David Valentin Rodriguez v. State ( 2019 )

NUMBER 13-18-00004-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
DAVID VALENTIN RODRIGUEZ, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 275th District Court
of Hidalgo County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Hinojosa
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria
Appellant David Valentin Rodriguez entered a plea of guilty and was convicted of
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a second-degree felony, and injury to a child,
a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.02, 22.04 (West, Westlaw
through 2017 1st C.S.). By two issues, Rodriguez argues that the trial court erred by (1)
denying his motion to suppress evidence, and (2) naming Mission Police Department
Officer Rey Medrano as the outcry witness. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Rodriguez was charged by indictment with aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon and injury to a child. Id. In the indictment, the State alleged that on or about
December 21, 2015, Rodriguez attacked Jocelyn Riggs in her apartment and struck her
with a crowbar. The State further alleged that during the attack on Riggs, M.C. 1, a five-
year-old child, attempted to intervene and was thrown to the floor by Rodriguez, causing
M.C. to strike his head on the floor. The police were called to the scene after Rodriguez
had fled. Riggs and M.C. were outside when the police arrived. Officer Medrano
interviewed both individuals. The police performed a search of Riggs’s apartment where
the incident took place and discovered marijuana and drug paraphernalia in the form of a
“bong” typically used to smoke marijuana.
Once the apartment was processed, Mission Police Officer Yvette Martinez applied
for a search warrant to search the residence of Rodriguez. Officer Martinez’s probable
cause affidavit provided the location as “1224 Lindberg, Palmhurst, Hidalgo County, TX
78574,” and provided a detailed description of the single-family home. The affidavit
further identified the suspect as “David Valentin Rodriguez (DOB: 04-26-91)” and noted
that the following items were believed to be in the premises:
[S]hirt, pants, beanie, socks, underwear, shoes, blunt object with victims
[sic] blood or any other items that may have traces of the victims [sic] blood
or hair and or: property or items, except the personal writings by the
accused, constituting evidence of an offense or constituting evidence
tending to show that a particular person committed an offense.
The affidavit also contained the facts of the incident as alleged by the Riggs as a basis
1 Pursuant to rule of appellate procedure 9.8, we will utilize the minor child’s initials throughout this
opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8.
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for probable cause. The warrant was approved by the magistrate judge. Pursuant to the
warrant, police officers then searched and collected evidence from Rodriguez’s
residence.
A. Pretrial Hearings
1. Motion to Suppress
Rodriguez filed a motion to suppress evidence claiming the warrant was fatally
defective, challenging the probable cause, and arguing that the warrant was facially
invalid. The trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress.
Officer Marco Antonio Basaldua, a crime scene investigator with the Mission Police
Department, testified that he processed Riggs’s apartment after the incident took place.
He testified that he was dispatched to process the crime scene and that he found
marijuana and a “bong” used to smoke marijuana in Riggs’s apartment. The drugs and
drug paraphernalia were collected, pursuant to instruction by Investigator Martinez.
Rodriguez’s attorney also questioned Officer Basaldua regarding the probable
cause affidavit. Officer Balsadua testified that the affidavit was signed by Investigator
Martinez, whom he has worked with on many occasions. After reading through the
affidavit, Officer Balsadua confirmed that the affidavit contained no mention of the drugs
or drug paraphernalia found in Riggs’s apartment. Rodriguez’s attorney also had Officer
Balsadua confirm that the affidavit did not contain information regarding the reliability of
Riggs to provide information to support a probable cause affidavit.
The State elicited testimony from Officer Balsadua that Officer Rey Medrano was
also present at the scene of the incident as the primary officer. The probable cause
affidavit also contained statements from Officer Medrano, who spoke to both individuals
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in the case.
Rodriguez’s attorney argued that the probable cause affidavit was lacking insofar
as the veracity of the information of Riggs was unreliable. Further, he argued that
Investigator Martinez should have included the information regarding the drugs and drug
paraphernalia located in Riggs’s apartment because it “in and of itself, smacks of a
presumption of an unreliable witness.” As to the warrant itself, Rodriguez’s attorney
argued that it was facially invalid because it did not properly describe the “places to be
searched, as well as the things to be seized,” and therefore was inadequate.
The State responded to these arguments stating that Riggs was not a confidential
informant, but rather an alleged victim, and therefore the information she provided for the
affidavit was reliable because it was knowledge from her personal experience. As to the
warrant itself, the State responded to the defense by arguing that the trial court was to
consider the warrant and the probable cause affidavit together because the warrant
incorporated the specific facts contained within the affidavit, including the person and
place to be searched and the items to be seized.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress.
