Ricky Ray Martinez v. State ( 2019 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
__________________
NO. 09-17-00399-CR
__________________
RICKY RAY MARTINEZ, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 258th District Court
Polk County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 24682
__________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Ricky Ray Martinez was charged with Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child.
See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(2)(B) (West 2019).1 After a jury trial,
Martinez was convicted and sentenced to 99 years in prison. Martinez appeals his
conviction.
1
We cite to the current version of the Penal Code provisions, as the amendments
made to the cited statutes do not affect this appeal.
1
In three issues, Martinez argues that the trial court erred when it (1) allowed
the victim to testify regarding her self-harm after the alleged sexual assaults, (2)
violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Texas Rule of Evidence 412 when it did not allow Martinez to
question the victim regarding her past sexual history, and (3) similarly violated the
Confrontation Clause and Rule 412 when it did not allow Martinez to question the
victim about a previously unrelated Sexual Assault Nurse Examination (SANE). We
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Background
The victim, Diana,2 Martinez’s stepdaughter, was 11 years old at the time of
the first assault. Diana testified that Martinez and Diana’s mother (Mother) had been
in relationship since she was “2 years old.” She testified that at the time of the first
assault, Mother worked at a nursing home and frequently worked nights. Martinez
babysat her and her younger siblings3 on nights Mother worked late.
In the winter of 2014, Diana’s younger sister wet her bed, and while Diana
helped Martinez change the sheets on the child’s bed, Martinez told Diana to come
2
We refer to the child with a pseudonym to conceal the child’s identity. See Tex.
Const. art. I, § 30 (granting crime victims “the right to be treated with fairness and
with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice
process”).
3
Martinez and Diana’s mother have two biological children.
2
into the room he shared with Mother. After Diana’s sister went back to sleep, Diana
went into Martinez’s room, and Martinez sexually assaulted her when he “put his
penis in my vagina.” Diana testified that Martinez sexually assaulted her “[t]hree or
four times” after the first incident, until Mother separated from Martinez and the
family moved to a different house. Diana and her siblings then went to live with their
maternal grandparents.
Diana acknowledged that while she lived with her grandparents, she entered
into an internet relationship with an 18-year-old boy. When her grandparents
discovered the relationship, they demanded that she end it and told her 18-year-old
boys “have the mindset of getting in your pants.” In response, Diana told her
grandparents she was not a virgin because she had been sexually assaulted by
Martinez. The police investigated the allegations and charged Martinez with
Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child.
Although several witnesses testified at trial, we only address the testimony
relevant to the issues raised by Martinez on appeal. Diana testified during direct
examination that she was hospitalized due to self-harm after Martinez sexually
assaulted her. 4 Martinez objected to the relevance of the testimony and the trial court
4
Diana testified that she started cutting herself because “I knew that I was going
through hard times and just at school having to deal with the pain that he did that to
me and other stuff.”
3
overruled his objection. During cross-examination, Martinez’s trial counsel
attempted to question Diana about her sexual history before she made allegations
against Martinez. The State objected to any testimony regarding the victim’s sexual
history. The trial court sustained the objection and did not allow Martinez to question
Diana about her sexual history.
Martinez also attempted to question Diana about circumstances surrounding
a SANE examination performed on her prior to and unrelated to the sexual assault
by Martinez. The State objected to questions regarding any SANE examination
unrelated to the allegations against Martinez, and the trial court, over objections from
Martinez’s trial counsel, did not allow Martinez to question Diana about any other
SANE examination.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Martinez and assessed
punishment at 99 years in prison. Martinez timely filed this appeal.
II. Analysis
A. Issue One
In his first issue, Martinez argues that the trial court erred when it allowed
Diana to testify regarding self-harm after Martinez assaulted her because the
testimony was not relevant to the charges against him, and the testimony was
“bias[ed] and prejudicial.” We review the trial court’s admission of evidence under
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an abuse of discretion standard. Tillman v. State, 354 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011) (citations omitted); Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010) (citation omitted).
During direct examination, the State attempted to question Diana about self-
harm, which she allegedly engaged in after Martinez sexually assaulted her.
Martinez objected as to relevance. The State argued that Martinez questioned
Diana’s credibility in his opening statement, and thus, opened the door to such
testimony. The trial court overruled Martinez’s objection and allowed a running
objection to testimony regarding Diana’s self-harm.
Any error in admitting evidence is cured if the same evidence comes in
elsewhere without objection, either before or after the complained-of ruling. Lane v.
State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (citing Valle v. State, 109
S.W.3d 500, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1998)). In the record before us, a counselor from Children’s Safe Harbor
who counseled Diana testified, without objection, that Diana engaged in cutting and
other self-destructive behavior after the alleged incident.5 Thus, any error in the
5
The Court of Criminal Appeals has addressed the issue of running objections
and multiple witnesses. Ford. v. State, 919 S.W.2d 107, 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
In Ford, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a defendant’s running objection
applied to all witnesses in the case. Id. But, the Court also cautioned that in some
situations “it would not be appropriate to allow a running objection to preserve error
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admission of this evidence was cured when the evidence was admitted later without
objection. See Broussard v. State, 163 S.W.3d 312, 318 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
2005, no pet.) (citing Lane, 151 S.W.3d at 193)). Accordingly, we overrule
Martinez’s first issue.
