Barnes v. American Standard Ins. Co. of Wis. , 297 Neb. 331 ( 2017 )


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    BARNES v. AMERICAN STANDARD INS. CO. OF WIS.
    Cite as 
    297 Neb. 331
    Jimmy R. Barnes, Jr., appellant, v.
    A merican Standard Insurance
    Company of Wisconsin, appellee.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed July 28, 2017.    No. S-16-854.
    1.	 Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will
    affirm a lower court’s grant of summary judgment if the pleadings and
    admitted evidence show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
    facts or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts
    and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    2.	 ____: ____. In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the
    judgment was granted and gives that party the benefit of all reasonable
    inferences deducible from the evidence.
    3.	 Summary Judgment: Proof. The party moving for summary judgment
    has the burden to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and
    must produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the moving party
    is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    4.	 Summary Judgment. In the summary judgment context, a fact is mate-
    rial only if it would affect the outcome of the case.
    5.	 ____. Summary judgment proceedings do not resolve factual issues, but
    instead determine whether there is a material issue of fact in dispute.
    6.	 ____. If a genuine issue of fact exists, summary judgment may not prop-
    erly be entered.
    7.	 Insurance: Contracts: Proof. The burden of establishing an effective
    cancellation before a loss is on the insurer.
    8.	 Statutes: Intent: Service of Process. It is the intent of Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 44-516 (Reissue 2010) to require registered or certified mail for every
    cancellation notice within its purview. The requirement of registered or
    certified mail facilitates proof of receipt of notice.
    9.	 Insurance: Notice. There is no requirement in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 44-516
    (Reissue 2010) that the insured actually receive notice.
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    BARNES v. AMERICAN STANDARD INS. CO. OF WIS.
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    10.	 Statutes: Presumptions: Legislature: Intent. In construing a statute,
    it is presumed that the Legislature intended a sensible, rather than
    absurd, result.
    11.	 Insurance: Service of Process: Notice: Legislature: Intent: Proof.
    By using registered or certified services as required in Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 44-516 (Reissue 2010), the Legislature relieved the insurer of proving
    that a notice of cancellation was received.
    Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: Duane
    C. Dougherty, Judge. Reversed and remanded for further
    proceedings.
    Daniel L. Rock and Jordan E. Holst, of Ellick, Jones, Buelt,
    Blazek & Longo, L.L.P., for appellant.
    Jane D. Hansen for appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Wright, Miller-Lerman, Cassel, K elch,
    and Funke, JJ.
    Miller-Lerman, J.
    NATURE OF CASE
    Jimmy R. Barnes, Jr., the appellant, was in a motorcycle-
    motor vehicle accident. American Standard Insurance Company
    of Wisconsin (American Standard) asserted that Barnes’ motor-
    cycle insurance policy had been canceled prior to the accident
    and denied underinsured coverage to Barnes. Barnes filed a
    complaint with a jury demand in the district court for Douglas
    County in which he claimed wrongful denial of coverage.
    The parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment.
    After a hearing, the district court granted American Standard’s
    motion for partial summary judgment, denied Barnes’ motion
    for partial summary judgment, and dismissed Barnes’ com-
    plaint with prejudice. Barnes appeals. We reverse, and remand
    for further proceedings.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    On June 7, 2013, Barnes entered into three motor vehi-
    cle insurance policies with American Standard, including
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    BARNES v. AMERICAN STANDARD INS. CO. OF WIS.
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    297 Neb. 331
    insurance policy No. 2171-0924-03, which insured a motor-
    cycle and included underinsured motorist coverage. According
    to American Standard’s evidence, it prepared three cancellation
    notices for Barnes’ three motor vehicle policies on September
    18, 2013, because either the bank account from which American
    Standard electronically withdrew Barnes’ monthly premium
    payments had insufficient funds for the payments or the bank
    had rejected the transaction at the time that the premiums
    were due. The notices were addressed to Barnes at his mailing
    address and stated that the three policies would be canceled
    effective October 1 unless the premiums were paid. American
    Standard contends that it mailed Barnes’ automobile insurance
    cancellation notices by certified mail. Barnes alleged that he
    did not receive the cancellation notices.
