United States v. Pipkin ( 1997 )


Menu:
  •                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    For the Fifth Circuit
    No. 96-20402
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    VERSUS
    ROGER W, PIPKIN, III,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    For the Southern District of Texas
    June 2, 1997
    Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, DeMOSS, Circuit Judge and JUSTICE,1
    District Judge.
    DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:
    Defendant Roger W. Pipkin, III, was convicted of multiple
    counts of wire fraud, money laundering, and structuring currency
    transactions so as to avoid reporting requirements.           Applying the
    Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S.
    Ct. 655 (1994), we hold that the evidence is insufficient to
    support    a   finding   that   Pipkin   knew   structuring   was   illegal.
    Accordingly, we reverse the structuring convictions.            Finding no
    other reversible error, we affirm all other convictions.
    1
    District Judge of the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by
    designation.
    BACKGROUND
    Pipkin took part in a scam that defrauded Pioneer Commercial
    Funding Corporation (“Pioneer”) of at least $14 million.    Pioneer
    was a lender which financed residential real estate transactions.
    Pioneer loaned money to borrowers based on loan packages presented
    by mortgage brokers.    Pioneer did not perform credit checks on the
    borrowers or appraise the properties itself, but instead relied on
    the mortgage bankers.
    One of the mortgage brokers Pioneer dealt with was Mortgage
    Credit Corporation (“MCC”), a company Pipkin was associated with.
    Pipkin and Robert Cartwright, president of MCC, entered into a
    scheme to defraud Pioneer by submitting phony loan applications.
    As part of the scheme, MCC prepared loan applications for the
    purchase of empty lots and non-existent properties.        MCC told
    Pioneer that the properties had great value, and Pioneer loaned
    money based on the inflated numbers. For example, MCC told Pioneer
    that a property was appraised at $227,867, when it was really a
    vacant lot worth $6,000.    Based on this deception, Pioneer loaned
    $153,370 on the property.    MCC also used fake buyers on the loan
    applications.   It filled out the applications using the names of
    Pipkin’s friends and acquaintances, paying them nominal amounts
    (usually $50) to sign the forms.
    MCC told Pioneer that it was closing the loans itself and had
    Pioneer wire the money directly to it.      Because the loans were
    fraudulent, MCC was not actually closing them, but just pocketing
    the money.   Between 1988 and 1989, Pioneer funded approximately
    2
    1,400 loans for MCC totaling about $93 million.         Of this amount,
    $14 to $17 million was fraudulent.        Because of the fraudulent
    loans, Pioneer was forced into bankruptcy.         These fraudulent loan
    applications form the basis for the conspiracy and wire fraud
    charges in Counts 1 through 8 of the indictment.
    In   June   1989,   Pipkin   purchased    a   cashier’s   check   for
    $320,797.97, using a check drawn on an account owned by C & P
    Realty, a company Pipkin controlled.          Pipkin used the cashier’s
    check to buy a house at 5138 Doliver Street in Houston.                This
    purchase forms the basis for the money laundering charges in Counts
    9 and 10 of the indictment.
    Three times between August and October 1989, Pipkin had an
    employee cash checks for him.     Each time, Pipkin gave the employee
    three checks, each for slightly less than $10,000.         The employee
    then cashed the checks at the same bank on successive days.             By
    using checks of less than $10,000, Pipkin hoped to avoid triggering
    the bank’s currency transaction reporting requirements.            These
    transactions form the basis for the structuring transaction charges
    in Counts 11 through 13 of the indictment.
    Pipkin was charged in a 13 count indictment with one count of
    conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371
    (Count 1); seven counts of aiding and abetting the commission of
    wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1343 (Counts 2
    through 8); two counts of laundering money in violation of 18
    U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (Count 9) and 1957 (Count 10); and three
    counts of structuring currency transactions in violation of 31
    3
    U.S.C. §§ 5313, 5322 and 5324(3) (Counts 11 through 13).           Pipkin
    was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 60 months as to each
    of Counts 1 through 8, to run concurrent with each other and 78
    months as to each of Counts 9 through 13, to run concurrent with
    each other and concurrent with Counts 1 through 8.          In lieu of a
    fine, Pipkin was ordered to pay $842,000 in restitution.            Pipkin
    filed a timely notice of appeal.
