Chris Traylor, as Executive Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission And the Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. Diana D., as Next Friend of KD, a Child Karen G., as Next Friend of TG and ZM, Children Guadalupe P., as Next Friend of LP, a Child Sally L., as Next Friend of CH, a Child Dena D., as Next Friend of BD, a Child OCI Acquisition, LLC ( 2016 )

ACCEPTED
03-15-00657-CV
11226023
THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
6/20/2016 11:40:07 AM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
CLERK
No. 03-15-00657-CV
In the Court of Appeals FILED IN
3rd COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
for the Third Judicial District 6/20/2016 11:40:07 AM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
Austin, Texas Clerk
Chris Traylor, as Executive Commissioner of the
Texas Health and Human Services Commission, et al.,
Appellants,
v.
Diana D., as Next Friend of KD, a Child, et al.,
Appellees.
On Appeal from the
200th Judicial District Court, Travis County
APPELLANTS’ RESPONSE TO APPELLEES’
“EMERGENCY MOTION FOR WRIT OF
ENFORCEMENT”
T O T HE H ONORABLE T HIRD C OURT OF A PPEALS :
As the Commission has repeatedly pointed out, plaintiffs seek to win this
case, and avoid the impact of Medicaid spending cuts mandated by the
Legislature, by drawing out the appellate process and avoiding application of
the statutes until the end of the current biennium. The Commission
challenged the district court’s issuance of a counter-supersedeas order on this
ground, among others. In its opinion rejecting plaintiffs’ legal theory, this
Court declared the Commission’s Rule 24 challenge to counter-supersedeas
to be moot. The Commission has understood that decision to mean that the
temporary injunction is now superseded under the automatic suspension
effected by its notice of appeal. If the Court determines that the vacatur of the
counter-supersedeas did not occur at the time of the issuance of the opinion
and had to wait till the mandate issued, the Commission asks for a ruling to
that effect so that it can immediately file a writ of mandamus on the
supersedeas issue (which is, by rule, independent of the appellate judgment)
in the Texas Supreme Court, so that it can obtain emergency relief and avoid
spending more than approximately $4,167,000 per month that the Legislature
never intended be spent.
Summary of the Argument
There is no basis for a motion to enforce to be filed in either the district
court or this court, because the panel’s opinion put the Commission’s
supersedeas of the temporary injunction order back in place. The proper next
step is for plaintiffs to seek mandamus relief in the Supreme Court regarding
the panel’s vacatur of their counter-supersedeas, when it dismissed the
challenge to the counter-supersedeas as moot.
Putting aside the supersedeas issues, the motion for “emergency
enforcement” should be denied, because the underlying motion for contempt
was filed in the wrong court. The plain text of the rules, and this Court’s
precedent, contemplate the filing of a motion for contempt in the court of
appeals to trigger a referral request. TEX. R. APP. P. 29.4. Because the motion
2
was filed in the wrong forum, the Court should summarily deny the relief
requested.
Even assuming the referral request were procedurally sound, it should be
denied because (1) there is no issue of fact and this Court is best suited to
determine the relevant issues of law and (2) the vacatur of the counter-
supersedeas evidenced an intent that the panel’s opinion go into effect
immediately. Denial of the motion is all the more appropriate, because the
district court could not grant plaintiffs the relief they seek without violating
the general standards of law announced in the Court’s opinion, which became
binding as law of the case from the moment the opinion issued.
Finally, there is no alternative basis for interim relief under Rule 29.3 or
the Court’s inherent powers. Rule 29.3 does not allow for a party to seek relief
it could otherwise have obtained in supersedeas, TEX. R. APP. P. 29.3, which
means that plaintiffs should pursue their remedy under Rule 24.4. And the
Court’s inherent power extends only to the power to preserve appellate
jurisdiction, which would not be impacted by a change to lower
reimbursement rates.
I. Plaintiffs Ask the Court to Place Decisions
Regarding the Appellate Process in the District
Court.
Plaintiffs’ motion asks for several forms of relief, at least one of which is
not mentioned in the prayer. While invoking several appellate rules, however,
plaintiffs fail to cite the text of the rules or the relevant precedent governing
3
interim appellate relief.1 The motion: (1) seeks an order referring enforcement
proceedings to the trial court, under Rule 29.4, Motion at 2; (2) asserts,
without citation, that parties are entitled to “have their rights preserved until
final disposition of the appeal,” Motion at 3; (3) suggests that the temporary
injunction is, necessarily, enforceable until the mandate issues, Motion at 3-4;
(4) seek relief as of right under Rule 29.3, Motion at 4.
Strikingly, plaintiffs fail even to mention the issue of supersedeas, which
ought to govern the present enforceability of the temporary injunction. At the
time the Court issued its opinion and judgment, the Court dismissed as moot
the Commission’s Rule 24.4 challenge to the trial court’s counter-
supersedeas order. In doing so, the Court implicitly (but necessarily)
determined that the trial court’s counter-supersedeas order was, as of that
moment, no longer in effect. Otherwise, the Commission’s challenge to the
order’s validity would not have been moot.
II. There is No Basis to Enforce the Temporary
Injunction, Because it is Currently Superseded.
The Court’s decision dismisses the challenge to the counter-supersedeas
as moot. See Traylor v. Diana D., No. 03-15-00657-CV, 2016 WL 1639871, at
*1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Supersedeas is not
1
Plaintiffs have suggested that the district court has jurisdiction over its contempt motion
“notwithstanding the appellate rules.” See Cover Letter to District Court Alerting it to this
Filing, Appendix Tab A. Plaintiffs cite no authority for this proposition, because there is
none. This motion should be summarily denied, because it should have been filed pursuant
to a motion for contempt filed in this Court, not a spurious motion for contempt filed in the
district court contrary to the rules of appellate procedure. See infra, Part III.B.1.
4
part of the judgment, but is challenged through a separate challenge
proceeding, that results in a rule-based mandamus in the Texas Supreme
Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 24.4. Supersedeas challenges, therefore, cannot be
subject to the requirements of mandate issuance, which applies only to the
“judgment.” TEX. R. APP. P. 18.1. While the dismissal of the Rule 24 motion
on mootness grounds necessarily reflects that the vacatur of the temporary
injunction was intended to take immediate effect, see Edwards Aquifer Auth. v.
