, 366
(Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.); Striedel v. Striedel, 15 S.W.3d 163, 164 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000,
no pet.); James v. Hubbard, 985 S.W.2d 516, 518 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.); see also In re
I.E.W., No. 13-09-00216-CV, 2010 WL 3418276, at *9 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 27, 2010, no pet.)
(mem. op.). A trial court generally retains jurisdiction to review, open, vacate, or modify a permanent
injunction upon a showing of changed conditions. Pidgeon v. Turner, 538 S.W.3d 73, 84 (Tex. 2017), cert.
denied, 138 S. Ct. 505 (2017); City of San Antonio v. Singleton, 858 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tex. 1993) (per
curiam).
4 As the transfer court for this case has noted, post-order review hearings are not unprecedented
in other family law settings—for instance, they are statutorily required in child placement cases. See Jasek
v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 348 S.W.3d 523, 529–30 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, no pet.)
(citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.501(b) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.)).
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any time an application with the court to rescind the protective order: (1) a victim [of
sexual assault or certain other offenses] who is 17 years of age or older or a parent or
guardian acting on behalf of a victim who is younger than 17 years of age . . . .” TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 7A.07(b)(1). L.S. notes that “offenders” are not listed among
the parties who may apply to have a protective order rescinded, and she contends that
this omission was a conscious choice by the Legislature.
This issue presents a question of statutory construction that we review de novo.
TIC Energy & Chem., Inc. v. Martin, 498 S.W.3d 68, 74 (Tex. 2016). Our objective is to
ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s intent as expressed in the statute’s language.
Id.
As support, L.S. relies on R.M. v. Swearingen, in which the court concluded that
the rescindment mechanism described in article 7A.07(b) is not available to offenders.
510 S.W.3d at 633.5 We agree with the Swearingen court’s determination that criminal
code section 7A.07 offers no aid to offenders. Id. at 634. That article provides that a
“victim” or an underage victim’s “guardian” may file an application to rescind a protective
order, but it makes no mention that “offenders” may file such an application. TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 7A.07(b). We presume that the Legislature chooses a statute’s
language with care, including each word chosen for a purpose, while purposefully omitting
words not chosen. Fort Worth Transp. Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 841 (Tex.
5 There is another rescindment provision in the family code which provides offenders with a right
to challenge the “continuing need” for a family protective order. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 85.025(b)
(West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). However, by its terms, this rescindment procedure does not apply
to criminal protective orders. Id. § 85.025(b-3).
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2018). The rescindment provision in code of criminal procedure article 7A.07 does not
give offenders a right to seek rescindment of the Order.6
However, the trial court held its review hearing with L.S.’s assent. Moreover, the
trial court did not grant Shawn’s motion to dissolve the Order; instead, the court appeared
to act on its own motion in dissolving the Order and instead issuing a trespass warning.
We therefor overrule L.S.’s second issue.
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In L.S.’s third issue, she argues that the trial court erred in basing its decision on
whether she had a reasonable continuing fear of Shawn, which she claims is irrelevant to
her entitlement to a protective order. L.S. contends that because Shawn introduced no
evidence concerning the criteria that are actually relevant, the evidence is insufficient to
support the trial court’s dissolution of the Order.
We review the trial court’s ruling on a protective order for sufficiency of the
evidence. Clements v. Haskovec, 251 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2008,
no pet.). Again, under the current statute, if the court finds that “there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the applicant is the victim of sexual assault or abuse, stalking, or
trafficking,” the court “shall issue a protective order that includes a statement of the
6 The Swearingen court concluded that because the wording of article 7A.07 excludes offenders,
an offender therefore lacks standing to challenge a criminal protective order. Swearingen, 510 S.W.3d at
634. Under Texas law, the standing inquiry consists of three elements: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered
an injury which is concrete and particular to the plaintiff, and which is actual or imminent; (2) there must be
a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; (3) it must be likely that the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision. Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 154–55 (Tex.
2012). Even if an offender who moves to vacate a protective order is properly considered a “plaintiff” under
the standing inquiry, there is no doubt that the offender is directly, particularly, and causally affected by a
protective order restricting their actions and that dissolution of the order would certainly address their
complaint. Accordingly, we express no opinion on whether article 7A.07 affects or relates to an offender’s
standing, as opposed to the offender’s statutory right to challenge the protective order.
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required findings.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 7A.03 (emphasis added). “No
additional showings beyond status as a crime victim are required to obtain the order.”
Swearingen, 510 S.W.3d at 633.
L.S. points out that previous versions of the statute required applicants to
demonstrate two elements before a criminal protective order would issue: that there
were “reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant is (1) the victim of a sexual assault;
and (2) the subject of a threat that reasonably places the applicant in fear of further harm
from the alleged offender.” Act of June 20, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 836, § 1, 2003
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 836 (Vernon); see Garcia v. Tautenhahn, 314 S.W.3d 541,
544–45 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2010, no pet.).
However, in subsequent amendments, the Legislature removed the requirement
to demonstrate a continuing threat and fear of further harm. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 7A.03. According to bill analysis, the impetus for this change was as follows:
The requirement of a threat of further harm thwarts the original purpose of
the sexual assault protective order statute by denying relief to some victims
who fear continued emotional abuse from their assailant. H.B. 649 allows
protective orders for victims of sexual assault without requiring the victim to
show a threat of future harm by the assailant.
Swearingen, 510 S.W.3d at 633 n.2 (quoting Senate Research Ctr., Bill Analysis, Tex.
H.B. 649, 82nd Leg., R.S. (2011)).
The only criterion that remains relevant is whether there are reasonable grounds
to believe the underlying offense occurred. This inquiry would be affected by newly
discovered evidence of actual innocence, but not by evidence of the applicant’s fears.
Shawn produced no evidence that L.S. was not the victim of sexual assault.
Rather, the only witness at the review hearing was L.S., who testified in detail concerning
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Shawn’s abuse, for which Shawn had previously pleaded guilty to felony indecency with
a child. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(d). Accordingly, we agree with L.S. that the
rescindment of the Order was not supported by sufficient evidence. See Clements, 251
S.W.3d at 84.
We sustain L.S.’s third issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court’s ruling and render judgment reinstating L.S.’s protective
order against Shawn.
NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ
Justice
Delivered and filed the
29th day of August, 2018.
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