Mark Haynes, Danielle Megan Haynes and Charles Edward Haynes v. Mario Molina and Charlene Molina, Individually and Dba Master Mechanical A/C and Heating, Jorge Molina ( 2021 )

Opinion issued September 14, 2021
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-19-00917-CV
———————————
MARK HAYNES, DANIELLE MEGAN HAYNES, AND CHARLES
EDWARD HAYNES, Appellants
V.
MARIO MOLINA AND CHARLENE MOLINA, INDIVIDUALLY AND
DBA MASTER MECHANICAL A/C AND HEATING, JORGE MOLINA,
Appellees
On Appeal from the 270th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2016-43961
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Mark Haynes—together with his wife, Danielle Megan Haynes, and his
father, Charles Edward Haynes—filed suit after his house was damaged, allegedly
by the appellees’ faulty sizing and installation of an air conditioning system. Mario
Molina and Charlene Molina, individually and d/b/a Master Mechanical A/C and
Heating, and Jorge Molina (collectively “Master Mechanical” or the “appellees”)
filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment. They alleged that
Mark and Danielle lacked standing because they did not own the house, Charles’s
claims were barred by limitations, and there was no evidence of one or more
elements of each of Charles’s causes of action. The trial court granted the motion
without specifying a basis.
On appeal, Charles purports to challenge the trial court’s ruling on limitations,
but he decided to “forego [sic] argument and briefing for efficiency’s sake.” Mark
and Danielle argue that they have standing because, although Mark’s father held
record legal title to the house, Mark provided the down payment and paid the
mortgage, taxes, and maintenance costs.
We affirm the dismissal of claims made by Charles because his brief was
inadequate as to one of the grounds for summary judgment, and we must affirm if
any ground for summary judgment is not challenged on appeal. We affirm the
dismissal of claims made by Danielle because the evidence does not support an
inference that she had an ownership interest in the house. We reverse the dismissal
of claims made by Mark because the record demonstrates that he has standing to
pursue his claims. We reverse the trial court’s judgment, in part, and we remand to
the trial court for further proceedings.
2
Background
In 1993, Charles E. Haynes and his wife, Martha Haynes, obtained a mortgage
for the purchase of a house in the City of Deer Park, Texas. Their son, Mark Haynes,
provided the down payment, and thereafter he made monthly payments to his father
to pay for the principal and interest on the loan. According to Mark, his father agreed
to take a loan in his name because Mark’s credit was inadequate at the time. Mark
maintains that his father promised to transfer the deed to him once he made the final
payment on the house. Neither Charles nor Martha ever took possession of the house.
Mark lived in the house with Danielle, and he paid all taxes, insurance, maintenance,
and repairs. Mark made the final payment to his father in 2017, and in March 2018,
Charles and Martha transferred the deed to Mark.
The appellants have alleged that in June 2014, Jorge Molina, who worked for
Master Mechanical, provided an estimate of the cost to replace the air conditioning
system on the house, install a filter, and replace ductwork. Based on this estimate
and Jorge’s representations, the appellants hired Master Mechanical to complete the
work. Several weeks later, the system malfunctioned, and Master Mechanical—
Jorge and other employees—returned to provide additional service under the
warranty. In May 2015, Mark and Danielle raised concerns about water dripping
from an air return inside the house. Although Master Mechanical returned to the
house to make additional changes to the system, in July 2015, the ceiling in the
3
master bedroom collapsed allegedly due to condensation from the air conditioning
system. In the following days, Mark learned that Master Mechanical had failed to
replace copper tubing that it previously represented had been replaced, and it failed
to obtain a city permit for the air conditioning system installation.
Mark and Danielle filed a complaint with the Texas Department of Licensing
and Regulation, which found that Mario Molina failed to obtain a permit before
installing the air conditioning system, Mario failed to provide proper installation,
service, or mechanical integrity, and Master Mechanical A/C and Heating failed to
comply with the 2012 International Residential Code, which had been adopted by
the City of Deer Park.