    DISCUSSION
    Pipkin appeals his convictions, arguing that the evidence is
    insufficient   to   support   his   structuring   and   money   laundering
    convictions, that the indictment should have been dismissed because
    of Speedy Trial Act violations, that the district court failed to
    instruct the jury on the issue of materiality in Counts 1 through
    10, and that the district court erred in failing to instruct the
    jury about the impeachment of a prosecution witness.              We will
    address each of these issues in turn.
    Structuring
    Federal law requires banks to file a currency transaction
    report (“CTR”) with the Secretary of the Treasury for any cash
    4
    transaction over $10,000.            31 U.S.C. § 5313(a);2 31 C.F.R. §
    103.22(a)(1).3       The law also forbids structuring a transaction for
    the purpose of evading a bank’s requirement to file a CTR.                  31
    U.S.C. § 5324(3).4       At the time Pipkin structured the transactions,
    the     law   provided    criminal    penalties   for   anyone    “willfully
    violating”     the    anti-structuring     requirements.     31    U.S.C.    §
    5322(a).5
    2
    Section 5313(a) provides that:
    When a domestic financial institution is involved
    in a transaction ... of United States coins or
    currency ... in an amount ... the Secretary [of the
    Treasury] prescribes by regulation, the institution
    ... shall file a report on the transaction at the time and in the
    way the Secretary prescribes.
    3
    Section 103.22(a)(1) provides in relevant part that:
    Each financial institution ... shall file a report
    of each deposit, withdrawal, exchange of currency
    or other payment or transfer, by, through, or to
    such financial institution which involves a
    transaction of currency of more than $10,000.
    4
    After Pipkin’s alleged structuring, § 5324(1)-(3) was
    reorganized without substantive change as § 5324(a)(1)-(3). We
    will refer to the codification as it existed at the time of the
    alleged offense.
    Section 5324(3) provides that:
    No person shall for the purpose of evading the
    reporting requirements of section 5313(a) ... (3)
    structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to
    structure or assist in structuring, any transaction
    with one or more domestic financial institution.
    5
    At the time of Pipkin’s structuring, § 5322(a) provided
    that:
    A person willfully violating this subchapter [31
    U.S.C. § 5311 et seq.] or a regulation prescribed
    under this subchapter (except section 5315 of this
    5
    The      Supreme   Court    interpreted    §   5322(a)’s     “willfully
    violating” provision in Ratzlaf v. United States, 
    510 U.S. 135
    , 146
    (1994), holding that the defendant must know “not only of the
    bank’s duty to report cash transactions in excess of $10,000, but
    also of his duty not to avoid triggering such a report.”                 In
    Ratzlaf, the defendant, Ratzlaf, ran up a large debt at a casino.
    He returned to the casino several days later with $100,000 of cash
    in hand, ready to pay the debt.        The casino informed him that all
    transactions of over $10,000 in cash had to be reported to federal
    authorities.      The casino said that it could accept a cashier’s
    check   for    the   full   amount   without   triggering   any   reporting
    requirement.     The casino then packed Ratzlaf into a limousine and
    sent him to area banks.       Informed that banks, too, are required to
    report cash transactions in excess of $10,000, Ratzlaf purchased
    multiple cashier’s checks, each for less than $10,000, and each
    from a different bank.       He then delivered the checks to the casino.
    See 
    id. at 137.