    On October 10, 2013, Barnes was struck by an underin-
    sured motorist while riding his motorcycle. Barnes sustained
    injuries as a result of the accident. He received $100,000 from
    the underinsured motorist’s insurance provider. Barnes alleged
    that his damages were in excess of this amount, so he made a
    claim for underinsured motorist coverage under his American
    Standard motorcycle policy, which he believed was still in
    force at the time of the accident. American Standard contended
    that the policy was not in force at the time of the accident and
    denied the claim.
    On September 16, 2015, Barnes filed his complaint with a
    jury demand against American Standard. He alleged that the
    policy covering the motorcycle was in force at the time of
    the accident, and he sought damages and attorney fees. On
    October 7, American Family filed its answer generally denying
    the allegations in the complaint.
    American Standard filed a motion for partial summary judg-
    ment, in which it stated that it was moving for summary
    judgement “on the issue of whether notice of cancellation was
    sent by certified mail.” Barnes also filed a motion for partial
    summary judgment, in which he stated that he was entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law regarding his claim for insurance
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    BARNES v. AMERICAN STANDARD INS. CO. OF WIS.
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    297 Neb. 331
    benefits. Barnes stated that he was not seeking summary judg-
    ment regarding the question of damages.
    A hearing was held on April 25, 2016. At the hearing, Barnes
    offered and the district court received exhibits 1 through 11,
    which included: Barnes’ affidavit; blank U.S. Postal Service
    forms 3811 and 3800; a copy of American Standard’s mailing
    log on postal service form 3877 (Form 3877) dated September
    18, 2013; American Standard’s responses to Barnes’ request
    for production of documents; and the cancellation notices
    dated September 18, 2013. American Standard offered and the
    district court received exhibits 12 through 20, which included:
    cancellation notices; two affidavits from American Standard
    employees regarding mailing procedures; documents regarding
    American Standard’s policy cancellation procedure; a demon-
    strative envelope used to illustrate certified mail; a copy of
    American Standard’s mailing log Form 3877 dated September
    18, 2013; and a U.S. Postal Service certificate of mailing for a
    piece of first-class mail relating to Barnes’ homeowner’s policy
    dated September 18, 2013.
    Barnes and American Standard each offered Form 3877,
    which indicated that three pieces of mail were sent to Barnes.
    Form 3877 has a space to indicate what type of service
    was applied to the mail, but the box for “Certified” was not
    checked. Form 3877 has a space where the sender is to include
    the addressee’s information, and it states, “Addressee (Name,
    Street, City, State, & ZIP Code).” (Emphasis in original.)
    American Standard supplied Barnes’ name, city, state, and ZIP
    Code on Form 3877, but it did not include his street or house
    number. Form 3877 contains the postmaster’s stamp, date,
    tracking numbers, fees, and postal worker’s signature.
    On August 12, 2016, the district court filed its “Order on
    Cross-Motions for Partial Summary Judgment.” The district
    court cited Neb. Rev. Stat. § 44-516(1) (Reissue 2010), which
    provides that “[n]o notice of cancellation of a policy . . . shall
    be effective unless mailed by registered or certified mail to the
    named insured . . . .” The district court noted that § 44-516
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    BARNES v. AMERICAN STANDARD INS. CO. OF WIS.
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    does not require American Standard to establish that Barnes
    received the cancellation notice; however, it requires that
    American Standard prove it mailed the cancellation notice to
    Barnes by registered or certified mail.
    In its ruling, the district court noted that in the context of
    federal tax cases, other courts have determined that Form 3877
    is an accepted method to prove that an item is sent by certified
    mail. The district court noted the defects in Form 3877, but
    nevertheless determined that the “majority of the evidence in
    this case establishes that [American Standard] complied with
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 44-516 by sending the cancellation notice
    to [Barnes] via certified mail on September 18, 2013.” The
    district court therefore granted American Standard’s motion
    for partial summary judgment, denied Barnes’ motion for
    partial summary judgment, and dismissed Barnes’ complaint
    with prejudice.