In June 2016, Mark and Danielle sued Mario Molina, Charlene Molina,
Master Mechanical A/C and Heating, and Jorge Molina.1 They alleged causes of
action for:
1
They sought the following damages:
(a) Out-of-pocket expenses;
(b) Loss of use;
(c) Cost of replacement housing and replacement of the a/c unit;
(d) Interest and/or finance charges assessed against and paid;
(e) Loss of the “benefit of the bargain”;
(f) Cost of repairs to the house and the HVAC unit;
(g) Remedial costs and costs of completion;
(h) Reasonable and necessary engineering or consulting fees;
(i) Mental anguish damages;
(j) Alternatively, replacement cost for the house should repair be financially
impracticable.
4
(1) violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act by
(a) engaging in an unconscionable action or course of action and
taking advantage of their lack of knowledge, ability, or
experience to an unfair and unconscionable degree;
(b) making misrepresentations in violation of section 17.46(b) of the
Texas Business and Commerce Code;
(c) breaching the implied warranties of fitness for a particular
purpose, good and workmanlike performance, and
merchantability.
(2) common law fraud;
(3) breach of contract; and
(4) negligence.
Master Mechanical filed a plea to the jurisdiction and a motion for summary
judgment, asserting that (1) Mark and Danielle lacked standing to recover damages
because they did not own the home when the air conditioning system was installed,
and (2) there was no evidence that the damages to the house were caused by
problems with the air conditioning system it installed. Mark and Danielle responded
with evidence, which Master Mechanical challenged. The trial court did not rule on
the plea, the motion for summary judgment, or Master Mechanical’s objections to
Mark and Danielle’s summary judgment evidence. In June 2019, Charles Haynes
joined the lawsuit as a plaintiff.
Master Mechanical amended its answer and filed a second plea to the
jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment. Master Mechanical again argued
5
that Mark and Danielle lacked standing to sue because they did not own the house
when the air conditioning system was installed. It also argued that Charles’s claims
were barred by limitations and that there was no evidence of one or more elements
of each of his causes of action. In response, Mark and Danielle asserted that they
have standing as consumers under the DTPA. They also asserted that they have
standing because they have a legal interest in the house as beneficial owners of the
property because Mark provided the down payment and the money for all payments
thereafter.
The trial court granted Master Mechanical’s plea to the jurisdiction as to the
claims made by Mark and Danielle, and it granted summary judgment as to the
claims made by Charles. The trial court dismissed all claims and rendered a final,
appealable judgment.
Analysis
I. Charles has waived his challenge to the summary judgment.
We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Eagle Oil &
Gas Co. v. TRO-X, L.P., 619 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. 2021). The party moving for
traditional summary judgment must show that no genuine issue of material fact
exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c);
Eagle Oil & Gas, 619 S.W.3d at 705. A defendant may obtain summary judgment
by conclusively establishing an affirmative defense. Eagle Oil & Gas, 619 S.W.3d
6
at 705. “We review the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against
the motion.” Id.When a movant argues multiple grounds for summary judgment and the order
does not specify the ground on which the judgment is rendered, the appellant must
negate all grounds on appeal. McCoy v. Rogers, 240 S.W.3d 267, 271 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); Ellis v. Precision Engine Rebuilders, Inc., 68
S.W.3d 894, 898 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). “If summary
judgment may have been rendered, properly or improperly, on a ground not
challenged, the judgment must be affirmed.” Ellis, 68 S.W.3d at 898.
A party appealing a motion for summary judgment must assert either a general
issue challenging the summary judgment as a whole or separate issues challenging
each independent ground for summary judgment alleged in the motion. Zapata v.
ACF Indus., Inc., 43 S.W.3d 584, 586 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no
pet.); see Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. 1970). “The
challenging party must also, however, present . . . arguments and supporting
authority in order to merit reversal.” McCoy, 240 S.W.3d at 272; see TEX. R. APP. P.
38.1(i) (providing requisites of appellate briefs).
