allstate-insurance-company-v-anne-amy-and-michael-spellings-masons ( 2012 )

Opinion issued June 28, 2012
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-11-01065-CV
———————————
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant
V.
ANNE (“AMY”) AND MICHAEL SPELLINGS, MASON’S MILL AND
LUMBER CO., INC., JESSE LEON, MACKENZIE PATRICK DAVIS,
MASON SPELLINGS, ROBERT GRANT CLAY, AND ESCALANTE’S
MEXICAN GRILLE, Appellees
On Appeal from the 281st District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2010-51824-A
OPINION
Appellant, Allstate Insurance Company, challenges the trial court’s rendition
of summary judgment in favor of appellees, Anne (“Amy”) and Michael Spellings,
Mason’s Mill and Lumber Co., Inc., Jesse Leon, Mackenzie Patrick Davis, Mason
Spellings, Robert Grant Clay, and Escalante’s Mexican Grille, in Allstate’s suit
against appellees for equitable subrogation. In its sole issue, Allstate contends that
the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees on its
equitable-subrogation claim.
We affirm.
Background
On June 30, 2009, Amber Jeffrey, who was seventeen years of age, lost
control of the car that she was driving, struck another car, occupied by Helen and
Jim Haywood, and died as a result of injuries she sustained in the collision. An
autopsy performed on Amber’s body revealed that she was legally intoxicated at
the time of the collision.
Allstate, the liability insurer for Amber and her father, Scott Jeffrey, paid the
Haywoods $1,350,973 in damages for the severe injuries they sustained in the
collision. The Haywoods then signed releases in favor of Allstate and the
Jeffreys.1
1
Specifically, the Haywoods expressly released Allstate, the Jeffreys, and “all other
persons, firms or corporations liable or, who might be claimed to be liable” from
claims “which have resulted or may in the future develop from” the collision. We
do not address the enforceability of the releases as to appellees.
2
On August 19, 2010, Scott Jeffrey filed a wrongful-death suit against
appellees and others related to the death of Amber.2 In his petition, Scott alleged
that on the night of the collision, Michael and Amy Spellings, who were the
parents of Amber’s best friend Sara Spellings, had allowed Amber to be provided
with alcoholic beverages at a warehouse of a company owned by the Spellings.
Scott also alleged that Amy Spellings had “introduced Amber to alcohol” and the
Spellings had “cultivated a safe haven” for minors “to consume and abuse
alcohol.” Scott brought suit against appellees for, among other things, violations
of the Texas Alcohol Beverage Code,3 wrongful death, negligence, negligence per
se, and attractive nuisance. He sought recovery of actual damages, pain and
suffering damages, medical expenses, mental anguish damages, and exemplary
damages.
Allstate filed a plea in intervention in Scott’s wrongful-death suit, alleging
that it had provided automobile and liability insurance coverage to the Jeffreys,
which was in effect on the date of the collision. It argued that it had a justiciable
interest in the litigation because it had “made medical, bodily injury, property
damage and collision payments to or for the benefit of Jim and Helen Haywood
2
Scott filed his suit after Allstate had settled Helen Haywood’s claim but before
Allstate settled Jim Haywood’s claim. However, the timing of the Haywoods’
settlements is not material to our analysis of whether Allstate is entitled to pursue
equitable subrogation in the instant proceedings.
3
See TEX. ALCOHOL BEV. CODE ANN. § 2.02(b), (c) (Vernon Supp. 2011).
3
and Scott Jeffrey and/or the Estate of Amber Jeffrey.” In its petition, Allstate
sought to “adopt and incorporate” Scott’s allegations against appellees for
“negligence and liability,” and it asserted a claim for equitable subrogation.
Allstate contended that it is entitled to “recover the amounts paid to the Haywoods
in auto liability coverage, umbrella coverage, and property damage coverage.”
