Andy Fields v. State ( 2018 )


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  •                           COURT OF APPEALS
    SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    FORT WORTH
    NO. 02-17-00015-CR
    ANDY FIELDS                                                            APPELLANT
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS                                                           STATE
    ----------
    FROM THE 213TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
    TRIAL COURT NO. 1463549R
    ----------
    MEMORANDUM OPINION1
    ----------
    Appellant Andy Fields appeals his third-degree felony conviction for
    committing assault against a member of his family or household or against
    someone with whom he had a dating relationship while having a prior conviction
    for that offense.2 In one point, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion
    1
    See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
    2
    See 
    Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01
    (a)(1), (b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2017).
    by admitting, over his relevance objection, one page of an exhibit that the State
    offered to establish the prior assault conviction. We affirm.
    Background
    One Sunday in July 2015, R.A. (Rebecca) was relaxing at her house with
    her twenty-year-old daughter T.A. (Tamara)3 and her two grandchildren. Fields,
    who had been in an off-and-on intimate dating relationship with Rebecca, arrived
    uninvited at the house and walked into Rebecca’s bedroom. Rebecca asked him
    why he was there and told him to leave. He refused, so Rebecca grabbed a
    backpack and a jacket that Fields had brought into the house and threw them
    outside.
    According to Rebecca, at that point, Fields became angry.            After he
    verbally sparred with her for a few minutes, he began hitting her face and chest
    as she attempted to push him off. Rebecca yelled for Tamara, who was asleep,
    to call 9-1-1. Tamara awoke, went to Rebecca’s room, saw Fields restraining
    Rebecca in a choke hold and hitting her, and attempted to get him off of her.
    Fields responded by hitting Tamara and by threatening to push her down some
    stairs. Tamara called 9-1-1, and Fields left the house.
    Greg Brooks, a Benbrook police officer, received a dispatch about the
    assault and began looking for a suspect whom the dispatcher described as
    shirtless and as wearing white shorts and blue shoes.           Officer Brooks found
    3
    We use aliases to protect the anonymity of R.A. and T.A. See McClendon
    v. State, 
    643 S.W.2d 936
    , 936 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982).
    2
    Fields, who matched the description, sitting on a porch in the same neighborhood
    as Rebecca’s house.         When Officer Brooks approached Fields, Fields gave
    Officer Brooks an incorrect date of birth. Fields later admitted to Officer Brooks
    that he had done so and gave his correct date of birth. Officer Brooks noticed
    that Fields was sweaty and had fresh scratches on his back, neck, face, and
    chest.       Fields told Officer Brooks that he had been in an argument with his
    girlfriend and that his girlfriend’s daughter had assaulted him.
    Benbrook police officer James Hatton also received a dispatch about the
    assault and went to Rebecca’s house.          When Officer Hatton walked into the
    house, he noticed blood on a wall, on a stairwell, in a bathroom, and on a chair.
    He also saw that several items had been “thrown about.” To Officer Hatton,
    Rebecca appeared hysterical; she was screaming, shaking, crying, and wincing
    because of pain near one of her eyes.4 Rebecca told Officer Hatton that Fields
    had accused her of “sleeping around,” that Fields had punched her, and that she
    had attempted to defend herself against the assault. Officer Hatton noticed that
    Rebecca’s face was swollen and that her hand was bleeding. He also noticed
    that Tamara had a red scratch on her arm. He concluded that Fields was the
    aggressor, relying in part on the fact that Fields was less credible because he
    had lied to Officer Brooks about his date of birth. John Whiteside, a detective
    At trial, Officer Hatton described Rebecca as “one of the most upset
    4
    reporting persons [he had] ever come across.”
    3
    with the Benbrook Police Department, joined Officer Hatton at the crime scene.
    He concurred with Officer Hatton’s conclusion that Fields was the aggressor.