Chemical Lime, Ltd., 291 S.W.3d 392, 393-94 (Tex. 2009), the temporary
injunction is not enforceable because of the principles governing supersedeas,
separate and apart from questions regarding the effective date of the judgment
regarding the temporary injunction.
The default rule is that suits for injunctive relief are superseded by the
State’s notice of appeal. In re State Bd. for Educator Certification, 452 S.W.3d
802, 804 (Tex. 2014) (“the State’s notice of appeal automatically suspends
enforcement of a judgment”). A superseded injunction cannot be enforced.
The supersedeas has been prevented from taking effect only by the counter-
supersedeas order, which the State has challenged under Rule 24, separate
from its appeal of the other interlocutory orders below. Because the Rule 24
challenge was dismissed as moot in the present tense, Diana D., 2016 WL
1639871, at *1 n.1, the only reasonable reading of the panel’s decision is that
the counter-supersedeas was dissolved effective upon the issuance of the
opinion. At that moment, the Commission’s notice of appeal’s automatic
5
supersedeas was reinvigorated. It now supersedes the judgment below, and
there is no basis for enforcing the district court’s order.
The upshot of the procedural wrangling in this case is that plaintiffs will
win everything they ask for—the continuation of higher Medicaid rates
through the end of the current biennium and the expenditure of millions of
dollars in funds the Legislature did not appropriate—merely through the
technicalities of the appellate process. The rules contemplate a fix for this
solution: mandamus to the Texas Supreme Court regarding vacatur of the
counter-supersedeas order. TEX. R. APP. P. 24.4(a). If plaintiffs wish to
reimpose counter-supersedeas and render the temporary injunction
enforceable again, they should seek relief in the Supreme Court, not the
district court or this Court. In any event, enforcement or non-enforcement of
the temporary injunction will not deprive the courts of appellate jurisdiction
or deprive plaintiffs of their appellate remedies. See infra, Part III.D.
By the same token, if the Court did not intend for its opinion rejecting
plaintiffs’ claims to have effect during the biennium, but instead intended for
plaintiffs to “win by losing,” the Commission asks that the Court issue an
order denying its Rule 24.4 motion so that the Commission can seek
emergency relief in the Supreme Court and prevent further procedural
roadblocks to implementing the statutorily-mandated cuts to Medicaid rates
for these services. In either event, because interim enforcement of the
temporary injunction turns on supersedeas, the next step is in the Supreme
Court, not this Court or the district court.
6
III. Even assuming the Counter-Supersedeas
remains In effect despite being moot, there is
No Basis for Appellate Enforcement of the
Temporary Injunction, or Any Other Form of
Temporary Relief.
Even assuming the counter-supersedeas remains in place, there is no basis
in law for plaintiffs to maintain the effect of the district court’s order pending
appeal, because (1) the Court’s judgment was designed to take effect
immediately, (2) these enforcement motions were wrongly filed in the district
court, rather than this Court, in contravention of Rule 29.4; and (3) plaintiffs
do not qualify for relief under Rule 29.3 or the appellate courts’ inherent
power to protect appellate jurisdiction.
A. Footnote 1 Makes the Judgment Immediately Enforceable,
Because it Vacates the Counter-Supersedeas as Moot.
As explained above, by stating that Rule 24.4 motion was moot at the time
the opinion issued, the panel vacated the countersupersedeas. It also,
necessarily, manifested an intent that the coercive power of the judgment
below be vacated at the time of the opinion. See Chemical Lime, 291 S.W.3d at
393-944. Because the language of footnote 1 presupposes that a change in the
status quo occurred at the time the opinion issued—otherwise, the Rule 24.4
challenge, which is on a completely different track of judicial review, would
not be mooted until the mandate issued. Thus, at least the portion of the
judgment that disallows plaintiffs from maintaining this lawsuit was intended
to go into effect contemporaneously with the opinion. This is a different point
than articulating that the supersedeas went into effect; the judgment was
7
necessarily immediately affected by the opinion, because otherwise footnote 1
would mean nothing.
This is precisely why Rule 29.4 places the contempt power over
interlocutory appeals in the appellate courts. See TEX. R. APP. P. 29.4. If they
intend their orders to go into effect immediately, the appellate courts are best
suited to resolve questions about the timing by which their legal conclusions
are implemented. Any motion for enforcement pending interlocutory appeal
should have originated in this Court, which is best suited to interpret its own
view of the law.
B. Plaintiffs Are Not Procedurally or Substantively Entitled to
Invoke Rule 29.4.
Plaintiffs treat their motion as a request to have a hearing in the district
court, at which the district court would enforce the temporary injunction in
place of this panel. The current filing is improper, because a Rule 29.4 referral
has to stem from a motion to enforce filed in this Court; the text of the
appellate rules forecloses a motion, like this one, that starts in the district court
and the proceeds to ask the court of appeals to cure the jurisdictional defect of
filing in the wrong forum. See infra, Part III.B.1. Nor would a referral be
substantively appropriate even if the motion to enforce had been filed in the
correct forum. While referral would be permissible in a proceeding where
evidence must heard, see TEX. R. APP. P. 29.4(a), there is no need for district
court proceedings in this case, because there is no dispute issue of fact. See
infra, Part III.B.2.
8
1. To obtain a Rule 29.4 referral order form this Court,
plaintiffs would have had to satisfy the filing requirements
for contempt before this Court.