    Ratzlaf was convicted of structuring transactions to evade the
    banks’ obligations to file CTRs, in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§
    5322(a) and 5324(3).        The district court instructed the jury that
    while the government had to prove Ratzlaf knew of the banks’
    title or a regulation prescribed under section
    5315) shall be fined not more than $250,000, or
    imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
    The law no longer requires a willful violation of the anti-
    structuring statute.   See Pub. L. No. 103-325 § 411, 108 Stat.
    2160, 2253 (1994), codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322(a) and 5324(c)(1).
    Pipkin’s alleged violations occurred between August and October
    1989, so the new law does not apply.
    6
    reporting requirements, it did not have to prove that he knew that
    structuring was unlawful.        See 
    Id. at 137-38.
    The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that “to
    give effect to the statutory `willfulness’ specification, the
    Government had to prove Ratzlaf knew the structuring he undertook
    was unlawful.”     
    Id. at 138.
       The Court stated that, for § 5322(a)
    purposes, a “willful” actor is “one who violates a known legal
    duty.” 
    Id. at 142
    (internal quotation omitted). Because “currency
    structuring is not inevitably nefarious,” 
    id. at 144,
    structuring
    is   not   “so   obviously     ‘evil’       or   inherently   ‘bad’   that   the
    willfulness      requirement     is     satisfied      irrespective    of    the
    defendant’s knowledge of structuring.”               
    Id. at 146.
         The Court
    reaffirmed “the venerable principle that ignorance of the law
    generally is no defense to a criminal charge.                   In particular
    contexts, however, Congress may decree otherwise. That ... is what
    Congress has done with respect to 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) and the
    provisions it controls.”       
    Id. at 149.
          Thus, to convict a defendant
    of structuring, “the jury ha[s] to find he knew the structuring in
    which he engage[d] was unlawful.”             
    Id. Much of
    the public’s ignorance regarding the illegality of
    structuring must be laid at the feet of the government.                      The
    Secretary of the Treasury thought that ignorance of the illegality
    of structuring was not an element of the crime, so he deliberately
    avoided publicizing the change in the law.                In March 1988, the
    Secretary considered requiring banks to take steps to inform the
    public of the new anti-structuring laws.               See 53 Fed. Reg. 7948
    7
    (1988).    For example, banks would have been required to place a
    notice of the requirements at every teller’s window, every deposit
    ticket would have been imprinted with a notice regarding the
    illegality of structuring, and all bank customers would have
    received notice of the new law in their bank statement every
    quarter.    
    Id. The Secretary
    withdrew the proposal in May 1989,
    stating that the notices were unnecessary because it was clear that
    “the government need only prove that a criminal defendant had
    actual knowledge of the currency reporting requirements and the
    specific intent to evade them; the government need not prove that
    the defendant had knowledge of the structuring prohibitions.”               54
    Fed. Reg. 20398 (1989); see 
    Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 140
    n.6 (noting
    Secretary’s actions).
    If the Secretary had adopted the proposed rules, our task
    would be much simpler.       See United States v. Simon, 
    85 F.3d 906
    ,
    911 (2d Cir.) (Winter, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 
    117 S. Ct. 517
    (1996).       We would simply hold that given the ample notice
    provided by his bank, Pipkin knew structuring was a crime.                 The
    Secretary chose not to go that route.            Mistakenly thinking the
    government would never have to prove knowledge of the illegality of
    structuring, the Secretary deliberately avoided taking steps to put
    the public on notice.      That certainly was his prerogative.       It was,
    however, also a gamble, as Ratzlaf proves.             Having chosen to keep
    the public in the dark, the government cannot now argue that
    everyone knew structuring was illegal.           Instead, it must provide
    some   specific    proof   that   will   allow   the    inference   that   the
    8
    defendant knew structuring was a crime.
