Jessie Alexander Luna v. State ( 2018 )


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  • Affirmed as Modified and Opinion Filed July 20, 2018.
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-17-01188-CR
    JESSIE ALEXANDER LUNA, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2
    Dallas County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. F-1630417
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Lang, Myers, and Stoddart
    Opinion by Justice Stoddart
    A jury convicted Jessie Alexander Luna of the murder of Jepatrick Morgan-Wright and
    assessed punishment at fifty years’ confinement in prison. Luna argues the trial court erred by
    admitting a crime scene video that was inflammatory and unfairly prejudicial and that the judgment
    should be modified to correct several errors. We modify the trial court’s judgment and affirm as
    modified.
    BACKGROUND
    Morgan-Wright was in his front yard with Lucas Quetel and Leanna Wallace when they
    saw a black Ford drive by with Jessica Martinez, Joe Salas, and Luna inside. Martinez owed
    money to Morgan-Wright from a prior drug transaction. Morgan-Wright and his friends entered
    Wallace’s vehicle, and followed the Ford until it stopped at a stop sign. Morgan-Wright exited the
    vehicle and walked toward the Ford to talk with Martinez. As he approached, Luna exited the
    Ford holding a gun and met Morgan-Wright. They exchanged words and Luna pointed the gun at
    Morgan-Wright’s head. Morgan-Wright told Luna, “You not gonna shoot me.” Luna then aimed
    at Morgan-Wright’s chest and shot him. Luna watched as Morgan-Wright stumbled back toward
    Wallace’s car and fell on the street. Luna and the occupants of the Ford then left the scene.
    Wallace called police and attempted to aid Morgan-Wright. Police and emergency medical
    personnel arrived soon thereafter, but were unable to revive Morgan-Wright. He died from a single
    gunshot wound to the chest.
    ANALYSIS
    In his first issue, Luna contends that the trial court erred by admitting a crime scene video
    recording over his objection that the probative value was outweighed by the prejudicial effect. See
    TEX. R. EVID. 403. Dallas police officer Ryan Smola testified he arrived at the scene after the
    shooting and assisted Grand Prairie police. A video recorded by Officer Smola’s body camera
    was offered in evidence. Luna objected to the recording under rule 403, but the trial court
    overruled the objection and allowed the State to publish the video to the jury. The video recorded
    efforts by police and EMTs to revive Morgan-Wright. Luna moved for a mistrial after publication
    of the video on grounds it was inflammatory and highly prejudicial. He commented that people in
    the courtroom “were screaming and running out the door.” The trial court denied the motion for
    a mistrial.
    We review the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion.
    Henley v. State, 
    493 S.W.3d 77
    , 82–83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). The trial court abuses its discretion
    when the decision falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. 
    Id. Rule 403
    of the Texas Rules of Evidence allows for the exclusion of otherwise relevant
    evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice,
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    confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative
    evidence. TEX. R. EVID. 403. Rule 403 favors the admission of relevant evidence and carries a
    presumption that relevant evidence will be more probative than prejudicial. Gallo v. State, 
    239 S.W.3d 757
    , 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). A court may consider many factors in determining
    whether the probative value of photographic evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger
    of unfair prejudice, including: the number of exhibits offered, their gruesomeness, their detail,
    their size, whether they are in color or black-and-white, whether they are close up, whether the
    body depicted is clothed or naked, the availability of other means of proof, and other circumstances
    unique to the individual case. Davis v. State, 
    313 S.W.3d 317
    , 331 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see
    also Fields v. State, 
    515 S.W.3d 47
    , 56 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.) (using same
    factors in rule 403 analysis of crime scene video).
    Here, the video recording is in color and is approximately nine minutes in length. It shows
    Morgan-Wright lying in the street while two officers perform CPR. Morgan-Wright was clothed
    but his shirt had been cut away. Blood is shown pooling near Morgan-Wright’s head and flowing
    down the incline of the street to the curb. Morgan-Wright’s face is shown covered in blood from
    his eyes to his chin. At one point, the officers rolled him on his side to inspect his back and
    observed blood beneath Morgan-Wright’s head and upper body. When officers rolled Morgan-
    Wright again, blood appears to the right of his head. The video shows Morgan-Wright being
    placed on a stretcher and carried to an emergency vehicle while officers continued to perform CPR.
    Luna argues the State had no need to show the video to further its opposition to his claim
    of self-defense, the video was unfairly prejudicial, it had a tendency to confuse or distract the jury
    from the main issues, and it was cumulative of the autopsy report and still photos of the victim’s
    injuries.
    Because there was evidence raising self-defense, the State had the burden to establish the
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    elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt and to persuade the jury beyond a reasonable doubt
    that appellant did not kill in self-defense. See Mendez v. State, 
    515 S.W.3d 915
    , 921 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [1st Dist.] 2017), aff’d, 
    545 S.W.3d 548
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). “A visual image of the
    injuries appellant inflicted on the victim is evidence that is relevant to the jury’s determination.”
    
