J.L.D., O/B/O M.E.D. v. T.A.J. ( 2016 )

J-S54028-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
J.L.D., O/B/O, M.E.D. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
T.A.J.
Appellant No. 30 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Order December 2, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County
Civil Division at No(s): No. 2015-1385-Civil
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OTT, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JULY 26, 2016
T.A.J.1 appeals from the order entered December 2, 2015, in the Court
of Common Pleas of Armstrong County, granting J.L.D.’s request, on behalf
of her minor daughter M.E.D., for a final protection order pursuant to the
Protection From Abuse (“PFA”) Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 6101 et. seq. On appeal,
T.A.J. argues that the PFA order was not supported by substantial evidence.
Based on the following, we affirm.
The trial court aptly detailed the facts underlying this appeal, which we
adopt as dispositive. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/3/2016, at 1-2; N.T.,
____________________________________________
1
Although the record and the trial court’s opinion identify the parties by
their full names, because both the defendant and complainant are minors,
“we will identify them in both the caption and in this memorandum by their
initials to preserve their privacy.” E.W. v. T.S., 916 A.2d 1197, 1199 n.1
(Pa. Super. 2007).
J-S54028-16
12/2/2015, at 25-27. We summarize the procedural history of the case as
follows. On October 2, 2015, J.L.D. filed a PFA petition on behalf of M.E.D.
against T.A.J. On the same day, a Temporary PFA was granted by the trial
court. On October 16, 2015 the trial court appointed a guardian ad litem to
represent T.A.J. On December 2, 2015, a hearing was held at which time
the trial court entered the final PFA at issue. This timely appeal followed.2
T.A.J.’s sole argument on appeal asserts the trial court abused its
discretion in determining that T.A.J. “knowingly” abused M.E.D. in
accordance with 23 Pa.C.S. § 6102(a)(5). T.A.J.’s Brief at 8-9.
Our standard of review is well settled.
In reviewing the validity of a PFA order, we must determine
whether the evidence, in the light most favorable to petitioner
and granting her the benefit of all reasonable inferences, was
sufficient to sustain the trial court’s determination that abuse
was shown by a preponderance of the evidence. Moreover, we
must defer to the lower court’s determinations of the credibility
of witnesses at the hearing.
R.G. v. T.D., 672 A.2d 341, 342 (Pa. Super. 1996) (internal citations
omitted). Moreover,
[a] PFA order may be issued “to bring about a cessation of abuse
of the plaintiff….” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6108. “Abuse,” as defined by the
____________________________________________
2
On January 5, 2016, the trial court ordered T.A.J. to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
T.A.J. complied with the trial court’s directive, and filed a concise statement
on January 26, 2015.
-2-
J-S54028-16
statute in relevant part, is “the occurance of one or more of the
following acts between … intimate partners:
(5) Knowingly engaging in a course of conduct or
repeatedly commiting acts toward another person,
including following the person, without proper authority,
under circumstances which place the person in reasonable
fear of bodily injury….”
23 Pa.C.S. § 6102(a)(5).
Id.
Our review of the record confirms that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding T.A.J. violated 23 Pa.C.S. § 6102(a)(5). See Trial
Court Opinion, 2/3/2016 at 1-3 (finding: (1) M.E.D. and T.A.J. entered a
tumultuous relationship on April 2, 2015, which led to many fights that
frightened M.E.D.; (2) T.A.J. continuously went to and remained outside
M.E.D.’s house after their fights, despite objections from both M.E.D. and
her brothers; and (3) the abuse culminated on September 29, 2015, when
M.E.D. told T.A.J. about a male friend, and T.A.J. responded by (a)
threatening to kill M.E.D., her unborn baby, her male friend, and her cat; (b)
threatening to make her life “a living hell;” and (c) calling M.E.D. up to 20
times that day with no answer, causing M.E.D. to become frightened and
intimidated). Furthermore, to the extent T.A.J. denied the allegations, the
trial court specifically found his testimony incredible. N.T., 12/2/2015 at 27.
