Prentis Ray Venzant v. State ( 2016 )

Opinion issued June 30, 2016
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-15-00297-CR
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PRENTIS RAY VENZANT, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 212th District Court
Galveston County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 14-CR-2810
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from a conviction for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
A. Trial Testimony
The complainant C. Heidelberg is a member of the Coast Guard and lives in
Galveston, Texas. She testified that, on July 22, 2014, she parked her 2014 Toyota
Tacoma pickup truck in the parking lot of her apartment complex around 9:00
p.m., and that her truck was still there when she walked her dog about 10:00 p.m.
When she went to leave for work about 6:30 the next morning, July 23rd, the truck
was gone. She had locked the truck, but there was a spare key in the center
console of the truck that she placed there on the 22nd and forgot to remove that
night. She immediately called the police, and an officer came out and took a report
on the theft. Heidelberg testified that she did not give anyone permission to drive
her truck that night or the next day. When appellant was pointed out to her in the
courtroom, she testified that she had never given him authorization to drive her
truck.
About ten days after she reported her truck stolen, Heidelberg got a bill in
the mail from an impound lot for storage of her truck. She called the officer who
had taken her report, who was not aware that the truck had been recovered. He
gave her the name of an Officer J. Blackwell in the Auto Crimes Unit to call, and
he likewise was not aware that Heidelberg’s truck had been recovered. Upon
further investigation, Blackwell told her that he discovered that it was not flagged
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in the system yet as stolen when appellant was pulled over driving it; it just
happened to get impounded the day after it was stolen because appellant had
committed a traffic violation while driving the truck.
It cost Heidelberg $500 to get her truck out of impound. She also testified
that—although she usually does not keep anything in the cab of her truck—she had
returned from a two-week trip on the night of July 22, and had been too tired to
unpack anything. Thus, in her truck cab, she had “clothes, GPS, laptop, games,
pretty much a lot of important things.” While she was able to retrieve her truck
from the impound lot, she never recovered the items that were in her truck. She
did not notice any damage to her truck after she got it back. She lives in a gated
community that cannot be accessed without a code or “clicker,” unless someone
who lives in the complex lets an outsider in.
Heidelberg was shown a dash-cam video of appellant and a passenger
getting out of her truck during a traffic stop and testified that she did not recognize
either of them. She has never given anyone a copy of the key to her truck, and had
not left the truck at a shop or with a valet that would have been able to copy the
key. She has never loaned the truck to anyone, and does not know how it was
stolen.
Sergeant P. Gist with the Clear Lake Shores Police Department testified to
coming into contact with appellant during the early morning hours of July 24,
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2014. He pulled appellant over for running a red light. At that point, Gist was not
aware that the truck appellant was driving was a stolen vehicle. During his
testimony, Gist narrated the dash-cam video of the traffic stop that was introduced
into evidence and played for the jury.
During the stop, Gist approached appellant, explained the traffic infraction
he witnessed, and asked for identification and insurance. After some looking,
appellant finally presented Gist with a tattered paper identification. After appellant
unsuccessfully searched throughout the vehicle for an insurance card, he told Gist
that “it was his aunt’s vehicle and he did didn’t know where the insurance was.”
Gist issued appellant citations for running a red light and failure to maintain proof
of financial responsibility.
Because appellant lacked a valid driver’s license, had no insurance, and had
just committed a traffic violation, Gist told appellant that the vehicle was going to
be impounded, and that appellant’s aunt would have to make arrangements to
retrieve her vehicle. Gist suggested that appellant and his passenger walk up to a
nearby Valero to call someone for a ride. Gist testified that appellant’s demeanor
reflected such a lack of concern that Gist pointed out to appellant that, in some
situations, “individuals are placed into custody for no license, no insurance, and a
traffic violation.” The video of the stop showed another Galveston County
Sheriff’s Department officer arriving and talking to Gist. Gist and the other
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officer, Deputy Smitty, performed a pat-down on appellant and his passenger to
make sure they were not carrying any weapons before he released them. Gist
explained that “Deputy Smitty . . . actually recognized both of these individuals
and conversed with them briefly because he worked in the jail at the Sheriff’s
Department for some time.”