    To support the inference that the defendant knew structuring
    was a crime, the government must prove “something more” than the
    fact that a defendant structured his transaction to avoid the
    filing of a CTR.   See United States v. Ismail, 
    97 F.3d 50
    , 58 (4th
    Cir. 1996); United States v. Wynn, 
    61 F.3d 921
    , 927-28 (D.C. Cir.),
    cert. denied, 
    116 S. Ct. 578
    (1995); United States v. Vazquez, 
    53 F.3d 1216
    , 1226 (11th Cir. 1995).     For example, the government may
    show that the “defendant had some special status or expertise from
    which a jury could reasonably infer that he knew structuring was
    illegal.”   
    Ismail, 97 F.3d at 58
    ; see also 
    Simon, 85 F.3d at 909-10
    (defendant, a stockbroker, was familiar with reporting requirements
    and required to file CTRs as part of his business); 
    Tipton, 56 F.3d at 1013
    (defendants who were bank officials were familiar with CTR
    reporting requirements).
    Pipkin does not deny that he structured transactions so as to
    avoid triggering a CTR.    Nor does Pipkin deny that he knew of the
    bank’s duty to file a CTR for any cash transaction over $10,000.
    He contends, however, that the evidence is insufficient to support
    a finding that he knew that structuring itself was illegal.       We
    agree.   At trial, the government provided ample proof that Pipkin
    knew about CTRs and banks’ duties to file them.       Indeed, Pipkin
    admitted as much on direct examination.     The government, however,
    offered no evidence that would support the inference that Pipkin
    knew of his duty not to structure.
    The government presented evidence that Pipkin was involved in
    9
    the banking industry in the past, even serving as president of a
    bank in the 1970s.         The evidence shows that as bank president
    Pipkin was responsible for making sure that CTRs were filed.
    Pipkin’s experience in the banking industry does not support an
    inference that he knew structuring was illegal, however, given the
    dates of his employment.      Banks have been required to file CTRs for
    over 25 years.       See Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting
    Act, Pub. L. 91-508, Tit. II, 84 Stat. 1118.            Structuring trans-
    actions to avoid triggering a CTR, however, did not become a crime
    until 1986,     a   mere   three   years   before   Pipkin   structured   the
    transactions.       See Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L.
    99-570, Tit. I, Subtit. H, § 1354(a), 100 Stat. 3207-22.             Pipkin
    worked for banks in the 1970s, when CTRs were required, but before
    structuring was illegal.           Therefore, the fact that Pipkin knew
    about CTRs from his banking days is absolutely no evidence that he
    knew structuring was illegal.         Because structuring was legal when
    he was a banker, if anything, his experience is evidence that he
    thought structuring was legal.
    The record shows that in the late 1980s Pipkin was president
    of First State Investors, an investment company.               There is no
    evidence that this company was ever required to file a CTR, or that
    Pipkin became aware of the new anti-structuring laws through his
    involvement with the company.         Likewise, the evidence that Pipkin
    attended two years of law school is no evidence of his knowledge of
    the illegality of structuring.        He attended before structuring was
    made a crime, and there is no evidence in the record that he kept
    10
    up with developments in the law after dropping out of law school.
    At least two circuits have held that the fact that a defendant
    went to lengths to conceal his structuring can provide evidence of
    his knowledge of its illegality.               See United States v. Marder, 
    48 F.3d 564
    , 574 (1st Cir.) (jury can infer knowledge of illegality
    from concealment), cert. denied, 
    115 S. Ct. 1441
    (1995); United
    States v. Walker, 
    25 F.3d 540
    , 543, 548 n.8 (7th Cir. 1994) (same).
    This view has been rejected by at least three circuits, which hold
    that the evidence of the structuring itself cannot allow the
    inference that the defendant knew structuring was unlawful.                       See
    
    Ismail, 97 F.3d at 58
       (“we   cannot      agree    that    evidence    of
    structuring alone can provide the basis for an inference, proving
    beyond a reasonable doubt, that a defendant knew that structuring
    violated the law); 
    Wynn, 61 F.3d at 927-28
    (“abundant evidence” of
    structuring    itself    insufficient          to   demonstrate      knowledge   that
    structuring violated the law); 
    Vazquez, 53 F.3d at 1226
    (“ample”
    evidence of structuring failed to prove defendant knew structuring
    was   illegal,   only    defendant’s       testimony      as    to    knowledge    of
    illegality allowed finding of willfulness).
