City of New Braunfels, Texas And YC Partners Ltd., D/B/A Yantis Company v. Carowest Land, Ltd. ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                                             ACCEPTED
    03-17-00696-CV
    21621145
    THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
    AUSTIN, TEXAS
    1/4/2018 5:29 PM
    JEFFREY D. KYLE
    CLERK
    No. 03-17-00696-CV
    FILED IN
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS     3rd COURT OF APPEALS
    AUSTIN, TEXAS
    FOR THE THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS 1/4/2018 5:29:20 PM
    AT AUSTIN             JEFFREY D. KYLE
    Clerk
    CITY OF NEW BRAUNFELS, TEXAS, and Y.C. PARTNERS, LTD.
    d/b/a YANTIS COMPANY,
    Appellants,
    vs.
    CAROWEST LAND, LTD.,
    Appellee.
    On Appeal from the 22nd Judicial District of Comal County, Texas
    Cause No. C2017-0474A, Hon. Margaret G. Mirabal, Sitting by Appointment
    CAROWEST LAND, LTD’S MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL OF
    APPELLANT YC PARTNERS, LTD. D/B/A YANTIS COMPANY
    Jason Davis                               Thomas R. Phillips
    State Bar No. 00793592                    State Bar No. 00000022
    Caroline Newman Small                     Maddy R. Dwertman
    State Bar No. 24056037                    State Bar No. 24092371
    DAVIS & SANTOS, P.C.                      BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
    719 S. Flores St.                         98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500
    San Antonio, Texas 78204                  Austin, Texas 78701
    (210) 853-5882                            (512) 322-2500
    (210) 200-8395 (Facsimile)                (512) 322-2501 (Facsimile)
    jdavis@dslawpc.com                        tom.phillips@bakerbotts.com
    csmall@dslawpc.com                        maddy.dwertman@bakerbotts.com
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE CAROWEST LAND, LTD.
    1
    Appellee Carowest Land, Ltd. (“Carowest”) hereby moves to dismiss
    the appeal of Appellant YC Partners, Ltd. d/b/a Yantis Company (“Yantis”) for
    want of jurisdiction.      In support of this motion, Carowest would show the
    following:
    I.     Yantis has no right to an interlocutory appeal of the order
    denying its plea to the jurisdiction because it is not a
    governmental unit.
    The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code permits interlocutory
    appeals only in certain specified circumstances, including the appeal of an order
    that “grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit as that term
    is defined in Section 101.001.”1 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(8).
    1
    Section 101.001 defines “governmental unit” as:
    (A) this state and all the several agencies of government that collectively
    constitute the government of this state, including other agencies bearing different
    designations, and all departments, bureaus, boards, commissions, offices,
    agencies, councils, and courts;
    (B) a political subdivision of this state, including any city, county, school district,
    junior college district, levee improvement district, drainage district, irrigation
    district, water improvement district, water control and improvement district, water
    control and preservation district, freshwater supply district, navigation district,
    conservation and reclamation district, soil conservation district, communication
    district, public health district, and river authority;
    (C) an emergency service organization; and
    (D) any other institution, agency, or organ of government the status and authority
    of which are derived from the Constitution of Texas or from laws passed by the
    legislature under the constitution.
    TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.001(3).
    2
    Because the statute authorizing interlocutory appeals is a narrow exception to the
    general rule that only final judgments and orders are appealable, Texas courts will
    “strictly construe” this provision “as ‘a narrow exception to the general rule that
    only final judgments are appealable.’” Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 
    233 S.W.3d 835
    , 841 (Tex. 2007) (quoting Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 
    53 S.W.3d 352
    , 355 (Tex. 2001)). Pursuant to its plain terms, the statute authorizes
    only the appeal of an order that grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a
    governmental unit. Because Yantis is indisputably not a governmental unit, either
    within the meaning of Section 101.001 or as commonly understood—and does not
    purport to be one—its attempt to appeal the district court’s denial of its own plea to
    the jurisdiction is improper. Yantis’s appeal should therefore be dismissed for
    want of jurisdiction.