Gist’s last statement drew an objection from appellant’s attorney. The
following exchange was had at the bench:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I’m going to object
because this is -- the officer has just interjected in this trial
information that this defendant had been in jail and that’s how the
deputy recognized him. That’s extremely prejudicial.
THE COURT: He didn’t say he was in jail. He said from the
jail. He could have been a visitor, worked at the jail. He didn’t say in
what capacity he recognized him from the jail. That’s my recollection.
Am I remembering that incorrectly?
[STATE’S COUNSEL]: That sounds accurate.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: There is no way to clarify that
without just making the damage worse. The State well knows this man
has been in jail numerous times. A patrol deputy is not -- at the north
end of the county is certainly not going to be somebody working at
the desk greeting visitors coming in at the jail. The clear implication is
that Prentis Venzant has been in jail before, and it’s improper, it’s
extremely prejudicial, it takes away his right to be tried without, you
know, any background information of prior arrests while we’re at the
guilt stage of the trial. It’s actually a violation of his constitutional
rights to be tried only on the charges that are currently being presented
against him. And I would ask that the jury be instructed to disregard
that last comment. Even at that, I’m not sure it is adequate, and I
would also ask for a mistrial on it.
THE COURT: Okay. Response?
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[STATE’S COUNSEL]: Well, Judge, of course the State did
not intentionally elicit that response from the officer, and as the record
will reflect and we request, that maybe a limiting instruction, a request
to disregard. It was not an actual offense. It is not an extraneous
offense. It was a little vague. If the officer said he recognized him
from a specific offense that he had committed earlier, that would have
been an issue. But the fact that he knows him from working at the jail,
again, as the Court explained earlier on, it could be visitation of a
loved one. For all they know, he could be a deputy. There’s many
different explanations for it. I would request a limiting instruction and
a request by the Court to disregard the vague statement about the jail.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I don't think anything -- anyone
believes Prentis Venzant is a deputy for Galveston County. I think the
inference is going to be very negative. Again, I would ask for the
mistrial.
Failing that, at the very least we would need an instruction to
disregard.
THE COURT: Okay. What would you like me to say in the
instruction to disregard?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: To disregard the last statement by the
sergeant.
THE COURT: Okay. What’s your suggestion?
[STATE’S COUNSEL]: That’s fine with us, Judge.
THE COURT: All right. I’m going to deny your motion for
mistrial, and I will instruct the jury to disregard the last statement.
The court instructed the jury to disregard Gist’s last statement, and then
clarified with appellant’s counsel that appellant was not requesting anything more
specific.
Gist further testified, on cross-examination, that he did not find a purse,
wallet, or any burglar’s tools, “such as a screwdriver or some electronic device.”
Appellant was driving with the truck key, and Gist saw no physical signs—such as
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damage to the steering column or the windows of the truck—to indicate it was
stolen.
Officer J. Blackwell with the Galveston Police Department Auto Crimes
Task Force testified that he investigated Heidelberg’s report of her stolen truck.
Upon investigation, Heidelberg learned that the truck had been impounded
following a traffic stop of defendant-appellant, who was driving the truck. After
Heidelberg told Blackwell that she did not know appellant, and did not give him
permission to drive her pickup truck, Blackwell referred the case to the district
attorney’s office, which brought charges.
Officer A Healy testified to the circumstances surrounding his arrest of
appellant. He had seen an active warrant for appellant’s arrest for unauthorized
use of a motor vehicle on a board in their office that displays pictures, names, dates
of birth and general identifiers for Galveston fugitives. When he saw appellant, on
September 10, 2014, walking down the street, Healy confirmed his warrant
through dispatch and then arrested him.
B. Jury Verdict and Trial Court’s Judgment
The jury found appellant guilty of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.