The third issue in the appellants’ brief states:
Is summary judgment on the statute of limitations (as to Charles
Haynes) proper when he is added in response to Defendants’ belated
7
concern that a necessary party is omitted? (Appellants forego argument
and briefing for efficiency’s sake but do not waive this point, fully
briefed in Haynes’ Response to Summary Judgment.)
Charles did not provide any substantive argument on this issue. In the court
of appeals, unbriefed issues are waived. Compare TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief
must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with
appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”), with TEX. R. APP. P. 53.2(i)
(providing that petition for review in Supreme Court of Texas need “not address
every issue or point included in the statement of issues or points. Any issue or point
not addressed may be addressed in the brief on the merits if one is requested by the
Court.”).
Charles’s issue is waived, and therefore the summary judgment ground of
limitations has not been negated on appeal. See McCoy, 240 S.W.3d at 272; TEX. R.
APP. P. 38.1(i). We overrule the third issue, and we affirm the summary judgment as
to Charles’s claims. See Ellis, 68 S.W.3d at 898.
II. Mark has standing to sue as the beneficiary of a purchase money
resulting trust.
On appeal, Mark argues that he has standing because he owned the house at
all relevant times. Mark argues that his parents held the title for his benefit and that
he provided “every cent of the purchase price.” Fundamentally, Mark has argued
that he was the beneficial owner by way of a purchase money resulting trust.
8
Master Mechanical argues that Mark lacked standing because his parents
owned the house as evidenced by the record title. Master Mechanical contends that
Mark and his parents had an oral contract for deed under which neither legal nor
equitable title transferred to Mark until he fully paid the purchase price, which was
after the installation of the air conditioning system and collapse of the ceiling.
A. Standard of review
A party may challenge a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction by filing a
plea to the jurisdiction. See Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554
(Tex. 2000). We review a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo.
Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. McKenzie, 578 S.W.3d 506, 512 (Tex.
2019) (citing Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex.
2004)). Ordinarily a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the plaintiff’s pleadings,
asserting that the alleged facts do not affirmatively demonstrate the court’s
jurisdiction. See Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 635
(Tex. 2012). We “construe the plaintiff’s pleadings liberally, taking all factual
assertions as true, and look to the plaintiff’s intent.” Heckman v. Williamson Cty.,
369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012).
A plea to the jurisdiction may also challenge the existence of jurisdictional
facts, and when it does, the parties may present evidence. Id. “In those situations, a
9
trial court’s review of a plea to the jurisdiction mirrors that of a traditional summary
judgment motion.” Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 372 S.W.3d at 635.
B. Standing
Standing is a constitutional prerequisite to suit and a component of subject
matter jurisdiction. Farmers Tex. Cty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 598 S.W.3d 237, 240
(Tex. 2020); Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150. “The standing requirement derives from
the Texas Constitution’s provision for separation of powers among the branches of
government, which denies the judiciary authority to decide issues in the abstract, and
from the open courts provision, which provides court access only to a ‘person for an
injury done him.’” Meyers v. JDC/Firethorne, Ltd., 548 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.
2018) (quoting TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13); see also In re Abbott, 601 S.W.3d 802, 807
(Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (stating that standing requirement in
Texas parallels federal test for Article III cases-and-controversies standing).
“A court has no jurisdiction over a claim made by a plaintiff who lacks
standing to assert it.” Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150. “In Texas, the standing doctrine
requires a concrete injury to the plaintiff and a real controversy between the parties
that will be resolved by the court.” Id. at 154. The first element of this three-part
standing test requires the plaintiff to plead facts that demonstrate that he is
“personally injured . . . that he, himself (rather than a third party or the public at
large), suffered the injury.” Id. at 155. The second element of the standing test
10
requires that the alleged injury be “traceable” to the challenged conduct of the
defendant so that there is a real controversy between the parties. Id. The third
element of the standing test requires the plaintiff to establish a “substantial likelihood
that the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact.” Id. (quoting Vt.
Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000)).
