Paralyzed Veterans of America v. DOT , 909 F.3d 438 ( 2018 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued September 7, 2018            Decided November 27, 2018
    No. 17-1272
    PARALYZED VETERANS OF AMERICA AND LARRY J. DODSON,
    PETITIONERS
    v.
    UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
    ELAINE L. CHAO, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF
    TRANSPORTATION,
    RESPONDENTS
    Consolidated with 18-5016
    On Petitions for Writ of Mandamus of Transfer Order of the
    United States District Court for the District of Columbia and
    for Review of Agency Action by the United States
    Department of Transportation
    Karianne M. Jones argued the cause for petitioners. With
    her on the briefs was Javier M. Guzman.
    Samantha L. Chaifetz, Attorney, U.S. Department of
    Justice, argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief
    were Michael S. Raab, Attorney, Steven G. Bradbury, General
    Counsel, U.S. Department of Transportation, Paul M. Geier,
    Assistant General Counsel, and Charles Enloe, Trial Attorney.
    2
    Before: GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and
    RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judges.
    Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
    EDWARDS.
    EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: Under 49 U.S.C.
    § 46110(a), petitions for review of specified orders issued by
    the Secretary of Transportation must be filed in the United
    States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or
    in the court of appeals for the circuit in which the petitioner
    resides or has its principal place of business. Section 46110
    covers, in particular, judicial review of orders issued under
    part A of subtitle VII of title 49 of the U.S. Code (“Part A”),
    including orders issued pursuant to §§ 41708 and 41709. A
    petition for review of an order issued under Part A must be filed
    not later than 60 days after the order is issued unless there are
    reasonable grounds for not filing by the 60th day.
    In 2016, the Department of Transportation (“DOT” or
    “Department”) issued a rule requiring airlines to report the
    number of wheelchairs and scooters that are mishandled after
    being transported as checked luggage on passenger flights.
    This so-called “Reporting Rule” was scheduled to take effect
    on January 1, 2018. On March 21, 2017, however, DOT issued
    an “Extension Rule” that delayed the effective date of the
    Reporting Rule by one year. On July 31, 2017, over four
    months after the issuance of the Extension Rule, Paralyzed
    Veterans of America and Larry J. Dodson, a paralyzed Air
    Force veteran, (“the Petitioners”) filed a lawsuit in the District
    Court challenging the Extension Rule. They contended that the
    rule was procedurally infirm because it was issued without
    notice-and-comment procedures and it was substantively
    invalid because it was arbitrary and capricious. In response to
    3
    this suit, DOT elected not to address the merits of the
    Petitioners’ claims and instead argued only that the District
    Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the suit. The
    District Court agreed with DOT, held that it lacked jurisdiction
    over this action, and then transferred the case “in the interests
    of justice” to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Paralyzed
    Veterans of Am. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 
    286 F. Supp. 3d 111
    ,
    120 (D.D.C. 2017).
    For the reasons stated below, we affirm the District Court.
    We agree that if there is jurisdiction to hear this suit, it lies in
    the courts of appeals. The Petitioners knew that challenges to
    the Extension Rule were required to be filed pursuant to
    § 46110(a). Indeed, the Petitioners cited the correct authority
    in their complaint. We therefore reject the Petitioners’ request
    that this case be transferred back to the District Court. We
    further dismiss the case because the Petitioners’ claim was filed
    after the 60-day statutory deadline and there are no “reasonable
    grounds” justifying their untimely filing.
    I.   BACKGROUND
    A. The Reporting Rule and the Extension Rule
    In 2011, DOT initiated notice-and-comment rulemaking to
    amend 14 C.F.R. § 234.6 to require airlines to report the
    number of wheelchairs and scooters that are delayed, damaged,
    or lost as checked luggage on domestic flights. The Department
    stated that the proposed data collection would be “crucial to
    understanding the magnitude of the problem as this data is not
    available to us through other means.” Reporting Ancillary
    Airline Passenger Revenues, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,726, 41,728 (July
    15, 2011). It further stressed that “[i]t is very important that
    passengers with mobility disabilities arrive at their destination
    with their wheelchair/scooter in good working order” because
    4
    “[w]ithout these devices, they will have great difficulty in
    exiting the airport or may be confined to their hotel or place of
    visit.” 
