in the Interest of R.M., C.S., I.S., and T.M., Children ( 2018 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-18-00077-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF R.M., C.S.,
I.S., AND T.M., CHILDREN
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FROM THE 231ST DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 231-458944-09
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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In a single issue, Appellant Mother argues that the evidence was
insufficient to support the trial court’s determination that termination of her
parental rights to three of her five children was in their best interest. We disagree
and affirm the trial court’s order.
Background
Mother has five children. The youngest, J.M., 2 was an infant at the time of
trial and was not part of these termination proceedings. 3 R.M., the oldest, was
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
14 years old, and R.M.’s alleged father was serving a 40-year prison sentence in
Louisiana at the time trial began. C.S. and I.S. were ten and nine years old,
respectively, and their father passed away before these proceedings were
initiated. T.M. was two years old when trial began. The four oldest children—
R.M., C.S., I.S., and T.M.—were all the subject of the termination proceedings in
the trial court.
The final trial was conducted piecemeal through four hearings spread out
over a span of six months starting September 1, 2017, and ending February 15,
2018, and at the conclusion of the proceedings, the trial court terminated
Mother’s parental rights to the three youngest children—C.S., I.S., and T.M.
R.M. was placed in the custody of a relative, Mother’s cousin, who was appointed
R.M.’s permanent managing conservator, and Mother’s rights were not
terminated as to R.M. Mother’s appeal is limited to the trial court’s decision to
terminate her parental rights and does not complain of the trial court’s decision
as it relates to R.M.
2
In accordance with rule 9.8, we refer to children and family members by
aliases. Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b) & cmt.
3
J.M. was born during the Child Protective Services (CPS) investigation,
and the petition filed by the Department of Family and Protective Services
(Department) concerning J.M. was severed from the instant case by agreement
of the parties.
2
I. Mother has a history of abusive relationships, mental illness, and
drug use.
A. Mother’s involvement in abusive relationships
Mother’s relationships with her children’s fathers have been marred by
domestic violence. With two of those fathers out of the picture at the time of
trial—one deceased, one incarcerated—the evidence presented to the trial court
focused on Mother’s relationship with Clark, T.M.’s father. Evidence of the
violence was provided by police officers, investigators, caseworkers, and Mother
herself.
On April 4, 2015, Fort Worth Police Department (FWPD) Officer Alexander
Marti responded to a report of domestic violence at Mother’s apartment. Officer
Marti testified that a child had called 911 after an argument between Mother and
Clark had escalated “to the point where the female was strangled while . . .
[Clark] was holding a baby, and . . . he also assaulted one of the children.” More
specifically, Officer Marti testified,
Towards the end of the incident, [Mother] was trying to get the kids
out of the apartment. [Clark] was not letting them go. He grabbed
one of the children by the arm, yanked the child by the arm to the
point where the kid said, it felt like his bones were popping out. And
then Mr. [Clark] locked them in the apartment refusing to let them
leave . . . .
Officer Marti arrested Clark for family-violence assault by strangulation,
endangering a child, injury to a child, and unlawful restraint.
During the subsequent investigation by CPS, Mother admitted that the
children had witnessed other incidents of domestic abuse, including an incident
3
when she and Clark were yelling and screaming at each other and Clark pulled
Mother’s hair so hard that it was ripped from her scalp. According to CPS
investigator Viviana Martinez, Mother recounted a time when Clark started a
“physical argument” and took her phone. Mother also purportedly told CPS
caseworker Crystal Roman of another instance when “he either pushed her or
threw her to the ground, and [T.M.] was in close proximity when it happened.”