In general, a cause of action for injury to real property belongs to the person
who owned the property at the time of the injury. Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas
Co., L.C., 331 S.W.3d 419, 424 (Tex. 2010). But see Ibarra v. Nicholes, 01-06-
00762-CV, 2007 WL 2214889, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 2, 2007,
pet. denied) (mem. op.) (deciding appeal in suit between commercial tenant of retail
center and subcontractor hired to make improvements to leased space).
C. Mark had equitable title in the house at all relevant times.
The central question, which is dispositive of this appeal, is whether Mark and
Danielle had an interest in the house when the air conditioning system was installed
that is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional standing requirements of a concrete
injury to Mark and Danielle that arises from a controversy with Master Mechanical
and that can be resolved by an order or judgment of the court. The parties proffer
competing theories to explain whether Mark had any ownership interest in the
property. No party specifically addresses Danielle’s standing.
11
Mark contends that he had equitable title at all relevant times because a
purchase money resulting trust was created by his providing the down payment when
his parents took record title of the house. Master Mechanical contends that the record
title shows that Mark’s parents owned the property, and Mark entered into an oral
contract for deed with them, under which his ownership would vest only after all
payments had been made. Under Mark’s theory, he was the equitable owner (of at
least an undivided portion of the property) when the air conditioning system was
installed and when the ceiling collapsed. Under Master Mechanical’s theory, Mark
did not acquire any ownership interest until he made the final payment and the deed
was transferred, which occurred after this lawsuit was filed.
1. Record title, legal title, equitable title
Ordinarily, record title is evidence of a person’s ownership rights in property.
Milner v. Milner, 361 S.W.3d 615, 621 (Tex. 2012). Record title refers to the
appearance of title in the public record, but it is distinct from the concepts of legal
and equitable title. See Longoria v. Lasater, 292 S.W.3d 156, 165 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2009, pet. denied) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1523 (8th ed. 2004)).
Legal title shows apparent ownership, but it does not necessarily signify full and
complete title or beneficial ownership. Longoria, 292 S.W.3d at 165. Equitable title
refers to a person’s beneficial interest that entitles the person to acquire formal legal
title. Id.12
2. Purchase money resulting trusts
It has long been the law in Texas that “[w]hen title to property is taken in the
name of someone other than the person who advances the purchase price, a resulting
trust is created in favor of the payor.” Tricentrol Oil Trading, Inc. v. Annesley, 809
S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex. 1991); Nolana Dev. Ass’n v. Corsi, 682 S.W.2d 246, 250
(Tex. 1984); Cohrs v. Scott, 338 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Tex. 1960); Morrison v. Farmer,
213 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. 1948); Tarpley v. Poage’s Adm’r, 2 Tex. 139, 150 (Tex.
1847) (“This [purchase money resulting trust] doctrine, according to Mr. Justice
Story, has its ‘origin in the natural presumption, in the absence of all rebutting
circumstances, that he who supplies the money means the purchase to be for his own
benefit, rather than that of another, and that the conveyance in the name of another
is a matter of arrangement and convenience between the parties for collateral
purposes.’”) (citations omitted). A thousand years of Anglo-French jurisprudence
has brought us to this point. See G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 454
(June 2020 Update). Section 454, “The purchase money resulting trust” states:
Hundreds of litigated cases attest that it is a common event for
one person to pay the price of property and to direct that the conveyance
run to another. . . . Taking into consideration the usual human desire to
obtain something for value and the relative infrequency of gifts, the
courts have held that the events outlined above normally show an intent
on the part of the payor of the price to get the benefit of the property
bought. Gifts are out of the ordinary course. The obtaining of property
or services in return for money paid is the normal expectation.
13
These purchase money transactions first arose in England in the
[M]iddle [A]ges, when the holding of land to uses was a very common
practice, and when secret uses were numerous. It was easy to infer that
the payor desired to follow the common usage of having the land held
to uses, and that he (the payor of the price) was to be the beneficiary of
the use. Modern courts have not felt that altered social or economic
customs warranted a change from an inference of a trust to an inference
of a gift. While trusts may not be as common nowadays as were uses of
land in England in the [M]iddle [A]ges, nevertheless they are
sufficiently numerous to make them natural devices for property
holding.