    Barnes appeals.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Barnes claims, summarized and restated, that the district
    court erred when it found that American Standard sent a can-
    cellation notice to Barnes by certified mail in compliance with
    § 44-516 and granted American Standard’s motion for partial
    summary judgment, denied Barnes’ motion for partial summary
    judgment, and dismissed Barnes’ complaint with prejudice
    when the matter was before the court on cross-motions for
    partial summary judgment and “discovery was leading to an
    alternate theory of recovery.”
    STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    [1,2] An appellate court will affirm a lower court’s grant
    of summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evidence
    show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or
    as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those
    facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law. Midland Properties v. Wells Fargo, 296 Neb.
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    407, 
    893 N.W.2d 460
    (2017). In reviewing a summary judg-
    ment, an appellate court views the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the party against whom the judgment was granted
    and gives that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences
    deducible from the evidence. 
    Id. ANALYSIS The
    centerpiece of our analysis is § 44-516(1), which both
    parties agree is controlling. Section 44-516(1) provides in rel-
    evant part as follows:
    No notice of cancellation of a policy to which section
    44-515 applies shall be effective unless mailed by regis-
    tered or certified mail to the named insured at least thirty
    days prior to the effective date of cancellation, except that
    if cancellation is for nonpayment of premium, at least ten
    days’ notice of cancellation accompanied by the reason
    therefor shall be given.
    American Standard filed a motion for partial summary judg-
    ment in which it sought judgment in its favor “on the issue
    of whether notice of cancellation was sent by certified mail.”
    Barnes filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking
    a judgment in his favor to the effect that American Standard
    was liable to him on the insurance policy. Following receipt
    of evidence on the cross-motions for summary judgment, the
    district court filed its order on August 12, 2016. As noted
    above, the district court granted American Standard’s motion
    for partial summary judgment, denied Barnes’ motion for par-
    tial summary judgment, and dismissed Barnes’ complaint with
    prejudice. Barnes claims that the district court’s decision was
    error, and we agree.
    The parties offered and the district court received vari-
    ous items of evidence at the summary judgment hearing. The
    evidence included Barnes’ affidavit, in which he stated that
    he did not receive the cancellation notice by certified mail or
    otherwise and that at the time of the October 10, 2013, colli-
    sion, he believed the policy was in full force and effect. The
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    BARNES v. AMERICAN STANDARD INS. CO. OF WIS.
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    297 Neb. 331
    evidence presented by American Standard included affidavits
    and documents regarding its mailing procedures; notices of
    cancellation addressed to Barnes; and Form 3877, also known
    as a Certificate of Mailing. Although not a witness to the
    actual mailing of the notice of cancellation, in her affidavit,
    a mail clerk for American Standard describes the procedure
    that “would” have been followed and offers her belief that the
    notice was sent via certified mail. Although she states that the
    fee on Form 3877 indicates certified service, she does not state
    it is consistent only with certified service. American Standard
    also offered a demonstrative exhibit consisting of an envelope
    with a certified mail label on it to illustrate the appearance of a
    certified mail envelope.
    The parties and the court dedicate considerable attention to
    Form 3877 and its defects. In its decision, the district court
    acknowledges that American Standard failed to check the cer-
    tified box and neglected to include Barnes’ street address
    on Form 3877. The district court stated this was “problem-
    atic.” The district court reasoned, however, that the defects
    could be overcome by American Standard’s presentation of
    other evidence showing American Standard’s ordinary mail-
    ing procedures and that other notices mailed to Barnes bore a
    street address.
    Referring to evidence presented by American Standard, the
    district court stated that the corroborating American Standard
    employee affidavit evidence “suggests that procedures for
    sending certified mail were followed” and that the street
    address on the cancellation notices on policies not at issue
    in this case “creates a strong inference that the cancella-
    tion[] notices were all sent to the same address.” Based on
    the inferences, the district court found that the “majority of
    the evidence in this case establishes that [American Standard]
    complied with Neb. Rev. Stat. § 44-516 by sending the cancel-
    lation notice to [Barnes] via certified mail on September 18,
    2013.” As explained below, by giving inferences favorable
    to American Standard, we believe the district court failed to
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    BARNES v. AMERICAN STANDARD INS. CO. OF WIS.
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    adhere to summary judgment standards and, therefore, its deci-
    sion was error.