    Id. Following notice-and-comment
    proceedings, DOT adopted
    the Reporting Rule on November 2, 2016. Reporting of Data
    for Mishandled Baggage and Wheelchairs and Scooters
    Transported in Aircraft Cargo Compartments, 81 Fed. Reg.
    76,300. Under the rule, air carriers are required, on a monthly
    basis, “to report the number of mishandled wheelchairs and
    scooters and the total number of wheelchairs/scooters
    transported in the aircraft cargo department.” 
    Id. at 76,303.
    The
    Department set January 1, 2018, as the compliance date for the
    reporting requirement because that date would “provide[] air
    carriers with adequate time to update their internal systems and
    reporting processes.” 
    Id. at 76,305.
    In January 2017, however, the White House issued a
    regulatory freeze memorandum, directing agencies to postpone
    for 60 days rules that had been published in the Federal
    Register but had not yet become effective. This directive did
    not appear to apply to the Reporting Rule because that rule had
    already become effective. However, according to the
    Petitioners, an industry lobbying group, Airlines for America,
    contacted officials at DOT multiple times to request that the
    Reporting Rule be delayed. Pets.’ Br. 7.
    On March 21, 2017, DOT issued the Extension Rule, a final
    rule that amended 14 C.F.R. § 234.6. DOT’s announcement
    said:
    The Department of Transportation is amending its
    regulations by extending the compliance date of its final
    rule on reporting of data for mishandled baggage and
    wheelchairs in aircraft cargo compartments from
    5
    January 1, 2018 to January 1, 2019. Under that final rule,
    the mishandled-baggage data that air carriers are
    required to report changed, from the number of
    Mishandled Baggage Reports and the number of
    domestic passenger enplanements to the number of
    mishandled bags and the number of enplaned bags. The
    rule also requires separate statistics for mishandled
    wheelchairs and scooters used by passengers with
    disabilities and transported in aircraft cargo
    compartments. This extension is in response to a request
    by Airlines for America (A4A) and Delta.
    Reporting of Data for Mishandled Baggage and Wheelchairs
    and Scooters Transported in Aircraft Cargo Compartments;
    Extension of Compliance Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 14,437, 14,437
    (Mar. 21, 2017). The Extension Rule was adopted without
    notice-and-comment rulemaking.
    Paralyzed Veterans voiced strong objections to the
    Extension Rule. In March 2017, nearly two weeks before the
    rule’s publication, the group issued a press release opposing
    any change to the Reporting Rule. Addendum to Pets.’ Br. 24.
    Members of Paralyzed Veterans also expressed their concerns
    in letters to subcommittees in both the House of
    Representatives and the Senate in March and May 2017. 
    Id. at 32,
    38–39. In addition, the Executive Director of Paralyzed
    Veterans wrote to the Secretary of Transportation to object to
    the delayed compliance date. 
    Id. at 26–27.
    These efforts were
    futile, however. Even though they had received no encouraging
    responses from DOT or members of Congress, the Petitioners
    waited until July 31, 2017, to file their complaint in the District
    Court.
    6
    B. The Statutory Authorities Cited by DOT in Support of the
    Amendments to 14 C.F.R. § 234.6
    Prior to the adoption of the Reporting Rule in 2016, 49
    U.S.C. §§ 41708 and 41709 were the statutory authorities cited
    by DOT to support rules incorporated as a part of 14 C.F.R.
    § 234.6. Paralyzed Veterans of 
    Am., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 118
    .
    Section 41708 permits the Secretary to require monthly reports
    from air carriers. See 49 U.S.C. § 41708(b)(1)(A) (“The
    Secretary may require an air carrier . . . to file annual, monthly,
    periodical, and special reports with the Secretary in the form
    and way prescribed by the Secretary . . . .”). And § 41709
    authorizes the Secretary to specify the records that air carriers
    must keep. 49 U.S.C. § 41709(a) (“The Secretary of
    Transportation shall prescribe the form of records to be kept by
    an air carrier . . . and the time period during which the records
    shall be kept.”). Both §§ 41708 and 41709 appear in Part A,
    and challenges to actions taken by DOT pursuant to these
    provisions are governed by 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a).
