Robert Aguilar v. State ( 2018 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-17-00299-CR
Robert AGUILAR,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 144th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2015CR12632
Honorable Lorina I. Rummel, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice
Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Delivered and Filed: August 1, 2018
AFFIRMED
The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in
denying Robert Aguilar’s motion to suppress his statement to police. Aguilar contends the trial
court erred because he did not voluntarily waive his rights before giving the statement. We affirm
the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
Aguilar was indicted for capital murder. Before trial, he moved to suppress the statements
he made to Detective Lawrence Saiz confessing to his participation in the murder. At the pretrial
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hearing, Aguilar’s attorney argued his statement was not freely and voluntarily given because of
the references he made to being in fear for his own safety and the safety of his family, and of the
possibility that a hit was out on him. After the trial court watched approximately twenty-five
minutes of the videotaped statement, which the attorney represented was the relevant portion of
the statement, the State called Detective Saiz as a witness.
Detective Saiz testified he responded to Aguilar’s question about how long they were going
to be talking by stating they would be there as long as Aguilar wanted to be there. Detective Saiz
also testified he never coerced or threatened Aguilar or directly or indirectly promised him
anything, and Aguilar spoke with him freely and voluntarily. When Aguilar asked Detective Saiz
what he would get out of giving his statement, Detective Saiz testified he told Aguilar there was
nothing he could do. Detective Saiz agreed Aguilar was concerned about people knowing his
whereabouts and the name of his family. Detective Saiz also agreed Aguilar believed there was a
hit out on him and was worried about his life and the safety of his family. Detective Saiz’s only
response was to tell Aguilar he would try to contact his family, but he did not make any promises
in exchange for Aguilar giving his statement. Detective Saiz agreed that a person named “Pelon”
was the person who ordered the kidnapping and murder of the victim, and “Pelon” was part of a
drug cartel, had not been arrested, and was believed to be in Mexico.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ruled Aguilar voluntarily waived his rights,
finding the statement was the product of free and deliberate choice rather than any coercion or
intimidation. The statement was admitted into evidence at trial, but the jury was instructed that it
could only consider the statement if it found Aguilar knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived his rights. The jury found Aguilar guilty of capital murder, and Aguilar was sentenced to
life in prison.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated
standard of review.” Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 189–90 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). “At a
motion to suppress hearing, the trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of credibility of
witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.” Id. at 190. “Therefore, we afford almost
complete deference to the trial court in determining historical facts.” Id. However, we review the
trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo. State v. Ford, 537 S.W.3d 19, 23 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2017).
DISCUSSION
Voluntariness is a factual determination that is assessed by considering the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the statement. Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 23 (Tex. Crim. App.
2000); Fineron v. State, 201 S.W.3d 361, 365 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2006, no pet.). When a
defendant alleges that he involuntarily waived his rights and made a statement, the totality of the
circumstances that must be considered include the characteristics of the accused and the details of
the interrogation. Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 337 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “[F]or purposes
of the Fifth Amendment, waiver of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination during
custodial questioning can be deemed involuntary only if it is a product of official coercion,
intimidation, or deception.” Leza v. State, 351 S.W.3d 344, 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
However, “a claim that a purported waiver of the statutory rights enumerated in Article 38.22 is
involuntary need not be predicated on police overreaching.” Id. (internal quotation omitted;
emphasis in original). “Circumstances unattributable to the police that nevertheless adversely
impact an accused’s ability to resist reasonable police entreaties to waive his statutory rights, such
as intoxication, are ‘factors’ in the voluntariness inquiry though they are usually not enough, by
themselves, to render a statement inadmissible under Article 38.22.” Id. (internal quotation
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omitted). A promise only renders a confession invalid if the promise is “positive, made or
sanctioned by someone in authority, and of such an influential nature that it would cause a
defendant to speak untruthfully.” Martinez v. State, 127 S.W.3d 792, 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
Detective Saiz testified that he did not coerce or threaten Aguilar and that Aguilar
voluntarily gave his statement. See Leza, 351 S.W.3d at 352 (relying on officer’s testimony in
holding statement was voluntarily given). “The trial judge reviewed the recording of the
interrogation and could measure the [detective’s] perceptions with respect to the voluntariness of
the appellant’s waiver for himself.” Id. Although Aguilar expressed fear due to his association
with a drug cartel and the actions the drug cartel could take, he took a long time deliberating about
whether he should talk to the detective, thereby demonstrating the statement was the product of
free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. See Joseph v. State,
309 S.W.3d 20, 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986))
(noting waiver “must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception”). Having reviewed the portion
of the videotape Aguilar’s attorney argued was relevant at the suppression hearing, we hold the
trial court’s finding that Aguilar voluntarily waived his rights “is supported by the record, and we
defer to it.” Leza, 351 S.W.3d at 353 (deferring to trial court’s conclusion that waiver was
voluntary when conclusion was supported by the record).
CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
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