in Re Christopher Haines ( 2018 )


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  •                                 Fourth Court of Appeals
    San Antonio, Texas
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    No. 04-18-00654-CV
    IN RE Christopher HAINES
    Original Mandamus Proceeding 1
    Opinion by:        Irene Rios, Justice
    Sitting:           Karen Angelini, Justice
    Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
    Irene Rios, Justice
    Delivered and Filed: November 28, 2018
    PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS CONDITIONALLY GRANTED
    Relator asserts the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the real party in interest to
    amend her petition after the trial court rendered a take-nothing summary judgment in favor of
    relator. We agree and conditionally grant the petition.
    BACKGROUND
    The real party in interest (hereinafter, the “plaintiff”) sued relator, relator’s brother Daniel
    Haines, and Texas Clydesdales, LLC alleging the following causes of action: (1) breach of
    contract, (2) common law fraud, (3) negligent misrepresentation, (4) conversion, and (5) violations
    of the Theft Liability Act. After Daniel died, plaintiff filed a first amended petition in which she
    1
    This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2017CI18574, styled Virginia Castillo v. Christopher Haines and Daniel
    Haines, pending in the 150th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable John D. Gabriel, Jr.
    presiding.
    04-18-00654-CV
    alleged the following claims against relator and Daniel’s estate: (1) promissory estoppel and (2)
    unjust enrichment. Texas Clydesdales, LLC and all other causes of action were dropped.
    On June 29, 2018, relator moved for both a traditional summary judgment and a no-
    evidence summary judgment on plaintiff’s promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment claims. In
    his motion for summary judgment, relator asked for relief only as to himself. 2 Plaintiff filed a
    response to relator’s motion for summary judgment. After relator filed a reply, plaintiff filed a
    response, stating, “The Plaintiff is now going to amend the petition again to include an Implied-
    in-Law Contract or quasi contract [claim].” Plaintiff did not file a second amended petition;
    therefore, the live pleading before the trial court when it considered relator’s motion for summary
    judgment was plaintiff’s first amended petition. On July 25, 2018, the trial court granted relator’s
    motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s two claims and ordered that plaintiff take nothing on
    these “causes of action against [relator].”
    On or about August 14, 2018, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a second amended
    petition. In this motion, plaintiff admitted “[t]he purpose of [her] amendment is to add a new claim
    of implied-in-law contract . . . .” Plaintiff contended relator could not claim surprise by the
    amendment and could have reasonably anticipated a claim of implied-in-law-contract because
    plaintiff “eluded that she was going to amend her pleadings in her response to [relator’s] motion
    for summary judgment prior to the summary judgment being granted.” Plaintiff also noted, “on
    August 9, 2018, [relator] filed a motion to sever [relator] to finalize the judgment on claims against
    him and [sic] is set for hearing on Monday, August 20, 2018.” Relator filed a response and
    objection to the motion for leave to amend.
    2
    Daniel’s estate did not move for summary judgment.
    -2-
    04-18-00654-CV
    On August 23, 2018, the trial court signed a written order granting plaintiff leave to file the
    second amended petition. The mandamus record contains a copy of the “judge’s notes,” which
    contain an August 23 hand-written notation stating, “The court finds that the summary judgment
    order is interlocutory.” The “notes” also state the motion to sever was denied. The next day,
    plaintiff filed her second amended petition in which she raised the following claims “against
    [relator] as the sole heir of Daniel Haines Estate:” (1) implied-in-law contract and (2) promissory
    estoppel. She also raised the implied-in-law contract claim against relator individually.
    ANALYSIS
    In his petition for writ of mandamus, relator asserts the trial court abused its discretion by
    allowing plaintiff to file an amended petition after the trial court rendered a take-nothing summary
    judgment in his favor. In her response to the petition, plaintiff contends she could seek leave of
    court to file an amended petition pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 63. Plaintiff contends
    relator cannot and did not show surprise under Rule 63 because she “eluded that she was going to
    amend her petition in her” response to relator’s motion for summary judgment.
    Rule 63 provides in pertinent part as follows:
    Parties may amend their pleadings . . . at such time as not to operate as a surprise
    to the opposite party; provided, that any pleadings . . . offered for filing within seven
    days of the date of trial or thereafter, or after such time as may be ordered by the
    judge under Rule 166, shall be filed only after leave of the judge is obtained, which
    leave shall be granted by the judge unless there is a showing that such filing will
    operate as a surprise to the opposite party.
    TEX. R. CIV. P. 63 (emphasis added). A summary judgment proceeding is a trial within the
    meaning of Rule 63. Goswami v. Metro. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 
    751 S.W.2d 487
    , 490 (Tex. 1988)
    (considering amendment filed four days before summary judgment hearing).
    Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c) provides that a summary judgment shall be rendered
    on the “pleadings . . . on file at the time of the hearing, or filed thereafter and before judgment with
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    04-18-00654-CV
    permission of the court . . ..” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c) (emphasis added). To file an amended
    pleading after the summary judgment hearing but before judgment is rendered, a non-movant must
    secure the trial court’s permission. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); see also Prater v. State Farm Lloyds,
    
    217 S.W.3d 739
    , 741 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.); Denman v. Citgo Pipeline Co., 
    123 S.W.3d 728
    , 735 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.); Automaker, Inc. v. C.C.R.T. Co., 
    976 S.W.2d 744
    , 745 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.); TEX. R. CIV. P. 63 (requiring
    leave of court to file any pleading “within seven days of the date of trial or thereafter”). A trial
    court cannot grant a motion to amend the pleadings once the court renders judgment. 
    Prater, 217 S.W.3d at 741
    ; 
    Denman, 123 S.W.3d at 735
    ; 
    Automaker, 976 S.W.2d at 746
    .
    Plaintiff argues Automaker does not apply here because the summary judgment in that case
    was final and appealable; whereas here, the summary judgment in favor of relator is interlocutory.
    Whether the summary judgment is final or interlocutory is of no consequence. Relator is seeking
    mandamus relief from an order allowing plaintiff to amend her petition to assert additional claims
    against relator after the trial court rendered a take-nothing summary judgment in his favor on all
    claims asserted against him in plaintiff’s last live pleading before the court.
    Plaintiff’s implied-in-contract claim was not on file at the time of the summary judgment
    hearing and was not filed thereafter “before judgment with permission of the court.” See TEX. R.
    CIV. P. 166a(c) (emphasis added). Rather, plaintiff filed her second amended petition to add this
    claim twenty days after the trial court signed the order granting relator’s take-nothing summary
    judgment. Therefore, we conclude the trial court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion to amend.
    See 
    Prater, 217 S.W.3d at 741
    (holding trial court properly considered amended petition “a nullity”
    because it was filed after trial court had signed order granting take-nothing summary judgment in
    defendant’s favor); 
    Denman, 123 S.W.3d at 735
    (refusing to consider claims raised in petition filed
    after summary judgment granted).
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    04-18-00654-CV
    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons stated above, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus, and
    direct the trial court to vacate, within fifteen days of this opinion, its August 23, 2018 Order
    Granting Leave to File Amended Pleadings as that order applies to any claims asserted by plaintiff
    against relator in plaintiff’s second amended petition. We are confident the trial court will comply
    with this opinion within the next fifteen days. A writ will issue only if the trial court fails to do
    so.
    Irene Rios, Justice
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