CPS concluded that there was reason to believe that neglectful supervision
and physical abuse had taken place but that removal was not immediately
necessary and referred Mother to Family Based Safety Services (FBSS) in June
2015. Roman worked with Mother for the next nine months until March 2016.
B. Mother’s mental health struggles
Roman testified to her concerns about Mother’s mental health. According
to Roman, Mother made statements during their initial visit about having “really
bad anxiety and having episodes of falling out or blacking out or not being able to
get out of bed” and “that she did not like to make left . . . turns because the devil
was waiting for her.” Based on her observations, Roman referred Mother to
counseling with Merit Family Services, where Kimberly Dunn-Lipscomb
counseled Mother.
Lipscomb began working with Mother in October 2015 to address the
concerns about Mother’s anxiety and experiences of domestic abuse. Her initial
observations of Mother were similar to those of Roman and she testified that
during their initial visit, Mother “would lower her voice and whisper when she
4
would tell [Lipscomb] certain facts about her life, like someone was listening to
[them].” Lipscomb also recalled how Mother would sometimes appear “jittery and
nervous” during counseling sessions, would “rub[] her hands together” and fail to
make appropriate eye contact, and how her speech was rushed and she
sometimes stuttered. Lipscomb identified these as classic symptoms of anxiety.
Mother admitted to Lipscomb that she had mental issues that needed to be
addressed, and Lipscomb explained to the trial court that the core of Mother’s
anxiety stemmed from past trauma, including her own childhood abuse and her
experiences during Hurricane Katrina.
MHMR records that were admitted into evidence at trial also showed a
history of Mother’s struggle with mental illness. These records indicated that
Mother had suffered bouts of “significant depression” starting in 2011 with a self-
described nervous breakdown. The records also described Mother’s experience
of childhood abuse, family history of mental illness including anxiety, and a past
admission for psychiatric treatment in 2014, and indicated that medication had
previously been prescribed for Mother. According to the records, three of
Mother’s children had attempted suicide. The records also revealed that Mother
had sought assistance for depression in October 2016 after the children were
removed from her care, at which time she was assessed as “psychotic with poor
judgment.” The records also included a recommendation from the October 2016
visit that Mother be placed in a “partial hospitalization program,” and if one was
not available, inpatient psychiatric hospitalization. Records from February 2017
5
indicated that Mother self-reported having bipolar disorder and “more frequent
mood swings,” that she was isolating herself from other people, that she had lost
her motivation to do much more than go to counseling, and that some of her
triggers were as basic as “crossing the street, new areas, walking up and down
the stairs, heights, [and] elevators.”
C. Mother’s drug use
Mother failed three drug tests during the termination proceedings. In
October 2016, she tested positive for marijuana and cocaine. In January 2017
and again in August 2017, she tested positive for cocaine. Yet Mother only
admitted to using marijuana in the past and claimed she had “no idea” why she
had tested positive for cocaine multiple times. She also disclaimed any
knowledge of Clark’s drug use, including a 2015 conviction for possession of
methamphetamine.
II. Mother’s initial improvement was short-lived and the children were
removed in March 2016.
By the beginning of 2016, Mother appeared to be improving and in January
2016, Lipscomb discharged Mother from counseling because Lipscomb felt they
had “address[ed] all the concerns with domestic violence.” Roman closed the
case in March 2016 because it appeared Clark was no longer living in the
apartment and Mother reassured Roman that she and Clark were no longer in a
relationship, “that she did not want to be with him, [and] that she would not allow
him into the home.”
6
Those assurances were quickly proven false. Mother did not follow
through with her promises to Roman and she began seeing Clark again. On
March 14, 2016, police were called when Clark took off from the apartment with
T.M., who was one at the time, after an argument with Mother. Accounts differed
as to what happened, but FWPD received reports that Clark had either placed
T.M. on a brick wall or had tossed the child over a brick wall surrounding the
apartment, had jumped over the wall, and then had picked up T.M. and run away
from the apartment complex. FWPD was able to locate Clark and T.M. using a
helicopter for an aerial search and by tracking Clark’s cell phone location. In
subsequent interviews, Mother blamed the children for starting the argument
between her and Clark.