    [3-6] The party moving for summary judgment has the
    burden to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists
    and must produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that
    the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    Brock v. Dunning, 
    288 Neb. 909
    , 
    854 N.W.2d 275
    (2014).
    In the summary judgment context, a fact is material only if
    it would affect the outcome of the case. 
    Id. Summary judg-
    ment proceedings do not resolve factual issues, but instead
    determine whether there is a material issue of fact in dispute.
    
    Id. If a
    genuine issue of fact exists, summary judgment may
    not properly be entered. 
    Id. We apply
    these principles to the
    instant case.
    As noted above, for notice of cancellation to be effective
    under § 44-516(1), the notice must be “mailed by registered
    or certified mail to the named insured.” The question posed
    by American Standard’s motion for partial summary judgment
    was whether the notice of cancellation was mailed by certified
    mail. Given the foregoing, whether American Standard ful-
    filled its statutory duty to mail the notice by certified mail was
    the central material fact raised by American Standard’s motion
    for partial summary judgment.
    [7] In a case involving an insurer’s compliance with a
    statutory requirement of notification prior to cancellation,
    we stated that “the burden of establishing an effective can-
    cellation before a loss is on the insurer.” Daniels v. Allstate
    Indemnity Co., 
    261 Neb. 671
    , 679, 
    624 N.W.2d 636
    , 643
    (2001). In Daniels, we reversed the district court’s order
    granting summary judgment in favor of the insurer. As in
    Daniels, once the statutory notice requirement was impli-
    cated in the instant case, it was American Standard’s burden
    to demonstrate compliance therewith in order to show that it
    was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. There is no actual
    direct evidence that the notice of cancellation was mailed
    certified to Barnes, and in the procedural context of a motion
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    for summary judgment, we believe the weight to be accorded
    American Standard’s other evidence must await resolution at
    trial. See Houska v. City of Wahoo, 
    235 Neb. 635
    , 
    456 N.W.2d 750
    (1990).
    [8] Our analysis focuses on the controlling statute, § 44-516.
    We have previously considered § 44-516, and we stated as
    follows:
    In 1972, in response to a growing national concern
    over arbitrary policy cancellations and nonrenewals, the
    Nebraska Legislature adopted a statutory scheme dealing
    with automobile insurance policy cancellations patterned
    after some model legislation proposed by certain insur-
    ance trade organizations. In 1973, it added the require-
    ment that the cancellation notice must be mailed by regis-
    tered or certified mail. . . .
    It is clear to us that the intent of the Legislature in
    the passage of these sections was to clear up confusion
    in the area of automobile insurance policy cancellation,
    not to further it. . . . We are satisfied it is the intent
    of section 44-516, R. R. S. 1943, to require registered
    or certified mail for every cancellation notice [within
    its purview.]
    The requirement of registered or certified mail facili-
    tates proof of receipt of notice.
    Sanders v. Mittlieder, 
    195 Neb. 232
    , 236, 
    237 N.W.2d 838
    ,
    840 (1976).
    [9,10] As we have stated above, § 44-516(1) provides
    that “[n]o notice of cancellation of a policy to which section
    44-515 applies shall be effective unless mailed . . . certified
    mail to the named insured . . . .” There is no requirement in
    the statute that the insured actually receive notice. In con-
    struing a statute, it is presumed that the Legislature intended
    a sensible, rather than absurd, result. See In re Adoption of
    Chase T., 
    295 Neb. 390
    , 
    888 N.W.2d 507
    (2016). The pro-
    vision in this statute sets forth precisely what requirement
    must be satisfied in order to successfully accomplish mailing
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    and, hence, cancellation. Thus, where the certified box on
    Form 3877 is checked, proof of certified mailing is greatly
    enhanced. And we have only to apply the requirement to the
    facts at hand. Applying the plain, direct, and unambiguous
    language of § 44-516(1), if the notice of cancellation was
    mailed to Barnes by certified mail, then the cancellation
    would become effective in the number of days thereafter pro-
    vided elsewhere in the statutes.
