Rigoberto Mendez Carrillo v. State ( 2018 )

AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed July 12, 2018.
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-17-00672-CR
RIGOBERTO MENDEZ CARRILLO, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F15-00405-M
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Lang-Miers, Evans, and Schenck
Opinion by Justice Schenck
Rigoberto Mendez Carrillo appeals his conviction for manslaughter. In his first issue, he
complains of the trial court’s decision to admit pre-crash data from the vehicles involved. In his
second issue, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for
manslaughter. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Because all issues are settled in the law, we
issue this memorandum opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
BACKGROUND
On the night of May 30, 2014, a married couple were driving home after attending church
and dining at a restaurant when a white truck driven by appellant sped up from behind their car
and struck them on the passenger side, sending the couple’s car up onto the median. Appellant did
not stop, but continued to speed down the street. The couple began to drive their damaged car
home when the husband noticed smoke up ahead in the direction appellant had driven.
When the couple arrived at the source of the smoke, they found appellant’s white truck had
crashed against a light post and another car was stopped with an impact on the driver’s side and
the driver of that car slumped unconscious. The husband checked on both drivers, but before he
could help the unconscious victim, fire fighters arrived from a nearby station and instructed him
to back away. The husband stepped back to stand with his wife. Appellant exited the white truck
and stood next to the couple. The wife noticed appellant smelled strongly of liquor, and the
husband noticed appellant’s face had been injured. Appellant asked the husband for help and said
if the husband did not say anything, appellant would pay for the couple’s car. After that, appellant
fell, and the fire fighters attended to him.
Both the victim and appellant were taken to the hospital for treatment. Police officers
obtained a blood draw from appellant that revealed he was legally intoxicated. The victim died
from the injuries he sustained in the collision.
A grand jury indicted appellant for manslaughter and found that a deadly weapon, to wit a
motor vehicle, was used and exhibited during the commission of the offense. Appellant pleaded
not guilty, and the case proceeded to trial. At trial, Officer David Frykolm of the Dallas Police
Department testified that he had obtained and executed search warrants on both vehicles to retrieve
the “black boxes” from both vehicles. Officer Frykolm explained that each car that contains an
airbag also contains a black box that records information prior to impact to determine if a crash is
severe enough to deploy the air bag. The officer testified he personally extracted the black boxes
from both vehicles and that from each he was able to download a crash data retrieval report. The
State offered these reports into evidence, and appellant objected to both as lacking a business
record affidavit or testimony from the equipment manufacturers that the reports were accurately
retrieved from the black boxes. The trial court overruled appellant’s objections, and Officer
Frykolm proceeded to testify as to the contents of the crash data retrieval reports.
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At the conclusion of the trial, a jury found appellant guilty of the offense as charged and
found that he had used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. The
jury assessed punishment at twelve years’ incarceration. Appellant filed a motion for a new trial,
asserting the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence, which was overruled by operation
of law.
DISCUSSION
In his first issue, appellant urges the trial court erred by admitting, over his objections, the
crash data retrieval report from each vehicle. In particular, appellant complains the crash data
retrieval reports were not supported by any business records affidavit and that the trial court failed
to examine the reliability and accuracy of the process that generated the crash data retrieval reports.
While appellant objected to each report when it was first offered into evidence, he did not make a
running objection or any further objection when Officer Frykholm testified about the contents of
the crash data retrieval reports. In particular, Officer Frykholm testified that the data revealed
appellant’s and the victim’s respective speeds and percentage of pressure on the accelerator in the
seconds before their air bags deployed. As the court of criminal appeals has repeatedly held, to
preserve error in admitting evidence, a party must object each time the inadmissible evidence is
offered or obtain a running objection. Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
Any error in admitting the crash data retrieval reports was waived when the same evidence came
in through the examination of Officer Frykholm without objection. See id.; see also Walker v.
State, 02-16-00418-CR, 2018 WL 1096060, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 1, 2018, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (appellant forfeited his objections to admission of
toxicology report where he objected to admission of report but failed to object to testimony
describing contents of report).
We overrule appellant’s first issue.
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In his second issue, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
conviction, specifically challenging the evidence of his intent.
When reviewing the record for legal sufficiency, we consider the combined and cumulative
force of all admitted evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to
the verdict to determine whether a jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Johnson v. State, 509 S.W.3d 320, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
A person commits manslaughter if he recklessly causes the death of an individual. TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.04(a). Manslaughter is a “result of conduct crime,” one in which
recklessness must go to the conduct causing the death. Ashorali v. State, 05-06-01476-CR, 2008
WL 726202, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 19, 2008, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication).