After this incident, the Department removed the children and filed a petition
seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights to her four children and Clark’s
parental rights to T.M. Clark, who could not be located at the time of the final
trial, did not participate in the proceedings. A service plan was put in place that
required Mother to avoid committing any crimes; demonstrate financial stability;
participate in a psychological evaluation and follow all resulting
recommendations; participate in individual counseling until she was successfully
discharged; take parenting and domestic violence classes; take all prescribed
medications; participate in couple’s counseling with Clark; and maintain stable
and appropriate housing.
7
III. Mother failed to implement good parenting behaviors.
CPS caseworker Jennifer Goodridge was assigned to the case. At trial,
Goodridge admitted that Mother had participated in some of the required
services—she completed the parenting class and attended visitation, for
example—but Goodridge also testified that Mother failed to make any progress in
implementing the lessons learned through counseling and the classes into her
everyday life. Lipscomb, who restarted weekly counseling sessions with Mother
in December 2016, expressed similar concerns. In their opinions, Mother’s
failures to implement those lessons were manifested by her continued contact
with Clark, the children’s ongoing serious behavioral issues, and her unstable
housing and employment.
A. Mother’s continued relationship with Clark
Particularly concerning to both Goodridge and Lipscomb was Mother’s
continued involvement with Clark.
Goodridge testified that Clark attempted to attend a supervised visitation
held at a McDonald’s in December 2016, something that she testified the court
order did not authorize Clark to do. According to Goodridge, the supervisor in
attendance, who knew that Clark was not supposed to be there, asked him to
leave, at which point Mother actively undermined the supervisor’s instruction by
taking T.M. to the bathroom, calling Clark on a cell phone and telling T.M. to say
“hi” to Clark.
8
During the proceedings, Mother became pregnant with another child by
Clark. That child, J.M., was removed from Mother’s care in August 2017
because Mother tested positive for cocaine shortly after his birth.
Mother continued to be in contact with Clark after J.M.’s birth. FWPD
Officer Allen Hostler testified that on November 16, 2017 he responded to
Mother’s apartment to investigate a report of domestic violence. According to
Officer Hostler, Mother called the police and reported that Clark was “being rude,
and she wanted him out of the house.” Clark was not at the apartment by the
time Officer Hostler arrived, but Officer Hostler recalled Mother informing him that
Clark had property, including clothing, at her apartment and that she had
“allowed him to stay on the balcony to sleep.” Officer Hostler testified, “[Mother]
said that she felt sorry for him, that she would let him stay over, and that he
would take advantage of her.”
B. The children’s behavioral problems
The Department also expressed concern about Mother’s ability to handle
certain behavioral problems exhibited by the children. According to Goodridge,
I.S. was hospitalized for mental health concerns multiple times over the course of
the proceedings, including four times in December 2017 and again in February
2018.
Goodridge testified, “The children have multiple behavioral problems . . . .
There have been a few incidents during visits [in] which [Mother] became
frustrated and was not able to manage [their] behaviors.” Goodridge described
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an incident close to the time of trial in which I.S., who was nine at the time,
“became agitated during a visit and was acting up and was very agitated and
angry and actually wound up running out of the visitation room and eventually ran
out of the CPS building near the highway.” Goodridge testified, “[Mother] was
sitting on the couch during his tantrum and during his exiting the building just
holding the baby.”
She also described a second incident earlier in the case in which the
oldest child, R.M., became agitated because “[Mother] had blamed [R.M.] for the
children being in foster care.” According to Goodridge, “[R.M.] got upset and
threw a chair, and . . . actually had to be taken out of the visitation room to calm
down.” While Goodridge described these as the most serious incidents that had
taken place during visitation, she also testified that Mother would generally “get
frustrated during visits and prefer[red] that [the children] just sit in chairs or not
interact with each other.” Goodridge noted her observation of a closer bond
between Mother and T.M. than between Mother and the other children, and she
especially noticed the lack of a bond between Mother and R.M. In summary,
Goodridge testified to her concerns of “[Mother]’s lack of bonding with the oldest
child, her inability to manage their behaviors, and, additionally, when one of the
children was sent to a psych[iatric] hospital last year, [Mother] handled that by
using drugs.”