Punishment was to the court, which heard evidence that appellant has 26 felony
and 24 misdemeanor prior convictions, but that he was raised in a dangerous
neighborhood and had never been offered help with his substance-abuse problems.
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The court found two enhancements to be true and sentenced appellant to nine
years’ confinement.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
Appellant raises two issues on appeal:
(1) “Whether there was sufficient evidence to support Venzant’s conviction for
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle when there was no evidence Venzant
was aware that the owner had not given her consent.”
(2) “Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Venzant’s motion
for a mistrial following a statement by a witness meant to inflame the minds
of the jurors and an impossibility of the removing the damaging impression
from the jurors’ minds.”
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In appellant’s first issue, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that
he knew the complainant had not consented to his use of her truck.
A. Applicable Law
§ 31.07. Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly
operates another’s boat, airplane, or motor-propelled vehicle without
the effective consent of the owner.
(b) An offense under this section is a state jail felony.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.07(a) (West 2011).
“[O]perating a vehicle is unlawful only if the accused is aware that the
operation of the vehicle is without the owner’s consent.” Battise v. State, 264
S.W.3d 222, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008) (citing McQueen v. State,
781 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); Edwards v. State, 178 S.W.3d 139,
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144 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.)). “Testimony that the car owner
did not give consent to operate his vehicle can be sufficient to support a finding
that an appellant knew he did not have consent to operate the vehicle.” Id. (citing
McQueen, 781 S.W.2d at 604–05; Edwards, 178 S.W.3d at 145).
B. Standard of Review
“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any
rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. State, 483 S.W.3d 78 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct.
2781, 2789 (1979); Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)
(holding that Jackson standard is only standard to use when determining
sufficiency of evidence)). The jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts and the
weight to be given to the testimony. Bartlett v. State, 270 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008). The jury, as the sole judge of credibility, may accept one
version of the facts and reject another, and it may reject any part of a witness’s
testimony. See Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); see
also Henderson v. State, 29 S.W.3d 616, 623 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2000, pet. ref’d) (stating jury can choose to disbelieve witness even when witness’s
testimony is uncontradicted).
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We may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence or
substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d
742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We afford almost complete deference to the
jury’s credibility determinations. See Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008). We resolve any inconsistencies in the evidence in favor of the
verdict. Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see also
Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“When the record
supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the
conflicts in favor of the prosecution and therefore defer to that determination.”).
Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt, and
circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Sorrells v. State,
343 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at
778). “Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the
appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is
sufficient to support the conviction.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007).
C. Analysis
Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he “was
aware that the owner did not consent to his use of the vehicle” and that there “was
no circumstantial evidence suggesting appellant knew that it was stolen.” He
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contends that the only evidence the State presented was that Heidelberg did not
give anyone permission to use her vehicle. According to appellant, under this
Court’s prior cases, that evidence is not enough to sufficiently demonstrate his
culpability:
While other Texas appellate courts have held that “[t]estimony
that a vehicle owner did not give consent to operate the vehicle can be
sufficient to support a finding that the accused knew he did not have
consent to operate the vehicle—Rodriguez v. State, No. 11-12-00346-
CR (Tex. App.—Eastland Feb. 2, 2015, no pet.) (not designated for
publication) (emphasis added)—this Court has not. Rather, this Court
has held that “testimony that the car owner did not give anyone
consent to use the vehicle, alone, without any indicia that the
defendant was aware that the owner had not consented, was legally
insufficient evidence of intent.” Edwards [v. State], 178 S.W.3d.
[139,] 145 [(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.)] (citing
Herbert [v. State] 827 S.W.2d 507, [508–09 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 1992, no pet.)]. Venzant would argue that in his case there
were no indicia that he was aware that the owner had not consented,
therefore Heidelberg’s testimony alone is insufficient to support his
conviction.
