Bates v. State , 495 S.W.3d 645 ( 2016 )


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  •                                  Cite as 
    2016 Ark. App. 326
    ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION III
    No. CV-15-1015
    Opinion Delivered   June 8, 2016
    MARY SHANNON BATES                                APPEAL FROM THE CRAWFORD
    APPELLANT                       COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
    [NO. 17PR-15-225]
    V.
    HONORABLE GARY COTTRELL,
    STATE OF ARKANSAS                                 JUDGE
    APPELLEE
    REVERSED AND DISMISSED
    WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge
    Appellant Mary Bates appeals the order of involuntary admission to “ASH or like
    Facility” for no more than forty-five days, entered by the Crawford County Circuit Court
    on August 19, 2015. Her sole argument is that there was insufficient evidence to support the
    court’s finding that appellant posed a clear and present danger to herself or others. We agree
    and reverse and dismiss.
    As an initial matter, the record before us does not indicate that a stay was obtained to
    suspend enforcement of the order entered by the trial court. Thus, the forty-five day
    treatment would have ended prior to us hearing this appeal. However, we decide this case
    Cite as 
    2016 Ark. App. 326
    on its merits because this kind of proceeding will almost always become moot before litigation
    can run its course and a decision here might avert future litigation.1
    The facts giving rise to this case are as follows: Appellant, who was a teacher at Central
    Middle School,2 was accused of causing a disturbance on August 10, 2015. Appellant refused
    the principal’s request to leave the building.         At that point, Dr. Harold Jeffcoat,
    Superintendent of the Van Buren School District, along with assistant superintendent Dr.
    Brian Summerhill, were notified and came to the school to speak with appellant. When
    Jeffcoat attempted to talk with appellant, she would not allow him to talk and she would talk
    about things that seemed unrelated to why they were there. Appellant subsequently agreed
    to meet with them at Jeffcoat’s office in the Administration Building. Frank Petray, the
    School Reserve Officer for Central High School, was contacted and asked to be present at the
    Administration Building when appellant arrived. Once appellant arrived, she was asked if she
    understood the reason for the meeting, to which she responded with answers that seemed
    unrelated to the questions. Appellant asked Jeffcoat and Summerhill how many children had
    to be hurt or how many children had to die. She stated that Summerhill knew what she was
    1
    See Campbell v. State, 
    51 Ark. App. 147
    , 
    912 S.W.2d 446
    (1995). We are mindful of
    our supreme court’s holding in Dickinson v. State, 
    372 Ark. 62
    , 
    270 S.W.3d 863
    (2008), in
    which the court dismissed the appeal as moot. However, this case can be distinguished from
    Dickinson, in that the appellant in Dickinson appealed from an initial seven-day order of
    commitment but failed to appeal the subsequent forty-five-day commitment. Here, Bates
    timely appealed the original admission order. Additionally, Dickinson did not overrule our
    prior case law addressing the issue involved in temporary civil-commitment orders despite
    being moot; it just declined to follow it.
    2
    It is unclear if the disturbance occurred at Central Middle School or Central
    Elementary because both are referenced in the record.
    2
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    2016 Ark. App. 326
    talking about. Just as before, appellant would not allow Jeffcoat to speak and when he tried,
    she would put her hand in his face and tell him to stop interrupting her. After about five
    minutes, appellant got mad, slammed her belongings down, and declared the meeting over.
    She also slammed the door as she left. Petray was advised to do whatever he needed to do
    about the situation with appellant. He followed her to the parking lot and performed field
    sobriety tests before she was allowed to leave. When asked if she was okay to drive home,
    she pointed toward her house and responded, “I just fucking live right there.” She passed the
    sobriety tests and drove away. Jeffcoat asked Petray for a police report of the incident for
    documentation, which Petray provided.
    On August 14, 2015, Petray was called back to the Administration Building because
    appellant had been sending group text messages telling individuals that they needed to do their
    jobs. Petray made contact with appellant at her home to inform her to stop sending the text
    messages and that she was no longer allowed on school property. During this meeting,
    appellant asked Petray, “How many children have to die?” or “How many more children
    have to be hurt?” Petray filed a petition for involuntary commitment on August 17, 2015.
    The court entered an order for detention, examination, and hearing the same day.
    The hearing on the petition took place on August 19, 2015. At the hearing, Petray
    testified about the events that led to his contact with appellant on August 10 and 14. He
    testified that he did not hear appellant make any specific threats to harm herself or others. He
    stated that based on the contact he had with appellant, he did not believe appellant to be a
    significant risk to herself or others. Jeffcoat also testified about his interactions with appellant
    3
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    2016 Ark. App. 326
    on August 10. He stated that appellant’s “tone was very angry,” and that “there was some
    aggression on her part.” He said that he believed that appellant was under some sort of
    influence. Jeffcoat stated that appellant “never threatened [him] or anyone in [his] presence
    with bodily harm.” He also said that appellant was unarmed. He testified that he did not feel
    that he was in “mortal danger” during his interactions with appellant.
    Appellant moved for the petition to be dismissed at the conclusion of the State’s case.
    The State responded, “Out of an abundance of caution, we have heard the testimony several
    times that children are going to die. I believe it is incorrect to dismiss this.” The court
    denied the motion.
    Appellant testified that she had taught for twenty-six years. She denied making any