Rule 29.4 contemplates that a party move for contempt in the appellate
court and seek referral to the district court if necessary. E.g., Victory Cheval
Holdings, LLC v. Antolik, No. 03-15-00464-CV, 2015 WL 5315646, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2015) (per curiam). That reading follows from rule’s plain text,
which makes enforcement of interlocutory orders a matter primarily of this
Court’s jurisdiction. TEX. R. APP. P. 29.4 (“only the appellate court in which
the appeal is pending may enforce the order”); TEX. R. CIV. P. 692 (setting
out formal requirements to enforce injunction, which are to be filed “in the
court in which such injunction is pending”); see In re Sheshtawy, 154 S.W.3d
114, 121 (Tex. 2004) (contrasting Court’s enforcement power over
interlocutory appeals with supersedeas regime governing enforcement of
judgments during appeal). It is procedurally improper to first file a motion for
contempt in the trial court, then to seek relief in this Court without first
invoking this Court’s Rule 29.4 motions. See IPSecure, Inc. v. Carrales, No. 04-
16-00005-CV, 2016 WL 3342108, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 15,
2016, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (concluding that district court lacked jurisdiction
to enforce temporary injunction on original motion, pursuant to rules of
appellate procedure 29.4 and 29.5)
Nor can the “Emergency Motion” now at issue qualify as a constructive
attempt to seek contempt in this Court. See Ex parte Blanchard, 736 S.W.2d
642, 643 (Tex. 1987) (per curiam) (contempt must be preceded by personal
9
service on the alleged contemnor of an appropriate show cause order or legally
equivalent method of notice); see also Ex parte Vetterick, 744 S.W.2d 598, 599
(Tex. 1988) (orig. proceeding).
Because plaintiffs have not attempted to invoke this Court’s contempt
power, they are not entitled to seek a referral to the district court under the
plain text of Rule 29.4. Their request for relief is an improper attempt to ask
this Court to cure their filing of a contempt motion in the wrong court. The
failure to file in the correct court warrants summary denial of the motion.
2. It would not be necessary to refer even an appropriately-filed
contempt proceeding to the district court, because as a matter
of law the Commission’s alleged actions do not violate the
temporary injunction.
Even if plaintiffs’ Rule 29.4 motion were procedurally firm, there is no
reason to refer the contempt issue to the district court, because there are no
facts to be found, only legal analyses to be made. See TEX. R. APP. P. 29.4(a),
(b) (describing district court’s role as being to “hear evidence” and “make
findings”). This Court is entirely capable of determining whether the
Commission’s actions violate the temporary injunction that the panel has
already held was brought by plaintiffs with no standing to sue, based on a non-
viable legal theory. Indeed, the district court could not issue any relief
consistent with the legal principles articulated in the Court’s opinion, because
the Court has foreclosed these plaintiffs from seeking judicial relief generally.
Further, the Commission’s actions about which plaintiffs complain are
not subject to contempt because they are not clearly and unambiguously
10
within the scope of the temporary injunction. To be enforceable by contempt,
an injunction decree must “set forth the terms of compliance in clear, specific
and unambiguous terms so that the person charged with obeying the decree
will readily know exactly what duties and obligations are imposed upon him.”
Ex parte Acker, 949 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The order may not be susceptible to
more than one interpretation. Ex Parte Glover, 701 S.W.2d 639, 640 (Tex.
1985) (orig. proceeding.
In their contempt motion before the district court, plaintiffs attached only
a public-notice document related to the submission of new rates to the federal
government. Tab B, Exhibit C; see also Tab B at 4 ¶ 5. The temporary
injunction expressly allow this action. “This Order does not affect HHSC’s
ability to seek CMS’s approval of the State Plan Amendment.” CR.596. 2 Just
as plaintiffs’ improperly-filed motion for contempt fails to articulate a factual
basis for contempt, they could not allege any action falling within the
temporary injunction to this Court.
Nor is it a foregone conclusion that the (now reversed and vacated)
temporary injunction is currently enforceable, because it is subject to more
than one interpretation and, therefore, inconsistent with Glover. The order
prohibits the Commission from “taking any action to propose or implement
2
State law requires public notice of the intent to file a rate change with the federal govern-
ment. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE §32.0231. The public notice is, thus, a necessary part of the
filing with CMS contemplated by the temporary injunction.
11
any change in reimbursement rates,” while simultaneously providing that the
Commission may seek federal approval of rates. CR.596. Because the rates
plaintiffs attempt to challenge in this lawsuit have already been deliberated
upon, the first and best reading of the injunction is that the additional step of
filing with the federal agency does not controvert the injunction. But if the
injunction can be read so broadly as to preclude further action on the already
completed ratemaking process, it is susceptible of two meanings and, as a
result, unenforceable.
C. Rule 29.4 Proceedings in the District Court Would Be
Useless Because the Court is Currently Bound by the Panel’s
Conclusions of Law, Which Foreclose this Lawsuit in its
Entirety.
When an appellate decision reversing a trial court judgment goes into
effect, it can preclude the lower court’s enforcement of the underlying order
regardless of the mandate. E.g., Flanary v. Wade, 102 Tex. 63, 66-67, 113 S.W.
8, 10 (1908). This need not always be the rule, but it should be when the court
of appeals’s legal analysis forecloses the underlying lawsuit. While the
judgment and mandate are required to enforce the judgment, the court of
appeals’s legal reasoning becomes precedential immediately. See Blair v.
Fletcher, 849 S.W.2d 344, 345 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam) (when law is
determined during scope of appeal, lower court must render its decision in
light of the change in the law).
Likewise, the Court’s opinion makes clear that the rates at issue in this
lawsuit were arrived at consistent with the relevant rules and statutes. Diana
12
D., 2016 WL 1639871, at *9-*11. A temporary injunction cannot be enforced
to preclude an act authorized by law. Villalobos v. Holguin, 146 Tex. 474, 480,
208 S.W.2d 871, 875 (1948) (“the decree must not be so broad as to enjoin a
defendant from activities which are lawful and a proper exercise of his
rights”). Accordingly, because the opinion states legal principles that cannot
be controverted by the district court, there would be no legal basis for a district
court to reach a substantively contrary result. Only this Court has power to
allow the plaintiffs to prevail on the procedural side of the ledger, when it has
conclusively rejected their legal arguments as a matter of law. The rule
requiring that interlocutory orders be enforced by the court currently
exercising appellate jurisdiction, TEX. R. APP. P. 29.4, makes a lot of sense.
D. Plaintiffs Have No “Right” to a Particular Level of Medicaid
Funding, and So Cannot Obtain Rule 29.3 Relief.
Plaintiffs refer to Rule 29.3, at some points, and repeatedly aver that they
are entitled to appellate relief that protects their “rights.” E.g., Motion at 4.