    While we are sympathetic to the Fourth, Eleventh and D.C.
    Circuits’   view   that      the   structuring        itself    cannot    allow    an
    inference of knowledge of illegality, we need not enter this debate
    because there is no evidence that Pipkin went to great lengths to
    hide his structuring.        During the three structuring episodes, he
    simply had an employee cash checks of slightly less than $10,000
    each. No effort was made to use multiple checks of smaller amounts
    11
    to avoid attracting notice of his structuring activity.         Cf.
    
    Marder, 48 F.3d at 564
    (fact that defendant used three checks to
    structure $11,460 transaction, rather than just two, is evidence of
    concealment).      Nor were different accounts used, or the checks
    made out to different individuals.    Pipkin’s scheme was so obvious
    that a teller at the bank noted his behavior and, unbeknownst to
    him, prepared a CTR.   On the form, she noted that this was the “5th
    time in 2 weeks” that such a transaction had been made.   Thus, even
    if we were to hold that the structuring itself could provide proof
    of knowledge, given Pipkin’s lack of concealment, there is no
    evidence to support such an inference in this case.
    The record is devoid of evidence which would support an
    inference that Pipkin knew structuring was illegal. Therefore, the
    evidence is insufficient to prove that he structured transactions
    in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322(a) and 5324(3). Accordingly, his
    convictions on Counts 11, 12 and 13 must be reversed.6
    Money Laundering
    Pipkin was convicted of laundering money in violation of 18
    U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (Count 9) and 1957 (Count 10).7   Pipkin
    6
    Pipkin also argues that the jury was not properly instructed
    that the government must prove that he knew structuring was
    illegal.   Because the evidence is insufficient to support the
    structuring convictions, we do not address the jury instruction
    issue. Accordingly, we express no opinion as to the correctness of
    the charge.
    7
    Pipkin does not appeal his conviction on Count 10. The
    conduct charged in Counts 9 and 10 was similar:     buying the
    cashier’s check.   The only real distinction is the concealment
    element under Count 9.
    12
    argues that the evidence is insufficient to convict him on Count 9,
    which involved purchasing the $320,797.97 cashier’s check using a
    check drawn on the account of one of his companies, C & P Realty.
    The cashier’s check was then used to purchase the house at 5138
    Doliver Street.   To obtain a conviction under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i),8
    the government must prove that Pipkin:   (1) conducted or attempted
    to conduct a financial transaction, (2) which he knew involved the
    proceeds of unlawful activity, (3) with the intent either to
    conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or
    control of the proceeds of unlawful activity. See United States v.
    West, 
    22 F.3d 586
    , 590-91 (5th Cir. 1994).
    Pipkin does not deny that the evidence is sufficient to
    support a finding that he conducted a financial transaction which
    he knew involved the proceeds of unlawful activity.        He does,
    8
    Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) provides that:
    (a)(1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved
    in a financial transaction represents the proceeds
    of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or
    attempts to conduct such a financial transaction
    which in fact involves the proceeds of specified
    unlawful activity --
    ***
    (B) knowing that the transaction is designed in
    whole or in part --
    (i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the
    location, the source, the ownership, or the
    control of the proceeds of specified unlawful
    activity
    ***
    shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than
    $500,000 or twice the value of the property
    involved in the transaction, whichever is greater,
    or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or
    both.
    13
    however, argue that the evidence is insufficient to support an
    inference that he did so with intent to conceal.           Pipkin contends
    that he merely purchased a cashier’s check using a check signed by
    him.   The check was drawn on an account of a corporation he owned,
    and the evidence shows he made no secret of his ownership.                The
    check was used to purchase a house, which he then occupied.            Pipkin
    contends that he used a cashier’s check to pay for the house
    because title companies will not take personal checks at closings.
