Wal-Mart Stores Texas, LLC v. Tony Peavley ( 2023 )


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  •                                     In The
    Court of Appeals
    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
    ________________
    NO. 09-21-00403-CV
    ________________
    WAL-MART STORES TEXAS, LLC, Appellant
    V.
    TONY PEAVLEY, Appellee
    ________________________________________________________________________
    On Appeal from the 163rd District Court
    Orange County, Texas
    Trial Cause No. B210209-C
    ________________________________________________________________________
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Wal-Mart Stores Texas, LLC (“Walmart Texas”) appeals the trial court’s
    Order Denying its Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Litigation in a suit
    asserting a negligence claim brought by its employee, Tony Peavley. 1, 2 In four
    issues, Walmart Texas asks whether: 1) the Federal Arbitration Act applies to the
    1Appellee’s name is Tony Peavley, but the lawsuit incorrectly named him as
    “Tony Peazley.” We refer to him by his correct name in this opinion.
    2We may consider this interlocutory appeal. See 
    Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 51.016
    , 171.098(a)(1) (permitting interlocutory appeal from an order
    denying motion to compel arbitration).
    1
    arbitration agreement; 2) Walmart met its burden to show the parties’ arbitration
    agreement was a valid agreement to arbitrate between Peavley and Walmart, or that
    Peavley ratified and accepted the arbitration agreement by accepting benefits under
    Walmart Texas’s Injury Care Benefit Plan; 3) Walmart met its burden to show that
    Peavley’s claims fell under the scope of the arbitration agreement; and 4) Peavley
    asserted any viable affirmative defense to the arbitration agreement’s enforcement
    or met his evidentiary burden to establish a viable defense to enforcement. As set
    forth below, we will reverse the trial court’s Order Denying Walmart Texas’s
    Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Litigation and remand for further
    proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    Background
    Peavley has been a Walmart Texas employee (or “associate”) since 2017. He
    allegedly sustained injuries in the course and scope of his employment while moving
    pallets of water and subsequently sued Walmart Texas for negligence. Walmart
    Texas answered and demanded arbitration by asserting there was a valid, enforceable
    arbitration agreement. Walmart Texas is a non-subscriber to workers’ compensation
    insurance and instead, adopted its Texas Injury Care Benefit Plan as of 2012 (“2012
    Plan”) in lieu of workers’ compensation insurance for associates who sustained
    injuries in the course and scope of their employment.
    On July 1, 2017, the 2012 Plan was amended and restated in Walmart Texas’s
    current Texas Injury Care Benefit Plan (the “Plan”). Walmart Inc. (formerly known
    2
    as Walmart Stores, Inc.) is the Plan Sponsor, and Walmart Texas is a participating
    employer in the Plan. The Plan provides specific benefits for employees, including
    payments for medical expenses and wage replacement, in the event of injury, work-
    related illness, death, or dismemberment. Appendix A of the Plan is titled
    “ARBITRATION OF            CERTAIN INJURY-RELATED DISPUTES” (the
    “Arbitration Agreement”).
    Under the Arbitration Agreement, binding arbitration is the sole and exclusive
    remedy for resolving any covered claim or dispute between Walmart Texas and an
    associate. In other words, neither the associate nor Walmart Texas shall be entitled
    to a bench or jury trial on any claim covered by the Arbitration Agreement. “Covered
    claims” include “any legal or equitable claim by or with respect to an Associate for
    any form of physical or psychological damage, harm, or death which relates to an
    accident, occupational disease, or cumulative trauma.” “Covered claims” also
    include “[t]he determination of whether a claim is covered by this [Arbitration
    Agreement].” The Arbitration Agreement states that “This Policy applies to each
    Associate and Employer without regard to whether they have completed and signed
    a Receipt, Safety Pledge, and Arbitration Acknowledgement form or similar written
    receipt.” It further provides that this policy for resolving claims by arbitration is
    equally binding on the employer and the associate. Finally, if either Walmart Texas
    or the associate files a claim covered by the Arbitration Agreement “…by any means
    other than arbitration, the responding party shall be entitled to dismissal of such
    3
    action, and the recovery of all costs and attorney’s fees and expenses related to such
    action.”
