In the Matter of the Guardianship of Sue Ann Acott, Adult, Bobby Ray Long v. Dan L. Strahl, Steven M. Elsbury, and Gary McDonald (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Feb 15 2016, 9:07 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Bobby Ray Long Dan L. Strahl
Indianapolis, Indiana Steven M. Elsbury
Greenfield, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Guardianship of February 15, 2016
Sue Ann Scott, Adult, Court of Appeals Case No.
30A01-1506-GU-658
Bobby Ray Long,
Appeal from the
Appellant-Non-Party, Hancock Circuit Court
v. The Honorable
Richard D. Culver, Judge
Dan L. Strahl, Steven M. Trial Court Cause No.
Elsbury, and Gary McDonald, 30C01-1403-GU-17
Appellees-Petitioners.
Kirsch, Judge.
[1] Bobby Ray Long (“Long”) appeals the trial court’s order overruling his
objection to the guardianship of Sue Ann Scott (“Scott”), contending that the
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trial court abused its discretion when it did so. Finding that Long lacks
standing to bring this appeal, we dismiss.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On March 13, 2014, Gary McDonald (“McDonald”) was appointed as
guardian of his mother, Scott. Scott consented to the appointment of
McDonald as her guardian, as did her four children, McDonald, Phillip
McDonald, David McDonald, and Sherrie Sauer (“Sauer”). On June 23, 2014,
Long filed with the trial court a motion to remove guardian. On July 10, 2014,
Sauer, who is Scott’s adult daughter, filed with the trial court a motion to
remove guardian and a request for consolidation of cases to have her motion
consolidated with Long’s motion. The trial court set a hearing on the two
motions, but before the hearing, Long and Sauer moved to withdraw their
motions. On April 10, 2015, the trial court received a letter from Long in which
he requested that McDonald be removed as guardian of Scott. After receiving
the letter, the trial court set a hearing for May 18, 2015 on Long’s objections to
guardianship. After the hearing, the trial court issued an order finding “that . . .
Long is the former boyfriend of . . . Sauer, who apparently is no longer
considered a part of the family.” Appellees’ App. at 9. The trial court ordered
that “the objections to the guardianship filed by . . . Long be, and the same
hereby are, overruled.” Id. Long now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision
[3] Initially, we note that our Supreme Court has defined standing as “‘having
sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial
resolution of that controversy.’” Old Nat’l Bancorp v. Hanover Coll., 15 N.E.3d
574, 575-76 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Ind. Civil Rights Comm’n v. Indianapolis
Newspapers, Inc., 716 N.E.2d 943, 945 (Ind. 1999)). The point of the standing
requirement is to ensure that the party before the court has a substantive right to
enforce the claim that is being made in the litigation. Simon v. Simon, 957
N.E.2d 980, 987 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Standing focuses generally upon the
question of whether the complaining party is the proper person to invoke the
court’s power. Id. “‘However, more fundamentally, standing is a restraint
upon this Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction in that we cannot proceed where there
is no demonstrable injury to the complainant before us.’” Id. (quoting Pence v. State,
652 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. 1995)) (emphasis in original).
[4] Appeals may be taken by either party from all final judgments in circuit courts
and superior courts. Ind. Code § 34-56-1-1. In order to prosecute an appeal,
“the person considering [him]self aggrieved must have first been a party before
the trial court.” Simon, 957 N.E.2d at 988-89. Indiana Appellate Rule 17(A)
provides in pertinent part that a party of record in the trial court shall be a party
on appeal. It has been held by this court that the “converse is also true: a
person who is not a party of record in the trial court cannot become a party for
the first time on appeal.” Simon, 957 N.E.2d at 989 (citing Treacy v. State, 953
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N.E.2d 634, 635-36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied). Thus, Appellate Rule
17 limits the class of parties on appeal to parties of record in the trial court. Id.[5] In the present case, Long was not a party of record in the trial court during the
guardianship proceedings. Long is not related by blood or marriage to Scott,
the protected person who is the subject of the guardianship. The trial court
originally set a hearing in response to Long’s June 23, 2014 motion for removal
of the guardian because a motion had also been filed by Sauer, a child of Scott.
However, no other family member joined Long in his letter sent in April 2015
that again requested the removal of the guardian. At no time did Long ever
petition the trial court to intervene in the guardianship action. Further, Long is
not an aggrieved party in this case. “For a person to be ‘aggrieved’ under the
statute, the probate court’s judgment must be adverse to the person’s legal
interests.” In re Estate of Eguia, 917 N.E.2d 166, 169 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). A
person’s subjective belief that he or she is aggrieved does not control, because
such interpretation would “provide no discernable limit to who could challenge
a probate court’s decision.” Id. Here, while Long may well have a personal
interest, he has no legal interest in Scott, and therefore, the trial court’s order
overruling his objection to the guardianship did not cause any adversity to him.
We, therefore, conclude that Long lacks standing to pursue an appeal of the
trial court’s judgment, and we dismiss his appeal.
[6] Dismissed.
[7] Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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