Ricardo Rodriguez v. State ( 2018 )


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  •                          NUMBER 13-17-00340-CR
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
    RICARDO RODRIGUEZ,                                                       Appellant,
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                        Appellee.
    On appeal from the 347th District Court
    of Nueces County, Texas.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Benavides and Longoria
    Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez
    Appellant Ricardo Rodriguez was charged by indictment with aggravated assault
    with a deadly weapon, a second-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2)
    (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). Specifically, the State’s indictment alleged that
    Rodriguez “intentionally or knowingly threaten[ed] [G.P.] 1 with imminent bodily injury by
    threatening to kill [G.P.], and . . . use[d] or exhibit[d] a deadly weapon, to-wit: gasoline
    and a source of ignition, during the commission of said assault.” Rodriguez pleaded guilty
    to the charged offense, and the trial court placed him on deferred adjudication community
    supervision for six years, subject to the following relevant conditions: (1) Rodriguez was
    to remain in Nueces County unless permitted to leave the county by the court; (2)
    Rodriguez was to complete a Batterers Intervention and Prevention (BIP) program; 2 and
    (3) Rodriguez was to refrain from making contact with G.P.
    Approximately two years after being placed on community supervision, the State
    filed a motion to revoke, alleging that Rodriguez had, among other things, violated the
    conditions of community supervision listed above by: (1) leaving Nueces County without
    court permission; (2) failing to complete to the BIP program; and (3) making contact with
    G.P. Rodriguez pleaded true to these allegations, and the trial court sentenced him to
    seven years in prison. This appeal followed.
    Rodriguez’s court-appointed counsel has filed an Anders brief. See Anders v.
    California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 744 (1967). We affirm.
    I.      ANDERS BRIEF
    Pursuant to Anders v. California, Rodriguez’s court-appointed appellate counsel
    has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that his review of the
    record yielded no grounds of reversible error upon which an appeal can be predicated.
    1   We will refer to the assault complainant using the pseudonym “G.P.” to protect the complainant’s
    identity.
    2
    A Batterers Intervention and Prevention (BIP) program is a group counseling program that
    specializes in family violence intervention and prevention of battering behaviors in an intimate relationship,
    marriage, or family. See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 42.141 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.).
    2
    See 
    id. Counsel’s brief
    meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional
    evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See
    In re Schulman, 
    252 S.W.3d 403
    , 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“In
    Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel
    finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and
    set out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 
    112 S.W.3d 340
    , 343–44
    (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 
    813 S.W.2d 503
    , 510 n.3
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
    In compliance with High v. State, 
    573 S.W.2d 807
    , 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
    Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 
    436 S.W.3d 313
    , 319–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014),
    Rodriguez’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no
    reversible error in the trial court’s judgment. Rodriguez’s counsel has also informed this
    Court that he has (1) notified Rodriguez that he has filed an Anders brief and a motion to
    withdraw; (2) provided Rodriguez with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed Rodriguez
    of his rights to file a pro se response, to review the record preparatory to filing that
    response, and to seek discretionary review in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals if this
    Court finds that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) provided Rodriguez with a form motion for
    pro se access to the appellate record with instructions to file the motion in this Court. See
    
    Anders, 386 U.S. at 744
    ; 
    Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319
    –20, 
    Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510
    n.3;
    see also In re 
    Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409
    n.23. An adequate time has passed, and
    Rodriguez has not filed a response.
    II.     INDEPENDENT REVIEW
    3
    Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the
    proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 
    488 U.S. 75
    , 80 (1988). After reviewing the entire record, as well as the Anders brief, we find
    nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 
    178 S.W.3d 824
    ,
    827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the
    opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for
    reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule
    of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); 
    Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509
    . Accordingly, we affirm the
    judgment of the trial court.
    III.   MOTION TO WITHDRAW
    In accordance with Anders, Rodriguez’s attorney has asked this Court for
    permission to withdraw as counsel.       See 
    Anders, 386 U.S. at 744
    ; see also In re
    
    Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408
    n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 
    903 S.W.2d 776
    , 779–80 (Tex.
    App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“[I]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must
    withdraw from representing the appellant.        To withdraw from representation, the
    appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the
    appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s
    motion to withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered
    to send a copy of this opinion and this Court’s judgment to Rodriguez and to advise him
    4
    of his right to file a petition for discretionary review. 3 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also
    In re 
    Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412
    n.35; Ex parte Owens, 
    206 S.W.3d 670
    , 673 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2006).
    /s/ Rogelio Valdez
    ROGELIO VALDEZ
    Chief Justice
    Do not publish.
    TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    Delivered and filed the
    15th day of March, 2018.
    3  No substitute counsel will be appointed. If Rodriguez seeks further review of this case by the
    Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review
    or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed within
    thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion for en
    banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. A petition for discretionary
    review must be filed with the clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals. See 
    id. R. 68.3.
    Any petition for
    discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 68.4. See
    
    id. R. 68.4.
    5