B. Issues Two and Three
In his second and third issues, Martinez argues that the trial court erred when
it did not allow him to question Diana about her sexual history or reference an
unrelated SANE examination performed on Diana prior to her allegations against
Martinez. Martinez argues that such error constitutes a violation of the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment under the United States Constitution and Texas Rule
of Evidence 412. Martinez asserts the evidence would tend to “show the victim[’]s
on a matter referred to by any witness at any [time] during trial.” Id. (citation
omitted). In determining that the defendant did preserve his objection as to all
witnesses, the Court noted that the defendant in Ford objected “‘to any and all impact
evidence’ as ‘to all witnesses’ testifying to such[,]” and therefore preserved his
objection to all witnesses in the case regarding such testimony. Id. at 113–114.
Following the Court of Criminal Appeals’ guidance in Ford, we decline to extend
Martinez’s running objection to questions about Diana’s self-harm to subsequent
witnesses because Martinez did not clearly request his running objection to apply to
all witnesses at trial. Any subsequent testimony by Diana’s counselor regarding her
self-harm was not covered by the running objection earlier in trial. See Scaggs v.
State, 18 S.W.3d 277, 292 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref’d) (holding “[a]
running objection when requested by defense counsel and granted by the trial court
does not preserve error when another witness testifies to the same matter without
objection.”).
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motive or bias for her testimony.” See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Tex. R. Evid.
412(b)(2)(C).
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him[.]” U.S. CONST. amend.
VI. This constitutional guarantee applies to both federal and state prosecutions.
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) (citation omitted); Woodall v. State, 336
S.W.3d 634, 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citations omitted). “The central concern
of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a
criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary
proceeding before the trier of fact.” Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990).
While a defendant is guaranteed the right to confront the witnesses testifying
against him, that right is not unlimited. “Generally speaking, the Confrontation
Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-
examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense
might wish.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985). Texas Rule of Evidence
412 prohibits a defendant from questioning a sexual assault victim about prior sexual
history, except under limited exceptions. See Tex. R. Evid. 412 (b)(2)(A–E). When
evidence is constitutionally required to be admitted under Rule 412, the trial court
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must still make a determination that the probative value is not substantially
outweighed by undue prejudice. See id. 412(b)(2)(E), (b)(3); State v. Dudley, 223
S.W.3d 717, 724 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2007, no pet.).
A trial court’s ruling under Rule 412 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d 895, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citation omitted);
see also Tex. R. Evid. 412. The trial court has wide discretion in determining
relevant testimony under the rules of evidence. See Johnson, 490 S.W.3d at 910
(citations omitted) (illustrating that Texas Rules of Evidence 401 and 613 allow a
defendant to cross examine a witness on relevant information regarding potential
bias and motives). While the standard for trial courts is to err on allowing any
relevant information to be presented in trial, Rule 412 asserts a more stringent
assessment and leans toward keeping the information out except for very limited
circumstances. See Tex. R. Evid. 412. Rule 412 prevents a defendant from
introducing a sexual assault victim’s past sexual history except, among other limited
things, to show “the victim’s motive or bias[.]” See id. 412(b)(2)(C); see also
Robisheaux v. State, 483 S.W.3d 205, 223–24 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, pet. ref’d)
(quoting Stephens v. State, 978 S.W.2d 728, 732–33 (Tex. App—Austin 1998, pet.
ref’d) (stating that “‘[t]he general balancing test under Rule 403 weighs in favor of
8
the admissibility of evidence, while Rule 412(b)(3) weighs against the admissibility
of evidence’”)).
Here, the excluded evidence fails to meet either of the required prongs for
evidence to be admissible as an exception under Rule 412. See Tex. R. Evid.
412(b)(2)(A–E), (b)(3). First, Martinez failed to show how the excluded testimony
about Diana’s sexual history would establish a bias or motive to fabricate the
allegations against Martinez as required by rule 412. See id. 412(b)(2)(C). The
defense attempted to question Diana about an unrelated incident regarding an alleged
sexual encounter in the woods that led to Mother taking Diana to a hospital for a
SANE examination. The State objected. Martinez then sought to elicit testimony
from Diana that she did not report the assault by Martinez to nursing staff or law
enforcement during the SANE examination for the unrelated incident, even though
this incident allegedly took place after the assault by Martinez. While the State had
no objection to testimony regarding Diana not reporting the assault by Martinez, the
State did object to bringing up the SANE examination conducted in the unrelated
incident. The trial court permitted Martinez to question Diana about why she did not
report the assault by Martinez while being examined at the hospital by the nursing
staff and interviewed by law enforcement officers; however, the trial court did not
permit Martinez to mention the unrelated SANE examination or to question Diana
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about the circumstances that led up to her speaking to nursing staff and law
enforcement officers.
Second, Martinez failed to show that this testimony would fall within a limited
exception to Rule 412. See id. 412. According to the purported testimony, Diana
denied any sexual activity occurred during the incident in question. Therefore,
Martinez failed to show how such an incident would show Diana’s bias or prejudice
to fabricate the allegations against him. If anything, Martinez’s argument for
admissibility would have been made stronger had Diana made an outcry against him
at that time. In any case, the trial court allowed Martinez to confront the witness
against him regarding her failure to report the allegations against him at that
opportunity. The trial court was well within the parameters outlined by the
legislature in Rule 412 and did not abuse its discretion when it refused to permit
Martinez to question Diana regarding her sexual history or expand on the
circumstances surrounding an unrelated SANE examination. Therefore, we overrule
Martinez’s second and third issues.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
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AFFIRMED.
________________________________
CHARLES KREGER
Justice
Submitted on January 2, 2019
Opinion Delivered May 8, 2019
Do Not Publish
Before Kreger, Horton and Johnson, JJ.
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