    The statutory authorities cited by DOT to support the
    Reporting Rule and the Extension Rule, both of which
    amended 14 C.F.R. § 234.6, were mistakenly listed as “49
    U.S.C. 329, 41101, and 41701.” See Reporting of Data for
    Mishandled Baggage and Wheelchairs and Scooters
    Transported in Aircraft Cargo Compartments, 81 Fed. Reg.
    76,300, 76,303 (Nov. 2, 2016); Reporting of Data for
    Mishandled Baggage and Wheelchairs and Scooters
    Transported in Aircraft Cargo Compartments; Extension of
    Compliance Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 14,437, 14,438 (Mar. 21,
    2017). The parties agree that DOT should have cited §§ 41708
    and 41709 to support these rules.
    7
    C. Paralyzed Veterans’ Challenge to the Extension Rule
    On July 31, 2017, the Petitioners filed suit in the District
    Court, alleging that DOT acted unlawfully by issuing the
    Extension Rule without notice and comment and without
    lawful justification. In addition, the Petitioners moved to stay
    the Extension Rule. In response, DOT cited 49 U.S.C. § 46110
    and moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
    The Petitioners argued that jurisdiction over this matter
    properly originated in the District Court, not in the court of
    appeals. The Petitioners pointed out that, in promulgating the
    Extension Rule, DOT cited 49 U.S.C. §§ 329, 41101, and
    41701 as authority to support the rule. The Petitioners
    acknowledge that §§ 41101 and 41701 both appear in Part A,
    but point out that neither of those provisions supports the
    Extension Rule as a substantive matter. Moreover, DOT
    concedes that § 329 does not appear in Part A. The Petitioners
    thus argued before the District Court that the Extension Rule
    was not “issued under” Part A and the strictures of 49 U.S.C.
    § 46110(a) did not apply to their lawsuit. The District Court
    found, however, that “[the Petitioners] do not seriously dispute
    that the Extension Rule’s citation to §§ 41101 and 41701 was
    a mistake.” Paralyzed Veterans of 
    Am., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 119
    .
    Nor do the parties seriously disagree with the District Court’s
    finding that “the Extension Rule could have been—and indeed,
    likely should have been—issued under [the] statutory authority
    [of §§ 41708 and 41709] that would have triggered direct
    review [in the court of appeals pursuant to 49 U.S.C.
    § 46110(a)].” 
    Id. at 118.
    After extensive review of the parties’ respective positions,
    careful analysis of the record, and consideration of the
    applicable case law, the District Court rejected the Petitioners’
    claim. The court held that, “where, as here, the record suggests
    8
    that a rule mistakenly cites an inapposite statutory authority
    instead of some other, clearly applicable authority, and where
    there is no evidence (or even allegation) of bad-faith conduct
    on the part of the promulgating agency, the Court may treat the
    rule as issued ‘under’ the mistakenly omitted authority for
    purposes of ascertaining its jurisdiction under a direct-review
    statute.” Paralyzed Veterans of 
    Am., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 119
    .
    The District Court concluded that because the Extension
    Rule was issued under Part A authority within the meaning of
    § 46110, it could not exercise jurisdiction over this action. 
    Id. at 120.
    The court accordingly transferred the case “in the
    interests of justice” to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
    
    Id. The court
    also denied without prejudice the Petitioners’
    motion for a stay, DOT’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-
    matter jurisdiction, and the Petitioners’ motion for summary
    judgment.
    Following the District Court’s transfer order, the
    Petitioners’ complaint was docketed by this court as a petition
    for review. The Petitioners then noticed an appeal of the
    District Court’s transfer decision, which this court construed as
    a petition for a writ of mandamus. On January 30, 2018, this
    court acted on its own motion to consolidate the two petitions.