    We considered a circumstance similar to the instant case in
    Houska v. City of 
    Wahoo, supra
    , where there was an absence of
    direct proof of actually “sending [the particular letter] by ordi-
    nary mail” as prescribed by the relevant statute, Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 76-710 (Reissue 2009). On appeal, we reversed the summary
    judgment entered in favor of the defendant.
    The plaintiff in Houska contended that the absence of
    direct evidence of compliance with the statute completely
    defeated the defendant’s assertion that it had complied with
    the statutory mailing requirement. We rejected the plaintiff’s
    contention and instead stated that proof of compliance could
    be proved by alternative evidence, such as direct proof per-
    taining to the particular letter in question or related to the
    deposit of the particular letter with the U.S. Postal Service,
    or sufficient competent evidence demonstrating adherence
    to a customary mailing procedure where letters which are
    properly addressed and stamped are handled in a manner
    whereby the particular letter would have been transmitted
    in accordance with the statute on the particular date of the
    alleged mailing. We stated in Houska that evidence showing
    office custom was followed in connection with the particular
    letter creates an inference that the particular letter comported
    with the statute, but that nevertheless, compliance with the
    statute presented a question for the trier of fact to decide. In
    the instant case, Barnes had demanded a jury trial, so a jury,
    not the court, would be the trier of fact. In Houska, the record
    was insufficient to determine as a matter of law that the
    method of sending the particular letter in question comported
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    with § 76-710, thus creating a genuine issue of material fact
    preventing summary judgment. As in Houska, we believe that
    in the absence of direct proof of compliance, it is proper for
    the finder of fact in the instant case to consider alternative
    evidence when it ultimately resolves the issue of compliance
    with § 44-516.
    As we read its order, contrary to the principles controlling
    resolution of summary judgment motions recited above, the
    district court evaluated the evidence, including alternative
    evidence, and resolved factual issues by taking the infer-
    ences in favor of the moving party rather than the nonmov-
    ing party. As an example, the district court found, inter alia,
    that the information found on the two Forms 3877 “show
    that three articles were sent to [Barnes] with tracking num-
    bers indicating that the items were sent via certified mail.”
    We believe there is no basis in this record to conclude that
    tracking numbers alone establish certified mail service, and
    in any event, it is inappropriate to infer such fact in American
    Standard’s favor.
    As the district court’s order acknowledges, American
    Standard failed to check the certified box on Form 3877. In
    finding that this significant defect was overcome by American
    Standard’s evidence, the district court relied heavily on tax
    cases where defects in Form 3877 are common. But we believe
    the district court’s reliance on the tax cases was misplaced.
    The primary tax case on which the district court relied in
    its order granting summary judgment in favor of American
    Standard is Coleman v. C.I.R., 
    94 T.C. 82
    (1990). That tax case
    is in agreement with other authorities that state that a properly
    and fully completed Form 3877 is preferable proof and entitles
    the mailer to a presumption of regularity. See United States v.
    Ahrens, 
    530 F.2d 781
    (8th Cir. 1976). But a failure to comply
    with Form 3877’s requirements do not merit the presumption.
    Coleman v. 
    C.I.R., supra
    .
    The issue in Coleman was whether the deficiency sought
    by the tax commissioner was time barred as asserted by the
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    taxpayers as an affirmative defense due to the allegedly tardy
    mailing of the tax commissioner’s notice of deficiency. In the
    instant case, the district court cited Coleman and found that
    the defective Form 3877, combined with American Standard’s
    corroborating habit evidence, established that the mailing to
    Barnes complied with the statutory requirement of certified
    mail. However, the lesson and application of Coleman is not as
    broad as characterized by the district court.
    In Coleman v. 
    C.I.R., supra
    , the tax court had previously
    denied summary judgment on the issue of timely mailing and
    ordered a trial on this question. Coleman was not a summary
    judgment case; instead, it was decided after trial where the
    disputed facts were ripe for resolution. See Wiley v. U.S.,
    
    20 F.3d 222
    (6th Cir. 1994) (reversing summary judgment
    in favor of government). Furthermore, as the opinion in
    Coleman explains, the burden of persuasion regarding the
    timeliness of mailing was always on the taxpayers asserting
    the affirmative defense that the action was barred by the stat-
    ute of limitations. Therefore, although the tax commissioner’s
    evidence of a defective Form 3877 and habit evidence carried
    its burden of production, ultimately, it was the taxpayers’
    failure to present persuasive evidence of an untimely notice
    that entitled the tax commissioner in Coleman to prevail at
    trial. See, similarly, Cropper v. C.I.R., 
    826 F.3d 1280
    (10th
    Cir. 2016) (affirming judgment in favor of government after
    stipulated trial).
