Daniel Ray Allison v. State ( 2018 )

NUMBER 13-17-00399-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
DANIEL RAY ALLISON, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 258th District Court
of Polk County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Contreras, Longoria, and Hinojosa
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria
Appellant Daniel Ray Allison was convicted of possession of less than one gram
of methamphetamine, a state jail felony. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 481.115(b) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). He appeals the trial court’s denial
of his motion to suppress. By one issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred in
denying his motion because probable cause was not shown prior to issuance of the
search warrant. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND 1
On July 22, 2015, Anthony Lowrie, a lieutenant employed by the Polk County
sheriff’s office, visited a property in Yaupon Cove in response to Crime Stoppers tips
regarding heavy foot traffic in the area. There, Lowrie found Clinten Zane Loving on the
property near a small motor home and discovered that he had a large quantity of
methamphetamine on his person. Another resident of the property, Lauren Boyd,
confirmed that there was methamphetamine on the property, although she did not know
where. Loving refused to give consent to Lowrie to search the property, and Lowrie
sought a search warrant for both motor homes on the property.
Relying on an affidavit by Lowrie, Judge David Johnson granted the search warrant
for both the larger motor home and the smaller motor home to its left. Lowrie’s affidavit
referenced the smaller motor home only twice: once in reference to where Loving was
found, and the other in his request to search the smaller motor home. Following its
issuance, the search warrant was executed, and both the small motor home and the larger
motor home on the property were searched. Methamphetamine and appellant’s
belongings were found in the smaller motor home.
Appellant was charged with possession of less than one gram of
methamphetamine, a state jail felony. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
1 This case is before this Court on transfer from the Ninth Court of Appeals in Beaumont pursuant
to a docket-equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001
(West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.).
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§ 481.115(b). He filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during execution of the
search warrant. A hearing was held, and the trial court denied the motion. Appellant
then pled nolo contendere pursuant to a plea agreement, and the trial court found him
guilty and sentenced him to two years’ confinement in state jail. Pursuant to the plea
agreement, appellant’s right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress was certified.
This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
In a single issue, appellant argues that probable cause was insufficient to issue a
search warrant for the smaller mobile home.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Under the U.S. and Texas Constitutions, a magistrate may not issue a search
warrant without first finding probable cause that a particular item will be found in a
particular location. Rodriguez v. State, 232 S.W.3d 55, 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Probable cause exists when the facts submitted to a magistrate are sufficient to justify a
conclusion that the object of the search is probably on the premises at the time the warrant
is issued. Cassias v. State, 719 S.W.2d 585, 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc). In
reviewing a decision to issue a search warrant, we apply a highly deferential standard.
Rodriguez v. State, 232 S.W.3d at 61. An affidavit is sufficient to establish probable
cause if a magistrate can reasonably infer that probable cause existed. Davis v. State,
202 S.W.3d 149, 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Reviewing courts will interpret the affidavit
in a commonsense way and not engage in “hypertechnical” review of the affidavit. State
v. McLain, 337 S.W.3d 268, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The proper focus of the
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analysis is not what the affidavit implies, but rather what inferences a magistrate can
reasonably make. Id. at 272.
B. Analysis
Appellant contends that the affidavit did not establish probable cause for the
smaller motor home due to lack of specificity with regards to the motor home and
appellant. However, the proper inquiry is not how many references to the motor home
and appellant are made in the affidavit; rather, the focus is on what inferences the
magistrate can make. See id. at 271. The search warrant specifies both the “residence”
and the motor home to its left. This smaller motor home is referenced in the affidavit as
the location where Loving was found with methamphetamine on his person. Because of
the large quantity of drugs possessed by Loving, the magistrate could have reasonably
inferred that there was a “fair possibility” that there was methamphetamine inside either
motor home. See Davis, 202 S.W.3d at 157. The fact that neither Loving nor appellant
were identified as the owner of this motor home does not defeat probable cause. See
McLain, 337 S.W.3d at 272; Rodriguez, 232 S.W.3d at 61; Davis, 202 S.W.3d at 157.
We overrule Allison’s sole issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
NORA L. LONGORIA
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
21st day of June, 2018.
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