in the Interest of C.J., a Child ( 2018 )


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  •              In the
    Court of Appeals
    Second Appellate District of Texas
    at Fort Worth
    --------------------------------------------
    No. 02-18-00219-CV
    --------------------------------------------
    IN THE INTEREST OF C.J., A CHILD
    On Appeal from the 233rd District Court
    Tarrant County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 233-526408-12
    Before Sudderth, C.J.; Gabriel and Kerr, JJ.
    Opinion by Justice Gabriel
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant J.A. (Mother) appeals the trial court’s final order terminating her
    parental rights to C.J. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b) (West Supp. 2017). The
    trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother’s conduct satisfied the
    termination grounds listed in family code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and alleged
    in the petition for termination. See 
    id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D),
    (E). The trial court further
    found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in
    C.J.’s best interest. See 
    id. § 161.001(b)(2).
    Accordingly, the trial court ordered the
    termination of Mother’s parental rights to C.J. and named appellee the Texas
    Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) as C.J.’s permanent managing
    conservator.1
    On July 30, 2018, Mother’s appointed appellate counsel filed a brief stating that
    she has conducted a professional evaluation of the record and has concluded that
    there are no arguable grounds to be advanced to support an appeal of the trial court’s
    termination order and that the appeal is frivolous.       Counsel’s brief presents the
    required professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no
    reversible grounds on appeal and referencing any grounds that might arguably support
    the appeal. See Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 744 (1967); see also In re K.M.,
    
    98 S.W.3d 774
    , 776–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, order) (holding Anders
    The trial court also terminated the parental rights of C.J.’s adjudicated father.
    1
    No party appeals that portion of the termination order.
    2
    procedures apply in parental-termination cases), disp. on merits, No. 2-01-349-CV, 
    2003 WL 2006583
    (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 1, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.). Further,
    counsel informed Mother of her right to request the record and to file a pro se
    response. See Kelly v. State, 
    436 S.W.3d 313
    , 318–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). In
    addition, this court informed Mother of these rights and gave her the opportunity to
    notify this court of her intent to respond. Although Mother responded on September
    12, 2018, she failed to show any arguable grounds supporting her appeal. DFPS
    notified this court that it agreed there are no grounds assailing the trial court’s
    judgment.
    In reviewing a brief that asserts an appeal is frivolous and that fulfills the
    requirements of Anders, this court is obligated to undertake an independent
    examination of the record to determine if any arguable grounds for appeal exist. See
    In re C.J., 
    501 S.W.3d 254
    , 255 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pets. denied) (citing
    Stafford v. State, 
    813 S.W.2d 503
    , 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)). After reviewing the
    entire record, we conclude that the trial court’s findings that Mother’s conduct
    satisfied a conduct ground listed in section 161.001(b)(1) and alleged in the petition
    and that the termination of Mother’s parental rights was in C.J.’s best interest were
    supported by clear and convincing evidence. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b);
    see, e.g., In re I.L.G., 
    531 S.W.3d 346
    , 352–56 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017,
    pet. denied); In re M.E.-M.N., 
    342 S.W.3d 254
    , 261–64 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011,
    pet. denied). The record reveals no arguable grounds for reversal; thus, we agree with
    3
    counsel that Mother’s appeal is without merit. See In re D.D., 
    279 S.W.3d 849
    , 850
    (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied).           We affirm the trial court’s order of
    termination. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a). We remind counsel of her continuing duty
    to represent Mother until she has exhausted her proceedings, including possibly filing
    a petition for review in the supreme court. See In re P.M., 
    520 S.W.3d 24
    , 27–28 (Tex.
    2016); In re D.T., No. 02-17-00061-CV, 
    2017 WL 2806323
    , at *1–3 (Tex. App.—Fort
    Worth June 29, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
    /s/ Lee Gabriel
    Lee Gabriel
    Justice
    Delivered: September 20, 2018
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-18-00219-CV

Filed Date: 9/20/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/24/2018