The courts of equity have therefore established a doctrine that
normally the payor of the purchase price of property is entitled to be
decreed the beneficiary of a trust where the conveyance was absolute
and was made to another with the consent of the payor.
Id.
A purchase money resulting trust “arises by operation of law when title is
conveyed to one person but the purchase price or a portion thereof is paid by
another.” Cohrs, 338 S.W.2d at 130. “The parties are presumed to have intended that
the grantee hold title to the use of him who paid the purchase price and whom equity
deems to be the true owner.” Id. “The trust arises out of the transaction and must
arise at the time when the title passes.” Id. (citing Morrison, 213 S.W.2d at 815);
Tolle v. Sawtelle, 246 S.W.2d 916, 919 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1952, writ ref’d)
(purchase money resulting trust arises out of transaction by which property is
purchased; later agreements cannot create a purchase money resulting trust).
A party who provides all or a portion of the purchase price acquires equitable
title when the deed is executed. See Hellmann v. Circle C Properties I, Ltd., No. 04-
14
03-00217-CV, 2003 WL 22897220, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 10, 2003,
pet. denied) (“The creation of the resulting trust in favor of AII [who provided the
purchase price] meant that Alejos [record title holder] held bare legal title as a result
of the deed while equitable title remained in AII.”); cf. Smithsonian Inst. v. Meech,
169 U.S. 398, 406–07 (1898) (holding that using parol evidence to prove the
existence of a purchase money resulting trust is expressly in accord with the statute
of frauds); BOGERT, supra, § 454 (explaining that statute of frauds does not apply to
purchase money resulting trust because purchase-money beneficiary “acquires at
once a vested interest”).
A party’s equitable ownership arising under a purchase money resulting trust
“extends to the proportion that her contribution bears to the total price.” Williams v.
Robinson, No. 12-08-00260-CV, 2009 WL 2356268, at *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler July
31, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing first, San Antonio Loan & Trust Co. v.
Hamilton, 283 S.W.2d 19, 28 (1955), then citing, Wright v. Wright, 132 S.W.2d 847,
850 (Comm’n App. 1939), and then citing, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRUSTS § 454
(1959)); see Baylor v. Hopf, 642, 17 S.W. 230, 231 (1891) (holding that plaintiff’s
provision of partial consideration for purchase of property entitled her to 28%
ownership interest in the land).
The doctrine of resulting trust prevents unjust enrichment of the person in
whom legal title rests. Nolana Dev. Ass’n, 682 S.W.2d at 250. The holder of
15
equitable title is considered the real owner, and the person vested with legal title is
considered to hold the property for the benefit of the equitable-title holder.2 Eagle
Oil & Gas Co., 619 S.W.3d at 706. A party holding equitable title to a house has
standing to sue for damage to the house. See Starr v. A.J. Struss & Co., No. 01-14-
00702-CV, 2015 WL 4139028, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 9,
2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that evidence that plaintiff received equitable title
by virtue of parol gift of house defeated challenge to plaintiff’s standing to sue for
damages due to allegedly faulty installation of air conditioning system).
3. Contract for deed
A contract for deed is a “financing arrangement that allows the seller to
maintain title to the property until the buyer has paid for the property in full.” Morton
v. Nguyen, 412 S.W.3d 506, 509–10 (Tex. 2013); see Ferrara v. Nutt, 555 S.W.3d
227, 236 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). Under a contract for deed,
“the buyer has an equitable right, but no obligation, to complete the purchase.” Shook
v. Walden, 368 S.W.3d 604, 625 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, pet. denied) (holding
2
Some courts refer to the interest of the party providing the down payment as a
“beneficial interest” or “beneficial title.” See Estate of Lee v. Ring, 734 S.W.2d 123,
125 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ) (“The intent of the person who
seeks to have beneficial title vested in him or her must be determined from the facts
and circumstances existing at the time of the transaction out of which the resulting
trust is sought to be established.”). Other cases refer to the interest of the “real
owners” as “equitable title.” Eagle Oil & Gas Co. v. TRO-X, L.P., 619 S.W.3d 699,
706 (Tex. 2021).