    In contrast to Coleman v. 
    C.I.R., supra
    , the posture of the
    instant case must be determined by summary judgment stan-
    dards, where the inferences are taken in favor of Barnes as
    the nonmoving party. Whereas the taxpayers in Coleman had
    the burden at trial to establish the nonoccurrence of statutory
    timely mailing, Barnes was not required to prove the nonoc-
    currence of statutorily required certified mail; instead, upon
    its motion for summary judgment, American Standard bore
    the burden to show that its notice to Barnes had met its
    statutory duty of a certified mailing and that it was entitled
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    to judgment as a matter of law. Following our review of the
    record, we believe that the evidence offered by American
    Standard did not entitle it to judgment.
    We find the cases involving disputed insurance claims more
    helpful than the tax cases. These cases explore the signifi-
    cance of the terms used by the U.S. Postal Service. In Horton
    v. Washington Cty. Tax Claim Bureau, 
    623 Pa. 113
    , 
    81 A.3d 883
    (2013), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explained
    that the types of mailing and different services added to the
    mailing, such as certified mail and tracking, are contained and
    defined in the Code of Federal Regulations as incorporated
    by the U.S. Postal Service’s Domestic Mail Manual. See,
    also, 39 C.F.R. § 111.1 (2016). Form 3877 is characterized as
    a “‘Certificate of Mailing.’” See Horton v. Washington Cty.
    Tax Claim 
    Bureau, 623 Pa. at 126
    , 81 A.3d at 891. A certifi-
    cate of mailing offers the sender “‘evidence that you sent the
    item when you say you did. This official record shows the
    date your mail was accepted. Certificates of mailing furnish
    evidence of mailing only.’” 
    Id. Form 3877,
    standing alone
    and without the certified box checked off, “‘furnish[es] evi-
    dence of mailing only,’” see id.; it does not directly prove the
    mail had other services attached. In the district court’s order
    on summary judgment, it referred to the Form 3877 at issue
    on which the certified box is not checked and Barnes’ street
    address is missing, but did bear a tracking number. Despite the
    limited evidentiary weight of the Form 3877, the district court
    stated that “tracking numbers indicat[e] that the items were
    sent via certified mail.” This determination tending to equate
    tracking numbers with certified mail is not supported by the
    record or the U.S. Postal Manual, and, as we noted above,
    further exhibits the district court’s erroneous approach giving
    inferences to the moving party instead of the nonmoving party
    on summary judgment.
    We find informative the reasoning in the opinion of the
    Supreme Court of Illinois in Ragan v. Columbia Mut. Ins. Co.,
    
    183 Ill. 2d 342
    , 
    701 N.E.2d 493
    , 
    233 Ill. Dec. 643
    (1998),
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    interpreting an insurance cancellation notification statute. The
    Illinois Insurance Code requires that an insurance “company
    shall maintain proof of mailing of such notice [of cancellation]
    on a recognized U.S. Post Office form or a form acceptable to
    the U.S. Post Office or other commercial mail delivery serv­
    ice.” See 215 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/143.14(a) (LexisNexis
    Cum. Supp. 2009). The Ragan decision, which granted sum-
    mary judgment in favor of the insured, was quoted at length
    in Hunt v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 
    2013 IL App (1st) 120561
    , ¶ 36, 
    994 N.E.2d 561
    , 570-71, 373 Ill.
