B. H.-L. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services ( 2018 )

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-17-00772-CV
B. H.-L., Appellant
v.
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY, 425TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. 16-0122-CPS425, HONORABLE BETSY F. LAMBETH, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
B.H.-L. appeals from the trial court’s order terminating her parent-child relationship
with her children, A.S. and A.L.1 After a bench trial, the trial court found that B.H.-L. had committed
conduct that satisfied the requirements for termination found in Paragraphs (D), (E), (O), and (P)
of Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1). See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (P).
In addition, the trial court found that termination was in the best interest of the children. See id.
§ 161.001(b)(2).
In three appellate issues, B.H.-L. contends that there was legally and factually
insufficient evidence to support the termination of her parental rights pursuant to Paragraphs (D),
(E), or (O). However, she does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination
1
We use initials to protect the privacy of those involved in this case. See Tex. Fam. Code
§ 109.002(d).
of her rights pursuant to Paragraph (P), nor does she challenge the trial court’s finding that
termination was in the best interest of the children. Therefore, she has waived any challenge she
may have to those findings. See Toliver v. Texas Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 217 S.W.3d 85,
102 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (“Holloway does not challenge the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting the findings under section 161.001(1)(F), (N), and (O), and thus he
waives any complaint about the sufficiency of the evidence to support these findings.”); see also
In re T.W., No. 05-16-00232-CV, 2016 WL 3437589, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 21, 2016, pet.
denied) (mem. op.) (“Father has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support these
grounds and has thus waived any complaint that the evidence is insufficient to support these
findings.”); J.T. v. Texas Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-15-00286-CV, 2015 WL
6459607, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 23, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[T]heir brief does not
challenge the jury’s findings that Father and Mother engaged in conduct satisfying the statutory
grounds found in subsection (N), (O), or (P). Father and Mother have therefore waived any challenge
they may have to the jury’s findings under those subsections.”).
Moreover, “[o]nly one statutory ground is necessary to support a judgment in a
parental-rights-termination case.” Spurck v. Texas Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 396 S.W.3d
205, 221 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.) (citing In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003)).
Therefore, the trial court’s unchallenged findings that B.H.-L. committed conduct satisfying
Paragraph (P) and that termination was in the children’s best interest are sufficient to support the
court’s termination order. See In re C.C., No. 12-17-00114-CV, 2017 WL 3184319, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Tyler June 30, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Because B.C. does not challenge any of the
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predicate grounds for termination or the best interest finding, these findings are binding on this
court. Therefore, the unchallenged finding that termination is in the children’s best interest along with
the unchallenged predicate grounds for termination suffice to support the trial court’s judgment.”)
(citations omitted).
In conclusion, because B.H.-L. has waived any challenge she may have to the trial
court’s findings concerning Paragraph (P) and the children’s best interest, we overrule her appellate
issues and affirm the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights.
__________________________________________
Scott K. Field, Justice
Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Goodwin and Field
Affirmed
Filed: March 13, 2018
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