    A grand jury indicted Fields with assaulting Rebecca by striking her face or
    by squeezing her neck. For jurisdictional purposes, the indictment alleged that
    Fields had a prior conviction for assault against a member of his family or
    household or against someone with whom he had a dating relationship. For
    sentence-enhancement purposes, the indictment also alleged that Fields had two
    prior felony convictions.
    At a jury trial, Fields pleaded not guilty, and he pleaded not true to the
    indictment’s enhancement allegations.       Through his cross-examination of the
    State’s witnesses and through his closing argument, Fields proposed to the jury
    that he had acted in self-defense.      Rebecca testified that Fields had been
    previously convicted for assaulting her and that he had a history of abusing her.
    The trial court admitted documentary evidence of Fields’s prior misdemeanor
    assault conviction. In the guilt-innocence jury charge, the court instructed the
    jury about the law of self-defense.
    The jury found Fields guilty. The jury then heard further evidence and
    arguments concerning his punishment, found the indictment’s sentence-
    enhancement allegations true, and assessed fifty years’ confinement. The trial
    court sentenced Fields accordingly, and he brought this appeal.
    4
    Admission of Evidence
    In his only point, Fields contends that the trial court abused its discretion
    by overruling his relevance objection to one page of State’s Exhibit 20, which the
    State offered to establish his prior conviction for assault against a member of his
    family or household or against someone with whom he had a dating relationship.
    See 
    Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01
    (b)(2)(A) (making assault against a member of
    a family or household or against someone with whom the defendant has a dating
    relationship a third-degree felony if the defendant has another conviction for that
    offense).
    State’s Exhibit 20 contains four pages. The first page is a docket sheet
    stating that in November 2014, Fields pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor, was
    convicted, and received a sentence of ninety days’ confinement. The second
    page is the judgment related to that conviction; the judgment states that Fields
    pleaded guilty to “ASSAULT BODILY INJURY-FM,” a class A misdemeanor. The
    third page is a charging instrument alleging that in September 2014, Fields
    assaulted Rebecca by striking her upper body with his hand. The fourth page is
    an earlier-filed complaint for the same case, alleging, unlike the charging
    instrument, that Fields assaulted Rebecca by applying pressure to her neck or
    throat with his hand and by impeding her breathing.5
    5
    This complaint alleged a felony assault. See 
    Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01
    (b)(2)(B). The charging instrument to which Fields pleaded guilty in 2014,
    which omitted the allegations about Fields applying pressure to Rebecca’s neck
    and impeding her breathing, alleged a misdemeanor assault.               See 
    id.
    5
    On appeal, Fields contends that page four was inadmissible because it
    bore “no relevance to the jurisdictional conviction, which [was] for misdemeanor
    assault bodily injury.”   He argues that page four’s admission harmed him
    because that page “introduced an extraneous offense to the guilt or innocence
    phase of the trial.”
    We conclude that we need not decide whether the trial court abused its
    discretion by admitting page four because any such error did not result in harm
    that justifies reversing Fields’s conviction.6 See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b).
    We must disregard any nonconstitutional error that does not affect an
    appellant’s substantial rights.7 See 
    id.
     An error affects an appellant’s substantial
    rights when it has a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining
    the jury’s verdict. King v. State, 
    953 S.W.2d 266
    , 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)
    (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 
    328 U.S. 750
    , 776, 
    66 S. Ct. 1239
    , 1253
    (1946)). Conversely, an error does not affect a substantial right if we have “fair
    assurance that the error did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect.”
    § 22.01(a)(1), (b). In response to Fields’s relevance objection in the trial court, a
    prosecutor argued, “It’s a document under seal. I mean, it’s a certified copy of a
    judgment.” The trial court overruled Fields’s objection without explaining its
    reasoning.
    6
    An error analysis is not required when a harm analysis is dispositive. See
    Wooten v. State, 
    400 S.W.3d 601
    , 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
    7
    Fields concedes that the trial court’s alleged error was “not constitutional
    in nature” and that rule 44.2(b)’s harmless error standard applies.