Lipscomb also did not believe Mother had made progress in managing her
children’s behavioral problems and testified that “several of the children have
10
very different personalities, so they act out in different ways, and . . . [Mother]
continue[d] to struggle with dealing with it in the moment.” Lipscomb
acknowledged that Mother had made progress by ceasing to engage in
ineffective and abusive parenting techniques and by implementing some positive
and effective ones, but she also cautioned that Mother had more work to do in
learning how to engage and interact with the children appropriately. Lipscomb
also testified that while Mother had made progress in recognizing the appropriate
developmental levels of the children, Mother “continue[d] to struggle with
understanding what their needs are individually, which causes her to become
frustrated, which in turn makes the children act out.”
Lipscomb expressed concern that the children would not be safe if they
were returned to Mother. Lipscomb explained that out of over 20 goals that she
and Mother had set, Mother had accomplished “maybe . . . four or five of them.”
By February 2018, Lipscomb had unsuccessfully discharged Mother from
counseling.
C. Mother’s unstable housing and employment situations
Mother testified at trial that she had lost her housing benefits after the
children were removed from her care. At the November 2017 trial date, she
submitted a copy of a lease for an apartment that she planned to move into that
cost more than $1,400 a month. But her ability to afford the apartment was
called into question by evidence of her sparse employment history.
11
Mother was unemployed for approximately ten years, from 2007 through
2017. She worked at Applebee’s for a month during the proceedings but was let
go because, according to Mother, she “was not fast enough.” She obtained
another job at Albertson’s and started it in November 2017.
IV. The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to C.S., I.S., and
T.M.
A. The Department’s plans for the children
R.M. lived with Mother’s cousin during the termination proceedings.
Goodridge reported that the placement went well, and the Department requested
that R.M. remain in Mother’s cousin’s care.
The Department sought termination of Mother’s parental rights to the other
three children, but Goodridge testified that the Department was hoping to place
them with relatives. Two of Clark’s relatives were prepared to take custody of
T.M., and at the time of the final day of trial in February 2018, the Department
had begun the process of evaluating their fitness for placement. The Department
was also investigating a placement option with C.S. and I.S.’s paternal relatives
in Louisiana at the time of trial. Goodridge did express some doubts about this
placement in light of the children’s “deteriorating” behavior.
B. Mother’s request
Mother requested that the trial court not terminate her parental rights but
instead appoint the Department as the children’s permanent managing
12
conservator and allow the Department to continue working to place the children
with relatives.
C. The trial court’s order
The trial court found that termination of Mother’s parental rights to C.S.,
I.S., and T.M. was in their best interest. It also found that Mother had:
- knowingly placed or allowed the children to remain in conditions or
surroundings which endangered their physical or emotional well-being, see
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D) (West Supp. 2017);
- engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who
engaged in conduct which endangered their physical or emotional well-
being, see id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E);
- executed an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment of
parental rights, see id. § 161.001(b)(1)(K); 4
- constructively abandoned the children, see id. § 161.001(b)(1)(N); and
- failed to comply with the provisions of the court-ordered service plan, see
id. § 161.001(b)(1)(O).
The trial court also terminated Clark’s parental rights to T.M. He does not
appeal.
Discussion
Mother’s appeal is limited to a single issue complaining of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental
rights to C.S., I.S., and T.M. was in her children’s best interest.
4
In our review of the record, we have not located any such affidavits.
Regardless, Mother does not contest this finding on appeal or the other four
statutory findings under subsection (b)(1), and we note that only one such finding
is required to uphold a parental-rights termination order. See In re A.V., 113
S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003).
