Christopher Allen Snyder v. State ( 2018 )

Opinion issued August 30, 2018
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-18-00062-CR
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CHRISTOPHER ALLEN SNYDER, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 207th District Court
Comal County, Texas1
Trial Court Case No. CR2016-800
MEMORANDUM OPINION
1
Pursuant to its docket equalization authority, the Supreme Court of Texas
transferred this appeal to this Court. See Misc. Docket No. 18–9010 (Tex. Jan. 12,
2018); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Vernon 2013) (authorizing
transfer of cases).
After appellant, Christopher Allen Snyder, without an agreed punishment
recommendation from the State, pleaded guilty to the offense of aggravated sexual
assault of a child under fourteen years of age,2 a jury assessed his punishment at
confinement for fifty years and a fine of $10,000. In his sole issue, appellant
contends that the trial court’s judgment should be modified.
We modify the trial court’s judgment and affirm as modified.
Background
A Comal County Grand Jury issued a true bill of indictment, alleging that
appellant, on or about July 24, 2016, “did then and there intentionally or knowingly
cause the penetration of the male sexual organ of [the complainant], a child younger
than 14 years of age, with the mouth of [appellant], and during commission of said
assault, [appellant] did use or exhibit a deadly weapon, to-wit, saliva of [appellant],
that in a manner of its use or intended use was capable of causing death or serious
bodily injury.”3 Further, it alleged that appellant, on or about July 24, 2016, “did
then and there intentionally or knowingly cause the male sexual organ of [the
complainant], a child younger than 14 years of age, to contact the mouth of
[appellant], and during commission of said assault, [appellant] did use or exhibit a
2
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(iii), (a)(2)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2017).
3
See id. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(iii), (a)(2)(A)(iv), (f)(2).
2
deadly weapon, to-wit: saliva of [appellant], that in the manner of its use or intended
use was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.”4
Before trial, the State moved to amend the indictment to allege that appellant,
on or about July 24, 2016, “did then and there intentionally or knowingly
cause . . . the male sexual organ of [the complainant], a child younger than 14 years
of age, to penetrate the mouth of [appellant]” and appellant, on or about July 24,
2016, “did then and there intentionally or knowingly cause the male sexual organ of
[the complainant], a child younger than 14 years of age, to contact the mouth of
[appellant].”5 The trial court granted the State’s motion to amend.
Appellant then pleaded guilty, without an agreement recommendation from
the State, to the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child under fourteen years
of age.6 And the trial court instructed the jury to find appellant guilty of the
aforementioned offense. The jury assessed appellant’s punishment at confinement
for fifty years and a fine of $10,000.
Modification of Judgment
In his sole issue, appellant argues that the trial court’s judgment should be
modified to reflect that he was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child
4
See id.
5
See id. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(iii), (a)(2)(B).
6
See id.
3
under fourteen years of age, pursuant to Texas Penal Code section
22.021(a)(1)(B)(iii), (a)(2)(B), rather than “super aggravated sexual assault” of a
child under fourteen years of age, pursuant to section 22.021(a)(1)(B)(iii),
(a)(2)(A)(iv), (f)(2).7 The State also requests that this Court reform the trial court’s
judgment.
Here, the trial court’s written judgment does not accurately comport with the
record in this case in that it states “22.021(f)(2) Penal Code” in regard to the “Statute
for Offense” of which appellant was convicted. The record, however, reveals that
appellant actually pleaded guilty to the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a
child under fourteen years of age, pursuant to Texas Penal Code section
22.021(a)(1)(B)(iii), (a)(2)(B).
“[A]ppellate court[s] ha[ve] the power to correct and reform a trial court
judgment ‘to make the record speak the truth when [they] ha[ve] the necessary data
and information to do so, or make any appropriate order as the law and nature of the
case may require.’” Nolan v. State, 39 S.W.3d 697, 698 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (quoting Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1991, pet ref’d)). This is true no matter who, or if anyone, has called the
matter to the attention of the appellate court. See French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607,
7
See, e.g., Moreno v. State, 413 S.W.3d 119, 123 & n.1, 128–30 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2013, no pet.) (referring to offense under Texas Penal Code section
22.021(f)(2) as “‘Super’ Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child”).
4
609 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Dromgoole v. State, 470 S.W.3d 204, 226 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d); Asberry, 813 S.W.2d at 529–30 (“The authority
of an appellate court to reform incorrect judgments is not dependent upon the request
of any party, nor does it turn on the question of whether a party has or has not
objected in the trial court.”).
Accordingly, we modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect that the “Statute
for Offense” of which appellant was convicted is “22.021(a)(1)(B)(iii), (a)(2)(B)
Penal Code.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28
(Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Ramirez v. State, 336 S.W.3d 846, 852 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2011, pet. ref’d) (modifying the “Statute for Offense” (internal quotations
omitted)).
We sustain appellant’s sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified.
Terry Jennings
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice of Radack and Justices Jennings and Lloyd.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
5