Specifically, Allstate asserted that “it was caused to make payments on the
insurance coverage afforded to Scott Jeffrey and/or Amber Jeffrey” and, as a
result, it incurred as its damages liability payments in the amount of $500,000 and
umbrella liability payments in the amount of $850,973.4
Appellees filed answers to Allstate’s plea, contending that Allstate had no
contribution or subrogation rights in Scott’s wrongful-death suit. Appellees then
filed summary-judgment motions, arguing that Allstate is precluded from seeking
reimbursement for payments it had made to the Haywoods “under any legal theory
or type of subrogation” because “Allstate stands in the shoes of its insured(s) for
subrogation purposes” and a “settling tortfeasor” like Allstate “has no right to
contribution.” Appellees noted that the Haywoods had made claims only against
the Jeffreys and Allstate for the severe injuries that they sustained in the collision,
Allstate had conducted an “extensive investigation” of the collision, and Allstate
4
Allstate also alleged that it had incurred damages as a result of making property-
damage payments, but a claim for those amounts was not disposed of by the
challenged summary judgment and it is not at issue in this appeal.
4
had concluded that Amber was the “sole cause” of the collision. Appellees
attached to their summary-judgment motions Allstate claim documents and the
releases that the Haywoods had executed.
In its summary-judgment response, Allstate contended that it was entitled to
“step into the shoes” of the Haywoods to “pursue reimbursement for the monies
paid out for medical, bodily injury, property damage and collision claims.”
Allstate argued that it “takes on the claims and defenses of the Haywoods because
it paid for the Haywoods’ damages” and it should be allowed to proceed on its
claims against appellees because they were “primarily responsible for the
accident.”5 Allstate attached to its summary-judgment response evidence that the
Spellings had provided alcohol to minors, including Amber, and the Spellings and
appellees had engaged in other negligent conduct.
The trial court granted appellees summary judgment on Allstate’s claims
“seeking a recovery based upon payments made to the Haywoods.” The trial court
5
Alternatively, Allstate contended that it was entitled to “step into the shoes” of
Scott or Amber’s Estate. As explained below, on appeal, Allstate contends only
that it is entitled to pursue equitable subrogation by standing “in the injured
parties’ shoes,” i.e., the Haywoods.
5
then severed Allstate’s equitable-subrogation claim in which it sought recovery of
payments made to the Haywoods.6
Standard of Review
To prevail on a summary-judgment motion, a movant has the burden of
proving that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and there is no genuine
issue of material fact. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339,
341 (Tex. 1995). When a defendant moves for summary judgment, he must either
(1) disprove at least one essential element of the plaintiff’s cause of action or (2)
plead and conclusively establish each essential element of his affirmative defense,
thereby defeating the plaintiff’s cause of action. Cathey, 900 S.W.2d at 341;
Yazdchi v. Bank One, Tex., N.A., 177 S.W.3d 399, 404 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2005, pet. denied). When deciding whether there is a disputed, material fact
issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non-movant will be
taken as true. Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548–49 (Tex.
1985). Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant
and any doubts must be resolved in his favor. Id. at 549.
6
Scott’s wrongful-death suit against appellees and Allstate’s petition in intervention
seeking recovery of property damage payments made to Scott remained pending in
the trial court following the severance.
6
Equitable Subrogation
In its sole issue, Allstate argues that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of appellees on its equitable-subrogation claim
because summary-judgment evidence demonstrated that it involuntarily paid a
third party debt in circumstances that favor equitable relief. Allstate emphasizes
that its equitable-subrogation claim “is not based on its standing” in the shoes of its
insureds, i.e., the Jeffreys, but rather “is based on its standing in the Haywoods’
shoes.”
First, we note that Allstate is not arguing in this appeal that the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment because it is entitled to recover, through
contractual or equitable subrogation, amounts that it paid directly to the Jeffreys.
