Com. v. Fleming, D. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S25017-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    DEMETRIOUS DARRON FLEMING
    Appellant                No. 925 WDA 2015
    Appeal from the PCRA Order May 11, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0001179-2003
    CP-02-CR-0006863-2002
    CP-02-CR-0009253-2003
    BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., MUNDY, J., and JENKINS, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.:                               FILED MAY 20, 2016
    Appellant, Demetrious Darron Fleming, appeals from the May 11, 2015
    order, dismissing his fourth petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post
    Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.          Appellant’s
    counsel has filed a petition to withdraw, together with a Turner/Finley1 no-
    merit letter.     After careful consideration, we grant counsel’s petition to
    withdraw and affirm the PCRA court’s order of dismissal.
    From the certified record, we summarize the procedural history of this
    case as follows. On November 13, 2003, Appellant entered an open plea of
    guilty to third-degree murder in the shooting death of Marvin Housch. The
    ____________________________________________
    1
    Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
    (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth
    v. Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
    (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
    J-S25017-16
    trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of incarceration of 18 to
    40 years.2 Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, seeking to withdraw his
    plea and, alternatively, for reconsideration of his sentence. The trial court
    denied the motion, and Appellant timely appealed. This Court affirmed the
    judgment of sentence on June 13, 2006 and our Supreme Court denied
    Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on November 21, 2006.                See
    Commonwealth           v.   Fleming,      
    905 A.2d 1042
      (Pa.   Super.   2006)
    (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 
    911 A.2d 933
    (Pa. 2006).
    Appellant subsequently filed his first PCRA petition on April 8, 2007,
    which the PCRA court denied.           On appeal, this Court affirmed on June 3,
    2010, and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on February 16,
    2011.     See Commonwealth v. Fleming, 
    4 A.3d 674
    (Pa. Super. 2010)
    (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 
    15 A.3d 2011
    (Pa. 2011).
    Appellant filed a second PCRA petition on May 29, 2012, which the PCRA
    court denied on September 12, 2012.                  Appellant did not appeal that
    decision. Appellant filed a third PCRA petition on August 6, 2013, asserting
    newly-discovered alibi witnesses.              The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s
    ____________________________________________
    2
    Appellant also entered guilty pleas to two weapons offense counts at two
    other dockets. By agreement the sentences for those charges were to run
    concurrently with whatever sentence the trial court imposed on the third-
    degree murder charge. The trial court imposed a sentence of three to six
    years’ incarceration on each firearm count to run consecutively with each
    other but concurrently with the third-degree murder sentence. There was
    no provision in the plea agreement for a minimum sentence on the
    homicide. The weapons charges are not a subject of Appellant’s instant
    PCRA petition.
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    petition as untimely, determining the newly discovered fact exception under
    Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) did not apply because Appellant was or could have
    been aware of the witnesses at the time of his guilty plea.          Appellant
    appealed, and this Court affirmed on May 7, 2014. See Commonwealth v.
    Fleming, 
    104 A.3d 40
    (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum)
    (Fleming III).
    Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition on November 20, 2014. On
    February 10, 2015, counsel entered his appearance on Appellant’s behalf,
    and the PCRA court granted leave to file an amended PCRA petition.
    Appellant filed a counseled amended PCRA petition on February 17, 2015,
    wherein he asserted newly discovered facts.        Those facts consisted of
    exculpatory evidence from an individual, Damile Mitchell, who claimed to be
    responsible for shooting and killing the victim.   The PCRA court granted a
    hearing on the amended petition, which was held on April 21, 2015.
    The PCRA court summarized the testimony produced at the hearing as
    follows.
    At the hearing, [] Mitchell testified that he was
    a drug dealer and had “rented” Housch’s vehicle in
    exchange for drugs he provided Housch. He claimed
    that Housch called him the night Housch was killed
    and asked him for help dealing with his daughter’s
    boyfriend. When he refused, he said that Housch
    became angry and threatened to go to the police.
    Eventually, he testified, he went to Housch’s home
    and argued with him again on the street. As they
    argued, he claimed that Housch reached for what he
    thought was a gun. He said that he feared for his
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    life so he pulled his weapon and shot Housch several
    times. He then fled the area.