2. Outcry Hearing
The trial court also held a hearing to determine the admissibility of the hearsay
statement of M.C., the child in the case. See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.072
(West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.).
Officer Medrano testified that he was on patrol the evening of the incident. Officer
Medrano was dispatched to the scene and arrived within five minutes of receiving the
dispatch call. Upon arriving at the scene, he found Riggs and M.C. in the alleyway near
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Riggs’s apartment and stated that both Riggs and M.C. had blood on them and both were
upset and scared. Officer Medrano stated that he was the first officer to arrive on the
scene and the first person to interview Riggs and M.C. He indicated that he calmed both
individuals down before asking them specifics about what had happened.
Officer Medrano asked M.C. questions about what he had seen and what had
happened. M.C. told Officer Medrano that “David” and Riggs were arguing inside of the
apartment and that David was choking Riggs. M.C. said that he tried to stop David and
he was pushed to the floor and hit his head. M.C. also told Officer Medrano that he saw
David hit Riggs with a “black bar.”
M.C.’s mother, Geneva Riggs, testified that her son was available to testify should
the need arise. Her testimony was that after she got out of work and stopped for food,
she went home to the apartment. When she arrived at the apartment, the door was locked
so she went around the back to find the gate and back sliding door open and a mess in
the apartment. Geneva said she then heard her son call for her from the alleyway. She
said she arrived before Officer Medrano, but that he was the first officer on the scene.
She also testified that her son told her what had happened before he told anyone else.
After the testimony of both witnesses, the State requested that the trial court allow
the hearsay statements of M.C. to come in through Officer Medrano as an outcry witness.
The defense argued that the witnesses contradicted each other, each claiming to be the
first person over the age of eighteen that M.C. relayed the events to. The defense stated
that the State did not meet their burden to prove that Officer Medrano was the first person
over the age of eighteen to speak with M.C. about what happened, and that the trial court
should deny the State’s motion to elicit the hearsay testimony at trial.
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In response, the State asked the trial court to determine that Officer Medrano’s
testimony was reliable based on his training and experience as a police officer to recall
and report events that occurred in the past, arguing that Geneva’s recollection may have
been inaccurate as a witness.
As the trier of fact, the trial court held that, based on his testimony, Officer Medrano
was the first person over the age of eighteen to speak with M.C. and therefore the hearsay
statements would be admissible through him.
B. Plea
After reserving his right to appeal the trial court’s ruling regarding his motion to
suppress and the outcry witness determination, Rodriguez pleaded guilty to counts one
and two of the indictment and was sentenced to the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice–Institutional Division for fourteen years and five years, respectively.
This appeal followed.
II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS
By his first issue, Rodriguez argues that the search warrant was insufficient to
establish probable cause and the affidavit in support of the search warrant was facially
invalid.
A. Standard of Review
An appellate court normally reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress
by using a bifurcated standard of review, giving almost total deference to the historical
facts found by the trial court and reviewing de novo the trial court’s application of the law.
Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). However, when assessing
the sufficiency of an affidavit for a search warrant, the reviewing court is limited to the four
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corners of the affidavit. Hankins v. State, 132 S.W.3d 380, 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
Accordingly, when we review the magistrate’s decision to issue a warrant, we apply a
highly deferential standard because of the constitutional preference for searches to be
conducted pursuant to a warrant as opposed to a warrantless search. Swearingen v.
State, 143 S.W.3d 808, 810–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 234–37 (1983)). We must interpret the affidavit in a common sense and realistic
manner, recognizing that the magistrate was permitted to draw reasonable inferences.
Davis v. State, 202 S.W.3d 149, 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
B. Applicable Law and Discussion
Probable cause exists when the totality of the facts and circumstances presented
to the magistrate support the conclusion that there is a fair probability or substantial
chance that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found at the specified location.
Flores v. State, 319 S.W.3d 697, 702 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Our duty is not to act as a
rubber stamp for the magistrate or the trial court, however, the decision of the magistrate
should carry the day in a doubtful or marginal case, even when the reviewing court might
reach a different conclusion in a de novo review. Id.
A search warrant shall be sufficient under article 18.04 of the code of criminal
procedure if it contains the following requisites:
1. that it run in the name of “The State of Texas”;
2. that it identify, as near as may be, that which is to be seized and
name or describe, as near as may be, the person, place, or thing to
be searched;
3. that it command any peace officer of the proper county to search
forthwith the person, place, or thing named;
4. that it be dated and signed by the magistrate; and
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5. that the magistrate’s name appear in clearly legible handwriting or in
typewritten form with the magistrate’s signature
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.04 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.).