Those claims are not before us. Second, we note that Allstate is not asserting that,
as a settling tortfeasor, it is entitled to stand in the shoes of the Jeffreys and recover
damages from appellees for amounts that it “overpaid” in settling the Haywoods’
claims. Allstate does not dispute that Texas law prohibits a settling tortfeasor that
paid more than its proportionate share of liability from seeking contribution from
other tortfeasors. See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Jinkins, 739 S.W.2d 19, 22 (Tex.
1987) (stating that “defendant can settle only his proportionate share of a common
liability and cannot preserve contribution rights under either the common law or
the comparative negligence statute by attempting to settle the plaintiff’s entire
7
claim”). Third, Allstate does not contend that it obtained an assignment of the
Haywoods’ potential causes of action against appellees, which, we note, would
also be foreclosed under Texas law. See Int’l Proteins Corp. v. Ralston-Purina
Co., 744 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex. 1988) (stating that “it is contrary to public policy
to permit a joint tortfeasor the right to purchase a cause of action from a plaintiff to
whose injury the tortfeasor contributed” and that joint tortfeasor “could settle only
its proportionate share of liability and could not preserve a right to contribution by
taking an assignment of” injured party’s cause of action). Instead, Allstate
contends only that, by standing in the shoes of the Haywoods, it is allowed to
“equitably subrogate against other responsible parties” in Scott’s wrongful-death
suit.
Equitable subrogation “allows a party who would otherwise lack standing to
step into the shoes of and pursue the claims belonging to a party with standing.”
Frymire Eng’g Co., Inc. ex rel. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jomar Int’l, Ltd., 259
S.W.3d 140, 142 (Tex. 2008). Texas courts interpret the doctrine of equitable
subrogation “liberally,” and the doctrine applies “in every instance in which one
person, not acting voluntarily, has paid a debt for which another was primarily
liable and which in equity should have been paid by the latter.” Id. In sum, “a
party seeking equitable subrogation must show it involuntarily paid a debt
primarily owed by another in a situation that favors equitable relief.” Id.; see also
8
Mid-Continent Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 236 S.W.3d 765, 774 (Tex. 2007)
(stating that “equitable (or legal) subrogation does not depend on contract but
arises in every instance in which one person, not acting voluntarily, has paid a debt
for which another was primarily liable and which in equity should have been paid
by the latter”). When equitable subrogation applies, “the insurer stands in the
shoes of the insured, obtaining only those rights held by the insured against a third
party, subject to any defenses held by the third party against the insured.” Id.; see
also Bennett Truck Transp., LLC v. Williams Bros. Const., 256 S.W.3d 730, 733
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (“When an insurer pays a loss, the
insurer becomes equitably subrogated to its insured’s rights and stands in the
insured’s shoes against the tortfeasor who caused the loss.”).
Allstate asserts that its equitable-subrogation claim has been “expressly
approved” by the Texas Supreme Court in Frymire, in which a hotel owner hired a
general contractor for a remodeling job, and the general contractor subcontracted
the heating, ventilation, air conditioning, and sheet metal work to Frymire. 259
S.W.3d at 141–42. The subcontract between Frymire and the general contractor
required Frymire to pay for any damages caused to the general contractor or hotel
owner by Frymire’s work and to obtain liability insurance to cover this indemnity
obligation. Id. at 142. Frymire, in compliance with its contractual obligation,
purchased a general liability policy from Liberty Mutual. Id.
9
While Frymire was installing a valve on a water line, the water line ruptured
at the point where the valve was being installed, causing extensive water damage
to the hotel. Id. The hotel owner sought indemnification from Frymire according
to the terms of the subcontract, Liberty Mutual paid the hotel owner on Frymire’s
behalf, and the parties signed an agreement releasing Frymire and Liberty Mutual
from all claims stemming from the incident. Id. Subsequently, Frymire, “by and
through Liberty Mutual,” sued the manufacturers of the valve to recoup the
indemnification payment. Id. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor
of the manufacturer, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that Frymire lacked
standing to assert its claims because it had failed to establish a right to equitable
subrogation. Id.