    Mitchell claimed at the hearing that he did not
    know that anyone had been arrested or convicted of
    the killing, though he knew the victim had died. He
    first learned that [Appellant] had been convicted of
    the crime in the fall of 2014, when they were both
    inmates at the State Corrections Institution at
    Albion. Sometime in September, Mitchell claims to
    have overheard [Appellant] discussing his case with
    another inmate and mention the name “Mary”.
    When he learned from the other inmate that
    [Appellant] had, in fact, been convicted of killing the
    man he now claims to have killed, he said he wrote
    the letter to the Innocence Institute. After doing so,
    he was approached by [Appellant] and confirmed
    what was in the letter.       He agreed to sign the
    affidavit that was offered into evidence at the
    hearing.      Mitchell acknowledged that he was
    currently serving a life sentence for murder.
    [Appellant] also testified.  He asserted his
    innocence and recounted how he came to learn of
    Mitchell’s letter and thereafter filed his Pro Se
    Petition. He claimed on direct examination that he
    pleaded guilty because he thought he would be
    sentenced to not less than six nor [more] than
    twelve years in prison. He claimed that since shortly
    after he was [] sentenced to eighteen to thirty-six
    years in prison, he has maintained his innocence.
    PCRA Court Opinion, 5/11/15, at 5-6 (footnotes omitted).
    Following the hearing, the PCRA court determined Appellant’s PCRA
    petition was timely under the Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) newly discovered fact
    exception.    The PCRA court then addressed the merits of Appellant’s
    substantive after discovered evidence claim.       The PCRA court found the
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    evidence not to be credible and by order, dated May 11, 2015, denied
    Appellant’s request for PCRA relief.
    Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on June 10, 2015.3          On
    December 7, 2015, counsel filed with this Court a petition to withdraw
    together with a copy of his no-merit letter sent to Appellant. On February 1,
    2016, Appellant filed a pro se response to counsel’s petition to withdraw and
    no-merit letter.4
    Counsel identifies the following issue Appellant wishes to raise on
    appeal.
    I.    Whether the PCRA [c]ourt erred in failing to
    grant relief to Appellant when it was proven by a
    preponderance of evidence that Appellant was
    innocent of the charges?
    Counsel’s No-Merit Letter at 6.          In his response, Appellant addresses the
    foregoing question and additionally raises a question of whether the
    standard of “miscarriage of justice” as applied by the PCRA court to second
    or subsequent PCRA petitions is correct.         Appellant’s Pro Se Answer at 6.5
    ____________________________________________
    3
    The PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors
    complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
    Procedure 1925(b). On August 14, 2015, the PCRA court issued a statement
    pursuant to Rule 1925(a) referencing its May 11, 2015 memorandum opinion
    and order as containing the reasons for its decision.
    4
    The Commonwealth has not filed an appellee brief in this appeal.
    5
    Appellant’s Pro Se Answer is not paginated.          Therefore, sequential page
    numbers are supplied.
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    Appellant also claims counsel’s petition to withdraw and no-merit letter are
    deficient. 
    Id. at 8-9.
    Our review is regulated by the following guidelines. “Our standard of
    review of [an] order granting or denying relief under the PCRA requires us to
    determine whether the decision of the PCRA court is supported by the
    evidence of record and is free of legal error. The PCRA court’s findings will
    not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified
    record.” Commonwealth v. Melendez-Negron, 
    123 A.3d 1087
    , 1090 (Pa.
    Super. 2015) (citation omitted).       Furthermore, we are bound by the
    credibility determinations of the PCRA court when they are supported by the
    record. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    966 A.2d 523
    , 532, 539 (Pa. 2009).
    “This Court analyzes PCRA appeals in the light most favorable to the
    prevailing party at the PCRA level.”     Commonwealth v. Freeland, 
    106 A.3d 768
    , 776 (Pa. Super. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted).
    To be entitled to PCRA relief, appellant must
    establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, his
    conviction or sentence resulted from one or more of
    the enumerated errors in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2),
    his claims have “not been previously litigated or
    waived[,]” and “the failure to litigate the issue prior
    to or during trial, … or on direct appeal could not
    have been the result of any rational, strategic or
    tactical decision by counsel.” 