Rodriguez argues that the search warrant did not establish probable cause
because the reliability of Riggs was not contained within in the supporting affidavit.
Rodriguez relies upon several cases establishing the need for an affidavit to show an
informant is credible and reliable. See e.g., Jones v. State, 364 S.W.3d 854, (Tex. Crim.
App. 2012); Angulo v. State, 727 S.W.2d 276, 279–280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Elardo v.
State, 163 S.W.3d 760, 766 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. ref’d); Mejia v. State, 761
S.W.2d 35, 38 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d).
However, the State argues that Riggs is not a confidential informant, but rather she
is a named informant and the State contends that Riggs’s status as a named informant
deems her worthy of belief; we agree. See Wilkerson v. State, 726 S.W. 542, 545 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1996) (stating “[w]hen the affidavit contains information given by a named
informant, this Court has held that the affidavit is sufficient if the information given is
sufficiently detailed so as to suggest direct knowledge on his or her part”). Here, Riggs
was an alleged victim in the case and gave the officer’s a detailed description of the
incident which was contained within the probable cause affidavit. Riggs’s first-hand,
direct knowledge is sufficient to justify the issuance of the search warrant. Id.
Rodriguez also argues that the warrant should be found to be facially invalid
because Investigator Martinez did not include in the affidavit information that drugs and
drug paraphernalia were found at Riggs’s apartment where the incident occurred or that
Riggs was a reliable witness. Under Franks v. Delaware, a defendant bears the burden
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of showing by a preponderance of the evidence at a suppression hearing that a probable
cause affidavit submitted in support of a warrant contains a false statement made either
knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth. 438 U.S. 154, 156
(1978).
We have already concluded that Riggs’s direct knowledge as a named informant,
even without a statement regarding her credibility in the affidavit, is sufficient. However,
Rodriguez contends that Investigator Martinez neglected to include the information
relating to the drugs and drug paraphernalia, which he argues goes directly to Riggs’s
credibility. He argues that Investigator Martinez did not include this information and thus,
the magistrate was unable to consider the unreliability of Riggs when signing off on the
search warrant. Rodriguez, however, provides no support for his contention that the drugs
and drug paraphernalia found in Riggs’s apartment somehow diminish her credibility to
relay the details of the incident that occurred. See id. at 171 (stating “the challenger’s
attack must be more than conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire
to cross-examine”); see also TEX. R. APP. P. R. 38.1(i).
Accordingly, Rodriguez’s first issue is overruled.
III. OUTCRY HEARING
By his second issue, Rodriguez argues that the trial court erred in overruling his
objection to the outcry testimony of Officer Medrano.
A. Standard of Review
The trial court has broad discretion to determine which of several witnesses is an
outcry witness, and we will not disturb its decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. See
Garcia v. State, 792 S.W.2d 88, 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Hayden v. State, 928 S.W.2d
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229, 231 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. ref’d). Moreover, the trial court is
afforded broad discretion to determine whether the complainant’s statement falls within
the article 38.072 hearsay exception. Garcia, 792 S.W.2d at 92. An abuse of discretion
will not be found unless the trial court’s decision is outside the zone of reasonable
disagreement. See Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000);
Tear v. State, 74 S.W.3d 555, 558 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. ref’d).
B. Applicable Law and Discussion
Article 38.072 provides that outcry testimony from the first adult to whom the child
made statements describing, in some discernable manner, the alleged offense will not be
inadmissible because of the hearsay rule if certain requisites are met. See TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 38.072. Rodriguez argues that Officer Medrano should not have
been deemed the proper outcry witness because the child’s mother also testified that she
was the first adult to whom her son spoke to about the alleged incident.
In the present case, the record fails to show the extent of the child’s conversation
with his mother. Although the mother says she was the first person the child told about
the incident, there is no evidence that the child described to her the details of the alleged
assault. See Garcia, 792 S.W.2d at 91 (stating that where the record is void of specific
details of statements made by the complainant to an individual, such individual cannot be
an outcry witness under article 38.072); Dorado v. State, 824 S.W.2d 794, 795 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 1992), vacated on other grounds, 843 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)
(holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in designating the outcry witness
where the record failed to show that the complainant detailed the alleged offense to
another person who appellant claimed was the “outcry” witness); Garibay v. State, 787
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S.W.2d 128, 130 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1990, pet. ref’d) (finding that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in designating the outcry witness). Accordingly, we find the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Officer Medrano to testify as an outcry
witness under article 38.072. See Hayden v. State, 928 S.W.2d 229, 231 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. ref’d).
Rodriguez’s second issue is overruled.
IV. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
NORA L. LONGORIA
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
7th day of March, 2019.
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