We do not agree with appellant’s characterization of the law or the record in
this case. Appellant cites Edwards and Herbert for the proposition that a vehicle
owner’s testimony that he or she did not give another person permission to drive
their vehicle is insufficient to support a conviction for unauthorized use of a motor
vehicle. In Edwards, however, we recognized that Herbert was inconsistent with
an earlier Court of Criminal Appeals’ case rejecting this view:
In McQueen [v. State, 781 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)], the
Court of Criminal Appeals held that testimony that the car owner did
not give anyone consent to operate his vehicle was sufficient to
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support a finding that the defendant knew he did not have consent to
operate the vehicle. Id. at 604–05. Without noting McQueen, this
court, in a case decided three years later, held that testimony that the
car owner did not give anyone consent to use the vehicle, alone,
without any indicia that the defendant was aware that the owner had
not consented, was legally insufficient evidence of intent. See Herbert
v. State, 827 S.W.2d 507, 508–09 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
1992, no pet.).
Edwards, 178 S.W.3d at 145. Since Herbert was decided, we have expressly
recognized McQueen’s holding that “[t]estimony that the car owner did not give
consent to operate his vehicle can be sufficient to support a finding that an
appellant knew he did not have consent to operate the vehicle.” Battise v. State,
264 S.W.3d 222, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d) (citing
McQueen, 781 S.W.2d at 604–05). Circumstantial evidence can be used to prove a
defendant was aware he or she lacked a vehicle owner’s consent to operate a motor
vehicle. E.g., Coleman v. State, 802 S.W.2d 394, 395 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990,
no pet.).
In White v. State, we also distinguished Herbert by noting that the defendant
in Herbert put on “uncontradicted evidence establishing a defense.” 844 S.W.2d
929, 932 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. ref’d). We cited McQueen’s
again for the proposition that that testimony by the vehicle owner that he or she did
not give the defendant permission to operate the vehicle was sufficient evidence
that the defendant knew he lacked the owner’s consent. Id.
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Appellant emphasizes that there was nothing in the outward appearance of
the truck—such as a broken window or steering column—to indicate it had been
stolen. But we have rejected the argument that such evidence negates a finding
that the defendant operated a vehicle knowing he lacked the consent of the
vehicle’s owner. White, 844 S.W.2d at 932 (“That nothing about the car’s steering
column, windows, or outward appearance in general indicated that it was stolen is
not evidence that appellant did not operate the car knowing that he did not have the
effective consent of the owner.”).
Here, not only was there testimony from the owner of the truck that she had
not given appellant (who she did not know) permission to drive the truck, but
appellant also lied to Officer Gist, stating that his aunt owned the truck.
Appellant’s lie, coupled with Heidelberg’s testimony that she did not know
appellant or give him permission to drive her truck, is sufficient circumstantial
evidence to support the jury’s finding that appellant knew he lacked the owner’s
consent. Cf. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (false
statements to cover up crime can indicate consciousness of guilt and is admissible
to prove guilt).
We overrule appellant’s first issue.
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MISTRIAL
In his second issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion for a mistrial after Gist made a statement to the jury that another officer
recognized appellant and his passenger from working at the jail.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“A mistrial is required only when the impropriety is ‘clearly prejudicial to
the defendant and is of such character as to suggest the impossibility of
withdrawing the impression produced on the minds of the jurors.’” Ladd v. State, 3
S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). We review the trial court’s refusal to
grant a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77
(Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (citing Simpson v. State, 119 S.W.3d 262, 272 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2003)).
B. Analysis
In response to a question by State’s counsel asking him to describe what was
going on at one point in a dash-cam video, Gist explained that he and Deputy
Smitty were patting down appellant and his passenger for weapons before he let
them go. Gist went on to volunteer that Smitty “actually recognized both of these
individuals and conversed with them briefly because he worked in the jail at the
Sheriff’s Department for some time.” Although the trial court instructed the jury
to disregard Gist’s statement, appellant argues that the harm was not curable
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because “the State’s witness stated clearly that [appellant] and his companion had
been to jail.” According to appellant, “[a]bsent Sergeant Gist’s statement, it is
unlikely appellant would have been convicted.” Appellant concedes that the
statement was not elicited by the State, but argues that it was not relevant to Gist’s
testimony, so it “can only be understood as an attempt calculated to inflame the
minds of the jurors against” appellant.