    Id., § 9543(a)(3)-(4).
                An issue is previously litigated if “the highest
    appellate court in which [appellant] could have had
    review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits of
    the issue[.]” 
    Id., § 9544(a)(2).
    An issue is waived
    if appellant “could have raised it but failed to do so
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    before trial, at trial, … on appeal or in a prior state
    post [-]conviction proceeding.” 
    Id., § 9544(b).
    Commonwealth v. Fears, 
    86 A.3d 795
    , 803-804 (Pa. 2014).
    Additionally, courts will not entertain a second or
    subsequent request for PCRA relief unless the
    petitioner makes a strong prima facie showing that a
    miscarriage of justice may have occurred.         [An
    a]ppellant makes a prima facie showing of
    entitlement to relief only if he demonstrates either
    that the proceedings which resulted in his conviction
    were so unfair that a miscarriage of justice occurred
    which no civilized society could tolerate, or that he
    was innocent of the crimes for which he was
    charged.
    Commonwealth. v. Medina, 
    92 A.3d 1210
    , 1215 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en
    banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), appeal granted, 
    105 A.3d 658
    (Pa. 2014).
    Our initial task is to review PCRA counsel’s request to withdraw.   As
    pronounced by our Supreme Court, the requirements PCRA counsel must
    comply with, when petitioning to withdraw, include the following.
    1) A “no-merit” letter by PC[R]A counsel
    detailing the nature and extent of his review;
    2) The “no-merit” letter by PC[R]A counsel
    listing each issue the petitioner wished to have
    reviewed;
    3) The PC[R]A counsel’s “explanation”, in the
    “no-merit” letter, of why the petitioner’s issues
    were meritless[.]
    Commonwealth v. Pitts, 
    981 A.2d 875
    , 876 n.1 (Pa. 2009), quoting
    Finley, supra at 215. “Counsel must also send to the petitioner: (1) a copy
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    of the “no-merit” letter/brief; (2) a copy of counsel’s petition to withdraw;
    and (3) a statement advising petitioner of the right to proceed pro se or by
    new counsel.” Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 
    931 A.2d 717
    , 721 (Pa. Super.
    2007).
    [W]here counsel submits a petition and no-
    merit letter that do satisfy the technical demands of
    Turner/Finley, the court - trial court or this Court -
    must then conduct its own review of the merits of
    the case. If the court agrees with counsel that the
    claims are without merit, the court will permit
    counsel to withdraw and deny relief. By contrast, if
    the claims appear to have merit, the court will deny
    counsel’s request and grant relief, or at least instruct
    counsel to file an advocate’s brief.
    
    Id. (citation omitted).
    Instantly, we conclude that PCRA Counsel has complied with the
    requirements of Turner/Finley. Specifically, PCRA counsel’s Turner/Finley
    letter/brief details the nature and extent of his review, addresses the claim
    Appellant raised in his amended PCRA petition, and determines that the
    issue lacks merit on appeal.      PCRA counsel discusses Appellant’s claim,
    explaining the reasons for his conclusion that the issue is meritless.
    Additionally, PCRA counsel served Appellant with a copy of the petition to
    withdraw and Turner/Finley letter/brief, advising Appellant that, if he is
    permitted to withdraw, Appellant has the right to proceed pro se or with
    privately retained counsel.
    As noted, Appellant filed a response to the petition to withdraw and
    no-merit letter.   Therein Appellant suggests that PCRA counsel’s no-merit
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    letter was deficient because PCRA counsel merely concluded that Appellant’s
    issues had no merit rather that concluding the appeal was wholly frivolous.
    Appellant’s Pro Se Answer at 8, citing Commonwealth v. Baney, 
    860 A.2d 127
    , 132 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 
    877 A.2d 459
    (Pa. 2005).
    Baney, however, involved a petition to withdraw during a direct appeal,
    implicating the requirements imposed by Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    (1967) and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
    978 A.2d 349
    , 361 (Pa.
    2009). We have previously noted the distinctions between the requirements
    of Anders/Santiago and the requirements of Turner/Finley, including the
    following.