In reviewing the propriety of the trial court’s summary judgment, the
supreme court first considered whether Frymire’s indemnity payment had
extinguished a tort debt primarily owed by another. Id. at 142–43. The court
concluded that Frymire had presented summary-judgment evidence demonstrating
that a design defect in the manufacturer’s valve “primarily caused the rupture,”
and, thus, the manufacturer was “primarily responsible” for the water damage. Id.
at 144. Next, the supreme court considered whether the indemnity payment made
by Frymire had been “involuntary.” Id. at 144–45. The supreme court stated that a
“payment is voluntary when the payor acts without any assignment or agreement
10
for subrogation, without being under any legal obligation to make payment, and
without being compelled to do so for the preservation of any rights or property.”
Id. at 145 (citation omitted). Noting that Frymire had paid the hotel owner “to
satisfy contractual indemnity obligations” that it owed to the general contractor,
the supreme court concluded that Frymire had “acted to satisfy a legal obligation
and to protect its interests under the contract” and, thus, it had “involuntarily
extinguished a debt primarily owed by [the manufacturer] to the hotel owner.” Id.
at 146. Finally, the supreme court considered whether the circumstances favored
equitable relief. Id. Noting that the hotel owner had elected not to pursue tort
claims against the manufacturer, the court concluded that, in light of the
evidentiary presumption that the manufacturer’s faulty product “primarily” caused
the water damage, the manufacturer would be unjustly enriched if Frymire was not
permitted to pursue its claims. Id.
In comparing the instant case to Frymire, Allstate asserts that the “summary-
judgment evidence shows” that the Spellings and other appellees “provided alcohol
to minors” and engaged in “drag racing” and “other negligent conduct.” Allstate
asserts that the evidence raises a fact issue on whether the debt it paid was
“primarily owed by another,” and it characterizes “the basis” of Scott’s underlying
wrongful-death suit as determining “who is primarily liable for this accident.”
Allstate further asserts that it involuntarily paid the Haywoods based upon a
11
“contractual/legal obligation for the protection” of the Jeffreys. Finally, Allstate
argues that because its settlement payment “adequately compensated” the
Haywoods, who did not file suit against appellees, appellees would be unjustly
enriched if Allstate is not permitted to pursue its equitable-subrogation claim
against them.7
The Frymire case is substantively distinguishable, and Allstate’s attempt to
bring an equitable-subrogation claim on the instant facts stretches any such claim
beyond the boundaries previously recognized by Texas courts. As noted above,
the supreme court has explained that an insurer bringing an equitable-subrogation
claim “stands in the shoes” of its insured and obtains “only those rights held by the
insured against a third party, subject to any defenses held by the third party against
the insured.” Mid-Continent Ins. Co., 236 S.W.3d at 774. Allstate concedes that it
is not attempting to stand in the shoes of its insureds to recover from appellees
amounts that it paid to its insureds. Rather, Allstate is seeking to stand in the shoes
of the Haywoods and recover from appellees amounts that it paid to the Haywoods
as the liability insurer of the Jeffreys.
7
Allstate’s arguments assume that its settlement payments, made expressly on
behalf of it and the Jeffreys, made the Haywoods whole. Although it appears
undisputed that the Haywoods did not file suit against appellees, this fact does not
demonstrate that the Haywoods were made whole or were “adequately
compensated.”
12
The Texas Supreme Court’s opinion in Frymire does not support Allstate’s
efforts to bring an equitable-subrogation claim against appellees in these
circumstances. The supreme court in Frymire expressly noted that Liberty Mutual,
the insurer, was bringing suit “through” Frymire, its insured, who had purchased
the Liberty Mutual policy to fulfill an express contractual indemnity obligation.8
259 S.W.3d at 142. Frymire owed both the general contractor and the hotel owner
an indemnity obligation for the water damage, and there was no dispute that
Liberty Mutual’s policy applied to the damage. Id. The supreme court expressly
noted that Frymire’s “situation” was not “much different” than that of a typical
“property insurer” and stated, “[I]nsurance policies are contracts, too, and if the
hotel’s property insurer had paid the hotel for the cost of repairs pursuant to a
policy agreement, it would certainly be able to assert an equitable subrogation
claim against [the valve manufacturer].” Id. at 145; see also Bennett Truck
Transp., LLC, 256 S.W.3d at 733 (allowing “common carrier” that had paid
property owner for damage sustained during transport to pursue equitable-
8
Allstate notes that, on remand, the Dallas Court of Appeals stated that Frymire
stood “in the shoes of the injured party.” Frymire Eng’g Co., Inc. v. Jomar, No.