16
that contract for deed provides “persons unable to obtain conventional mortgage
financing an alternative means of purchasing real property”). Under a typical real
estate contract, the buyer “is contractually obligated to complete the purchase and
may be liable for breach upon failure to pay the seller.” Id.A contract for deed is an executory contract, which is subject to the statute of
frauds and which “is not enforceable unless the contract is in writing and signed by
the party to be bound or by that party’s authorized representative.” TEX. PROP. CODE
§ 5.072; Nguyen v. Yovan, 317 S.W.3d 261, 267 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2009, pet. denied). The purchaser under a contract for deed obtains an immediate
right to possession of the property, but he does not acquire equitable title until the
full purchase price has been paid. Ferrara, 555 S.W.3d at 240; Cullins v. Foster,
171 S.W.3d 521, 533 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (holding
that purchaser under contract for deed obtains equitable title when he has “paid the
purchase price and fully performed the obligations under the contract”).
4. Mark was the beneficiary of a purchase money resulting trust, not
a party to an oral contract for deed.
In this case, it is undisputed that record title to the house was taken in
Charles’s and Martha’s names. It is also undisputed that there is no written contract
between Mark and his parents regarding the purchase of the house. Mark and Charles
both provided affidavits in which each swore that: (1) Mark provided the down
payment and made all subsequent payments; (2) Mark took possession of the house;
17
and (3) Mark “had always been the owner of the house.” In his deposition Mark
testified that his parents owned the house, which he finished paying off in 2017. He
also testified that in 2018, his parents transferred the title to him.
The facts are not consistent with a contract for deed. First, there is no written
contract for deed, which is required under the statute of frauds. Even if we were to
consider parol evidence—which is not available to prove a contract for deed—it does
not support the existence of such an arrangement. There is no evidence that Charles
and Martha provided any of their money toward the purchase of the house or that
they purchased the house at some point prior to entering into an agreement by which
Mark would make the payments.
The facts in this case are consistent with a purchase money resulting trust.
Both Mark and Charles averred that Mark provided the money for the down payment
and continued paying Charles the amount required to satisfy the mortgage. By
providing the down payment, a purchase money resulting trust was created at the
time that his parents took legal title to the house. The absence of a written agreement
is not fatal to the creation of a purchase money resulting trust, which is not regulated
by the statute of frauds because the ownership interests—both legal and equitable—
immediately vest at the time of the transaction.
18
Mark clarified that his statement that his parents owned the house was based
on the fact that they hold record legal title. His testimony is not inconsistent with his
assertions that he always had equitable ownership of the house.
We conclude that Mark was the beneficiary of a purchase money resulting
trust and that he had equitable title to the house at all times relevant to this lawsuit.
Because he had equitable title, we hold that Mark has standing to sue. See Starr,
2015 WL 4139028, at *4–5 (holding that party with equitable title had standing to
sue for damage to house). We sustain Mark’s first issue. In light of this holding, we
do not need to consider his other standing arguments. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (“The
court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but
that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”).
3. The record does not show that Danielle had an ownership interest
at any time relevant to this suit.
Our conclusion is different as to Danielle’s standing. The record includes no
evidence that Danielle contributed in any way to the down payment used to purchase
the house, and her name does not appear on any relevant version of the title. We
conclude that the record does not demonstrate that Danielle has standing to sue, and
we hold that the trial court properly dismissed her claims.
19
Conclusion
We affirm the take-nothing summary judgment and dismissal of Charles’s and
Danielle’s claims. We reverse the trial court’s grant of the plea to the jurisdiction
and dismissal of Mark’s claims, and we remand for further proceedings.
Peter Kelly
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Guerra, and Farris.
20