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I. Standard of Review
In a termination case, the State seeks not just to limit parental rights but to
erase them permanently—to divest the parent and child of all legal rights,
privileges, duties, and powers normally existing between them, except the child’s
right to inherit. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.206(b) (West Supp. 2017); Holick v.
Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). Consequently, “[w]hen the State seeks to
sever permanently the relationship between a parent and a child, it must first
observe fundamentally fair procedures.” In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552, 554 (Tex.
2012) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1391–
92 (1982)). We strictly scrutinize termination proceedings and strictly construe
involuntary termination statutes in favor of the parent. In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d
796, 802 (Tex. 2012); E.R., 385 S.W.3d at 554–55; Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20–21.
Termination decisions must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. See
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b), § 161.206(a) (West 2014); E.N.C., 384
S.W.3d at 802. Due process demands this heightened standard because “[a]
parental rights termination proceeding encumbers a value ‘far more precious
than any property right.’” E.R., 385 S.W.3d at 555 (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S.
at 758–59, 102 S. Ct. at 1397); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002); see
also E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 802. Evidence is clear and convincing if it “will
produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of
the allegations sought to be established.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007 (West
2014); E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 802.
14
For a trial court to terminate a parent-child relationship, the party seeking
termination must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s
actions satisfy one ground listed in family code section 161.001(b)(1) and that
termination is in the best interest of the child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 161.001(b); E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 803; In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex.
2005). Both elements must be established; termination may not be based solely
on the best interest of the child as determined by the trier of fact. Tex. Dep’t of
Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987); In re C.D.E., 391
S.W.3d 287, 295 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.).
In evaluating the evidence for legal sufficiency in parental termination
cases, we determine whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could
reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that the Department proved the
challenged ground for termination. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex.
2005).
We review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and
judgment. Id. We resolve any disputed facts in favor of the finding if a
reasonable factfinder could have done so. Id. We disregard all evidence that a
reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved. Id. We consider undisputed
evidence even if it is contrary to the finding. Id. That is, we consider evidence
favorable to termination if a reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard
contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. See id.
15
We cannot weigh witness credibility issues that depend on the appearance
and demeanor of the witnesses because that is within the factfinder’s province.
Id. And even when credibility issues appear in the appellate record, we defer to
the factfinder’s determinations as long as they are not unreasonable. Id.
We are required to perform “an exacting review of the entire record” in
determining whether the evidence is factually sufficient to support the termination
of a parent-child relationship. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 500 (Tex. 2014). In
reviewing the evidence for factual sufficiency, we give due deference to the
factfinder’s findings and do not supplant the trial court’s judgment with our own.
In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). We determine whether, on the
entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that
the termination of the parent-child relationship would be in the best interest of the
child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex.
2002). If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable
factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a
factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction in the truth
of its finding, then the evidence is factually insufficient. H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at
108.
There is a strong presumption that keeping a child with a parent is in the
child’s best interest. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006).
We review the entire record to determine the child’s best interest. In re
E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 250 (Tex. 2013). The same evidence may be probative
16
of both the subsection (1) ground and best interest. Id. at 249; C.H., 89 S.W.3d
at 28. Nonexclusive factors that the trier of fact in a termination case may also
use in determining the best interest of the child include
(A) the desires of the child;
(B) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the
future;
(C) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the
future;
(D) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;
(E) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote
the best interest of the child;
(F) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency
seeking custody;
(G) the stability of the home or proposed placement;
(H) the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the
existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and
(I) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.
Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976) (citations omitted); see
E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 249 (stating that in reviewing a best interest finding, “we
consider, among other evidence, the Holley factors”); E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 807.
These factors are not exhaustive, and some listed factors may be inapplicable to
some cases. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Furthermore, undisputed evidence of just
one factor may be sufficient in a particular case to support a finding that
termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. On the other hand, the
17
presence of scant evidence relevant to each factor will not support such a
finding. Id.