However, as the Commission explained in its appellate briefing and the Court
concluded, there are no “rights” to future levels of reimbursement because
Medicaid rates are always subject to being lowered based on the amount of
funds appropriated.
Rule 29.3 relief cannot be granted if the same relief could have been
obtained by supersedeas in the trial court. TEX. R. APP. P. 29.3. Plaintiffs
obtained the very remedy they now seek from this Court in the order granting
13
counter-supersedeas relief. They are, therefore, precluded from seeking a
temporary order in this Court.
But even if plaintiffs had not sought, or could not seek, supersedeas, their
request for Rule 29.3 would still necessarily fail. Rule 29.3 places a burden on
the movant to make a “clear showing” that a present right has been violated.
Falcon v. Bonanza Capital, Ltd., No. 03-12-00132-CV, 2012 WL 1655809, at
*1 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.) (per curiam). Thus, for example, the
Court has issued Rule 29.3 relief to prevent a trial in derogation of an
interlocutory appeal regarding an arbitration clause. EnerVest Operating, LLC
v. Molett, No. 03-11-00823-CV, 2012 WL 1647991, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin
2012, no pet.) (per curiam). The most common use of the Rule has been to
enforce the automatic stay provision that governs most interlocutory appeals.
E.g., Trulock v. City of Duncanville, 277 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2009, no pet.). It has been used to seal documents while an interlocutory
appeal is pending. Monsanto Co. v. Davis, 10 S.W.3d 28, 29 (Tex. App.—Waco
2002, no pet.) (per curiam). It has also been cited, perhaps unnecessarily, as a
basis for issuing injunctive relief to preserve the res of a real-estate dispute.
Lavigne v. Holder, 186 S.W.3d 625, 626 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no
pet.).
But the rule has never been used, as plaintiffs seek to use it in this case, to
bestow on a party the very relief it would obtain if that party ultimately
prevailed in the pending litigation. As the Court correctly noted in Mote
Resources Inc. v. Railroad Commission, there is a difference between the subject
14
matter of the dispute and the legal result of the litigation, 618 S.W.2d 877, 879
(Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1981, no writ). The property interest at issue in Mote
Resources existed as a matter of law until the court acted. This prohibits relief
requesting that a temporary injunction order be left in place pending appeal.
Lamar Builders, Inc. v. Guardian Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 786 S.W.2d 789, 790-91
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ).
As the Court has already concluded, plaintiffs have no present right to
retain the same or similar reimbursement rates for Medicaid services in the
future. Diana D., 2016 WL 1639871, at *6 (holding that plaintiffs lack vested
rights). Because Medicaid funding is always contingent on cuts in
appropriations, 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE § 32.028,
plaintiffs have no presently enforceable right on which to base their request
for Rule 29.3 relief.
E. Plaintiffs Cannot Invoke the Inherent Power to Protect
Appellate Jurisdiction, Because a Change in the Rates Will
Not Moot these Proceedings.
Plaintiffs suggest that some sort of relief is necessary to protect their
“right . . . to have their rights preserved until final disposition of the appeal.”
Motion at 2. This is a misstatement of the scope of appellate power and the
nature of an appealing party’s rights. Apart from the broader power to issue
temporary relief and enforce unsuperseded temporary orders pending
interlocutory appeals, see TEX. R. APP. P. 29.3, 29.4, the appellate courts have
only inherent authority to issue relief pending interlocutory appeal, and that
15
authority extends only to orders that protect appellate jurisdiction, see TEX.
CONST. art. V § 6(a); e.g., Madison v. Martinez, 42 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Tex. Civ.
App.—Dallas 1931, writ ref’d). A writ of appellate injunction is appropriate,
for example, to prevent the sale of real property to which a party asserts a
present right that will not cease to exist unless and until a court rules on the
substance of the lawsuit. E.g., Mote Resources, 618 S.W.2d at 879 (issuing
appellate injunction for deprivation of title to oil and gas produced under the
rule of capture, because property interest in captured minerals would not be
extinguished, if at all, until final judgment). Anything less than the potential
dissolution of the appeal cannot trigger the Court’s inherent powers.
This Court’s inherent grant of injunction power is significantly more
constrained than the trial court’s power to issue a temporary injunction
preserving the status quo ante. See Baird v. Sam Houston Elec. Coop, 627
S.W.2d 732, 733-34 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] orig. proceeding) (per
curiam). The appellate court lacks authority to issue the writ merely to
preserve the parties from harm pending appeal. Id. The original writ cannot
issue to remedy a situation that would “result only in damages or
inconvenience . . . leaving the subject-matter of the appeal in such a condition
that the judgment of [the court of appeals] could effectively operate thereon.”
Madison, 42 S.W.2d at 86.
Plaintiffs do not assert that a change in rates would destroy jurisdiction
over this appeal. Indeed, the very structure of the Medicaid system is that
rates go into effect, may be rejected by the federal government or the courts,
16
and are then put back in place for future services provided or used. See Diana
D, 2016 WL 1639871, at *9. Because the rate making process contemplates
exactly this type of change, there is no potential basis for issuing an appellate
injunction.
Conclusion and Prayer
The Court should deny the relief requested because:
• the order on which plaintiffs rely was superseded by the
Court’s opinion when that opinion issued;
• plaintiffs have filed contempt proceedings in the wrong
court, in contravention of rule 29.4; and
• the underlying temporary injunction cannot support the
relief plaintiffs previously obtained through supersedeas
proceedings and now seek to reinstate.
There is no alternative basis for providing relief because:
• plaintiffs cannot qualify for temporary relief under Rule
29.3 because they already received similar relief under the
counter-supersedeas order, and their appropriate remedy is
to file a mandamus in the Supreme Court; and
• the Court’s inherent power to grant injunctive relief does
not extend to these plaintiffs because a change in the rates
will not moot the proceedings.
Accordingly, the Court should summarily deny the motion.
17
Respectfully submitted.
