Standifer, Ronny Joe ( 2015 )

PD-1339-15
PD-1339-15 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Transmitted 10/12/2015 9:22:18 PM
Accepted 10/14/2015 5:04:35 PM
No. _________________ ABEL ACOSTA
CLERK
IN THE
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
RONNY JOE STANDIFER
Petitioner and Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
Appellee
APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR
DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
Cause Number 2013-122-C1 in the 19th District Court of McLennan County
Cause Number 10-15-00038-CR in the Tenth Court of Appeals
Filed by Patrick Brady
State Bar Number 00783709
510 North Valley Mills Drive, Suite 500
October 14, 2015 Waco, Texas 76710
Phone: 254-772-8022
Fax: 254-772-9297
e-mail: pbrady@slmpc.com
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED
PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:
I. IDENTITY OF JUDGE, PARTIES, AND COUNSEL
Petitioner and Appellant: RONNY JOE STANDIFER
Attorney for Petitioner: PATRICK OWEN BRADY
On Appeal 510 North Valley Mills Drive, Suite 500
Waco, Texas 76710
254-772-8022
Fax: 254-772-9297
e-mail: pbrady@slmpc.com
Attorney for Petitioner: DENTON LESSMAN
At Trial 100 North sixth Street, Suite 707
Waco, Texas 76701
254-776-4544
Fax: 254-776-4551
e-mail: dlessmanatty@aol.com
Petition for Appellant, Ronny Joe Standifer Page i
Appellee: THE STATE OF TEXAS
Attorney for the State: ABEL REYNA
On Appeal STERLING HARMON
Criminal District Attorney
219 North Sixth Street, Suite 200
Waco, Texas 76701
254-757-5084
Fax: 254-757-5021
e-mail: sterling.harmon@co.mclennan.tx.us
Attorney for the State: ROBERT MOODY
At Trial AMANDA DILLON
Criminal District Attorney
219 North Sixth Street, Suite 200
Waco, Texas 76701
254-757-5084
Fax: 254-757-5021
Trial Court Judge: THE HONORABLE MATT JOHNSON
Petition for Appellant, Ronny Joe Standifer Page ii
II. TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. IDENTITY OF JUDGE, PARTIES, AND COUNSEL . . . . . . . . . . . . i
II. TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iii
III. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iv
IV. REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
VI. STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
VII. GROUNDS FOR REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
VIII. ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
IX. PRAYER FOR RELIEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
X. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
XI. CERTIFICATE REGARDING FONT AND WORD LIMIT . . . . . .11
XII. APPENDIX
(Pages from reporter’s record and Memorandum Opinion)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Attached at the Back
Petition for Appellant, Ronny Joe Standifer Page iii
III. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Allridge v. State
850 S.W.2d 471 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
Barajas v. State
93 S.W.3d 36 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Draughon v. State
831 S.W.2d 331 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 7
Samaripas v. State
No. 13-11-00442-CR, 2015 WL 1957244 (Tex.App., Apr. 30, 2015) . . . . . 8
Sells v. State
121 S.W.3d 748 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6, 7
Standefer v. State
59 S.W.3d 177 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
Rules
Tex. R. App. Proc. 33.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 2
Tex. R. App. Proc. 66.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Petition for Appellant, Ronny Joe Standifer Page iv
IV. REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Counsel believes oral argument would aid the Court.
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The appellant, Ronny Joe Standifer, was indicted for Aggravated Assault –
Serious Bodily Injury, a second degree felony which was enhanced to first degree
punishment with an allegation of a prior felony conviction. (1 C.R. 6)
At trial, a jury found Ronny guilty (1 C.R. 139) and assessed his sentence at
life in prison with a $10,000 fine (1 C.R.148).
Notice of appeal was filed February 5, 2015.
VI. STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On appeal, the sole issue presented to the Tenth Court of Appeals was stated
as follows:
“It was reversible error for the judge to allow the prosecution to ask
the voir dire panel what evidence the panel wanted at trial when the
alleged victim would not testify.” (Appellant’s Brief)
On September 10, 2015, the Tenth Court of Appeals held error, if any, was
not preserved (Opinion at page 2 in the Appendix to this Petition), even though
defense counsel made an objection (2 R.R. 79) to the voir dire questioning.
