Bobby D. Hall-Bey v. Derek Wallace, Jeffrey Alford, and Linda Hone ( 2019 )

Opinion issued February 26, 2019
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-18-00112-CV
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BOBBY HALL-BEY, Appellant
V.
DEREK WALLACE AND JEFFREY ALFORD, Appellees
On Appeal from the 412th District Court
Brazoria County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 89389-I
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Bobby Hall-Bey, an inmate proceeding pro se, challenges the trial
court’s dismissal of his lawsuit against appellees Derek Wallace and Jeffrey Alford,
pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 101.106(f). Hall-Bey
contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his suit because section 101.106(f)
does not apply to his case. We dismiss for want of jurisdiction.
Background
On December 30, 2016, Hall-Bey sued Texas Department of Criminal Justice
(“TDCJ”) supervisory officer, Wallace, and property officer, Alford, among others,
alleging theft of his personal property.1 Hall-Bey did not name TDCJ as a defendant
in the suit.
Hall-Bey alleged that, on June 3, 2016, while he was housed at the TDCJ’s
Ramsey Unit, he and other prisoners were evacuated and relocated to another unit
due to flooding of the Brazoria River. He further alleged that, upon his return to the
Ramsey Unit on June 18, 2016, he discovered that his property had been lost,
damaged, or illegally confiscated. Hall-Bey sought relief in the amount of $78.50,
the alleged value of his property.
On August 3, 2017, Alford and Wallace filed their answer and motion to
dismiss pursuant to Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 101.106(f). On
August 25, 2017, Hall-Bey filed his response, asserting that he filed suit pursuant to
subsection (d), not (f).
On January 3, 2018, the trial court granted Wallace’s and Alford’s section
101.106(f) motion to dismiss. Hall-Bey timely appealed.
1
Although not initially named, Wallace and Alford were later joined as defendants.
2
Discussion
“[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction is essential to a court’s power to decide a case.”
Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553–54 (Tex. 2000). It is not
presumed and it may not be waived. Tex. Ass’n Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852
S.W.2d 440, 443–44 (Tex. 1993). Absent subject matter jurisdiction, a court does
not have authority to render judgment and must dismiss the claim without resolving
the parties’ substantive arguments. City of Houston v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442
(Tex. 2013) (per curiam). A trial court’s judgment rendered without subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be considered a final judgment. Id.Lack of subject matter jurisdiction amounts to fundamental error and may be
raised for the first time on appeal. See id. (citing Tex. Ass’n Bus., 852 S.W.2d at
443–44). An appellate court may address sua sponte the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. (“Not only may a reviewing court assess jurisdiction for the first
time on appeal, but all courts bear the affirmative obligation to ascertain that subject
matter jurisdiction exists regardless of whether the parties have questioned it.”)
(internal quotation omitted). “Our standard for reviewing subject matter jurisdiction
requires the pleader to allege facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s
jurisdiction to hear the cause.” Tex. Ass’n Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446. Whether an
appellate court has jurisdiction is a question of law. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife
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v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). Accordingly, we evaluate the issue
under a de novo standard of review. See id.Section 24.007 of the Texas Government Code states that “[a] district court
has original jurisdiction of a civil matter in which the amount in controversy is more
than $500, exclusive of interest.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 24.007(b). In Texas,
the sum of money in controversy between the parties to a civil suit is a component
of subject matter jurisdiction. See Bland Indep. Sch. Dist., 34 S.W.3d at 554; see
also Gomez v. Unknown Roe-Phillips CO V, No. 06-17-00002-CV, 2017 WL
3701730, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Aug. 22, 2017, no pet.). The amount in
controversy is determined by the amount the plaintiff seeks to recover. Tune v. Tex.
Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 23 S.W.3d 358, 361 (Tex. 2000) (“It has long been the law that
the phrase ‘amount in controversy,’ in the jurisdictional context, means ‘the sum of
money or the value of the thing originally sued for . . . .’”) (quotation omitted).
In his petition, Hall-Bey sued Wallace and Alford for $78.50, the estimated
value of his property. That amount falls below the $500.00 amount-in-controversy
requirement for a district court to acquire jurisdiction. See TEX. GOV’T CODE
§ 24.007(b). Accordingly, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to decide the
merits of Hall-Bey’s case. See Miller v. Harvey, No. 10-09-00106-CV, 2011 WL
1901985, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco May 18, 2011, no pet.) (vacating trial court’s
dismissal and dismissing case for want of jurisdiction where state prison inmate who
4
sued TDCJ employees for confiscation of personal property sought amount in
controversy less $500); Parker v. Ross, No. 10-08-00317-CV, 2010 WL 35844369,
at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco Sept. 15, 2010, no pet.) (same). Our jurisdiction of the
merits of an appeal extends no further than that of the trial court from which the
appeal was taken. Ward v. Malone, 115 S.W.3d 267, 269 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi 2003, pet. denied). Because the trial court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction, we may not address the merits of Hall-Bey’s claims in this appeal.
Conclusion
We vacate the trial court’s order and dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.2
Russell Lloyd
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Lloyd, Kelly, and Hightower.
2
All pending motions are dismissed as moot.
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