05-04-01717-CV, 2008 WL 4838414, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 10, 2008, no
pet.). However, the supreme court in Frymire emphasized that the indemnity
obligation owed by Frymire to the hotel owner was not “much different” than that
of a typical “property insurer.” Frymire Eng’g Co., Inc. ex rel. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Jomar, 259 S.W.3d 140, 145 (Tex. 2008). Thus, we conclude that the
Dallas Court of Appeals’ statement, made upon remand, does not provide a basis
on which Allstate is entitled to stand in the shoes of the Haywoods and pursue
recovery of its insurance payments by intervening in Scott’s wrongful-death suit
against appellees.
13
subrogation claim against negligent third party after noting that “common carriers
are generally liable as insurers for any loss or injury to the property occurring
during transport”). Thus, Frymire had a legal duty to satisfy its contractual
indemnity obligation by paying the hotel owner for the water damage, and, in
doing so, it involuntarily extinguished a debt primarily owned by another. 259
S.W.3d at 145; see also Bennett Truck Transp., LLC, 256 S.W.3d at 734
(concluding that common carrier that had paid owner for property damage had not
“voluntarily pa[id] the owner’s entire damages” but instead had been “required to
do so because of its status as a common carrier” and insurer of property).
Here, attempting to fit its claim into the Frymire framework, Allstate asserts
that the Jeffreys had “voluntarily contracted for insurance with Allstate to cover
any damages caused in an automobile accident, as well as a policy for excess
coverage.” (Emphasis added). But Allstate does not dispute that the terms of its
liability policy provided for liability payments to the Haywoods based only upon
the fault of its insured.9 To the extent that Allstate made any payments exceeding
the amounts owed in proportion to the fault of its insured, such payments would
have been voluntary. Thus, we conclude that Allstate is not entitled to recoup the
payments it made to the Haywoods by intervening in Scott’s wrongful-death suit
9
This is not to say that, in making the settlement payments, Allstate or the Jeffreys
admitted fault.
14
and bringing an equitable-subrogation claim against appellees.10 Accordingly, we
hold that the trial court did not err in granting appellees summary judgment.
We overrule Allstate’s sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Terry Jennings
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Jennings and Keyes.
10
In regard to the voluntariness element of an equitable-subrogation claim, the Texas
Supreme Court has explained that an “insurer who pays a third-party claim against
its insured is not a volunteer if the payment is made in good faith and under a
reasonable belief that the payment is necessary to its protection.” Keck, Mahin &
Cate v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 20 S.W.3d 692, 702 (Tex.
2000). In Keck, the supreme court was addressing claims brought by an excess
liability insurer alleging that it had been “forced to settle a third party claim for too
much because the attorneys and primary carrier had mishandled the defense.” Id.
at 695. In support of its holding, the supreme court cited a case from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and a case from the Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals involving similar fact patterns, i.e., claims brought by an excess
insurer against either its insured or a primary insurer seeking reimbursement of
amounts owed under a primary policy. Id. (citing Arkwright–Boston Mfrs. Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Aries Marine Corp., 932 F.2d 442, 447 (5th Cir. 1991) and Argonaut
Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 869 S.W.2d 537, 542 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
1993, writ denied)). The circumstances surrounding the subrogation claims in
those cases were materially different than those present in the instant case.
Allstate has not cited any cases that would support an insurer bringing an
equitable-subrogation claim on facts similar to those presented here.
15