    Peavley concedes he completed a computer-based learning (“CBL”) program
    online. In that CBL, Peavley was required to complete various modules and click
    acknowledgments that were required before moving on. Peavley did so, and one of
    the required CBL modules included an acknowledgment of the Arbitration
    Agreement, which required him to click an “I Understand” button to complete. After
    reviewing the information in the CBL module, it advised Peavley to click on a link
    containing the Plan and read it, which contained the Arbitration Agreement as
    Appendix A, among other things. Peavley did so, then to complete the CBL module,
    he had to click the “I Understand” button. The section informs the associate that by
    clicking the “I Understand” button, the associate is completing the course and
    acknowledging: 1) that the associate “read and [understood] the Arbitration
    Acknowledgement and Policy;” (2) that the associate understands his or her rights
    and obligations under the Plan; and (3) that the associate’s training record will be
    updated to show that the associate has successfully completed the course. Peavley
    completed these CBL training modules on three occasions – in September 2017,
    February 2019, and May 19, 2020, the last of which was eight days before his alleged
    on the job injury.
    Walmart Texas filed its Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Litigation and
    supported the Motion to Compel with the following evidence: CBL Module; the Plan
    4
    including the Arbitration Agreement and Acknowledgment; Peavley’s CBL Record;
    and Senior Manager of Regional Risk Management Tim Osmond’s Affidavit, which
    outlines the CBL procedures and that Walmart Texas maintains records showing
    Peavley completed the training module by accessing the module with his
    confidential associate identifier and password based on the training records that
    Walmart Texas retains.
    Osmond authenticated the documents attached to the Motion to Compel,
    including the Plan CBL module as Exhibit “A.” Osmond averred that within that
    CBL module, there is a “Mandatory Arbitration Process” section and a section titled
    “Summary Plan Description” and associates “must click the link to the Plan and
    review it before continuing.” Walmart Texas attached a copy of its Summary Plan,
    which contained the “Arbitration of Certain Injury-Related Disputes” as “Appendix
    A.” Osmond explained the Acknowledgements contained an express declaration that
    the associate was acknowledging by clicking the “I Understand” button he had read
    and understood the “Arbitration Acknowledgment and Policy.” Osmond averred
    Walmart Texas’s training records showed that Peavley completed the CBL modules
    for the Plan and that the Plan, including the Summary Plan Description with
    Appendix A, was provided to Peavley through CBL training as a part of his
    employment. Osmond further averred that Peavley’s training records show Peavley
    followed the described process to complete the Plan CBL and show that he
    5
    acknowledged he read and understood Appendix A, Arbitration of Certain Injury
    Related Disputes.
    More importantly and more specifically, Appendix A contains the following
    language:
    (b) Binding Effect: This Policy for resolving claims by arbitration is
    equally binding upon, and applies to any such claims that may be
    brought by, an Employer and each Associate and his/her spouse,
    children, parents, beneficiaries, Representatives, executors,
    administrators, guardians, heirs or assigns (including, but not limited
    to, any survival or wrongful-death claim). This binding arbitration will
    be the sole and exclusive remedy for resolving any such claim or
    dispute.
    (1) This Policy applies to each Associate and the Employer
    without regard to whether they have completed and signed a
    Receipt, Safety Pledge and Arbitration Acknowledgement form
    or similar written receipt. Adequate consideration for this Policy
    is represented by, among other things, eligibility for (and not
    necessarily any receipt of) benefits under this Plan and the fact
    that it is mutually binding on both the Employer and Associates.
    Any actual payment of benefits under this Plan to or with
    respect to an Associate shall serve as further consideration
    for and represent the further agreement of such Associate to
    the provisions of this Policy. This Policy shall remain in effect
    with respect to the Employer and all Associates, without regard
    to any Associate refusal of benefits under this Plan, return of
    benefit payments under this Plan to an Employer, ineligibility for
    or cessation of benefits under this Plan in accordance with its
    terms, or any voluntary or involuntary termination of an
    Associate’s employment with an Employer.
