Antonio Arriaga and Inez Lara Rosales v. Obdulia Martinez Arriaga, Antonio Martinez Arriaga Jr., and Reyna Luisa Martinez Arriaga ( 2018 )

NUMBER 13-16-00610-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
ANTONIO ARRIAGA AND
INEZ LARA ROSALES, Appellants,
v.
OBDULIA MARTINEZ ARRIAGA,
ANTONIO MARTINEZ ARRIAGA JR.,
AND REYNA LUISA MARTINEZ ARRIAGA, Appellees.
On appeal from the 197th District Court
of Willacy County, Texas.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Contreras and Hinojosa
Dissenting/Concurring Memorandum Opinion by Justice Contreras
I agree with the majority that the Rule 11 agreement signed by counsel for appellant
Inez Lara Rosales constituted an agreed judgment, thereby effectively dismissing her
claims. However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the statements made by
appellant Antonio Arriaga in open court on August 24, 2016 constituted an unequivocal
and unambiguous abandonment of his claims in trial court cause number 2015-CV-0316-
A. Therefore, I respectfully dissent in part and concur in part.
As the majority correctly notes, we must determine Arriaga’s intent from the
language he used, examining the surrounding circumstances, including the state of the
pleadings, the allegations made, and the attitude of the parties with respect to the issue.
See In re J.M., 352 S.W.3d 824, 826 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.); Laredo Med.
Grp. v. Jaimes, 227 S.W.3d 170, 174 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, pet. denied). At the
August 24, 2016 hearing, the trial court called cause number cause number 2015-CV-
0316-A, and counsel for appellees then expressed his understanding that Arriaga would
be “dismissing any claim he has in that case” (emphasis added) but did not “know the
extent of that dismissal.” There was no discussion as to what counsel meant by “that
case”; but, given the circumstances, it would be entirely reasonable to interpret that phrase
as referring to the other case involving the same parties and subject matter (i.e., trial court
cause number 2014-CV-0100-A)—even if Arriaga’s claims in that other case were
technically no longer pending.
Arriaga then explained to the court that “I am no longer interested in pursuing this
case” (emphasis added). Arriaga was proceeding without representation by counsel, and
his statement appears in the record only as translated from Spanish to English by
Rosales’s counsel. Arriaga did not testify under oath, he provided no further explanation
regarding his intentions, and his statement was not clarified through questions posed by
the other parties or by the trial court. There was no discussion of the numerous, detailed
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factual and legal allegations made by Arriaga against appellees in his first amended
petition, nor was there a distinction made between the two cause numbers. The trial court
explicitly set a future hearing to resolve “both” cases, yet in the interim, issued the order
dismissing Arriaga’s claims with prejudice.
It is also noteworthy that, immediately after the order of dismissal was entered,
Arriaga filed a verified motion to set the dismissal aside. In that motion, he averred that
there was a misunderstanding, distinguished his actions regarding the prior lawsuit, and
affirmatively stated that he was “still keeping his causes of action viable” regarding
trespass to try title and the wrongful taking of “personalty.” Arriaga requested that the
court grant an evidentiary hearing regarding these allegations. He continued to assert his
request for affirmative relief at the subsequent hearing on October 19, 2016.
Reading Arriaga’s statement in context with the remainder of the proceedings—in
conjunction with the fact that Arriaga was not represented by counsel, put under oath, or
provided with a translator for the duration of the hearing—I would conclude that his
statement did not constitute an affirmative stipulation to dismiss his claims in cause
number 2015-CV-0316-A with prejudice. See In re C.C.J., 244 S.W.3d 911, 921 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). Although cause number 2015-CV-0316-A was the only case
called by the trial court at the August 24, 2016 hearing, Arriaga’s translated reference to
“this case” may have meant only trial court cause number 2014-CV-0100-A, especially
given the fact that it was directly preceded by appellees’ counsel’s reference to “that case.”
I would conclude that Arriaga’s statement was unclear and ambiguous and,
therefore, should have been disregarded by the trial court. In re C.C.J., 244 S.W.3d at
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921; Laredo Med. Grp., 227 S.W.3d at 174. For these reasons, I would sustain appellants’
first issue and reverse the trial court’s judgment dismissing Arriaga’s claims.
DORI CONTRERAS
Justice
Delivered and filed the 30th
day of November, 2018.
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