II. Application
Mother’s argument is premised on the fact that the Department did not
seek to terminate her parental rights to R.M. In her view, the Department’s
request to terminate her rights to three of the children and not to R.M. was
inconsistent and undermines the trial court’s decision.
Mother’s argument fails to view the plans for the children’s placements in
the context of the other evidence presented. Evidence about placement plans
and plans for adoption are relevant to a determination about best interest. C.H.,
89 S.W.3d at 28. The Department did not seek termination of Mother’s rights to
R.M., who was 14 at the time of trial, because R.M. had already been
successfully placed with Mother’s cousin. The Department did not indicate
whether the cousin was interested in adopting R.M. In contrast, the other three
children were living with foster families. And while the Department was actively
working to place them with family members, it had a broader goal of eventual
adoption of the children.
Viewing the evidence as a whole and in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s decision, we do not view the trial court’s determination that termination
was in the best interest of C.S., I.S., and T.M. as unreasonable. The trial court
was presented with evidence of the following:
18
• Mother’s continued involvement in violent and abusive relationships and
the children’s observations of those relationships. See In re E.M., 494
S.W.3d 209, 222 (Tex. App.—Waco 2015, pets. denied) (“Abusive or
violent conduct by a parent or other resident of a child’s home may
produce an environment that endangers the physical or emotional well-
being of a child.”); In re G.M.G., 444 S.W.3d 46, 59 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“Abusive or violent conduct can produce a
home environment that endangers a child’s well-being.”). Despite the
Department’s attempts to aid Mother and her acknowledgement that her
relationship with Clark was violent and detrimental to the children, Mother
continued to see Clark and allow him in her home during the pendency of
the termination proceedings.
• Mother’s three positive tests for cocaine use during the termination
proceedings. In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2004, pet. denied) (“Drug use and its effect on a parent’s life and his ability
to parent may establish an endangering course of conduct.”).
• Mother’s lack of progress in managing her mental health conditions. See
In re C.D., 664 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1984, no writ.)
(acknowledging that although mental illness alone is not a ground for
termination of parental rights, when a parent’s mental illness allows her to
engage in conduct that endangers the child’s well-being, that conduct has
bearing on the advisability of termination).
• Mother’s unstable housing and employment situations. See G.M.G., 444
S.W.3d at 60 (“A parent who lacks stability, income, and a home is unable
to provide for a child’s emotional and physical needs.”) quoting In re
J.T.G., No. 14-10-00972-CV, 2012 WL 171012, at *17 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 19, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.)); R.W., 129
S.W.3d at 739 (“As a general rule, conduct that subjects a child to a life of
uncertainty and instability endangers the physical and emotional well-being
of a child.”).
• Mother’s failure to implement sufficient positive parenting techniques and
the children’s serious behavioral needs, particularly I.S.’s own mental
health conditions. See In re S.B., 207 S.W.3d 877, 886 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2006, no pet.) (explaining that, in addition to the Holley factors, a
parent’s inability to provide adequate care for the child, lack of parenting
skills, and poor judgment may also be considered when considering the
child’s best interest).
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• Despite Mother’s completion of some requirements of her service plan, her
failure to progress in counseling and failure to implement the lessons
learned through classes and counseling. See In re W.E.C., 110 S.W.3d
231, 245 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (discussing a parent’s
failure to utilize offered programs in evaluating decision to terminate her
parental rights).
Based on our thorough review of the record, we hold that the evidence was
factually and legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of
Mother’s parental rights to C.S., I.S., and T.M. was in their best interest. We
therefore overrule Mother’s sole issue.
Conclusion
Having overruled Mother’s sole issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s
order.
/s/ Bonnie Sudderth
BONNIE SUDDERTH
CHIEF JUSTICE
PANEL: SUDDERTH, C.J.; GABRIEL and KERR, JJ.
DELIVERED: July 19, 2018
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