    Peavley responded to the Motion to Compel Arbitration and argued that no
    valid agreement to arbitrate exists because he did not agree to arbitrate. In support
    of his response, Peavley provided an affidavit averring that
    6
    I have never agreed to or otherwise consented to any arbitration
    agreement to my knowledge. I never signed an arbitration agreement in
    person or electronically, or otherwise. It was never explained to me that
    by clicking the ‘I understand’ button at the end of my training module
    that I was creating contractual obligations for myself, or any other
    party. Upon completing the course, the only option I had was to select
    ‘I understand’ as that was the only button I could choose.
    Peavley objected to Osmond’s affidavit on the basis that Osmond lacked personal
    knowledge but failed to obtain rulings on these objections. Walmart Texas also filed
    Objections to Plaintiff’s Affidavit and Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s
    Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Litigation and attached a copy of Peavley’s
    recorded statement, where he acknowledged completing the CBLs. The trial court
    overruled Walmart Texas’s objections to Peavley’s affidavit and denied the Motion
    to Compel Arbitration and Stay Litigation.
    Standard of Review
    “[A] party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of a valid
    arbitration agreement and show that the disputed claims fall within the scope of that
    agreement.” Wagner v. Apache Corp., 
    627 S.W.3d 277
    , 282 (Tex. 2021) (citing In
    re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 
    166 S.W.3d 732
    , 737 (Tex. 2005)). We review a trial
    court’s order denying a motion to compel arbitration for an abuse of discretion.
    Henry v. Cash Biz, LP, 
    551 S.W.3d 111
    , 115 (Tex. 2018). We defer to the trial
    court’s factual determinations if they are supported by evidence but review its legal
    determinations de novo. Id.; see also Aerotek, Inc. v. Boyd, 
    624 S.W.3d 199
    , 204
    (Tex. 2021) (noting deference to factual determinations if they are supported by
    7
    evidence). Whether the disputed claims fall within the scope of a valid arbitration
    agreement is a question of law, which we review de novo. See Henry, 551 S.W.3d
    at 115; In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 
    279 S.W.3d 640
    , 642–43 (Tex. 2009).
    Analysis
    In his brief, Peavley concedes jurisdiction and does not dispute the scope of
    the agreement. Rather, citing his own affidavit testimony, he contests the existence
    of an agreement to arbitrate, arguing that the evidence at trial created a fact issue as
    to whether he agreed to arbitrate in the absence of a signature and “that he had no
    such notice and agreed to no such thing.” Accordingly, we turn to issues two and
    four: whether Walmart Texas met its burden to show there was a valid agreement to
    arbitrate between it and Peavley; and whether Peavley asserted any viable
    affirmative defense to the arbitration agreement’s enforcement or met his evidentiary
    burden to establish a viable defense to enforcement.
    To compel arbitration, a party must prove that a valid arbitration agreement
    exists. Aerotek, 624 S.W.3d at 204; Henry, 551 S.W.3d at 115 (citation omitted). In
    order for the Arbitration Agreement to be valid, Peavley must have consented to it.
    See Aerotek, 624 S.W.3d at 204 (citation omitted). Peavley does not contest that he
    completed the CBL module, instead he argues that there is no valid Arbitration
    Agreement because he did not receive notice or agree to the provision. Peavley’s
    argument is like that of the employees attempting to avoid the arbitration provision
    in Aerotek, which the Texas Supreme Court rejected. See id.
    8
    “An electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a person if it
    was the act of the person. The act of the person may be shown in any manner,
    including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine
    the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.”
    
    Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code Ann. § 322.009
    (a); see also Aerotek, 624 S.W.3d at 205–
    06 (discussing same). The Aerotek Court explained that a
    security procedure[] may include requiring personal identifying
    information—such as a social security number or an address—to
    register for an account; assigning a unique identifier to a user and then
    tying that identifier to the user’s actions; maintaining a single, secure
    system for tracking user activities that prevents unauthorized access to
    electronic records; business rules that require users to complete all steps
    in a program before moving on or completing it; and timestamps
    showing when users completed certain actions.