Petition for Appellant, Ronny Joe Standifer Page v
No motion for rehearing was attempted.
Petition for Appellant, Ronny Joe Standifer Page vi
VII. GROUND FOR REVIEW
Ground No. 1
The Tenth Court of Appeals erred in deciding that a complaint had not been
preserved when defense counsel objected, “This is getting into the specific
facts of the case potentially. Improper commitment.” at the beginning of a
voir dire colloquy regarding what proof is desired or expected by the
potential jurors.
VIII. ARGUMENT
A. Reasons for Review (Rule 66.3)
The Tenth Court of Appeals has decided an important question of state law
in a way that conflicts with the applicable decisions of the Court of Criminal
Appeals. Specifically, the Tenth Court of Appeals raised the burden for preserving
error beyond what is required by Rule 33.1, Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure,
assuming Rule 33.1 can be interpreted by Draughon v. State, 831 S.W.2d 331
(Tex.Crim.App. 1992).
In the alternative, the Tenth Court of Appeals has decided an important
question of state law that has not been, but should be, settled by the Court of
Criminal Appeals. Specifically, the Tenth Court of Appeals has effectively held
Petition for Appellant, Ronny Joe Standifer Page 1
that Rule 33.1 requires every single voir dire question to be followed by an
objection in order for error to be preserved.
Further, the Tenth Court of Appeals has sanctioned a departure from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings by the lower court which is so
great that it requires discretionary review, and therefore the Tenth Court of
Appeals has itself so far departed from the accepted and usual course.
B. The Record
The Alleged Assault
The alleged victim of the assault died prior to trial from unrelated health
problems. (3 R.R. 8) Therefore, the prosecution’s case was largely circumstantial.
On November 15, 2012, peace officers responded to a 911 call and found a
naked female lying on the floor of her home unconscious but holding a telephone.
(3 R.R. 48) They also found blood and clumps of hair in other rooms of the
residence. (3 R.R. 48, 51, 95 - 99) At trial, a doctor described the woman’s
injuries as follows:
-- One ear was 90% avulsed (hanging on by 10%) (3 R.R. 133)
-- “Significant trauma” to the genital area (3 R.R. 136)
-- Heart stopped, requiring CPR (3 R.R. 138)
-- Broken ribs (3 R.R. 141)
-- “Severe anoxic brain injury” (3 R.R. 145)
Petition for Appellant, Ronny Joe Standifer Page 2
-- Spinous fracture (3 R.R. 146)
-- Brain bleeding (3 R.R. 147)
The injuries were, according to the doctor, consistent with being hit and kicked (3
R.R. 152), and this opinion was bolstered by other (3 R.R. 95 – 99, 104 and 216).)
Ronny Joe Standifer became a suspect in the case (3 R.R. 54 and 186), and a
detective contacted Ronny who freely admitted making the original 911 call. (3
R.R. 187 – 190) Eventually, Mr. Standifer gave statements about what happened
to the woman. (3 R.R. 192 – 196 and 202, State’s Exhibit 94)
At trial, Mr. Standifer testified. He explained to the jury that he arrived at
the woman’s house around 10:00 p.m. (3 R.R. 237) and found the woman sitting
on her couch drinking (3 R.R. 238). The medical records showed that the woman
had a blood alcohol level of .2 grams per deciliter (3 R.R. 152) which is legally
intoxicated (3 R.R. 219). She acted intoxicated and eventually fell asleep (3 R.R.