    It is … apparent that Anders and Turner/Finley are
    close cousins, bearing similarities in that counsel is
    required to examine the record, present issues, and
    request permission to withdraw. However, there are
    also significant differences. Anders applies to direct
    appeals; Turner/Finley applies to PCRA cases.
    Anders counsel is not permitted to withdraw unless
    the appeal is wholly frivolous, but Turner/Finley
    counsel is permitted to do so if the case lacks merit,
    even if it is not so anemic as to be deemed wholly
    frivolous.
    Wrecks, supra at 721-722.
    Appellant also contends that Attorney Farrell failed to comply with the
    mandates of Turner/Finley because “he fails to list and address the nature
    and extent of all of the Appellant’s claims.” Appellant’s Pro Se Answer at 8.
    Appellant’s arguments in this regard pertain first to a disagreement with
    PCRA counsel’s conclusion that the issue on appeal is without merit and,
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    second, to a disapproval of PCRA counsel’s performance at the PCRA hearing
    for failing to introduce additional witness statements.6 
    Id. at 11-12.
    We will
    address the former argument as part of our independent review. We note
    that the latter argument is not about PCRA Counsel’s technical compliance
    with PCRA Counsel’s Turner/Finley obligations or the merits of the appeal,
    but is about PCRA Counsel’s stewardship at the April 21, 2015 PCRA hearing.
    Thus, Appellant is actually asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel
    claim.     However, this Court, after exhaustively reviewing our Supreme
    Court’s jurisprudence, has held that even in circumstances as these, “claims
    of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness may not be raised for the first time on
    appeal.”    Commonwealth v. Henkel, 
    90 A.3d 16
    , 20 (Pa. Super. 2014),
    appeal denied, 
    101 A.3d 785
    (Pa. 2014). Consequently, we cannot address
    Appellant’s assertions in this regard.
    Therefore,     finding   PCRA     counsel   compliant   with   the   technical
    requirements of Turner/Finley and their progeny, we proceed to perform
    an independent merits review of Appellant’s claims. We note the PCRA court
    determined that Appellant’s PCRA petition qualified for an exception, under
    Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) to the one-year jurisdictional time limit for filing for
    ____________________________________________
    6
    Those statements, by purported alibi witnesses, were the subject of one of
    Appellant’s earlier PCRA petitions.       We affirmed the PCRA court’s
    determination at that time that the statements did not constitute newly
    discovered facts as to constitute an exception to the timeliness requirements
    of the PCRA. See Fleming III, supra.
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    PCRA relief.7     The PCRA court determined that Mitchell’s statement and
    existence as a witness were unknown at the time of Appellant’s plea, could
    ____________________________________________
    7
    The timeliness of an appellant’s petition is a threshold issue “because the
    PCRA time limitations implicate our jurisdiction and may not be altered or
    disregarded in order to address the merits of a petition.” Commonwealth
    v. Cristina, 
    114 A.3d 419
    , 421 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations omitted),
    vacated on other grounds, 
    131 A.3d 482
    (Pa. 2016).
    Our Supreme Court has previously described a
    petitioner’s burden under the newly-discovered fact
    exception as follows.
    [S]ubsection (b)(1)(ii) has two components,
    which must be alleged and proved. Namely,
    the petitioner must establish that: 1) “the facts
    upon which the claim was predicated were
    unknown” and 2) “could not have been
    ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.”
    42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) (emphasis added).
    Commonwealth v. Bennett, 
    593 Pa. 382
    , 
    930 A.2d 1264
    , 1272 (2007). “Due diligence demands that
    the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect his
    own interests. A petitioner must explain why he
    could not have learned the new fact(s) earlier with
    the exercise of due diligence. This rule is strictly
    enforced.”    [Commonwealth v.] Williams, [
    35 A.3d 44
    , 53 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 
    50 A.3d 121
    (Pa. 2012)]. Additionally, as this Court has
    often explained, all of the time-bar exceptions are
    subject to a separate deadline.