    Id. at 205–06 (internal citations omitted). These examples of security procedures are
    non-exclusive. Id. at 206.
    Walmart Texas provided evidence in the form of Osmond’s affidavit.
    Osmond’s affidavit established and the evidence Walmart Texas attached to its
    motion established that Peavley completed the training modules at a Walmart
    location and accessed the modules by entering his confidential associate
    identification number and password. Osmond explained that once a module is
    completed, an electronic training record is retained showing the date of completion,
    9
    status of completion, and score if a test was required.3 Osmond further averred that
    within the Plan CBL module, the associates must click the link to the Plan and review
    it before they can continue. “Within the Summary Plan Description that the
    Associate must click on to review before continuing to the next page is Appendix A
    titled ‘Arbitration of Certain Injury Related Disputes,’ which thoroughly describes
    the arbitration program.” Finally, in the “Acknowledgment of Completion” section
    of the CBL, by clicking “I Understand” the participant acknowledged that he read
    and understood the Arbitration Acknowledgment and Policy. Peavley does not
    dispute that he completed the CBL module at issue or that he received benefits under
    the plan. Peavley’s simple denial that he did not “agree” and did not have “notice”
    constituted no evidence. See Aerotek at 209. Peavley could not have completed the
    CBL without acknowledging and consenting to the Arbitration Agreement. See id.
    In other words, the evidence conclusively shows Peavley, by clicking the button,
    acknowledged he understood the Arbitration Agreement and that is sufficient to
    show he agreed to the terms in what the document says.
    3On     appeal, Peavley complains that Osmond’s affidavit lacks personal
    knowledge, which is a defect of form. Although he objected to Osmond’s affidavit
    in the trial court, Peavley failed to obtain rulings on those objections and has waived
    them. See Stewart v. Sanmina Tex. L.P., 
    156 S.W.3d 198
    , 207 (Tex. App.—Dallas
    2005, no pet.) (stating lack of personal knowledge is a defect of form). Because
    Peavley failed to obtain a ruling on his objections as to lack of personal knowledge
    in the trial court, he cannot raise these objections on appeal. See 
    id.
    10
    An employer may enforce an arbitration agreement entered into during an at-
    will employment relationship if the employee received notice of the arbitration
    policy and accepted it. In re Dallas Peterbilt, Ltd., L.L.P., 
    196 S.W.3d 161
    , 163
    (Tex. 2006); In re Halliburton Co., 
    80 S.W.3d 566
    , 568 (Tex. 2002). In Dallas
    Peterbilt, the employee argued that despite signing an acknowledgment form of a
    summary, he did not have notice because he never received the actual Mutual
    Agreement to Arbitrate Claims. See 196 S.W.3d at 162. Likewise, in Halliburton,
    the employee received a one-page summary of the agreement to arbitrate. See 80
    S.W.3d at 568–69. In essence, both the employees in each case argued that only the
    underlying agreements themselves could provide notice. Rejecting these arguments,
    the Texas Supreme Court explained that in determining whether an employee
    received notice of a binding arbitration agreement, the “cases do not confine that
    ‘notice analysis’ to the underlying agreement, but to all communications between
    the employer and employee.” In re Dallas Peterbilt, Ltd., L.L.P., 196 S.W.3d at 162
    (citations omitted). Although a summary of such an arbitration policy could be
    sufficient to place one on notice, the evidence here goes a step further and establishes
    that Peavley received the actual policy as Appendix A to the Summary Plan
    Description.