    Yantis suggests that its joinder in this interlocutory appeal is proper
    “because Yantis is a party whose interests are aligned with co-defendant, the City
    of New Braunfels.” Yantis Br. at 1 (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(c)). Although
    Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 25.1(c) permits “[p]arties whose interests are
    aligned” to “file a joint notice of appeal,” it does not follow that any party can
    pursue an interlocutory appeal, either by itself or as a tag-along, absent statutory
    authorization to do so. Chapter 51 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
    authorizes the interlocutory appeal of a denial of a governmental unit’s plea to the
    3
    jurisdiction, not the denial of any “plea to the jurisdiction based on governmental
    immunity,” as Yantis asserts. Yantis Br. at 1. Yantis cites no authority showing
    that its appeal should be permitted, and Carowest has found none. But even if
    Yantis’s reading of Rule 25.1(c) were correct, “when a rule of procedure conflicts
    with a statute, the statute prevails.” Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at Houston v.
    Rios, 61 Tex. S. Ct. J. 174, 180 (Tex. Dec. 15, 2017) (quoting Johnstone v. State,
    
    22 S.W.3d 408
    , 409 (Tex. 2000)).
    II.    Texas courts have held that Section 51.014(a)(8) does not
    authorize the interlocutory appeal of an order granting or
    denying a plea to the jurisdiction by a non-governmental co-
    defendant of a governmental unit.
    Texas courts have consistently declined to extend the statutory right of
    interlocutory appeal to orders granting or denying a plea to the jurisdiction by a co-
    defendant of a governmental unit that is not itself a governmental unit.2 See, e.g.,
    City of Donna v. Ramirez, No. 13-16-00619-CV, 
    2017 WL 5184533
    , at *7 (Tex.
    App.—Corpus Christi Nov. 9, 2017, no pet. h.) (holding that Section 51.014(a)(8)
    does not authorize government employees sued in their individual capacities to
    bring interlocutory appeal); AECOM USA, Inc. v. Mata, No. 04-15-00773-CV,
    
    2016 WL 5112222
    , at *2–4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept. 21, 2016, pet. filed)
    (mem. op.) (holding that independent contractor of TxDOT was not a
    2
    Although courts have held that a state official sued in his official capacity may seek
    interlocutory appellate review from the denial of a jurisdictional plea, such holding has no
    application to a private entity like Yantis.
    4
    governmental unit entitled to bring an interlocutory appeal under Section
    51.014(a)(8)); cf. Adams v. Harris Cnty., No. 04-15-00287-CV, 
    2015 WL 8392426
    , at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 9, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
    (dismissing interlocutory appeal from order granting plea to the jurisdiction filed
    by government official sued in his individual capacity); Doty v. Beaumont Indep.
    Sch. Dist., No. 09-10-00306-CV, 
    2010 WL 4514139
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
    Nov. 10, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing interlocutory appeals from trial
    court’s orders granting pleas to the jurisdiction filed by non-governmental co-
    defendants of governmental unit); Sanders v. City of Grapevine, 
    218 S.W.3d 772
    ,
    776 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied) (holding that order dismissing
    claims against city officials in their individual capacities was not an appealable
    interlocutory order under Section 51.014(a)(8)).        As the Fourteenth Court of
    appeals explained in dismissing the appeal of private developers who attempted to
    join in the interlocutory appeal of an order denying Harris County’s plea to the
    jurisdiction:
    We find no authority which allows a party to bootstrap an
    unappealable interlocutory order to a governmental
    entity’s statutory interlocutory appeal of a denial of a
    plea to the jurisdiction. To accept the Developers’
    arguments would require a holding which grants the right
    of interlocutory appeal to any co-defendant of a
    governmental unit filing a plea to the jurisdiction.
    Strictly construing the interlocutory appeal statute, we
    cannot say that it permits such an overly broad
    5
    interpretation. Accordingly, we overrule the Developers’
    issue on appeal and grant appellees’ motion to dismiss
    the Developers’ appeal as we are without jurisdiction to
    consider it.
    City of Houston v. Grudziecke, No. 14-02-00947-CV, 
    2003 WL 1922671
    , at *4
    (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 24, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.); see
    generally Astoria Indus. of Iowa, Inc. v. SNF, Inc., 
    223 S.W.3d 616
    , 627 n.24 (Tex.
    App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied) (“An interlocutory order that is explicitly
    appealable under section 51.014 may not be used as a vehicle for carrying other
    nonappealable interlocutory orders to the appellate court.”).3
    The circumstances of this case are analogous to those in Grudziecke.