Ken Paxton Scott A. Keller
Attorney General of Texas Solicitor General
Jeffrey C. Mateer Kristofer S. Monson
First Assistant Attorney General Assistant Solicitor General
State Bar No. 24037129
Office of the Attorney General kristofer.monson@
P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059) texasattorneygeneral.gov
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
Tel.: (512) 936-1700
Fax: (512) 474-2697 /s/ Kristofer S. Monson
Kristofer S. Monson
Assistant Solicitor General
State Bar No. 24037129
kristofer.monson@texasattorneygen-
eral.gov
Counsel For Appellants
18
Certificate of Service
On June 20, 2016, this document was served electronically on:
Daniel R. Richards
Benjamin H. Hathaway
Richards Rodriguez & Skeith LLP
816 Congress Avenue
Suite 1200
Austin, Texas 78701
drichards@rrsfirm.com
bhathaway@rrsfirm.com
/s/ Kristofer S. Monson
Kristofer S. Monson
19
No. 03-15-00657-CV
In the Court of Appeals
for the Third Judicial District
Austin, Texas
CHRIS TRAYLOR, AS EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER OF THE TEXAS HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES COMMISSION, ET AL.,
Appellants,
v.
Diana D., as Next Friend of KD, a child, et al.,
Appellees.
On Appeal from the
200th Judicial District Court, Travis County
APPENDIX
Tab
1. Cover Letter to District Court Alerting it to this Filing ......................................... A
2. Motion for Contempt Improperly Filed in District Court ...................................... B
Tab A: Cover Letter to District Court
Alerting it to this Filing
CHASE C. HAMILTON
Direct Line: (512) 391-8262
chamilton@rrsfirm.com
June 16, 2016
The Honorable Tim Sulak Via Email Megan.Johnson@traviscountytx.gov
353rd Civil District Court
1000 Guadalupe, 5th Floor
Austin, Texas 78701
Re: Cause No. D-1-GN-15-003263 Diana D., as next of friend of KD, a child, et al. v.
Chris Traylor, as Executive Commissioner of Texas Health and Human Services
and Texas Health and Human Services Commission; In the 200th District Court of
Travis County, Texas.
Dear Judge Sulak:
As opposing counsel informed the court yesterday, Plaintiffs filed the attached motion for
emergency relief in the court of appeals. While there is case law to support the proposition that a
trial court has inherent power to enforce its orders, and that Plaintiffs’ motion for contempt is
properly before the trial court notwithstanding the rules of appellate procedure, the enforcement
of orders on appeal may begin with the court of appeals.
Therefore, out of an abundance of caution and to simplify the issues that will be before
the trial court, Plaintiffs have asked the court of appeals to formally authorize the trial court to
conduct a hearing on their motion for contempt, and to otherwise enforce the trial court’s order,
which remains in effect until the appeal is finally resolved and mandate issues. We have advised
the court of appeals that this Court is holding a June 22 hearing date, and ask that the Court keep
the June 22 setting available until such time as the court of appeals acts on Plaintiffs’ motion.
Sincerely,
RICHARDS RODRIGUEZ & SKEITH, LLP
Chase C. Hamilton
cc: All Parties of Record
816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1200, Austin, Texas 78701 | Phone: (512) 476-0005 | Fax: (512) 476-1513 | Web: www.rrsfirm.com
Tab B: Motion for Contempt Improperly
Filed in District Court
CAUSE NO. D-l-GN-15-003263
DIANA D., as next of friend of KD, a child, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
KAREN G., as next friend of TG and ZM, §
children, GUADALUPE P., as next of friend §
of LP, a child, SALLY L., as next of friend of §
CH, DENA D., as next friend of BD, a child, §
LESLIE M., as next friend of CM, a child §
OCI ACQUISITION, LLC d/b/a §
CARE OPTIONS FOR KIDS, §
CONNECTCARE SOLUTIONS, LLC §
d/b/a CONNECTCARE THERAPY FOR §
KIDS, ATLAS PEDIATRIC THERAPY §
CONSULTANTS LLC, and PATHFINDER §
PEDIATRIC HOME CARE, INC., §
200TH JUDICIAL DISTMCT OF
Plaintiffs,
V.
CHRIS TRAYLOR, as EXECUTIVE
COMMISSIONER of TEXAS
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
COMMISSION, and TEXAS
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
COMMISSION,
Defendants. TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS
PLAINTIFFS9 MOTION FOR CONTEMPT
TO THE HONORABLE TIM SULAK:
1. On September 25, 2015, this Court signed an Order Granting Temporary Injunction and
Denying Supersedeas (the "Temporary Injunction") in the above entitled and numbered cause.
The Temporary Injunction orders Defendants to desist and refrain from taking any action to
propose or implement any change in reimbursement rates for physical, occupational, and speech
therapy services under the Texas Medicaid program without conducting a review of payments
for providing Medicaid-reimbursable therapy services and conducting a review of costs
associated with providing Medicaid-reimbursable therapy services. Defendants filed a notice of
appeal and on April 21, 2016, the Third Court of Appeals issued its opinion and judgment
reversing this Court's Temporary Injunction and dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
However, the Third Court of Appeals has not issued mandate.
2. On May 31, 2016, Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion for extension of time to file a
petition for review in the Texas Supreme Court.1 On June 1, 2016, the Texas Supreme Court
granted the motion for extension of time setting the date for filing of a petition for review on July
6, 2016. On May 25, 2016, Defendants issued a notice of a proposed change in Medicaid
reimbursement rates that includes a change in the reimbursement rates for physical, occupational,
and speech therapy services. This notice was first made public on June 3, 2016 by publication
in the Texas Register. Upon information and belief, Defendants have neither conducted a review
of payments for providing Medicaid-reimbursable therapy services nor have they conducted a
review of costs associated with providing Medicaid-reimbursable therapy services as provided
for in the Temporary Injunction.
3. The Temporary Iniunction remains in effect until mandate is issued. Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 18.6 provides:
The appellate court's judgment on an appeal from an interlocutory order takes
effect when the mandate is issued. The court may issue the mandate with its
judgment or delay the mandate until the appeal is finally disposed of. If the
mandate is issued, any further proceeding in the trial court must conform to the
mandate.