    Peavley contests that he received notice of the arbitration policy; however, his
    argument lacks merit since he does not dispute completing the CBL and clicking the
    button that states “I Understand.” By clicking that button, the language in the module
    11
    reflects that Peavley expressly acknowledged he had read and understood the
    agreement that required him to arbitrate injury-related disputes. Appendix A states
    the policy is binding on Walmart and Peavley, and the fact Peavley accepted benefits
    under the Plan serves “as further consideration for and represent[ed] the further
    agreement” that Peavley agreed to the terms in the Plan. We conclude Peavley had
    notice of the Arbitration Agreement both before his injury occurred and before he
    accepted benefits under the Plan. See id. at 163 (finding the employer’s summary
    constituted effective notice since it unequivocally provided the employee with
    knowledge of the arbitration agreement); In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d at 569
    (holding that a notice and summary given to the employee was unequivocal notice).
    “An at-will employee who receives notice of an employer’s arbitration policy
    and continues working with knowledge of the policy accepts the terms as a matter
    of law.” In re Dallas Peterbilt, Ltd., L.L.P., 196 S.W.3d at 163 (citation omitted).
    Walmart Texas’s evidence established that Peavley received notice of the arbitration
    policy when he completed the CBL modules on three separate occasions and
    continued to work for Walmart Texas after receiving notice. Furthermore, Peavley
    accepted the terms of the Arbitration Agreement. Due to the above, we further
    conclude Peavley agreed to arbitrate his on-the-job injury claim against Walmart
    Texas as a matter of law. 4 See id.
    4Also of note, our sister court in Dallas held the same Arbitration Agreement
    was valid and enforceable where another Walmart employee completed the online
    12
    We conclude that Walmart Texas met its burden of showing the existence of
    a valid agreement to arbitrate between it and Peavley. We sustain issue two.
    Since Walmart Texas met its burden of establishing the existence of a valid
    arbitration agreement and Peavley does not dispute that the claims fall within the
    scope of that agreement, the burden shifted to Peavley to prove an affirmative
    defense to enforcing the agreement. See Henry, 551 S.W.3d at 115 (citations
    omitted). Peavley failed to plead any affirmative defense to enforcement, and we
    have already explained that his affidavit denying he agreed or consented to arbitrate
    claims with his employer did not create a fact issue on whether he was bound to
    resolve his dispute with Walmart Texas under the arbitration agreement in the Plan.
    See Aerotek, 624 S.W.3d at 210. Accordingly, Peavley failed to meet his burden of
    establishing a viable affirmative defense to the Arbitration Agreement’s
    enforcement. We sustain issue four.
    Conclusion
    Since Peavley does not contest jurisdiction or the scope of the Arbitration
    Agreement, we overrule issues one and three. As to Walmart Texas’s remaining
    CBL modules containing the same materials and acknowledged receiving the
    arbitration policy. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Constantine, No. 05-17-00694-CV,
    
    2018 WL 2001959
    , at *1, 6–8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 30, 2018, no pet.) (mem.
    op.). The plaintiffs there argued that Walmart’s evidence showing the employee
    completed the Plan CBL module was insufficient to show that he agreed to arbitrate
    his clam. See 
    id. at *5
    . There, as here, the employee clicked an “I Understand” button
    beneath the “Arbitration Acknowledgement.” See 
    id.
    13
    issues, we conclude Walmart Texas met its burden of showing the parties had a valid
    arbitration agreement, established Peavley acknowledged completing the CBL
    module, and established that Peavley continued working for Walmart Texas after
    receiving notice of the arbitration policy. We further conclude that Peavley failed to
    create a fact issue by submitting an affidavit that did nothing more than deny his
    agreement or consent. See Aerotek, 624 S.W.3d at 210; In re Dallas Peterbilt, 196
    S.W.3d at 163. Consequently, Peavley’s affidavit failed to raise a fact issue showing
    he had an affirmative defense to enforcing the Arbitration Agreement.
    We reverse the Order Denying Walmart Texas’s Motion to Compel
    Arbitration and Stay Litigation and remand the case to the trial court for further
    proceedings consistent with this opinion. Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(d).
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    _____________________________
    W. SCOTT GOLEMON
    Chief Justice
    Submitted on January 19, 2023
    Opinion Delivered February 9, 2023
    Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.
    14
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-21-00403-CV

Filed Date: 2/9/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/10/2023