    This court now faces two issues: First, whether, pursuant
    to 49 U.S.C. § 46110, original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
    this case lies with the courts of appeals because the Extension
    Rule was issued at least in part under statutory authority found
    in title 49, subtitle VII, part A. Second, if review of the
    Extension Rule was required to be sought in accordance with
    § 46110, whether the Petitioners have shown “reasonable
    grounds” for failing to file their petition for review within 60
    days after the issuance of the Extension Rule.
    9
    II.     ANALYSIS
    A. Standard of Review
    The District Court transferred the case to this court “in the
    interest of justice.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1631. We review de novo
    the lower court’s determination that it lacks subject matter
    jurisdiction. Tootle v. Sec’y of Navy, 
    446 F.3d 167
    , 173 (D.C.
    Cir. 2006).
    B. The District Court Properly Transferred the Case
    Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631
    The Petitioners contest, through a writ of mandamus, the
    District Court’s order of transfer to this court. The writ of
    mandamus is an “extraordinary remedy, to be reserved for
    extraordinary situations.” In re U.S. Dep’t of Def., 
    848 F.2d 232
    , 234–35 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Gulfstream Aerospace
    Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 
    485 U.S. 271
    , 289 (1988)).
    Because we reject the Petitioners’ claim that jurisdiction over
    this matter properly lies in the District Court, there is no ground
    for this court to issue a writ of mandamus.
    Section 46110(a) provides for direct review in the court of
    appeals when the Secretary of Transportation issues an order
    under “Part A” of Subtitle VII. The term “order” includes
    “rules” for purposes of § 46110. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. U.S.
    Dep’t of Transp., 
    827 F.3d 51
    , 55–57 (D.C. Cir. 2016). And
    Subtitle VII broadly covers “aviation programs,” while “Part
    A” generally covers “Air Commerce and Safety.” See Cmtys.
    Against Runway Expansion, Inc. v. FAA, 
    355 F.3d 678
    , 683
    (D.C. Cir. 2004). Therefore, the Extension Rule obviously fits
    within the compass of Part A of Subtitle VII. And when DOT
    promulgated the Extension Rule, it cited Part A provisions as
    authority to support the rule; however, as indicated above, the
    10
    Department mistakenly cited §§ 41101 and 41701, instead of
    §§ 41708 and 41709.
    Furthermore, the Petitioners are correct in pointing out that
    the two Part A statutory provisions cited by DOT – 49 U.S.C.
    §§ 41101 and 41701 – plainly do not support the Extension
    Rule. DOT also cited 49 C.F.R. 1.27(n) as a potential source of
    authority. Paralyzed Veterans of 
    Am., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 115
    .
    However, the District Court correctly rejected this claim
    because this provision merely delegates authority to the
    General Counsel to issue the Extension Rule on behalf of the
    Secretary. 
    Id. Nevertheless, we
    find no merit in the Petitioners’
    claim that the direct-review provision of 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a)
    has no application in this case. The problem with the
    Petitioners’ argument is that it rests on the implicit assumption
    that they were misled by DOT’s failure to cite §§ 41708 and
    41709 in support of the Extension Rule. The record does not
    support this assumption.
    First, although DOT cited the wrong provisions in Part A
    when it promulgated the disputed rule, the Petitioners were on
    notice that the Department meant to rely on Part A. As
    explained above, Part A authorizes DOT’s regulation of air
    commerce, including the agency’s imposition of recordkeeping
    and reporting requirements. In addition, the Extension Rule –
    which amends 14 C.F.R. § 234.6 – expressly invokes Part A
    authority. And Part A provisions do, in fact, provide clearly
    applicable statutory authority for the Extension Rule.
    Paralyzed Veterans of 
    Am., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 118
    –19.
    Second, the Petitioners acknowledge that prior to the
    adoption of the Reporting Rule, the citations of authority for 14
    C.F.R. § 234.6 read: “49 U.S.C. 329 and Sections 41708 and
    41709.” See 14 C.F.R. pt. 234 (2011); Pets.’ Br. 9–10. These
    statutory citations were mistakenly changed in 2011 when
    11
    DOT issued the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the
    Reporting Rule. As the District Court explained:
    At oral argument, the Department suggested that the
    notice of proposed rulemaking had actually meant to
    expand part 234’s authority citation—that is, to cite
    chapters 411 and 417 of title 49. This mistake was then
    compounded by the drafters of the final Reporting Rule,
    who “corrected” the citation not by changing the phrase
    “41101 and 41701” to “411 and 417,” but rather by
    changing the word “chapters” to “sections.” In light of
    the foregoing review of the Reporting Rule’s drafting
    history, this explanation for the change—the only one
    offered by either party—“makes perfect sense.” Am.