    threats in regard to children. She stated that she was in a professional development meeting
    on August 10 and that they were watching a video on bullying. She said that the majority
    of the teachers present were not paying attention to the video and were leaving the meeting,
    playing on their cellphones, and talking to each other. She testified that she did not believe
    that bullying was being addressed properly and that her statement about children getting hurt
    was in reference to bullying. She also discussed her frustration with the way things were
    being handled at her school, including the lack of time to prepare between classes and the
    many rules they had to follow.
    At the conclusion of the hearing, appellant reiterated that the petition against her
    should be dismissed because the State failed to provide “any evidence that [appellant] is a
    threat to anyone. The evidence presented does not justify an involuntary commitment[.]”
    4
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    2016 Ark. App. 326
    The State responded that the petition “is in regard to the kids. She made multiple statements
    regarding danger or death to kids and out of an abundance of caution, the court should
    consider this.” The court found that appellant suffered from mental disease and defect and
    that she was a danger to herself and others. As a result, appellant was committed for a period
    of up to forty-five days. An order of involuntary admission was entered on August 19, 2015.
    Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on September 11, 2015. This appeal followed.
    Arkansas Code Annotated section 20-47-207(c)3 provides:
    (1) A person shall be eligible for involuntary admission if he or she is in such a mental
    condition as a result of mental illness, disease, or disorder that he or she poses a clear
    and present danger to himself or herself or others.
    (2) As used in this subsection, “a clear and present danger” to himself or herself is
    established by demonstrating that:
    (A) The person has inflicted serious bodily injury on himself or herself or has
    attempted suicide or serious self-injury, and there is a reasonable probability
    that the conduct will be repeated if admission is not ordered;
    (B) The person has threatened to inflict serious bodily injury on himself or
    herself, and there is a reasonable probability that the conduct will occur if
    admission is not ordered; or
    (C) The person’s recent behavior or behavior history demonstrates that he or
    she so lacks the capacity to care for his or her own welfare that there is a
    reasonable probability of death, serious bodily injury, or serious physical or
    mental debilitation if admission is not ordered; or
    (D)(i) The person’s understanding of the need for treatment is impaired to the
    point that he or she is unlikely to participate in treatment voluntarily;
    (ii) The person needs mental health treatment on a continuing basis to prevent
    a relapse or harmful deterioration of his or her condition; and
    3
    (Repl. 2014).
    5
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    2016 Ark. App. 326
    (iii) The person’s noncompliance with treatment has been a factor in the
    individual’s placement in a psychiatric hospital, prison, or jail at least two (2)
    times within the last forty-eight (48) months or has been a factor in the
    individual’s committing one (1) or more acts, attempts, or threats of serious
    violent behavior within the last forty-eight (48) months.
    (3) As used in this subsection, “a clear and present danger to others” is established by
    demonstrating that the person has inflicted, attempted to inflict, or threatened to inflict
    serious bodily harm on another, and there is a reasonable probability that the conduct
    will occur if admission is not ordered.
    A hearing must be held on a petition for involuntary confinement and at that time, the
    court must determine whether clear and convincing evidence has been presented that the
    person sought to be involuntarily admitted is a danger to herself or to others.4 Clear and
    convincing evidence is that degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a firm
    conviction as to the allegation sought to be established.5 The appellate inquiry is whether
    the trial court’s finding that the disputed fact was proved by clear and convincing evidence
    is clearly erroneous.6 A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to
    support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm
    conviction that a mistake has been made.7
    Here, the State failed to meet its burden of proof. There was no evidence that
    appellant posed a danger to herself or others based on the testimony in the record. By all
    4
    Ark. Code Ann. § 20-47-214(b)(2) (Repl. 2014).
    5
    Anderson v. Douglas, 
    310 Ark. 633
    , 
    839 S.W.2d 196
    (1992).
    6
    J.T. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 
    329 Ark. 243
    , 
    947 S.W.2d 761
    (1997).
    7
    Yarborough v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 
    96 Ark. App. 247
    , 
    240 S.W.3d 626
    (2006).
    6
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    2016 Ark. App. 326
    accounts, no one feared that appellant was a present danger to herself or to anyone else. The
    State attempted to excuse its lack of proof by contending that the court should consider the
    petition out of an abundance of caution. However, the statute does not allow an abundance
    of caution to take the place of clear and convincing evidence when someone is being
    involuntarily committed. We are convinced that the trial court’s finding that appellant posed
    a clear and present danger to herself or others is clearly erroneous. Therefore, the order of
    involuntary admission is reversed and dismissed and the record of appellant’s involuntary
    commitment is to be removed from the treatment records at “ASH or like Facility.”8
    Reversed and dismissed.
    HARRISON and WHITEAKER, JJ., agree.
    Lisa-Marie Norris, for appellant.
    Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Valerie Glover Fortner, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
    8
    See Black v. State, 
    52 Ark. App. 140
    , 
    915 S.W.2d 300
    (1996).
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CV-15-1015

Citation Numbers: 2016 Ark. App. 326, 495 S.W.3d 645

Judges: Waymond M. Brown

Filed Date: 6/8/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023