Oliver C. v. Edu-Hi ( 2019 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    MAR 05 2019
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    OLIVER C., by and through his parents            No.   17-17498
    Nichole C. and Cyrus C.; NICHOLE C.;
    CYRUS C.,                                        D.C. No.
    1:17-cv-00133-LEK-KSC
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.                                              MEMORANDUM*
    STATE OF HAWAII DEPARTMENT OF
    EDUCATION,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Hawaii
    Leslie E. Kobayashi, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted February 11, 2019
    Honolulu, Hawaii
    Before: TALLMAN, BYBEE, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    Oliver C. is a preschool student who qualifies for special education services.
    In September 2016, Oliver’s family moved from the Honolulu District to the
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    Windward School District across the island. The Windward Department of
    Education (“DOE”) determined that Benjamin Parker Elementary in the Windward
    District could implement Oliver’s Individualized Education Program (“IEP”). In
    October 2016, Oliver’s parents objected to this determination and filed a request
    for mediation and a due process hearing, and they sought a stay-put order from the
    Office of Administrative Hearings for the Department of Commerce and Consumer
    Affairs to allow Oliver to remain at his school in Honolulu during all proceedings.
    On February 22, 2017, a Hearings Officer denied Oliver’s parents’ stay-put request
    and held that Benjamin Parker was the appropriate placement for the 2016–2017
    school year. The district court affirmed.
    On appeal, Oliver’s parents argue that the Hearings Officer erred by denying
    the stay-put order under § 1415(j) of the Individuals with Disabilities Education
    Act (“IDEA”) because moving Oliver from Kuhio to Benjamin Parker would
    significantly change his educational placement. “We review de novo the district
    court’s determination as to whether the school district complied with the IDEA,”
    Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. D.A., 
    792 F.3d 1054
    , 1059 (9th Cir. 2015), and
    review “a district court’s findings of fact in an IDEA case for clear error,” M.L. v.
    Fed. Way Sch. Dist., 
    394 F.3d 634
    , 642 (9th Cir. 2005). We have jurisdiction
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm.
    2
    The IDEA’s stay-put provision states that “during the pendency of any
    proceedings conducted [under the IDEA] . . . [a] child shall remain in [his]
    then-current educational placement.” 
    20 U.S.C. § 1415
    (j). We define “current
    educational placement” as “the placement set forth in the child’s last implemented
    IEP.” N.E. ex rel. C.E. & P.E. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 
    842 F.3d 1093
    , 1096 (9th Cir.
    2016) (citation omitted). A change in location alone does not qualify as a change
    in “educational placement.” Rather, a change in placement occurs “when there is a
    significant change in the student’s program.” N.D. v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 
    600 F.3d 1104
    , 1116 (9th Cir. 2010); see also U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Policy Letter to
    Fisher, 21 IDELR 992, 995 (OSEP July 6, 1994) (“[A] change in location alone
    would not substantially or materially alter the child’s educational program.”).
    The record supports the Hearings Officer’s factual findings and
    determination that Benjamin Parker could implement Oliver’s IEP and that it did
    not constitute a change in educational placement. See K.D. ex rel. C.L. v. Dep’t of
    Educ., Haw., 
    665 F.3d 1110
    , 1117 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We give deference to the state
    hearing officer’s findings particularly when, as here, they are thorough and
    careful.” (citing Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 
    15 F.3d 1519
    , 1524 (9th Cir.1994))).
    Oliver’s parents’ additional arguments fail. First, they received proper prior
    written notice as required by 
    20 U.S.C. § 1415
    (b)(3) because, in addition to
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    discussing the changes on the phone and at the September 26th meeting, the DOE
    sent Oliver’s parents a letter providing official notice of the school change on
    October 6th, which they received on the 8th. Regardless, § 1415(b)(3)(A) requires
    the DOE to provide the parents with written notice when it “proposes to initiate or
    change . . . [the] educational placement of the child.” As explained, changing
    schools did not change Oliver’s “educational placement” for purposes of this
    section. Second, Oliver’s parents were not denied meaningful participation
    because they were able to present evidence, attend the meetings, and express their
    opinions—the fact that they did not agree with the final decision does not mean
    they were not able to meaningfully participate. Third, the DOE did not
    “predetermine” Oliver’s placement; it considered other potential schools in the
    Windward District but found they would not accommodate Oliver’s IEP. And
    fourth, the DOE did not change Oliver’s placement solely for its own convenience.
    As the district court noted, the decision to move Oliver to Benjamin Parker was
    based on several factors, including the extended transportation time between his
    home and Kuhio that would limit the instructional hours required in his IEP, and
    the possibility of a medical emergency during the long bus ride. The district court
    did not err in affirming the Hearings Officer’s decision that Benjamin Parker can
    accommodate Oliver’s IEP and thus is the appropriate placement.
    4
    AFFIRMED.
    5