Terrell Devonte Robinson v. State ( 2018 )


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  •                        COURT OF APPEALS
    SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    FORT WORTH
    NO. 02-17-00054-CR
    NO. 02-17-00055-CR
    TERRELL DEVONTE ROBINSON                                         APPELLANT
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS                                                     STATE
    ----------
    FROM THE 396TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
    TRIAL COURT NO. 1439989D, 1451613D
    ----------
    MEMORANDUM OPINION1
    ----------
    Terrell Devonte Robinson appeals the revocation of his deferred
    adjudication supervision and convictions for two different offenses:       (1)
    possession of a controlled substance of more than one but less than four grams
    enhanced with a habitual offender notice and (2) burglary enhanced with a
    habitual offender notice. See 
    Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115
    (c)
    1
    See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
    (West 2017); 
    Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.42
    (d) (West Supp. 2017). Robinson
    contends that both convictions are invalid because––before he entered his
    original guilty plea resulting in deferred adjudication for both offenses––the State
    misinformed him in court filings about the correct punishment range he was
    facing. Thus, Robinson argues that he did not enter the original guilty pleas
    intelligently in violation of his Due Process right. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Davison
    v. State, 
    405 S.W.3d 682
    , 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We dismiss the appeals.
    Background
    In March 2016, a grand jury indicted Robinson for possession of a
    controlled substance; while that case was pending, in June 2016, a grand jury
    indicted Robinson for burglary.    Both indictments contain a habitual offender
    notice. Robinson, his counsel, and counsel for the State signed initial plea offer
    acknowledgements in both cases.           Each offer states that the range of
    punishment is “not more than 99 years[’] or less than 25 years[’]” confinement.
    But later memorializations of plea offers list different minimum punishments. On
    May 31, 2016, Robinson, his counsel, and the State’s counsel signed a plea offer
    in the drug possession case that lists the minimum punishment as five years’
    confinement. A July 2016 status conference report in the drug possession case
    lists a potential minimum punishment of five years’ confinement; the July 2016
    status conference report in the burglary case lists a potential minimum
    punishment of fifteen years’ confinement.
    2
    On September 26, 2016, Robinson pleaded guilty to both offenses without
    a punishment recommendation from the State. Robinson, his counsel, counsel
    for the State, and the trial judge signed written plea admonishments that day,
    which list twenty-five years as the minimum term of confinement for each
    offense.   At the plea hearing, the trial court questioned Robinson about his
    understanding of the range of punishment for each charge:
    THE COURT: They’re also saying in that indictment you have a
    second prior felony conviction. So if you’re found guilty and they
    prove both of them, then your punishment becomes 25 years in the
    penitentiary at a minimum, all the way up to 99 years or life.
    [ROBINSON]: Yes, sir.
    THE COURT: Do you understand what effect the second prior
    conviction can have upon your range of punishment?
    [ROBINSON]: Yes, sir.
    THE COURT: Then on the second case, that’s a burglary of a
    habitation case.
    ....
    THE COURT: With the second prior conviction it becomes 25
    minimum. Do you understand that?
    [ROBINSON]: Yes, sir.
    THE COURT: All the way up to life.
    [ROBINSON]: Yes, sir.
    The trial court asked the parties about the status of plea negotiations. The
    State told the judge that it had offered a plea bargain of twenty years’
    3
    confinement, but Robinson’s counsel told the trial court that Robinson wished to
    participate in a drug rehabilitation program, which required him to enter an open
    plea of guilty. Not only did Robinson’s counsel ask him whether he understood
    that the minimum punishment for each offense would be twenty-five years’
    confinement, the trial judge also clearly explained the consequences to
    Robinson:
    THE COURT: Okay. Here’s the problem. First of all, in order to get
    into the DIRECT program the State, first of all, would have to be
    willing to waive a jury in these cases. If they do not waive a jury,
    then you can’t get into DIRECT. Okay?
    Second of all, it is a -- it would be an open plea to me and I
    could say, no, I’m not going to follow that DIRECT. Okay. I’m not
    going to do that. I’m going to send you to 40 years in the
    penitentiary. But if you do an open plea, if the State is willing to do
    that, it would also involve you having to plead true to the
    enhancement paragraphs, which means if I did defer entering a
    finding of guilt and placed you on probation and you messed up on
    the probation, if you didn’t finish the DIRECT program, I could send
    you anywhere -- to the penitentiary anywhere within that 25- to 99-
    year punishment range. Do you understand that?
    [ROBINSON]: Yes.
    [Emphasis added.]
    As a result of Robinson’s open guilty pleas, the trial court placed him on
    five years’ deferred adjudication community supervision for each offense. The
    trial court ordered Robinson to successfully complete an intensive outpatient
    program as one of his conditions of community supervision. Robinson did not
    appeal the trial court’s orders.
    4
    The trial judge supervising the drug rehabilitation program discharged
    Robinson unsuccessfully in January 2017, and the State filed a petition to
    adjudicate for each offense. Robinson, his counsel, counsel for the State, and
    the trial judge again signed written plea admonishments in each case, which
    state that if the trial judge granted the petitions to adjudicate, the range of
    punishment for each offense would be “25 – life.”
    At a hearing on the petitions, Robinson pleaded true to all of the
    allegations in the State’s petitions. But although he acknowledged that when he
    was first placed on deferred adjudication community supervision he knew what
    “habitual” meant and that he had pleaded true to the habitual offender
    enhancement paragraph in each case, he testified that he did not “know that [he]
    would have to come back and face 25 years.” When his counsel asked him,
    “[D]id you think the probation would expose you to the same punishment range if
    you were to screw it up?” Robinson answered he did not know that. During
    closing, Robinson’s counsel asked the trial judge to withdraw the prior pleas of
    true to the habitual offender paragraphs:
    I don’t think he was properly advised about the consequences of
    pleading true at the time of the plea and, therefore, may have been
    in some way robbed of his Sixth Amendment right to effective
    counsel. So if you are going to send him to the penitentiary, I’d ask
    that you find at least one of the paragraphs not true and adjudicate
    him of the lesser.
    The trial court declined to do so and sentenced Robinson to twenty-five years’
    confinement in each case.
    5
    Disposition
    Robinson’s two issues challenge the validity of the original orders of
    deferred adjudication.    Unless an order placing a defendant on deferred
    adjudication community supervision is void, that defendant may not raise issues
    related to the original plea proceeding––including voluntariness-related issues––
    in an appeal from a subsequent adjudication proceeding. See Nix v. State, 
    65 S.W.3d 664
    , 667–69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (“[A] judgment is void only in very
    rare situations—usually due to a lack of jurisdiction.”); Jordan v. State, 
    54 S.W.3d 783
    , 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Manuel v. State, 
    994 S.W.2d 658
    , 661–62 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 1999). We therefore must dismiss Robinson’s only two issues and
    his appeals. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f); Manuel, 
    994 S.W.2d at 660, 662
    .
    /s/ Wade Birdwell
    WADE BIRDWELL
    JUSTICE
    PANEL: SUDDERTH, C.J.; PITTMAN and BIRDWELL, JJ.
    DO NOT PUBLISH
    Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
    DELIVERED: March 1, 2018
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-17-00055-CR

Filed Date: 3/1/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/6/2018