A person acts recklessly when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. PENAL § 6.03(c). The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all of the circumstances as viewed
from the actor’s standpoint. Id. The jury’s determination of a culpable mental state is usually
grounded upon inferences drawn from the attendant circumstances and may be inferred from the
acts, words, and conduct of the accused. Ashorali, 2008 WL 726202, at *6.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the essential elements of the offense are
those of a hypothetically correct jury charge: “one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized
by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily
restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which
the defendant was tried.” Anderson v. State, 416 S.W.3d 884, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). When
the charge authorizes the jury to convict the defendant on more than one theory, as it did in this
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case, the verdict of guilt will be upheld if the evidence is sufficient on any theory authorized by
the jury charge. Id.
The charge in this case permitted the jury to convict appellant of manslaughter if it found
he acted recklessly by (1) operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of or intoxicated
due to the introduction of alcohol, (2) driving the motor vehicle at an unsafe speed for the
conditions then existing, or (3) failing to yield right of way while operating a motor vehicle to
oncoming traffic, therefore striking the motor vehicle occupied by the victim.
Appellant contends the evidence presented to the jury at best amounted to criminal
negligence. He urges the following evidence demonstrates he was unaware of the risk his conduct
created. The husband and the wife appellant struck previously admitted that they did not actually
observe the collision between appellant’s truck and the decedent’s car. Nor did either spouse
testify whether the light at the intersection facing appellant was green when appellant proceeded
into the intersection and collided with the victim. A firefighter-paramedic who was first on the
scene testified that he did not see appellant exit the truck or the accident. The medical examiner
who performed the autopsy on the victim testified the “manner of death” was an “accident” and
that in identifying the manner of death, “we do take [criminal intent] into consideration.” A fire
rescue officer who was at the scene of the accident testified that based on his experience, the “intent
of the crash” was unintentional. An officer with the Dallas Police Department testified he was not
able to determine whether appellant or the victim had the green light. Appellant testified at trial
that on the night in question he had no idea he would cause the death of another person, just before
the accident, he had been assaulted by five men and was speeding away to evade them, and as he
approached the site of the accident, he saw he had a green light. Additionally, appellant denied he
knew he was intoxicated when he hit the couple’s car.
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Despite appellant’s protestations, the evidence, viewed, as it must be, in the light most
favorable to the verdict, shows appellant was heavily intoxicated at the time of the collision, which
resulted in the victim’s death, and driving at a high speed despite just having struck another vehicle.
See Rubio v. State, 203 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2006, pet. ref’d) (driving under the
influence of alcohol demonstrates conscious disregard of substantial risk). The wife struck prior
to the fatal impact identified appellant as the driver of the truck and testified that as he stood next
to her at the scene of the collision, she noticed a strong odor of liquor coming from him. The
firefighter-paramedic testified he believed appellant was intoxicated at the scene of the collision
because of a strong smell of alcohol on him and other signs and symptoms of intoxication. Blood
tests taken within hours of the collision showed appellant had a blood alcohol content of at least
0.16 grams of ethanol per 100 milliliters of blood—twice the legal limit, and a toxicologist testified
at trial that, based on his training and experience, appellant was intoxicated at the time of the blood
draws. On cross-examination, appellant admitted he drank six beers that evening before the
collision, was intoxicated when he hit the couple’s car, and knew after hitting the couple’s car that
he was in no state to drive. Appellant also admitted that despite knowing he was intoxicated and
in no state to drive, he made the conscious decision to continue driving after hitting the couple’s
car. Further, the husband of the couple testified appellant told him not to say anything and that he
would pay for the couple’s car. From the foregoing, the jury could conclude appellant was
intoxicated and knew he was in no state to drive before he collided with the victim’s car, and that
his comments to the husband revealed he understood he was responsible for the accident.
Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s second issue.
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CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/David J. Schenck/
DAVID J. SCHENCK
JUSTICE
DO NOT PUBLISH
TEX. R. APP. P. 47
170672F.U05
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Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
RIGOBERTO MENDEZ CARRILLO, On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District
Appellant Court, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F15-00405-M.
No. 05-17-00672-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Schenck,
Justices Lang-Miers and Evans
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 12th day of July, 2018.
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