1 A true and correct copy of the motion is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
2 A ti"ue and correct copy of the notice is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
3
A true and correct copy of the notice is attached hereto as Exhibit C. The notice was published at:
http://\vww.sos.state.tx.us/texreg/archive/June32016/In%20Addition/In%20Addition.html#186.
The pending appeal is an appeal of an interlocutory order, therefore T.R.A.P. 18.6 applies.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Third Court of Appeals only takes effect when mandate issues.
Mandate has not issued, therefore the judgment of the Third Court of Appeals has not taken
effect and the Temporary Injunction remains in effect. Under the Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 18.1(a)(2), the clerk of the Third Court of Appeals does not issue mandate until the
resolution of the petition for review. Because mandate has not issued and because mandate will
not issue so long as the petition for review is pending, the Temporary Injunction remains in
effect.
4. The Trial Court retains iurisdiction and may enter an order of contempt. Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 29.5 provides:
While an appeal from an interlocutory order is pending, the trial court retains
jurisdiction of the case and unless prohibited by statute may make further orders,
including one dissolving the order complained of on appeal. If permitted by law,
the trial court may proceed with a trial on the merits. But the court must not make
an order that:
(a) is inconsistent with any appellate court temporary order; or
(b) interferes with or impairs the jurisdiction of the appellate court or
effectiveness of any relief sought or that may be granted on appeal.
T.R.A.P. 29.5 confers continuing jurisdiction on the trial court during the period between the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and the issuance of mandate. In re KY, 273 S.W.3d 703, 707-
08 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (Trial court had jurisdiction to proceed to trial
on the merits between issuance of judgment and mandate by Court of Appeals.) The pending
appeal is an appeal of an interlocutory order, therefore this Court retains jurisdiction of the case
and may make further orders. A contempt order enforcing the Temporary Injunction is not
inconsistent with any appellate court temporary order because no temporary order has been
granted. A contempt order does not interfere with or impair the jurisdiction of the appellate
court or the effectiveness of any relief sought or that may be granted on appeal.
5. Defendants have violated the Temporary Injunction. The notice issued by Defendants is
an act to propose or implement a change in reimbursement rates for physical, occupational, and
speech therapy services. Upon information and belief, Defendants have neither conducted a
review of payments nor have they conducted a review of costs associated with providing
Medicaid-reimbursable therapy services as provided for in the Temporary Injunction.
Accordingly, the actions of the Defendants violate the Temporary Injunction.
6. Relief Requested. Plaintiffs request that the Court hold a hearing and enter an order
holding Defendants in contempt for violation of the Temporary Injunction. Plaintiffs request that
the Court issue an order that, until mandate is issued by the Texas Supreme Court or the Third
Court of Appeals, any act by Defendants to propose or implement a change in reimbursement
rates for physical, occupational, and speech therapy services without complying with the
Temporary Injunction is void and of no effect.
Respectfully Submitted,
RICfHARDS RODRIGUEZ & SKEITH
816j Congress A^venue, Suite 1200
Austin, Texas ^8701
Telebhone: 51^-476-0005
FapsiWe: 51^-476-1(513
By: [\,
DANIEL R. RICHARDS
State Bar No. 00791520
drichards(a),rrsfirm.com
BENJAMIN H. HATHAWAY
State Bar No. 09224500
bhathaway@jTsfirm.com
CLARK RICHARDS
State Bar No. 90001613
crichards@rrsfirm.com
CHASE C. HAMILTON
State Bar No. 24059881
chamiltQn@jTsfirm.com
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the foregoing document has been delivered to the following counsel
of records on this, the 8 day of June 2016 by electronic notification and/or e-mail:
Esteban Soto
Melissa Holman
Sara Casey
Eugene A. Claybom
Andrew Lutostanski
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General of Texas
P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
Kristofer S. Monson
Assistant Solicitor General
Office of the Attorney General of Texas
P.O. Box 12548, (MC 059)
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
DANIEL R. RICHARDS
Exhibit A to Plaintiffs' Motion for Contempt FILED
Page 1 of 5 16-0405
5/31/2016 4:42:54 PM
tex-10899377
SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
16-0405
No. ___________________
BLAKE A. HAWTHORNE, CLERK
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
DIANA D., AS NEXT OF FRIEND OF KD, A CHILD; KAREN G., AS
NEXT OF FRIEND OF TG AND ZM, CHILDREN; GUADALUPE P., AS
NEXT OF FRIEND OF LP, A CHILD; SALLY L., AS NEXT OF FRIEND
OF CH; DENA D., AS NEXT OF FRIEND OF BD, A CHILD; OCI
ACQUISITIONS, LLC D/B/A CARE OPTIONS FOR KIDS;
CONNECTIONCARE SOLUTIONS, LLC D/B/A CONNECTCARE
THERAPY FOR KIDS; ATLAS PEDIATRIC THERAPY CONSULTANTS,
LLC; and PATHFINDER PEDIATRIC HOME CARE, INC.,
Petitioners,
v.
CHRIS TRAYLOR, EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER OF TEXAS HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES COMMISSION; and THE TEXAS HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES COMMISSION,
Respondents.
On Petition for Review from the
Third Court of Appeals at Austin, Texas
No. 03-15-00657-CV
UNOPPOSED FIRST MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME
TO FILE PETITION FOR REVIEW
Exhibit A to Plaintiffs' Motion for Contempt
Page 2 of 5
Petitioners respectfully file this unopposed first motion for extension of time
to file their petition for review. The current filing deadline is June 6, 2016.
Petitioners request a 30-day extension, for a new deadline of July 6, 2016.
The reasons for this extension are as follows: Our law firm, Alexander
Dubose Jefferson & Townsend LLP, was only recently retained to assist with
petition for review proceedings to this Court. The firm’s counsel require an
extension to master the record, research the law, and develop the arguments
necessary to allow for meaningful review by this Court.
Petitioners’ counsel is also tasked with preparation of Appellee’s Brief in No.
03-15-00728-CV; Westlake Ethylene Pipeline Corporation v. Railroad Commission
of Texas and Eastman Chemical Company, in the Third Court of Appeals at Austin,
due May 31, 2016; preparation of Appellees’ Brief in No. 10-15-00066-CV,
McDonald’s Restaurants of Texas, Inc., et al v. Crisp, et al, in the Tenth Court of
Appeals at Waco, due June 1, 2016; and preparation of a Brief on the Merits in No.