    Petroleum 
    Inst., 714 F.3d at 1333
    . Why else would the
    Department have changed the citation from clearly
    applicable statutory authority (§§ 41708 and 41709) to
    clearly inapposite authority (§§ 41101 and 41701)?
    Paralyzed Veterans of 
    Am., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 118
    –19. The
    Extension Rule’s citation to §§ 41101 and 41701 was simply a
    mistake, but not one that misled the Petitioners. See 
    id. at 119.
    The Petitioners do not seriously dispute any of this.
    Finally, the Petitioners’ complaint pointedly cites
    §§ 41708 and 41709 as the relevant statutory authorities for the
    Extension Rule:
    15. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §§ 329, 41708, and 41709,
    the Secretary of Transportation has the authority to
    require air carriers to collect and report information
    related to transportation that the Secretary decides will
    contribute to the improvement of the transportation
    system.
    12
    16. In accordance with this legislative authority, the
    Secretary of Transportation has adopted regulations for
    the collection and reporting of data regarding
    mishandled wheelchairs and scooters that are entrusted
    to domestic airlines by disabled passengers and
    transported in aircraft cargo compartments. 14 C.F.R.
    § 234.6.
    Joint Appendix 10. In light of this, the Petitioners are hard
    pressed to contend that they were somehow misled by DOT’s
    mistaken citations to §§ 41101 and 41701. See 5 U.S.C.
    § 706(2) (providing that “due account shall be taken of the rule
    of prejudicial error” in review of agency actions).
    Because §§ 41708 and 41709 indisputably provide
    authority for the Extension Rule, exclusive jurisdiction over
    this action lies with the courts of appeals pursuant to
    § 46110(a).
    C. The Petitioners Had No “Reasonable Grounds” for Their
    Untimely Petition for Review
    There is no doubt that the petition for review in this case
    was filed more than 60 days after the issuance of the Extension
    Rule. It is therefore untimely under § 46110(a) unless there are
    reasonable grounds justifying the Petitioners’ failure to file by
    the 60th day. On the record before us, we find that the
    Petitioners have offered no reasonable grounds for the untimely
    filing. We are therefore constrained to dismiss the petition for
    review.
    “This court ‘rarely [finds] reasonable grounds under
    section 46110(a).’” Citizens Ass’n of Georgetown v. FAA, 
    896 F.3d 425
    , 435 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr.
    v. FAA, 
    821 F.3d 39
    , 43 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). And we have made
    13
    it clear that “a delay caused by filing a petition or complaint in
    the wrong court by itself is not a reasonable ground for failing
    to meet the statutory sixty-day deadline.” Nat’l Fed’n of the
    Blind, 
    827 F.3d 51
    , 58 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Moreover, the few
    instances in which we have found reasonable grounds are
    easily distinguishable from the circumstances in this case.
    For example, in City of Phoenix v. Huerta, 
    869 F.3d 963
    (D.C. Cir. 2017), we excused an untimely petition for review
    because the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) actively
    represented to the petitioners in that case that the agency’s
    decision-making process had not yet consummated. 
    Id. at 969–
    70. In at least two public meetings and three letters, agency
    officials assured the petitioners that their concerns regarding
    contested flight plans and related noise problems were being
    evaluated. 
    Id. at 970.
    The FAA even reconvened a working
    group that had modified the flight plans. 
    Id. Given this
    situation, we declined to “punish the petitioners for treating
    litigation as a last rather than a first resort when an agency
    behave[d] as the FAA did[.]” 