238 – 241) and Ronny decided to move out of the woman’s residence because “I
said, man, I just can’t take this no more” (3 R.R. 241). He began packing his
belongings which eventually woke the woman. (3 R.R. 241 – 242) She tried to
stop him from leaving. (3 R.R. 242 – 244) She tried to physically stop him which
resulted in her falling multiple times. (3 R.R. 244 – 246) At one point, the woman
fell on her dog which then attacked or tried to attack them both. (3 R.R. 247 and
State’s Ex. 94) Also, during various times in the struggles that night, Mr. Standifer
Petition for Appellant, Ronny Joe Standifer Page 3
fell on top of the woman, but it was never intentional. (3 R.R. 252) He did not
cause the terrible injuries reflected in the photos (3 R.R. 251 – 252) and did not
cause any intentional injuries (3 R.R. 232 and 252) and not knowingly or
recklessly (3 R.R. 257). In fact, Mr. Standifer protected her from the attacking
dog. (3 R.R. 251 and 253) He left the residence after calling 911 because he was
on parole and in violation of his parole by being at that location. (3 R.R. 233)
With regard to injuries possibly being caused by a dog, prosecution
witnesses testified that many of the injuries could not be caused by a dog (3 R.R.
59, 60 – 61, 81and 82, 143, 151 and 178 – 179), that the dog was not aggressive (3
R.R. 46, 67, 116), and that the dog did not have blood on its muzzle (3 R.R. 117) .
With regard to a suggestion that the injuries were caused by a fall, witnesses
testified that falls would not cause injuries so extensive. (3 R.R. 81 – 82, 84 – 85,
143 – 144, 150 and 178 – 179)
CPR was specifically excluded as a possible cause of at least one rib
fracture. (3 R.R. 144 – 145)
Voir Dire
During jury selection, the prosecution began preparing the jury for the fact
that the alleged victim would not testify. The prosecution asked the voir dire panel
Petition for Appellant, Ronny Joe Standifer Page 4
about “the one witness rule” (2 R.R. 68 – 78) and then asked the panel to speculate
about reasons the “victim” would not testify (2 R.R. 78 – 79) and finally asked:
“How would you prove something without the victim – the person
that was actually there who was injured?” (2 R.R. 79)
The defense objected that the question called for an improper commitment, and the
court overruled the objection. (2 R.R. 79) Immediately, the prosecutor restated the
question as follows:
“How do you prove something like if you don’t have a victim?”
and
“What would you want to see?” (2 R.R. 79)
These questions elicited several responses from the potential jurors including the
following:
“Whatever you present to the jurors.” (2 R.R. 80)
“The doctor.” (2 R.R. 80)
“DNA.” (2 R.R. 80)
“Medical.” (2 R.R. 80)
“Victim’s family.” (2 R.R. 80)
“What about pictures?” (2 R.R. 81)
Petition for Appellant, Ronny Joe Standifer Page 5
The prosecution also suggested examples of evidence which might be offered
instead of eyewitness testimony: “Prior instances” (prior bad acts) and “injuries on
the other side” (i.e., injuries on Mr. Standifer). (2 R.R. 81)
C. The Law
“The trial court has broad discretion over the process of selecting a jury.”
Sells v. State, 121 S.W.3d 748, 755 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003); Barajas v. State, 93
S.W.3d 36, 38 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). “Thus, we leave to the trial court's
discretion the propriety of a particular question and will not disturb the trial court's
decision absent an abuse of discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion when it
prohibits a proper question about a proper area of inquiry. A question is proper if
it seeks to discover a juror's views on an issue applicable to the case.” Sells, at
755-56.
An attorney cannot attempt to bind or commit a prospective juror to a verdict
based on a hypothetical set of facts. Sells, at 755-56; Allridge v. State, 850
S.W.2d 471, 480 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). An open-ended question can be a
commitment question, and therefore improper, if the question asks the prospective
juror to set the hypothetical parameters for juror’s decision-making. Standefer v.
State, 59 S.W.3d 177, 180 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001)
Petition for Appellant, Ronny Joe Standifer Page 6
In addition, a trial judge may prohibit as improper a voir dire question that is
so vague or broad in nature as to constitute a global fishing expedition. Sells, at
756.
In order to preserve error, a party must object to an improper voir dire
question. Draughon v. State, 831 S.W.2d 331, footnote 1 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992).
An objection is sufficient if it apprises the trial judge of the party’s complaint, and
error is preserved if the judge's adverse ruling is authoritative enough to obviate the
necessity for further objection. Draughon, at footnote 1.