15-0732, University of the Incarnate Word v. Redus, et al, in the Supreme Court of
Texas, due June 1; and preparation of Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits in Loya v.
Loya, No. 15-0763, in the Supreme Court of Texas, due June 27.
This extension is unopposed and is not sought for delay. No party will be
prejudiced if it is granted. No prior extension has been sought for this filing.
Exhibit A to Plaintiffs' Motion for Contempt
Page 3 of 5
As set forth in the Certificate of Conference, Respondents do not oppose the
relief sought in this motion.
Petitioners respectfully request that the Court grant this unopposed first
motion for extension of time to file their petition for review, for a new deadline of
July 6, 2016.
Exhibit A to Plaintiffs' Motion for Contempt
Page 4 of 5
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Wallace B. Jefferson
Wallace B. Jefferson
State Bar No. 00000019
wjefferson@adjtlaw.com
Rachel A. Ekery
State Bar No. 00787424
rekery@adjtlaw.com
Amy Warr
State Bar No. 00795708
awarr@adjtlaw.com
ALEXANDER DUBOSE JEFFERSON &
TOWNSEND LLP
515 Congress Avenue, Suite 2350
Austin, Texas 78701-3562
Telephone: (512) 482-9300
Facsimile: (512) 482-9303
Daniel R. Richards
State Bar No. 00791520
drichards@rrsfirm.com
Benjamin H. Hathaway
State Bar No. 09224500
bhathaway@rrsfirm.com
Clark Richards
State Bar No. 90001613
crichards@rrsfirm.com
Chase C. Hamilton
State Bar No. 24059881
chamilton@rrsfirm.com
RICHARDS RODRIGUEZ & SKEITH LLP
816 Congress Avenue, Ste. 1200
Austin, TX 78701
Telephone: (512) 476-0005
Facsimile: (512) 476-1513
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONERS
Exhibit A to Plaintiffs' Motion for Contempt
Page 5 of 5
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
I certify that on May 31, 2016, I conferred with Kristofer S. Monson, counsel
for Respondents, and he stated that his clients do not oppose the relief sought in this
motion for extension of time.
/s/ Wallace B. Jefferson
Wallace B. Jefferson
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on May 31, 2016, this motion was served via electronic
service through eFile.TXCourts.gov on Respondents through counsel of record,
listed below:
Kristofer S. Monson
Assistant Solicitor General
State Bar No. 24037129
Kristofer.monson@texasattorneygeneral.gov
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
Office of the Attorney General of Texas
P.O. Box 12548, (MC 059)
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
Telephone: (512) 936-1700
Facsimile: (512) 474-2697
/s/ Wallace B. Jefferson
Wallace B. Jefferson
Exhibit B to Plaintiffs' Motion for Contempt FILE COPY
Page 1 of 10
RE: Case No. 16-0405 DATE: 6/1/2016
COA #: 03-15-00657-CV TC#: D-1-GN-15-003263
STYLE: DIANA D. v. TRAYLOR
Today the Supreme Court of Texas granted the motion for
extension of time to file petition for review under TEX. R.
APP. P. 53.7(f) in the above-referenced case. The petition
for review is due to be filed no later than July 6, 2016.
MS. RACHEL ANNE EKERY
ALEXANDER DUBOSE JEFFERSON & TOWNSEND
LLP
515 CONGRESS AVENUE, SUITE 2350
AUSTIN, TX 78701-3562
* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *
Exhibit B to Plaintiffs' Motion for Contempt FILE COPY
Page 2 of 10
RE: Case No. 16-0405 DATE: 6/1/2016
COA #: 03-15-00657-CV TC#: D-1-GN-15-003263
STYLE: DIANA D. v. TRAYLOR
Today the Supreme Court of Texas granted the motion for
extension of time to file petition for review under TEX. R.
APP. P. 53.7(f) in the above-referenced case. The petition
for review is due to be filed no later than July 6, 2016.
MS. VELVA L. PRICE
TRAVIS COUNTY DISTRICT CLERK
P. O. BOX 1748
AUSTIN, TX 78767-1748
* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *
Exhibit B to Plaintiffs' Motion for Contempt FILE COPY
Page 3 of 10
RE: Case No. 16-0405 DATE: 6/1/2016
COA #: 03-15-00657-CV TC#: D-1-GN-15-003263
STYLE: DIANA D. v. TRAYLOR
Today the Supreme Court of Texas granted the motion for
extension of time to file petition for review under TEX. R.
APP. P. 53.7(f) in the above-referenced case. The petition
for review is due to be filed no later than July 6, 2016.
MR. BENJAMIN H. HATHAWAY
RICHARDS RODRIGUEZ & SKEITH
816 CONGRESS AVE., SUITE 1200
AUSTIN, TX 78701
* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *
Exhibit B to Plaintiffs' Motion for Contempt FILE COPY
Page 4 of 10
RE: Case No. 16-0405 DATE: 6/1/2016
COA #: 03-15-00657-CV TC#: D-1-GN-15-003263
STYLE: DIANA D. v. TRAYLOR
Today the Supreme Court of Texas granted the motion for
extension of time to file petition for review under TEX. R.
APP. P. 53.7(f) in the above-referenced case. The petition
for review is due to be filed no later than July 6, 2016.
MR. CLARK RICHARDS
RICHARDS RODRIGUEZ & SKEITH, L.L.P.
816 CONGRESS, SUITE 1200
AUSTIN, TX 78701
* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *
Exhibit B to Plaintiffs' Motion for Contempt FILE COPY
Page 5 of 10
RE: Case No. 16-0405 DATE: 6/1/2016
COA #: 03-15-00657-CV TC#: D-1-GN-15-003263
STYLE: DIANA D. v. TRAYLOR
Today the Supreme Court of Texas granted the motion for
extension of time to file petition for review under TEX. R.
APP. P. 53.7(f) in the above-referenced case. The petition
for review is due to be filed no later than July 6, 2016.