    Dec. 792, 801-02 (2013), as follows:
    [T]he supreme court stated “[i]t is apparent from the
    wording of the provision in the context of the Insurance
    Code that the purpose of the statute is to protect the
    insured from cancellation of his insurance without his
    knowledge. To accomplish this purpose, the legisla-
    ture could have required insurance companies to prove
    receipt by the insured. But, by enacting this section, the
    legislature clearly sought to strike a balance between the
    interest of the insured in being informed of a cancella-
    tion of his insurance policy and the burden that would
    be put on an insurance company to prove receipt by the
    insured.” [Ragan v. Columbia Mut. Ins. Co., 
    183 Ill. 2d
    ] at 
    351[, 701 N.E.2d at 497
    , 233 Ill. Dec. at 647]. In
    striking a balance between insured persons and insurers,
    the legislature gave insurance companies a “very low
    threshold of proof” relating to the mailing of cancella-
    tion notices, requiring only that the insurer show proof
    of mailing on a recognized United States Post Office
    form or form acceptable to the United States Post Office
    or other commercial mail delivery service. 
    Id. at 351-
          52[, 701 N.E.2d at 
    497, 233 Ill. Dec. at 647
    ]. The court
    then held that a finding that “the statute implicitly allows
    an insurance company to use other evidence to show it
    maintained the proof of mailing when the statute explic-
    itly requires it to maintain such a form would disturb the
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    BARNES v. AMERICAN STANDARD INS. CO. OF WIS.
    Cite as 
    297 Neb. 331
    balance that the legislature sought to achieve in enacting
    [section 143.14].” Id. at 3
    52[, 701 N.E.2d at 497
    , 233 Ill.
    Dec. at 647].
    For completeness, we note that Hunt approved the use of the
    equivalent of Form 3877 by the insurer based on the Illinois
    statute and a provision in the Domestic Mail Manual. Hunt v.
    State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
    Co., supra
    .
    [11] We believe the reasoning in Ragan v. Columbia
    Mut. Ins. 
    Co., supra
    , is generally relevant to our case. In
    § 44-516(1), the Legislature specifically selected that the
    notice of cancellation be mailed by “registered or certified
    mail.” We understand that these added services are terms of
    art, and we believe these services were deliberately chosen
    by the Legislature. In this regard, we note, for comparison,
    that in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 44-522(4) (Reissue 2010), concern-
    ing property, marine, or liability insurance, the Legislature
    chose to permit notice by “first-class mail.” See § 44-522(4)
    (providing “cancellation or nonrenewal shall be sent by reg-
    istered, certified, or first-class mail to the insured’s last mail-
    ing address known to the insurer”). The Legislature chose to
    require notice by registered or certified mail in § 44-516, but
    it did not choose to require proof that notice of cancellation
    was received. But as the court in Hunt v. State Farm Mutual
    Automobile Insurance Co. expressed, under certain statutes,
    insurance companies have a “‘very low threshold of proof.’”
    
    2013 IL App (1st) 120561
    at ¶ 
    36, 994 N.E.2d at 570
    , 373 Ill.
    Dec. at 801. We agree with this observation, and given the
    terms chosen by the Legislature in the applicable Nebraska
    statute, § 44-516, we are not inclined to reduce the require-
    ments further. For completeness, we note that we are aware
    that the mailing-related notice requirements in § 44-516(1)
    and other statutes were expanded upon, pursuant to 2017 Neb.
    Laws, L.B. 406, but they were not effective at the time of the
    underlying events in this case or at the time the district court’s
    opinion was filed.
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    BARNES v. AMERICAN STANDARD INS. CO. OF WIS.
    Cite as 
    297 Neb. 331
    In sum, taking the inferences in favor of Barnes as the non-
    moving party, the evidence submitted by American Standard
    did not establish directly that it mailed the notice of cancel-
    lation by certified mail and it was not entitled to judgment as
    a matter of law. The district court’s order of August 12, 2016,
    is reversed.
    CONCLUSION
    The district court’s decision, which weighed the evidence
    and found that the “majority of the evidence . . . estab-
    lishes that [American Standard] complied with Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 44-516 by sending the cancellation notice to [Barnes] via
    certified mail,” was not warranted in the procedural context of
    a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the
    order of the district court which granted American Standard’s
    motion for partial summary judgment, denied Barnes’ motion
    for partial summary judgment, and dismissed Barnes’ com-
    plaint with prejudice. The cause is remanded for further pro-
    ceedings consistent with this opinion.
    R eversed and remanded for
    further proceedings.
    Stacy, J., not participating.