    The statutory exceptions to the timeliness
    requirements of the PCRA are also subject to a
    separate time limitation and must be filed
    within sixty (60) days of the time the claim
    could first have been presented.      See 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). The sixty (60) day
    time limit … runs from the date the petitioner
    first learned of the alleged after-discovered
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    not have been earlier discovered by due diligence, and were raised within 60
    days of Appellant’s first awareness of the information. PCRA Court Opinion,
    5/11/15, at 6.     Upon review of the record, we conclude the PCRA court’s
    timeliness determination is supported.              The subject “facts” came to light
    when Mitchell sent a letter on October 20, 2014 to “Innocence Institute of
    Western Pennsylvania,” a copy of which was forwarded to Appellant, on
    October 27, 2014, by its former director, Professor William Moushey. 
    Id. at 5;
    see also Amended PCRA Petition, 2/17/15, Exhibits a, b. Appellant filed
    his pro se PCRA petition raising this claim on November 20, 2014.                 We
    accordingly conclude Appellant’s subject PCRA petition qualifies for the
    Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) newly discovered fact exception to the PCRA’s one
    year timeliness constraint.
    We therefore proceed to address the merits of Appellant’s substantive
    after discovered evidence claim under Section 9543(a)(2)(vi).
    To obtain relief based upon newly-discovered
    evidence under the PCRA, Appellant must establish
    that: (1) the evidence has been discovered after trial
    and it could not have been obtained at or prior to
    trial through reasonable diligence; (2) the evidence
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    facts. A petitioner must explain when he first
    learned of the facts underlying his PCRA claims
    and show that he brought his claim within sixty
    (60) days thereafter.
    
    Id. (some citations
    omitted).
    
    Medina, supra
    at 1216.
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    J-S25017-16
    is not cumulative; (3) it is not being used solely to
    impeach credibility; and (4) it would likely compel a
    different verdict.
    Commonwealth v. Washington, 
    927 A.2d 586
    , 595-596 (Pa. 2007).
    Additionally, although Appellant urges us to hold otherwise, because this is
    not Appellant’s first PCRA petition reviewed on its merits, he must show a
    strong prima facie case of innocence or a miscarriage of justice.       See
    
    Medina, supra
    .8
    [B]efore granting a new trial, a court must assess
    whether the alleged after-discovered evidence is of
    such nature and character that it would likely compel
    a different verdict if a new trial is granted. In
    making that determination, a court should consider
    the integrity of the alleged after-discovered
    evidence, the motive of those offering the evidence,
    and the overall strength of the evidence supporting
    the conviction.    See also Commonwealth v.
    Washington, 
    592 Pa. 698
    , 717, 
    927 A.2d 586
    , 597
    (2007) (stating exculpatory accomplice testimony
    should be viewed with suspicion where accomplice
    has already been tried and has nothing to lose);
    Argyrou[v. State, 
    349 Md. 587
    , 
    709 A.2d 1194
    ,]
    1204 [(1998)] (noting “cases that have addressed
    ____________________________________________
    8
    Appellant argues that “the miscariage [sic] of justice standard first
    announced in [Commonwealth v.] Lawson, [
    549 A.2d 107
    (PA 1988)]
    should no longer appply [sic] to second of subsequent PCRA petitions.
    Foremost, the language of the PCRA does not imposed [sic] such a
    requirement.” Appellant’s Pro Se Answer at 6. Appellant argues, that
    Lawson, decided before the 1995 Amendments to the PCRA, is obsolete and
    the amendments, including the timeliness requirements, obviate the policy
    reasons behind the Lawson holding. 
    Id. at 6-7.
    Nevertheless, we are
    bound by our recent precedents confirming Appellant’s burden in this case.
    See 
    Medina, supra
    .       Furthermore, given the PCRA court’s credibility
    determinations in this case, Appellant’s claims would fail even absent the
    additional burden imposed in second or subsequent PCRA petitions.
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    [newly-discovered evidence] have focused not
    simply on the credibility of the person offering the
    exculpatory evidence, but on the credibility or
    trustworthiness of the evidence itself, as well as the
    motive, or other impeaching characteristics, of those
    offering it”).
    Commonwealth v. Padillas, 
    997 A.2d 356
    , 365 (Pa. Super. 2010) (some
    citations omitted), appeal denied, 
    14 A.3d 826
    (Pa. 2010).