D. Analysis
In Mr. Standifer’s case, the purpose in the State’s voir dire was primarily to
(1) commit jurors to relying on certain kinds of evidence, for example
medical records and medical testimony, prior bad acts, the testimony
of relatives of the alleged victim and photos; and
(2) commit jurors to not requiring eyewitness testimony.
A secondary effect of the questions was to make all of the panel members
view the case from the prosecutor’s point of view – the line of questioning started
“How do you prove . . .” and thereby put the burden of proof on the jurors.
Petition for Appellant, Ronny Joe Standifer Page 7
The overall effect of the questioning was to prime the jury for the evidence
so the jurors would not question the nature or manner of proof offered during trial.
The questioning was improper because it asked the prospective jurors to set
the parameters for their decision-making. The alleged victim was not going to
testify – she had died before voir dire began – so the issue was simply what else
did the jury need before answering “guilty.” It is analogous to the line of
questioning in Samaripas v. State, No. 13-11-00442-CR, 2015 WL 1957244, at 1
(Tex. App. Apr. 30, 2015) when the defense tried to ask, “What type of evidence
would you expect the State of Texas to bring to you in order to convince you that
somebody committed an offense beyond a reasonable doubt?” It was improper in
Samaripas, and it is improper here.
This was largely a case of circumstantial evidence, and Mr. Standifer was
entitled to a jury that would potentially require the prosecution to present an
eyewitness to the alleged “assault.” The jury was unfairly committed to
considering only the prosecution’s side – the medical records, the photos, the prior
bad acts, and “whatever” was offered instead of eyewitness testimony.
Mr. Standifer’s attorney clearly objected to the inquiry about what evidence
the jury wanted if the alleged victim did not testify. What followed was a
conversation about what circumstantial evidence might be used to prove a case
Petition for Appellant, Ronny Joe Standifer Page 8
instead of having the victim’s testimony. No reasonable person could think the
defense had no objection to the conversation.
C. Conclusion
Defense counsel’s objection clearly apprised the judge of the complaint, and
the judge’s ruling was clear enough that (1) a reasonable person could realize
further objections would be overruled and therefore unnecessarily repetitive, and
(2) a reasonable person would understand that the defense objected to the subject
of the conversation with the jury, not just the initial question.
The complaint was preserved for appeal, and the court of appeals should
have considered the complaint on the merits.
Petition for Appellant, Ronny Joe Standifer Page 9
IX. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Appellant prays that the Court grant this Petition for Discretionary Review,
order a brief on the merits, and then reverse the holding of the court of appeals.
Respectfully submitted,
/S/ Patrick Brady
Patrick Brady
State Bar No. 00783709
510 North Valley Mills Drive, Suite 500
Waco, Texas 76710
254-772-8022
Fax: 254-772-9297
e-mail: pbrady@slmpc.com
X. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on October 12, 2015, a true and correct copy of the
above has this day been delivered to the McLennan County District Attorney’s
Office, 219 North 6th Street, Waco, Texas 76701, by electronic service at the e-
mail addresses for the State Prosecuting Attorney and the McLennan County
District Attorney.
S/ Patrick Brady
Patrick Brady
Petition for Appellant, Ronny Joe Standifer Page 10
XI. CERTIFICATE REGARDING FONT AND WORD LIMIT
In accordance with Rule 9.4, the undersigned attorney certifies as follows:
1. This petition complies with the type-volume limitation of TEX. R. APP. P.
9.4(i) because this petition contains 1,734 words, excluding the parts of the
petition exempted by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1), or,
2. This petition complies with the typeface requirements and the type style
requirements of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(e) because this petition has been
produced on a computer in conventional typeface using Microsoft Word,
Times New Roman font, 14 point in the body of the petition and 12 point in
the footnotes.
/S/ Patrick Brady
Patrick Brady
Petition for Appellant, Ronny Joe Standifer Page 11
XII. APPENDIX
The appendix is following and attached.
Petition for Appellant, Ronny Joe Standifer Page 12