In reviewing a PFA order, “[w]e must defer to the credibility determinations
of the trial court.” Custer v. Cochran, 933 A.2d 1050, 1058 (Pa. Super.
-3-
J-S54028-16
2007) (en banc) (citation omitted). Therefore, we adopt the discussion of
the trial court as dispositive of this appeal.
Order affirmed.3
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/26/2016
____________________________________________
3
In the event of further proceedings, the parties are directed to attach the
trial court’s February 3, 2016, opinion to this memorandum.
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Circulated 07/26/2016 12:37
12:32 PM
IN THE COURT Ob' COMMON J?LEAS OF ARMSTRONG COUNTY', PENNSYLVANIA
.... _L. iall,_ 0/B/O,
~E.-..., Plaintiff
vs. No, 2015 - 1385 - CIVIL
Pa.R.A.P. 1925 OPINION
VALASEI< , l? • J,
This is an appeal from a final protection from abuse
{"PFA") order entered by this Court against Defendant on December 2,
2015.
Defendant has filed his statement of issues presented· on
appeal. The issues are: (1) that the trial court's decision to issue
the permanent PFA order was in error in that the same was not
supported by the evidence, and (2) that the trial court's decision to
issue the permanent PFA order was in error in that defendant's actions
did not constitute abuse as defined under 23 Pa.C.S,A. § 6102(a).
The Court made certain findings on the record at the end of
the PFA hearing in support of its decision to issue a final PFA. The
court wishes to ~upplement its on-the-record findings with the
following facts. Defendant, age 151 and the victim, age 14, were
boyfriend and girlfriend. The victim is pregnant with Defendant's
child, which is due on March 19, 2016.
Defendant and the victim began going t?gether on Apcil 2,
2015. The couple fought all the timo. Defendant would come to the
victim's house and constantly refuse to leave. Defendant called the
victim demeaning names such as "slutn and "whore.n Defendant pulled
the victim's hair. When Defendant and the victim would fight,
Defendant would run through the victim's house and flip over a kitchen
chair. 'fhis frightened the victim. Once, Defendant slammed the
victim's door, breaking it.
Defendant would constantly go by the victim's house after a
fight. The victim would ask her brothers to tell Defendant to leave.
However, Defendant refused to leave. He would just sit outside the
victim's house and sometimes yell. The victim told Defendant she
wanted some time alone and that she needed to think, but he continued
driving past her house anyway.
on September 29, 2015, the victim had a conversation with a
male friend named - The victim told Defendant about-·
Defendant became enraged. He threatened to kill the victim and her
baby if th~ victim broke up with Defendant. Defendant also said he
would kill - or anyone else that the victim was with. Defendant
told the victim he would make her life "a living hell." In addition,
Defendant told the victim that he would kill her cat.
Even though the victim did not want to speak to Defendant,
he continued to call the victim. Defendant filled up the victim's
voice mail with messages. The victim blocked Defendant's calls, but
he used other people's phones to try to avoid being blocked.
Defendant called the victim about 20 times that day. He just kept
calling. The victim is afraid of him.
The above record demonstrates that for a number of months,
Defendant intimidated and dominated the victim through anger, name-
calling, refusing to leave her house and acts of violence. This
culminated in a phone call on September 29, 2015, during which
Defendant threatened to kill the victim, her baby and the victim's
friend,-.
The record provides more than adeq~ate support that
Defendant violated 23 Pa.C,S.A. § 6102(a) (5) by "(k)knowingly engaging
in a course of conduct or repeatedly committing acts toward another
person, including following the person, without proper authority,
under circumstances which place the person in reasonable fear of
bodily injury.n Defendant is a very angry young man who is prone to
acts of violence. His course of conduct placed the victim in
reasonable fear of bodily injury. The Court's issuance of a final PFA
order against Defendant was clearly supported by the evidence and
Defendant's actions undeniably fell within the definition of abuse.
For all of these reasons, this Court recommends affirrnance,
3