    Because his purchase of the check was “open and notorious,” United
    States v. Dobbs, 
    63 F.3d 391
    , 397 (5th Cir. 1995), Pipkin asserts,
    the evidence is insufficient to show he concealed the transaction.
    We disagree.
    Under our Circuit’s law, concealment can be established by
    showing that “the transaction is part of a larger scheme designed
    to conceal illegal proceeds.”        United States v. Ismoila, 
    100 F.3d 380
    , 390 (5th Cir. 1996), petition for cert. filed (Mar. 31, 1997)
    (No. 96-8492).     As we said in United States v. Willey,        “it in not
    necessary to prove ... that the particular transaction charged is
    itself highly unusual....”     United States v. Willey, 
    57 F.3d 1374
    ,
    1386 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct 675 (1995).                  “Indeed,
    viewed in isolation, many transactions charged as money laundering
    could not be classified as ‘unusual’ financial transactions. Those
    who would launder illegal proceeds frequently use cash, personal
    checks, or cashier’s checks to pay for the assets or to make the
    transfers that are charged as money laundering.”          
    Id. at 1386
    n.23.
    In   determining   whether   there    is   a   larger   scheme   to   conceal
    14
    proceeds, the defendant’s use of “a third party, for example, a
    business entity or a relative, to purchase goods on [her] behalf
    ... usually constitutes sufficient proof of a design to conceal.”
    
    Id. at 1385.
    The facts of this case prove that Pipkin’s purchase of the
    cashier’s check was more than an innocent isolated transaction.
    Rather, the purchase was part of a larger scheme designed to
    conceal illegal proceeds.     In buying the Doliver Street house,
    Pipkin led the owner to believe that he was purchasing the house in
    trust for his children, using a third party as trustee.                 The
    trustee then purchased the house with the understanding between
    himself and Pipkin that he would eventually transfer the house into
    Pipkin’s name. At the closing, the owner was given the $320,797.97
    cashier’s check Pipkin bought.     The check was payable to the Aspen
    Mortgage Company, in order to pay off the prior mortgage on the
    house.   After the trustee bought the house, a lease agreement was
    prepared showing   that   Pipkin   was   leasing   the   house   from   the
    trustee.   The house was then transferred to Sam Houston Oil and
    Gas, a corporation which Pipkin controlled.        The record reflects
    that Sam Houston Oil and Gas never conducted any business, but was
    a shell corporation.
    Given these numerous, complicated transactions, many involving
    third parties (including a shell corporation), there is abundant
    evidence of Pipkin’s concealment.         Therefore, the evidence is
    sufficient to support Pipkin’s conviction of money laundering in
    Count 9.
    15
    Speedy Trial Act
    Pipkin asserts that his trial did not begin until 917 days
    after his initial appearance.   Pipkin argues that because of this
    delay, the district court erred in not dismissing the indictment
    pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq.   Pipkin
    failed to move for dismissal of the indictment prior to trial.   He
    therefore waived his right to dismissal under the Speedy Trial Act.
    See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (“Failure of the defendant to move for
    dismissal prior to trial ... shall constitute a waiver of the right
    to dismissal under this section.”); United States v. Bradfield, 
    103 F.3d 1207
    , 1220 (5th Cir. 1997).
    Materiality Instruction
    In United States v. Gaudin, 
    115 S. Ct. 2310
    (1995), the Court
    held that where materiality is an element of the offense, a
    defendant has a constitutional right to have the jury instructed on
    the question of materiality.    Pipkin contends that the district
    court erred in not instructing the jury that any misrepresentations
    he made in the wire fraud scheme were material misrepresentation.
    Assuming, without deciding, that the wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C.