    6
    Solomon v. State, 
    49 S.W.3d 356
    , 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Johnson v. State,
    
    967 S.W.2d 410
    , 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
    In making this determination, we review the record as a whole, including
    any testimony or physical evidence admitted for the jury’s consideration, the
    nature of the evidence supporting the verdict, and the character of the alleged
    error and how it might be considered in connection with other evidence in the
    case. Motilla v. State, 
    78 S.W.3d 352
    , 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). We may also
    consider the jury instructions, the State’s theory and any defensive theories,
    whether the State emphasized the error, closing arguments, and even voir dire, if
    applicable. 
    Id.
     at 355–56. We must determine whether the error likely moved
    the jury from a state of nonpersuasion to a state of persuasion concerning
    Fields’s guilt. See Snowden v. State, 
    353 S.W.3d 815
    , 825 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2011); Murkledove v. State, 
    437 S.W.3d 17
    , 29 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014,
    pet. dism’d).
    We first consider the alleged error in context with other evidence and in
    light of Fields’s defensive theory.   Motilla, 
    78 S.W.3d at 355
    .    As explained
    above, Fields’s theory in the trial court was that he acted in self-defense during
    the altercation with Rebecca and Tamara.       To evaluate this theory, the jury
    considered first-hand accounts of the altercation from Rebecca and Tamara and
    Fields’s challenges to those accounts through cross-examination. The jury also
    considered an audio recording of Tamara’s 9-1-1 call; testimony from officers
    who interacted with Fields, Rebecca, and Tamara shortly after the altercation and
    7
    observed their demeanor; and photographs of Fields’s and Rebecca’s injuries
    and of the state of Rebecca’s home following the altercation. In the context of
    this evidence that focused the jury’s attention on the charge at issue, we cannot
    conclude that the jury likely predicated its decision of Fields’s guilt on page four’s
    extraneous allegation.8    Furthermore, even if the jury was prone to base its
    decision to convict Fields on his prior misconduct rather than on testimony and
    evidence related to the July 2015 assault, page four’s allegation of such
    misconduct was not likely as compelling as Rebecca’s and Tamara’s testimony—
    received by the jury without objection—that Fields had repeatedly abused
    Rebecca in the past.
    We next consider the alleged error in light of the trial court’s jury charge.
    See 
    id.
     The trial court’s guilt-innocence jury charge instructed the jury that it
    could not consider evidence of Fields’s extraneous offenses unless it found
    beyond a reasonable doubt that he had committed them.              The charge also
    instructed the jury that even if it made such a finding, it could consider the
    offenses only for determining “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
    knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, if any, in connection with
    this offense.” We presume that the jury followed these instructions and therefore
    did not consider page four’s allegation as evidence of Fields’s guilt for the July
    8
    As the State argues, the record reflects that the jury sent notes to the trial
    court during deliberations, including a note asking to see “pictures of the parties
    involved,” but does not reflect that the jury requested to review State’s Exhibit 20.
    8
    2015 assault. See Casanova v. State, 
    383 S.W.3d 530
    , 543 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2012) (reciting the “usual presumption that jurors follow the trial court’s explicit
    instructions to the letter”).
    Finally, we consider whether the State emphasized the error. See Motilla,
    
    78 S.W.3d at 355
    . The State did not emphasize page four’s allegation (that
    Fields had choked Rebecca and had impeded her breathing during his
    September 2014 assault) during its questioning of Rebecca or during its closing
    argument. Instead, during Fields’s cross-examination of Rebecca, he elicited
    testimony concerning the allegation.
    For all of these reasons, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s alleged
    error in admitting page four of State’s Exhibit 20 affected Fields’s substantial
    rights. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Motilla, 
    78 S.W.3d at 355
    . Because the
    record does not reveal reversible error, we overrule Fields’s sole point.
    Conclusion
    Having overruled Fields’s only point, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    /s/ Wade Birdwell
    WADE BIRDWELL
    JUSTICE
    PANEL: SUDDERTH, C.J.; PITTMAN and BIRDWELL, JJ.
    DO NOT PUBLISH
    Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
    DELIVERED: March 1, 2018
    9