    Id. There are
    no similar
    circumstances in this case. Paralyzed Veterans had some
    interactions with two congressional subcommittees, but
    attempts to communicate with officials at DOT were futile. See
    Addendum to Pets.’ Br. at 29–40. And there is nothing in the
    record to indicate that the Petitioners here received any credible
    assurances from either legislators or DOT officials that the
    issuance of the Extension Rule would be delayed, or that the
    rule would be revised or withdrawn.
    The circumstances in this case are also distinguishable
    from the situation that we considered in Paralyzed Veterans of
    Am. v. C.A.B., 
    752 F.2d 694
    (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev’d on other
    grounds, Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 
    477 U.S. 597
    (1986). In that case, we found that the agency had
    continued to accept comments about the rule at issue. 
    Id. at 705
                                    14
    n.82 (“Aware that the rule might be undergoing modification,
    and unable to predict how extensive any modification would
    be, petitioners elected to wait until the regulation was in final
    form before seeking review.”). We therefore agreed that it was
    prudent for the petitioners in that case “to exhaust [their]
    administrative remedies, and to conserve the resources of both
    the litigants and this court.” 
    Id. The situation
    in this case is
    quite different because DOT gave no indication to the
    Petitioners that there was even a remote possibility that the
    Extension Rule would be revised or rescinded. The Petitioners
    therefore had no legitimate expectation that their concerns
    would be addressed.
    In cases of the sort presented here, a claim of “reasonable
    grounds” to justify an untimely filing under § 46110 must be
    supported by evidence showing that petitioners had reasonable
    bases for believing that agency officials would address the
    concerns at issue. See City of 
    Phoenix, 869 F.3d at 970
    (quoting
    Safe Extensions, Inc. v. FAA, 
    509 F.3d 593
    , 596 (D.C. Cir.
    2007)). In Safe Extensions, for example, the FAA actively
    misled the petitioners into believing that the agency would
    issue a new order that would afford redress. 
    See 509 F.3d at 602
    –04. Moreover, since the FAA specifically encouraged the
    petitioners to wait for further agency action, it was reasonable
    for the petitioners to delay in filing a petition for review. 
    Id. at 603–04.
    Here, the Petitioners have not shown that DOT misled
    them in any way about the Extension Rule’s finality. In fact,
    the Petitioners admit that DOT officials never “substantively
    responded” to their requests. Pets.’ Br. 41–42.
    In these circumstances, the law of the circuit requires
    dismissal of this case. See, e.g., Citizens Ass’n of 
    Georgetown, 896 F.3d at 435
    ; Taylor v. Huerta, 
    856 F.3d 1089
    , 1093–94
    (D.C. Cir. 2017); Nat’l Fed’n of the 
    Blind, 827 F.3d at 57-58
    ;
    Avia Dynamics, Inc. v. FAA, 
    641 F.3d 515
    , 521 (D.C. Cir.
    15
    2011). Our sister circuits have adhered to the same legal
    principles enunciated here. See, e.g., Skydive Myrtle Beach v.
    Horry Cnty. Dep’t of Airports, 735 F. App’x 810, 815 (4th Cir.
    2018) (per curiam); Tulsa Airports Improvement Trust v. FAA,
    
    839 F.3d 945
    , 950 (10th Cir. 2016); Corbett v. Transp. Sec.
    Admin., 
    767 F.3d 1171
    , 1178–79 (11th Cir. 2014);
    Americopters, LLC v. FAA, 
    441 F.3d 726
    , 732–34 (9th Cir.
    2006). Since the Department did nothing to create uncertainty
    regarding the Extension Rule’s finality, the Petitioners were
    required to meet the statutory 60-day filing deadline. They had
    good reason to know that direct review in the court of appeals
    was required pursuant to § 46110. And if the Petitioners had
    any doubt, they should have filed suit within sixty days “in both
    the court of appeals and the district court.” Nat’l Fed’n of the
    
    Blind, 827 F.3d at 58
    (citation omitted).
    III.    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons set forth above, we deny the Petitioners’
    request for a writ of mandamus. We further dismiss the case
    because the Petitioners’ claim was filed after the 60-day
    statutory deadline and there are no “reasonable grounds”
    justifying their untimely filing.
    So ordered.