MS. AMY WARR
ALEXANDER DUBOSE JEFFERSON & TOWNSEND
LLP
515 CONGRESS AVE., SUITE 2350
AUSTIN, TX 78701-3562
* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *
Exhibit B to Plaintiffs' Motion for Contempt FILE COPY
Page 6 of 10
RE: Case No. 16-0405 DATE: 6/1/2016
COA #: 03-15-00657-CV TC#: D-1-GN-15-003263
STYLE: DIANA D. v. TRAYLOR
Today the Supreme Court of Texas granted the motion for
extension of time to file petition for review under TEX. R.
APP. P. 53.7(f) in the above-referenced case. The petition
for review is due to be filed no later than July 6, 2016.
MR. JEFFREY D. KYLE
CLERK, THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
209 WEST 14TH STREET, ROOM 101
AUSTIN, TX 78701
* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *
Exhibit B to Plaintiffs' Motion for Contempt FILE COPY
Page 7 of 10
RE: Case No. 16-0405 DATE: 6/1/2016
COA #: 03-15-00657-CV TC#: D-1-GN-15-003263
STYLE: DIANA D. v. TRAYLOR
Today the Supreme Court of Texas granted the motion for
extension of time to file petition for review under TEX. R.
APP. P. 53.7(f) in the above-referenced case. The petition
for review is due to be filed no later than July 6, 2016.
MR. CHASE HAMILTON
RICHARDS RODRIGUEZ & SKEITH
816 CONGRESS AVENUE, SUITE 1200
AUSTIN, TX 78701
* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *
Exhibit B to Plaintiffs' Motion for Contempt FILE COPY
Page 8 of 10
RE: Case No. 16-0405 DATE: 6/1/2016
COA #: 03-15-00657-CV TC#: D-1-GN-15-003263
STYLE: DIANA D. v. TRAYLOR
Today the Supreme Court of Texas granted the motion for
extension of time to file petition for review under TEX. R.
APP. P. 53.7(f) in the above-referenced case. The petition
for review is due to be filed no later than July 6, 2016.
MR. DANIEL R. RICHARDS
RICHARDS RODRIGUEZ & SKEITH, L.L.P.
816 CONGRESS, SUITE 1200
AUSTIN, TX 78701
* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *
Exhibit B to Plaintiffs' Motion for Contempt FILE COPY
Page 9 of 10
RE: Case No. 16-0405 DATE: 6/1/2016
COA #: 03-15-00657-CV TC#: D-1-GN-15-003263
STYLE: DIANA D. v. TRAYLOR
Today the Supreme Court of Texas granted the motion for
extension of time to file petition for review under TEX. R.
APP. P. 53.7(f) in the above-referenced case. The petition
for review is due to be filed no later than July 6, 2016.
MR. KRISTOFER S. MONSON
ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL
P.O. BOX 12548 (MC 059)
AUSTIN, TX 78711-2548
* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *
Exhibit B to Plaintiffs' Motion for Contempt FILE COPY
Page 10 of 10
RE: Case No. 16-0405 DATE: 6/1/2016
COA #: 03-15-00657-CV TC#: D-1-GN-15-003263
STYLE: DIANA D. v. TRAYLOR
Today the Supreme Court of Texas granted the motion for
extension of time to file petition for review under TEX. R.
APP. P. 53.7(f) in the above-referenced case. The petition
for review is due to be filed no later than July 6, 2016.
MR. WALLACE B. JEFFERSON
ALEXANDER DUBOSE JEFFERSON & TOWNSEND
LLP
515 CONGRESS AVENUE, SUITE 2350
AUSTIN, TX 78701-3562
* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *
Exhibit C to Plaintiffs' Motion for Contempt
Page 1 of 2
Texas Health and Human Services Commission
Public Notice
The Texas Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC) announces its intent to submit an
amendment to the Texas State Plan for Medical Assistance under Title XIX of the Social
Security Act. The proposed amendment is effective July 15, 2016.
The purpose of this amendment is to update the fee schedules in the current state plan by
adjusting fees, rates or charges for physical, occupational, and speech therapy for:
Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment Services (EPSDT);
Physicians and Other Practitioners; and
Home Health Services.
These rate actions comply with applicable adjustments in response to direction from the 2016-
2017 General Appropriations Act (House Bill 1, 84th Leg., R.S., art. II, Rider 50, at II-96 to II-
98 (Health and Human Services section, Health and Human Services)). Proposed rate
adjustments were calculated based on an analysis of Medicaid fees paid by other states and
previous Texas Medicaid payments for Medicaid-reimbursable therapy services. Where current
Texas Medicaid rates exceed 150 percent of the median of other states' rates for the same service,
a percentage reduction is applied in most cases. A small percentage reduction is also applied to
Texas Medicaid rates that do not exceed 150 percent of the median of other states' rates for the
same service and in cases where information on other states' rates is not available. All of the
proposed adjustments are being made in accordance with 1 TAC §355.201.
The proposed amendment is estimated to result in an annual savings of $30,683,785 for federal
fiscal year (FFY) 2016, consisting of $17,529,646 in federal funds and $13,154,139 in state
general revenue. For FFY 2017, the estimated annual savings is $129,880,683 consisting of
$72,966,968 in federal funds and $56,913,715 in state general revenue. For FFY 2018, the
estimated annual savings is $135,171,008 consisting of $75,939,072 in federal funds and
$59,231,936 in state general revenue.
To obtain copies of the proposed amendment or to submit or view written comments, interested
parties may contact Dan Huggins, Director of Rate Analysis for Acute Care Services, by mail at
the Rate Analysis Department, Texas Health and Human Services Commission, P.O. Box
149030, H-400, Austin, Texas 78714-9030; by telephone at (512) 707-6071; by facsimile at
(512) 730-7475; or by e-mail at dan.huggins@hhsc.state.tx.us. Copies of the proposal will also
be made available for public review at the local offices of the Texas Department of Aging and
Disability Services.
TRD-201602645
Karen Ray
Exhibit C to Plaintiffs' Motion for Contempt
Page 2 of 2
Chief Counsel
Texas Health and Human Services Commission
Filed: May 25, 2016