It has long been the rule in Texas that a “witness’s inadvertent reference to
an extraneous offense is generally cured by a prompt instruction to disregard.”
E.g., Young v. State, 283 S.W.3d 854, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Kipp v. State,
876 S.W.2d 330, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). “However, an instruction to
disregard will not cure the error of improperly inserted evidence of an extraneous
offense when that evidence establishes exactly what the State is trying to prove.”
Stine v. State, 300 S.W.3d 52, 59 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, pet. dism’d). A
mistrial should be granted only in cases where the “reference was clearly
calculated to inflame the minds of the jury or was of such damning character as to
suggest it would be impossible to remove the harmful impression from the jurors'
minds.” Young, 283 S.W.3d at 878.
We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
appellant’s motion for a mistrial. This situation is similar to the one presented in
Rojas v. State, 986 S.W.2d 241, 250 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). In Rojas, a Texas
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Ranger responded to a question about whether he believed the version of events
given by appellant in a confession by stating, “I believe she wanted him to move
out. She knew because of his past anger, his past violence that that was the only
way—.” Id. This drew an objection and motion for mistrial, “because the
comment was not responsive to the question, beyond any evidence presented at
trial, prejudicial and inflammatory, and a violation of appellant’s due process
rights.” Id. The trial court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to
disregard, but denied appellant’s motion for a mistrial. The Court of Criminal
Appeals held that the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion was not an abuse of
discretion:
In the instant case, [the trooper’s] response reflects a
misunderstanding of the question on the part of the witness which was
not anticipated by the State. Also, [his] comment was not a concrete
reference to an extraneous offense, but merely vague speculation. Due
to defense counsel’s timely objection, [he] was prevented from
elaborating on the mentioned extraneous conduct. Moreover, the trial
judge’s prompt sustaining of counsel’s objection conveyed the
appropriate message that the witness’s comment was not supported by
the evidence and was not to be considered. Therefore, the trial judge’s
instruction to disregard cured any error and the judge did not abuse his
discretion in overruling appellant's motion for mistrial.
Id. Here, similarly, Gist’s comment about Smitty knowing appellant and his
passenger from working at the jail was not purposefully elicited or anticipated by
the State. Also, as in Rojas, it was not “a concrete reference to an extraneous
offense.” Cf. Phillips v. State, 130 S.W.3d 343, 348 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
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Dist.] 2004) (holding witness’s statement that her sister “confessed to something”
was not reference to specific extraneous offense and, in any event, any prejudicial
effect was cured by instruction to disregard) aff’d 193 S.W.3d 904 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006). Finally, as in Rojas, the trial court here promptly sustained
appellant’s objection and instructed the jury to disregard.
Given that even references to a defendant committing a specific extraneous
offense have been deemed curable with an instruction to disregard, Gist’s
statement here that did not refer to a specific extraneous offense was not “so
clearly calculated to inflame the minds of the jury or . . . of such damning character
as to suggest it would be impossible to remove the harmful impression from the
jury’s mind.” Kemp v. State, 846 S.W.2d 289, 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); see,
e.g., Stine, 300 S.W.3d at 59 (trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
motion for mistrial in burglary of a habitation trial when witness stated that
appellant stole items from Ace Hardware when they were shopping; trial court’s
sustaining objection and instructing jury to disregard was curative). “We generally
presume the jury follows the trial court’s instructions” to disregard. Lusk v. State,
82 S.W.3d 57, 61 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2002, pet. ref’d) (citing Waldo v. State,
746 S.W.2d 750, 752–53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)). Appellant has not established
otherwise here.
We overrule appellant’s second point of error.
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CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Sherry Radack
Chief Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Jennings and Lloyd.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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