    Yantis, a private entity, is attempting to bootstrap the nonappealable interloctuory
    order denying its own plea to the jurisdiction to the City’s statutory interlocutory
    appeal of the order denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction.                   Because no
    authority grants Yantis the right of interlocutory appeal, this Court must dismiss
    Yantis’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.           Independent of the Court’s decision
    concerning jurisdiction over Carowest’s declaratory judgment claims against the
    City, this Court lacks the power to render a decision regarding jurisdiction over
    3
    Even if a private party could pursue an interlocutory appeal when its interests were
    identical to an appealing governmental unit’s, Yantis would have no right to appeal here. Yantis
    openly concedes that its “position differs from that of the City” as it regards the triggering of
    Carowest’s alleged obligation to indemnify and hold harmless the City. Yantis Br. at 8. Yantis
    on the one hand claims a right to interlocutory appeal on the basis that its interests are aligned
    with those of the City, while on the other it seeks judgment on issues where its interests and the
    City’s clearly diverge.
    6
    Carowest’s declaratory judgment claims against Yantis. See N.Y. Underwriters
    Ins. Co. v. Sanchez, 
    799 S.W.2d 677
    , 679 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam) (holding that in
    the absence of express statutory authorization, the assumption of appellate
    jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal is fundamental error).
    Prayer
    For the foregoing reasons, Carowest respectfully requests that the
    Court dismiss Yantis’s appeal of the district court’s order denying Yantis’s plea to
    the jurisdiction.4 Carowest further requests that any costs associated solely with
    Yantis’s attempted appeal be assessed against Yantis. Carowest further requests
    such other and further relief as the Court deems proper under the circumstances.
    4
    The mandate need not issue until the conclusion of the appeal.
    7
    Respectfully submitted,
    BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
    By: /s/ Thomas R. Phillips
    Thomas R. Phillips
    State Bar No. 00000022
    Maddy R. Dwertman
    State Bar No. 24092371
    98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500
    Austin, Texas 78701
    (512) 322-2500
    (512) 322-2501 (Facsimile)
    tom.phillips@bakerbotts.com
    maddy.dwertman@bakerbotts.com
    DAVIS & SANTOS, P.C.
    Jason Davis
    State Bar No. 00793592
    Caroline Newman Small
    State Bar No. 24056037
    719 Flores St.
    San Antonio, Texas 78204
    (210) 853-5882
    (210) 200-8395 (Facsimile)
    jdavis@dslawpc.com
    csmall@dslawpc.com
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    CAROWEST LAND, LTD.
    8
    CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
    I certify that on January 2, 2018 and January 4, 2018, respectively,
    counsel for Appellee conferred with Lamont A. Jefferson, counsel for YC Partners,
    Ltd., and G. Alan Waldrop, counsel for the City of New Braunfels, who confirmed
    that Appellants are opposed to this motion and the relief requested herein.
    /s/ Thomas R. Phillips
    Thomas R. Phillips
    9
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I certify that on January 4, 2018, a true and correct copy of the
    foregoing motion was served via the Court’s Electronic Filing System on the
    following counsel of record:
    G. Alan Waldrop                      Lawrence Morales, II
    Ryan D. V. Greene                    Chuck Shipman
    TERRILL & WALDROP                    THE MORALES FIRM, P.C.
    810 West 10th Street                 6243 W. IH 10, Suite 132
    Austin, Texas 78701                  San Antonio, Texas 78201
    awaldrop@terrillwaldrop.com          lawrence@themoralesfirm.com
    rgreene@terrillwaldrop.com           cshipman@themoralesfirm.com
    Valeria M. Acevedo                   Lamont A. Jefferson
    J. Frank Onion, III                  Emma Cano
    CITY OF NEW BRAUNFELS, TEXAS         JEFFERSON CANO
    CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE               112 East Pecan St., Suite 1650
    424 S. Castell Ave.                  San Antonio, Texas 78205
    New Braunfels, Texas 78130           ljefferson@jeffersoncano.com
    vacavedo@nbtexas.org                 ecano@jeffersoncano.com
    fonion@nbtexas.org
    Attorneys for Appellant
    Attorneys for Appellant              YC Partners, Ltd., d/b/a Yantis Company
    City of New Braunfels, Texas
    /s/ Thomas R. Phillips
    Thomas R. Phillips
    10