    Gallo, 239 S.W.3d at 762
    . The fact that the jury also heard testimony regarding the injuries
    depicted does not reduce the relevance of the visual depiction. 
    Id. Although Luna
    claims the video
    is unfairly prejudicial, the video does nothing more than reflect the gruesomeness of the offense,
    which is not a sufficient reason for excluding evidence. See Ripkowski v. State, 
    61 S.W.3d 378
    ,
    392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
    The Court of Criminal Appeals has held video and still photographs are not entirely
    cumulative of each other. 
    Id. The form
    of presentation differs and therefore a video has its own
    value and impact before the jury. See Gordon v. State, 
    784 S.W.2d 410
    , 412 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1990) (“Video recordings in general may be more helpful to a jury than still photographs.”). A
    video offers a panoramic view of the scene depicting the dimensions, size, and close proximity of
    the crime scene not offered by photographs. See Ripkowski v. 
    State, 61 S.W.3d at 392
    .
    The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that the probative value of the video was
    not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We conclude the trial court’s
    decision to admit the video was within the zone of reasonable disagreement and was not an abuse
    of discretion. We overrule appellant’s first issue.
    In his second issue, appellant contends the judgment should be modified to correctly reflect
    the date of the judgment, the names of the attorneys representing the parties, the statute of the
    offense, the finding on a deadly weapon, as well as the plea and finding on the first enhancement
    paragraph. The State agrees and raises two additional errors by cross-point related to appellant’s
    state identification number and time credit.
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    This Court may modify the trial court’s judgment to make the record speak the truth when
    it has the necessary data and information to do so. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State,
    
    865 S.W.2d 26
    , 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 
    813 S.W.2d 526
    , 529 (Tex.
    App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). We conclude the suggested modifications are supported by the
    record. We modify the trial court’s judgment to correctly reflect “10/6/2017” as the date of the
    judgment, Raquel Jones as the State’s attorney, Richard Franklin as the defendant’s attorney,
    “19.02 Penal Code” as the statute of the offense, “Yes, a firearm” as the deadly weapon finding,
    “True” as the plea and finding on the first enhancement paragraph, “4/14/2016” as the date of
    arrest on appellant’s time credit, and 06579485 as his state identification number.
    As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    /Craig Stoddart/
    CRAIG STODDART
    JUSTICE
    Do Not Publish
    TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
    171188F.U05
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    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    JESSIE ALEXANDER LUNA, Appellant                     On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
    No. 2, Dallas County, Texas
    No. 05-17-01188-CR         V.                        Trial Court Cause No. F-1630417.
    Opinion delivered by Justice Stoddart.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                         Justices Lang and Myers participating.
    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED
    as indicated in the following table:
    Section to be modified                Replace existing text with:
    State ID No.                                 06579485
    Date Judgment Entered                        10/6/2017
    Attorney for State                           Raquel Jones
    Attorney for Defendant                       Richard Franklin
    Findings on Deadly Weapon                    Yes, a firearm
    Plea to 1st Enhancement Paragraph            True
    Findings on 1st Enhancement Paragraph        True
    Statute for Offense                          19.02 Penal Code
    Time Credited                                From 4/14/2016 to 10/6/2017
    As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
    Judgment entered this 20th day of July, 2018.
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