    § 1343, requires that the misrepresentations be material,9 there is
    still no error.    The jury was properly instructed that it was to
    determine whether the misrepresentations were material. See United
    States v. McGuire, 
    99 F.3d 671
    , 672-73 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc),
    9
    See United States v. Faulhaber, 
    929 F.2d 16
    , 18 (1st Cir.
    1991) (finding no materiality requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 1341, the
    mail fraud statute).
    16
    petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. (U.S. Jan. 29, 1997) (No. 96-
    1206).
    Impeachment of Witness Instruction
    Pipkin argues that the district court erred in refusing to
    include in the charge an instruction regarding impeachment by
    evidence of untruthful character.    During the trial, a witness
    testified that Cartwright, president of MCC and a key government
    witness against Pipkin, was not an honest person and is a “very
    good con man.”   Pipkin’s defense was that Cartwright, not Pipkin
    had committed the crimes, and that Cartwright was lying.
    As part of that strategy, Pipkin asked that the jury be given
    the following instruction:
    You have heard the testimony of Robert Cartwright.
    You also heard testimony from others concerning
    their opinion about whether that witness is a
    truthful person or the witness’s reputation, in the
    community where the witness lives, for telling the
    truth.   It is up to you to decide from what you
    heard here whether Robert Cartwright was telling
    the truth in this trial.     In deciding this, you
    should bear in mind the testimony concerning the
    witness’s reputation for truthfulness as well as
    all the other factors already mentioned.
    The district court refused to give this instruction, and instead
    gave a general instruction regarding the credibility of witnesses.
    As part of that instruction, the district court told the jury that:
    You are the sole judges of the credibility or
    “believability” of each witness and the weight to
    be given the witness’s testimony.     An important
    part of your job will be making judgments about the
    testimony of the witnesses including the defendant
    who testified in this case.      You should decide
    whether you believe what each person had to say,
    and how important that testimony was.
    17
    District courts have “substantial latitude in formulating the
    jury charge,” United States v. Laury, 
    49 F.3d 145
    , 152 (5th Cir.),
    cert. denied, 116. S. Ct. 162 (1995), and we review refusals of
    requested jury instructions for abuse of discretion.                             We reverse
    “only if the requested instruction (1) is substantively correct;
    (2) was not substantially covered in the charge actually delivered
    to the jury; and (3) concerns an important point in the trial so
    that failure to give it seriously impairs the defendant’s ability
    to effectively present a given defense.”                         United States v. Gray,
    
    105 F.3d 956
    , 967 (5th Cir.) (internal quotations and citations
    omitted), cert. denied, 
    117 S. Ct. 1326
    (1997).                             In essence, our
    inquiry         is   whether    “the   defendant         was     improperly      denied    an
    opportunity to convey his case to the jury.”                           
    Laury, 49 F.3d at 152
    .
    Instructions         regarding    the       credibility         of    witnesses    was
    substantially covered in the charge the district court gave and
    Pipkin was not improperly denied an opportunity to convey his case
    to   the    jury.         See   
    Laury, 49 F.3d at 152
      (failure    to    give
    instruction          on   substance    abuse       by   a    witness    not    grounds    for
    reversal when jury was given the general credibility instruction);
    United States v. Moore, 
    786 F.2d 1308
    , 1316 (5th Cir. 1986) (no
    error      in    denying     instruction       regarding         witness’s      psychiatric
    condition when judge gave jury general credibility instruction).
    Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
    refusing to give the requested instruction.
    18
    CONCLUSION
    The government did not prove that Pipkin knew that structuring
    was a crime.   Therefore, under Ratzlaf v. United States, 
    114 S. Ct. 655
    (1994), the evidence is insufficient to support his structuring
    convictions.   Accordingly, we REVERSE the structuring convictions
    on Counts 11 through 13 and VACATE the sentences on these counts.
    The district court committed no other reversible error, so we
    AFFIRM all other convictions and sentences.
    19