    Instantly, the PCRA court first noted that the fairness of Appellant’s
    guilty plea proceedings has already been determined during Appellant’s
    direct appeal and earlier PCRA proceedings. PCRA Court Opinion, 5/11/15,
    at 7.
    That leaves for consideration that claim that a
    miscarriage of justice occurred because the
    [Appellant] is innocent of the crime. To meet this
    burden, [Appellant] would have to establish that the
    after discovered evidence was such that had he been
    found guilty following a trial, the new evidence would
    require that he be granted a new trial.
    
    Id. The PCRA
    court then engaged in its duty to evaluate the credibility of
    Appellant’s proffered after-discovered evidence.       See 
    Padillas, supra
    .
    Appellant argues “the admission by []Mitchell that he was the actual killer of
    Marvin Housch coupled with the Affidavits of … Alibi witnesses and
    Appellant’s PCRA testimony all implicate … Appellant’s actual innocence.”
    Appellant’s Pro Se Answer at 6.       The PCRA court explained its contrary
    findings as follows.
    Neither [Appellant] nor Mitchell provided credible,
    believable testimony.
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    Though [PCRA] counsel argued that Mitchell’s
    testimony should be believed because his testimony
    exposed him to criminal liability for the murder of
    Marvin Housch, Mitchell is already serving a life
    sentence. A conviction in the death of Housch would
    not mean any additional time. The suggestion that
    Mitchell could face the death penalty if he were tried
    is absurd. The District Attorney’s Office did not seek
    the death penalty against Petitioner, meaning that
    the circumstances of the crime did not provide the
    required aggravating circumstances.          Mitchell’s
    homicide conviction came after the date that Housch
    was killed so the multiple murder aggravator would
    not be present. Accordingly, Mitchell did not expose
    himself to any additional punishment through his
    admission to having killed the victim.
    Moreover, Mitchell’s testimony was that he
    acted in self[-]defense when he shot the victim.
    Though he claimed to have killed Housch, he was
    careful to make sure that he described his actions in
    a manner that would allow him to claim he was
    justified in doing so.
    In assessing Mitchell’s credibility, the [PCRA
    c]ourt must also consider that it is inconsistent with
    [Appellant’s] testimony at the plea hearing and at
    sentencing. [Appellant], while under oath at both
    proceedings, admitted that he shot and killed the
    victim. Though he claimed at the PCRA hearing that
    he lied at both of those proceedings because he
    thought he would be sentenced to no more than
    twelve years in prison, [the trial c]ourt has already
    rejected that claim as being unworthy of belief.
    The [PCRA c]ourt also considered, in rejecting
    the testimony of Mitchell, the lack of any
    corroboration. Mitchell’s description of the killing
    offered no facts that were not available from either
    the record in this matter, most of which [Appellant]
    has access to, or available from [Appellant] himself.
    [Appellant] presented no other witness or evidence
    that corroborated any of the claims made by
    [Mitchell]. All that he has offered in support of his
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    claim of innocence is Mitchell’s “risk-free” admission
    to the crime and his own previously rejected claim of
    innocence. In the absence of some corroboration of
    Mitchell’s claims or some other reason to credit his
    testimony, the Petitioner has failed to meet his
    burden of establishing that a miscarriage of justice
    has occurred because he is innocent of the charges
    to which he has plead guilty.
    PCRA Court Opinion, 5/11/15, at 7-9.
    PCRA counsel in his no-merit letter expresses his disagreement with
    the PCRA court’s credibility findings, but concedes “[i]t is well-settled that a
    PCRA court’s credibility determinations are binding upon an appellate court
    so long as they are supported by the record.” Counsel’s No-Merit Letter at
    9, quoting Commonwealth v. Robinson, 
    82 A.3d 998
    , 1013 (Pa. 2013).
    Indeed, upon careful review, we conclude the PCRA court’s findings are
    amply supported by the record and we may not disturb them.                 See
    
    Melendez-Negron, supra
    ; 
    Johnson, supra
    .            Accordingly, we agree with
    counsel that Appellant’s issue on appeal lacks merit and we conclude the
    PCRA court correctly denied relief. We therefore affirm the PCRA court’s May
    11, 2015, order and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.
    Order affirmed. Petition to withdraw as counsel granted.
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    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/20/2016
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